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it Abstract 
This  work  discusses  the  role  of  the  economic  elites  of  Russia  and  Ukraine  in  the 
development  of  relations  between  the  two  countries  in  the  period  between  1994-1998.  A 
"Pragmatist  approach"  to  bilateral  relations,  that  emerged  in  Kyiv  and  in  Moscow  in  the 
mid-1990s,  and  the  doctrine  of  CIS  integration  are  identified  as  the  ideological 
underpinnings  for  the  participation  of  the  economic  elites  in  the  process  of  foreign  policy- 
making. 
According  to  these  approaches,  economic  elites  in  Russia  and  Ukraine  share  similar 
economic  interests  derived  from  the  necessity  to  restore  a  post-Soviet  common  economic 
space.  Convergent  interests  of  the  economic  elites  are  assumed  to  be  powerful  incentives 
to  increase  bilateral  co-operation  and  eventually  foster  economic  and  political  reintegration 
between  the  two  countries. 
In  an  analysis  based  on  the  study  of  domestic  sources  of  foreign  policy,  the  author  contests 
these  approaches.  This  work  argues  that,  contrary  to  expectations,  the  consolidation  of 
nation-based  economic  elites  led  to  the  emergence  of  conflicting  rather  than  convergent 
interests.  The  redistribution  of  national  wealth,  following  the  demise  of  the  Soviet  structure 
of  state-ownership,  sparked  a  struggle  between  domestic  and  economic  elites  for  the  control 
of  economic  resources.  The  penetration  of  external  economic  actors  was  viewed,  in  this 
perspective,  as  a  factor  that  might  upset  the  delicate  balance  of  power  between  domestic 
institutions  and  economic  agents.  A  nationalist  vocabulary,  resulting  from  a  century-long 
struggle  for  independence,  was  used  in  Ukraine  to  express  a  protectionist  mood  against 
Russian  competitors. 
This  research  contributes  to  the  debate  on  co-operation  between  states  and  the  role  that 
domestic  factors  play  in  encouraging  or  hindering  such  a  process.  In  particular,  this  study 
supports  the  argument  that  recently  established  independent  states  are  less  prone  to  join  co- 
operation  schemes,  especially  when  a  process  of  redistribution  of  national  resources  follows 
..  ý  _- 
,t 
iii the  demise  of  the  previous  regime.  The  economic  elites  may  be  identified  in  this  process  as 
active  participants  or  even  promoters  of  nationalist  movements. 
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X111 INTRODUCTION 
When  Leonid  Kuchma  became  President  of  Ukraine  in  July  1994,  expectations  for  a  radical 
change  in  bilateral  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  rose  markedly.  In  striking 
contrast  to  the  Kravchuk  presidency,  which  had  conducted  the  process  of  nation-building 
on  the  basis  of  an  aggressive  rhetoric  of  anti-Russian  sentiments,  the  Russian  establishment 
saw  in  Kuchma  a  leader  who  would  promote  the  reconciliation,  if  not  the  reunification,  of 
the  two  brotherly  countries. 
The  promised  change  in  foreign  policy  strategy  was  strictly  related  to  the  different 
background  that  Kravchuk  and  Kuchma  enjoyed,  and  the  different  constituencies  and  sets 
of  interests  that  they  represented.  Leonid  Kravchuk  had  presided  over  a  coalition  of 
nomenklatura  and  nationalist  forces,  whose  differing  positions  towards  economic  and 
political  reforms,  coupled  with  a  primary  concern  to  preserve  the  Soviet-era  networks  of 
power  within  an  independent  Ukraine,  led  to  stagnation.  The  political  inactivity  of  the 
Kravchuk  administration  and  the  reluctance  of  its  political  allies  to  initiate  any 
transformation  of  the  centralised  economic  structure  were  finally  responsible  for  the 
economic  disaster  that  characterised  the  first  years  of  independence. 
In  1991,  Kravchuk  had  been  elected  President  with  a  large  percentage  of  votes  from  the 
eastern  and  the  southern  regions  of  the  country,  but  also  in  the  conservative  countryside 
outside  the  western  territories,  where  he  was  rewarded  for  the  role  he  and  the  "national 
communists"  had  played  in  achieving  independence.  '  In  his  electoral  campaign,  Kravchuk 
had  called  for  "statehood,  democracy,  prosperity,  spirituality  and  trust",  stressing  the 
economic  benefits  that  would  accrue  to  the  Ukrainians  from  independence?  In  the 
immediate  post-Soviet  years,  Kravchuk  struggled  to  define  Ukrainian  identity  in  opposition 
1  S.  Birch  (1995)  "The  Ukrainian  Parliamentary  And  Presidential  Elections  of  1994"  Electoral  Studies. 
March,  Vol.  14,  No.  1,  pp.  93-99 
2  A.  Wilson  (1997),  "Ukraine:  Two  Presidents  and  their  Power",  in  Postcommunist  Presidents,  edited  by  R. 
Taras,  (Cambridge:  CUP),  pp.  67-105 to  Russia,  and  sought  a  new  source  of  legitimacy  in  anti-Russian  rhetoric  to  counter  his 
rapidly  declining  popularity. 
During  the  1994  presidential  elections,  Kravchuk  allied  himself  with  the  Ukrainian 
nationalists,  aiming  to  win  the  vote  in  the  western  regions  of  the  country.  Annexation  of 
these  territories  into  Soviet  Ukraine  only  at  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War  had  produced 
strong  national  sentiments.  To  accommodate  a  western  electorate,  Leonid  Kravchuk's 
campaign  was  fought  on  themes  such  as  statehood,  respect  for  the  Ukrainian  language  and 
culture,  independent  foreign  policy  and  close  relations  with  Central-Eastern  and  Western 
Europe.  3 
Kravchuk's  main  opponent,  Leonid  Kuchma  campaigned,  instead,  on  a  ticket  of  a  closer 
relationship  with  Moscow,  while  stressing  Ukraine's  Eurasian  identity.  Kuchma,  who  had 
been  director  of  the  largest  missile  plant  in  Ukraine,  Prime  Minister  in  charge  of  economic 
reforms  under  Kravchuk,  and  finally,  President  of  the  Union  of  Industrialists,  promised  to 
place  the  solution  of  the  Ukrainian  economic  crisis  at  the  top  of  his  political  agenda. 
Improving  relations  with  Russia,  as  Ukraine's  main  trading  partner,  was  an  integral  part  of 
a  strategy  that,  Kuchma  assured,  would  be  founded  on  a  concept  of  healthy  pragmatism. 
The  electoral  results  showed  that  voting  had  mainly  been  shaped  by  the  two  candidates' 
views  on  the  national  issue.  More  that  three-quarters  of  Ukrainian-speakers  voted  for 
Kravchuck,  while  a  similar  percentage  of  Russian-speakers'  cast  their  votes  for  Kuchma. 
In  the  second  round,  Kuchma  won  every  region  in  eastern  and  southern  Ukraine,  and  the 
Left-Bank  of  the  river  Dnieper.  Kravchuk  earned  the  majority  of  votes  in  western  Ukraine 
and  in  the  Right-Bank  regions.  4  This  significant  shift  of  preferences  seemed  to  herald  a 
momentous  turn  also  in  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine,  and  many  external  observers 
thought  that  Ukraine  would  soon  return  to  a  Russian  sphere  of  political  influence. 
3  Ibid. 
4  Ibid. 
2 Despite  all  expectations,  however,  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  did  not  evolve 
towards  increased  co-operation  or  economic  and  political  reintegration.  Kuchma's 
promises  of  a  rapprochement  with  Russia  were  kept  with  the  signature  of  the  1997 
Friendship  Agreement,  which  set  relations  between  the  two  countries  on  a  footing  of 
equality.  But  the  consolidation  of  Russia  and  Ukraine  as  two  clearly  separate  political  and 
economic  entities  and  the  emergence  of  distinctive  national  elites  clearly  hindered 
prospects  of  reintegration.  5 
In  particular,  the  redistribution  of  economic  resources,  which  followed  the  disintegration  of 
the  Soviet  economy,  sparked  an  acrimonious  competition  among  domestic  and  foreign 
economic  elites  to  gain  control  over  national  wealth.  The  development  of  divergent  rather 
than  convergent  interests  among  economic  elites  in  Russia  and  in  Ukraine  was  an  important 
factor  in  fostering  a  process  of  increasing  diversification  between  the  two  countries. 
In  this  work  I  look  at  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  in  the  years  1994-98,  namely 
the  period  between  the  first  election  of  Leonid  Kuchma  and  the  August  economic  crash  in 
Russia,  from  the  specific  perspective  of  the  foreign  policy  interests  formulated  by  the 
economic  elites  of  both  countries. 
The  assumption  is  that,  according  to  the  pragmatist  approach  to  Russian-Ukrainian  relations 
and  the  doctrine  of  CIS  integration  (see  below),  the  emergence  of  economic  elites  as 
powerful  political  actors  should  have  represented  the  essential  precondition  to  initiate  a 
process  of  reintegration.  The  presumption  of  existing  economic  interrelations  between  the 
two  countries,  and  consequential  convergent  interests  among  business  elites  in  Russia  and 
S  In  this  work  I  understand  elites  as  small  and  cohesive  groups  of  strategic  actors,  who  control  administrative 
and  economic  resources  and  through  them  exercise  substantial  and  regular  influence  on  a  country.  I 
distinguish  between  a  political  and  an  economic  elite,  the  first  mainly  in  control  of  political  resources 
(administration  and  policy-making),  the  second  mainly  in  charge  of  economic  resources  (industrial  and 
financial  assets,  media  outlets).  Political  and  economic  elites  may  overlap;  they  may  also  be  internally 
fragmented  along  fault  lines  determined  by  their  interests.  As  elite  groups  react  to  the  fluidity  of  the  political 
and  economic  environment,  coalitions  among  different  subgroups  emerge  and  break  up  when  their  interests 
change.  Powerful  economic  actors  who  interact  with  the  political  institutions  and  establish  with  them  a 
continued  relation  through  which  to  pursue  their  own  narrow  interests  are  defined  as  oligarch.  Finally,  I  call  a 
"developmental  elite"  an  elite  whose  social  responsibility  is  seen  as  leading  the  country  through  a  process  of 
economic  development. 
3 Ukraine  should  have  helped  to  overcome  the  "ideological"  empasse  induced  by 
professional  politicians. 
Instead,  the  period  1994-1998  saw  the  stratification  of  economic  elites  and  the 
establishment  of  an  oligarchic  or  proto-oligarchic  system  in  both  Russia  and  Ukraine.  The 
creation  of  mutually  advantageous  coalitions  between  political  and  economic  power 
allowed  economic  actors  to  translate  their  policy  preferences  towards  relations  with  the 
neighbouring  country  into  implemented  policies. 
The  redistribution  of  economic  resources  (primarily  access  to  privatising  assents)  gave  rise 
to  a  struggle  for  control  over  national  wealth  among  domestic  economic  actors  and  against 
foreign  competitors.  Preoccupations  among  the  Ukrainian  economic  elite  that  the  richer 
and  more  experienced  Russian  business  would  dominate  in  the  privatisation  of  large 
strategic  assets  found  expression  through  a  nationalist  discourse.  A  rhetoric  of  "national 
bourgeoisie",  calling  for  the  defence  of  "national  capital"  as  the  main  instrument  to 
preserve  the  newly  acquired  independence,  was  employed  to  articulate  the  Ukrainian 
protectionist  mood. 
On  this  basis,  economic  elites  in  Russia  and  Ukraine  developed  antagonistic  interests  and 
policy  preferences  that  pulled  towards  the  separation  rather  than  the  reintegration  of  the  two 
countries.  The  process  of  economic  liberalisation  that  followed  the  collapse  of  the  centrally 
planned  systems  and  the  redistribution  of  economic  resources  impaired,  then,  the 
emergence  of  transnational  coalitions  supportive  of  acceleration  in  economic  and  political 
co-operation. 
4 A  Pragmatists  Approach  to  Russo-Ukrainian  Relations 
In  July  1994,  the  Ukrainian  newspaper  Golos  Ukrainy  published  the  story  of  Anatolii 
Gavrilenko,  Director  of  a  Kyiv  industrial  combine.  In  the  previous  four  years,  without  ever 
changing  its  product  specialisation,  the  enterprise  had  been  transferred  four  times  from  the 
competence  of  one  ministry  to  another  and  only  in  the  last  year  it  had  been  subordinated  to 
the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Economic  Relations.  Gavrilenko  also  lamented  that  in  the  post- 
independence  years  the  enterprise  had  hardly  received  spare  parts  from  its  partners  in  the 
CIS  countries.  Thus,  in  order  to  keep  the  business  going,  Gavrilenko  had  been  forced  to 
start  to  produce  those  parts  within  the  Kyiv  plant,  finally  becoming  independent  from  the 
CIS  suppliers.  6 
The  story  of  enterprise  director  Gavrilenko  was  a  little  success.  Gavrilenko  had  reacted  to 
the  severance  of  Soviet  economic  relations  reconverting  his  enterprise  to  internal 
production,  but  still,  he  argued,  the  factory  had  lost  a  number  of  valuable  trading  partners 
located  in  the  Russian  regions.  This  vignette  was  not  unique  in  the  post-Soviet  landscape, 
and  both  Ukrainian  and  Russian  newspapers  published  in  the  post-independence  years 
numerous  stories,  which  highlighted  the  problems  deriving  from  the  rupture  of  the  Soviet 
command  economy. 
A  large  number  of  Russian  and  Ukrainian  enterprises  remained  linked  to  their  traditional 
partners,  even  though  with  the  drawing  of  the  new  national  borders,  they  were  now  located 
abroad.  Russian  and  Ukrainian  enterprises  experienced  extraordinary  hardship  because  of 
the  introduction  of  diverging  payment  and  tax  systems,  new  currencies  and  custom  tariffs. 
Amidst  those  who  wanted  to  restore  a  fully-fledged  union  between  the  two  countries,  and 
those  who  wished  to  severe  all  bilateral  connections,  voices  started  to  be  heard  both  in 
Russia  and  in  Ukraine,  which  advocated  a  more  concrete  approach  to  their  common 
problems.  Empty  nationalistic  claims,  it  was  maintained,  should  be  replaced  by  the 
6  Golos  Ukraine,  July  28,1994,  p.  6 
5 recognition  that  the  economic  systems  of  the  two  countries  were  interdependent  and  would 
continue  to  be  so  even  after  the  emergence  of  two  separates  states. 
Arkadii  Vol'skii,  Chairman  of  the  Russian  Union  of  Industrialists  became  one  of  the  most 
vociferous  supporters  of  a  foreign  policy  imbued  with  "constructive  pragmatism". 
"We  have  lived  together  for  300  years,  [our  economies]  were  built  as  a  single  large  factory.  Our  links  were  so 
much  intertwined  that  their  interruption  is  blocking  production  on  both  sides  of  the  frontier.  I  would  very 
much  like  our  leaders  to  understand  this,  because  debates  on  who's  feeding  whom  are  of  no  use  to  anyone'  .7 
Vol'skii  argued  that  these  sentiments  reflected  the  common  opinion  of  many  enterprise 
directors  on  both  side  of  the  border.  It  was  felt  that,  while  for  many  politicians  the 
establishment  of  good  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  was  a  matter  of  "ideology", 
for  the  business  community  it  was  a  matter  of  survival.  ' 
Even  after  independence,  Russia  remained  the  primary  provider  of  energy  supplies  for 
Ukraine,  the  main  creditor  and  the  single  largest  market.  Ukraine  imported  from  Russia 
almost  90%  of  its  oil  and  more  than  60%  of  its  gas  supplies  every  year.  The  remaining  15 
to  20%  of  gas  was  imported  from  Turkmenistan  and  Uzbekistan,  although  for  a  period  in 
1997,  the  Turkmeni  gas  provider  was  controlled  by  Gazprom.  In  January  1997,  Kyiv 
maintained  an  outstanding  debt  with  Russia  estimated  by  the  Ukrainian  Finance  Minister 
Igor  Mitiukov  in  $  8.8  billion.  By  March  1998,  $900  million  of  this  amount  were  due  only 
to  Gazprom  9 
Russia  was  also  the  main  consumer  of  Ukrainian  foodstuffs,  wheat,  meet,  sugar,  products 
that  would  hardly  find  a  market  in  the  European  Union,  given  the  poor  standards  of  its 
commercialisation,  and  the  persisting  barriers  for  the  protection  of  the  European  internal 
agricultural  production.  In  the  first  half  of  1996,  Ukraine  accounted  for  52%  of  Russian 
imports  from  the  CIS,  and  for  49%  of  Russian  exports  to  the  CIS.  The  total  trade  turnover 
7  D.  Ternovoi  (1997),  "Sinkhronnoe  Lobbirovanie",  Biznes,  n.  20,27  May,  p.  11 
$  Golos  Ukraine,  August  27,1994,  p.  3 
9  0.  M.  Smolansky,  (1999),  "Fuel,  Credit,  and  Trade.  Ukraine's  Economic  Dependence  on  Russia",  Problems 
of  Post-Communism  March/April,  pp.  49-58 
6 between  the  two  countries  amounted  to  $17.7  billion  in  1996,  and  to  $15.1  billion  in  1997 
(the  drop  was  a  result  of  the  1996  "trade  war"  initiated  by  the  imposition  of  a  20%  value- 
added  tax  on  all  Ukrainian  goods  exported  to  Russia).  '° 
Such  a  close  economic  interdependence  became  for  Moscow  a  bargaining  chip  over 
Ukraine,  as  economic  leverage  was  used  regularly  to  "guide"  Kyiv  into  political  decisions 
that  would  prove  more  favourable  to  Russian  interests.  Russia  made  no  secret  of  its  firm 
opposition  to  Ukrainian  attempts  to  diversify  its  markets,  a  move  that  would  ultimately 
alter  the  strategic  balance  between  the  two  partners. 
In  the  post-independence  years,  Ukraine  was  thus  struggling  to  define  its  geopolitical 
location,  gain  international  credibility  and  establish  a  set  of  strategic  alliances.  Kyiv  was 
faced  by  the  challenge  of  balancing  an  economic  dependence  on  Russia,  against  the 
ambition  to  see  its  European  identity  recognised  through  admission  to  the  institutions  of 
Western  security  and  co-operation.  A  "pragmatic"  examination,  however,  suggested  that 
Ukrainian  foreign  policy  could  not  give  exclusive  preference  to  a  potential  friendship  with 
the  West,  while  disregarding  relations  with  Russia. 
As  the  Ukrainian  economist  Igor  Burakovskii  put  it,  there  were  three  main  reasons  why 
Russia  would  remain  a  significant  factor  in  Ukraine's  political  choices,  regardless  of  the 
foreign  policy  course  ultimately  adopted  in  Kyiv.  First,  Russia  was  at  the  same  time  the 
largest  European  country  and  a  world  power.  Second,  thanks  to  its  extensive  natural 
resources  Russia  could  in  the  short-run  recover  its  economic  strength,  and  co-operation 
with  its  eastern  neighbour  would  then  become,  once  again,  a  necessary  precondition  for 
Ukrainian  welfare.  Finally,  Ukrainian  enterprises  still  maintained  a  high  degree  of 
interdependence  with  their  Russian  counterparts.  1  The  Ukrainian  economist  Vladimir 
Gugel'  argued: 
'o  Ibid. 
I1"  V.  Burakovskii,  (1996)  "Ukrainsko-rossiiskiye  ekonomicheskiye  otnosheniya",  Occasional  Paper  on 
Changes  in  the  Slavic-Eurasian  world.  Slavic  Research  Center.  Hokkaido  University.  November  1996, 
Sapporo. 
7 "The  problem  of  economic  relations  with  Russia,  and  with  the  other  republics  is  often  looked  at  in  a 
propagandistic  fashion,  mixing  together  the  analysis  of  economic  interests  with  a  strong  anti-Russian 
syndrome.  Ideology  is  tied  up  with  a  mythical  matrix,  which  impregnates  the  evaluation  of  the  real  potential 
of  the  Ukrainian  economy".  12 
The  "mythology"  of  Russo-Ukrainian  relations,  which  Gugel'  referred  to,  was  based  on  the 
"improper"  assumption  that  the  Ukrainian  economy  had  been  developed  within  the 
framework  of  the  Soviet  empire  according  to  a  colonial  model,  through  which  the  Russians 
had  plundered  Ukraine's  wealth.  From  the  assumption  of  Russian-imposed  economic 
colonialism  derived  the  conclusion  that  cutting  off  economic  relations  with  Russia  would 
promote  the  effective  restructuring  of  the  Ukrainian  industrial  system,  and  its  consequential 
reorientation  towards  more  profitable  markets. 
Integration  with  the  countries  of  the  former  Soviet  Union  was  viewed,  then,  by  many  as  an 
obstacle  to  gaining  access  to  the  world  economy,  because  of  their  technological 
underdevelopment.  Preserving  links  with  the  backward  former  Soviet  economies  would 
automatically  continue  Ukraine's  economic  backwardness.  Conversely,  the  best  prospect 
for  a  rapid  development  of  the  Ukrainian  economy  was  viewed  as  tied  to  a  quick  rupture  of 
economic  relations  with  Russia,  on  the  one  side,  and  integration  into  the  European 
environment,  on  the  other.  13 
Integration  into  the  European  Union  was  certainly  seen  by  Ukrainian  observers  as  a  very 
attractive  prospect,  but  once  again,  appeals  to  a  realist  assessment  of  the  Ukrainian 
economic  situation  invited  to  draw  a  more  "pragmatic"  foreign  policy  agenda.  Quoting  a 
World  Bank  report  published  in  1991,  the  Ukrainian  economist  Valentina  Pisanskaya 
pointed  out  that,  when  the  Soviet  Union  broke  up,  Ukraine  was  importing  from  Russia  $15 
billion  worth  of  oil,  gas  and  wood  every  year.  At  the  time,  however,  the  subsidised  price 
system  meant  that  one  could  buy  two  tons  of  oil  with  one  ton  of  grain.  Ukraine  would  sell 
meat  to  Russia,  but  buy  petrol.  According  to  the  coefficients  of  conversion  in  use  then, 
12  Golos  Ukraine.  August  27,1994,  p.  3 
13  Ibid. 
S Ukraine  would  get  one  dollar  for  every  kilo  of  meat,  but  would  pay  only  seven  kopeks  for  a 
litre  of  petrol.  Pisanskaya  concluded: 
"We  would  like  very  much  to  enter  in  a  content  and  prosperous  Europe,  but  the  reality  is  that  with  our 
technology,  and  our  non-competitive  production  we  do  not  conform  to  their  requirements  and  necessities.  We 
are  not  needed  by  this  Europe".  14 
In  1994,  Anatolii  Zlenko,  Ukrainian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  also  noted  that  the 
European  Common  House  was  not  ready  yet  to  receive  Ukraine. 
"For  a  full  integration  of  Ukraine  into  the  world  and  European  economic  and  political  space  we  have  to  ask 
ourselves  these  questions:  to  which  extent  does  the  participation  of  Ukraine  in  this  process  correspond  to  its 
national  interests?  Does  it  guarantee  its  national  security,  and  the  vital  and  strategic  interests  of  the  country  as 
an  expression  of  sovereign  will?  " 
Zlenko  agreed  that,  given  the  close  links  and  the  dependence  of  Ukrainian  vital  activities  on 
the  former  Soviet  republics,  and  on  Russia  in  particular,  the  economic  crisis  could  be 
overcome  only  through  restored  co-operation  with  these  countries.  15 
The  key  message  of  the  Ukrainian  pragmatists,  then,  was  that  European  and  world  markets 
would  be  a  fantastic  mirage  for  the  Ukrainian  economy,  and  the  harsh  reality  was  the 
necessity  to  get  back  to  business.  Ukraine  was  faced  with  the  urgent  need  to  preserve  and 
consolidate  its  only  economically  feasible  trade  and  industrial  links,  namely  those  with  the 
former  Soviet  Union  and  with  Russia. 
The  Soviet  economy  had  been  built  in  seventy  years,  and  -  the  pragmatists  maintained  - 
cross-border  co-operation  could  not  be  severed  overnight.  This  was  especially  true  at  a 
time  of  economic  crisis,  when  resources  for  restructuring  and  reorientation  were  short  for 
everybody.  Vitol'd  Pavlovich  of  the  International  Fund  for  Humanitarian  and  Economic 
Relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  warned  that: 
14  Golos  Ukraine.  August  18,1994,  p.  5 
9 "The  era  of  political  romanticism  is  over,  we  are  now  facing  the  harsh  necessity  of  a  sensible  pragmatism. 
Especially  in  the  economic  sphere.  There  is  much  talk  about  the  country's  economic  independence,  but  it  is 
not  clear  to  everybody  that  such  independence  requires  stability  for  the  manufacturers,  [that  is]  stability  in  the 
legislation  concerning  their  activity'.  16 
According  to  this  idea  of  "sensible  pragmatism",  political  independence  was  to  be  viewed 
as  an  empty  concept  if  it  was  not  based  on  a  sound  economic  system,  which,  in  turn,  could 
only  exist  on  the  basis  of  the  former  Soviet  economy.  Because  of  their  efforts  to  create  a 
system  that  was  politically  and  economically  insulated  from  Moscow,  the  Kravchuk 
administration  was  accused  of  lacking  a  clear  awareness  of  the  Ukrainian  situation,  and  it 
was  portrayed  by  the  pragmatists  as  a  group  of  "political  romantics".  Trading  the 
efficiency  of  the  industrial  sphere  for  an  "idyllic"  idea  of  independence,  political  circles  in 
Kyiv  had  failed  to  understand  that  an  agreement  with  Russia,  even  at  the  price  of  reduced 
sovereignty,  might  be  what  the  country  ultimately  needed  given  its  difficult  financial 
circumstances. 
Calling  for  the  establishment  of  an  economic  Union  between  Russia  and  Ukraine,  the  group 
`Edinstvo'  (Unity),  active  in  the  Ukrainian  border  regions,  put  the  reasons  for  the  economic 
disorder  in  Ukraine  down  to  the  break  up  of  the  pre-existing  economic  relations. 
According  to  Edinstvo's  Vice  President,  in  Donetsk,  Dnipropetrovsk  and  Zaporizhzhia 
links  at  the  inter-enterprise  level  had  remained  active,  "not  thanks  to  the  state's 
intervention,  but  despite  the  state's  intervention".  17 
15  Golos  Ukraine,  August  10,1994,  p.  5 
16  Go10s  Ukraine.  September  1,1994,  p.  2 
17  Golos  Ukraine,  September  13,1994,  p.  2 
10 Power  to  the  Pragmatists 
Pragmatism  became  the  catch-phrase  of  Leonid  Kuchma's  electoral  campaign  in  the  spring 
of  1994,  and  during  the  first  months  of  his  presidential  mandate.  Kuchma's  electoral 
commitment  to  improved  relations  with  Russia,  synthesised  in  the  slogan  `less  walls  more 
bridges',  was  confirmed  in  his  first  presidential  speech  to  the  Verkhovna  Rada. 
"Our  aim  is  not  revolution,  but  a  systematic,  resolute,  and  consistent  renewal  of  the  economic  and  socio- 
political  system  in  Ukraine.  The  main  means  to  achieve  this  [objective]  are  realism  and  common  sense  in 
both  domestic  and  foreign  policy".  18 
Kuchma  made  it  clear  that  he  was  particularly  aware  of  the  fact  that  nation-building 
purposes  did  not  always  coincide  with  the  necessities  of  the  Ukrainian  industrial  sector. 
"The  priorities  of  Ukraine's  foreign  policy  should  not  be  determined  by  ideology,  but  by  the  nation-wide 
interests  of  our  state.  In  concrete  terms  this  means  that  realism,  specificity  and  pragmatism  should  replace 
political  romanticism,  euphoria,  and  a  certain  vagueness  characteristic  of  the  initial  period  of  state- 
building".  '9 
Both  in  Russia  and  in  Ukraine,  Kuchma's  words  were  interpreted  as  a  sign  of  Ukraine's 
acceptance  of  Russia's  inevitable  superiority.  20  Yet,  Kuchma's  speeches  were  only  one  of 
many  expressions  of  a  wider  movement,  which  had  surfaced  among  industrialists  and 
business  people  in  the  former  Soviet  countries.  A  movement  officially  represented  by  the 
International  Congress  of  Industrialists  and  Entrepreneurs,  whose  proclaimed  aim  was  to 
exercise  pressure  over  the  political  structures  of  the  newly  independent  states,  and  have  the 
economy  and  business  put  first  in  the  battle  against  "romantic  politics". 
'8  Kyiv  Radio  Ukraine  World  Service.  July  19,1994.  ' 
19  Ibid. 
20  Ulaainian  nationalists  criticised  Kuchma's  inaugural  speech  for  endangering  Ukraine's  sovereignty.  A 
document  signed  among  others  by  members  of  the  Rukh  stated  that  "The  Eurasian  expanse  where  the 
President  sees  Ukraine  playing  a  leading  role  is  nothing  other  than  the  space  that  is  economically  and 
politically  subordinate  to  Russia.  [...  ]  Ukrainian  economic  contacts  with  Russia  are  necessary,  but  they  must 
be  aimed  at  consolidating  Ukrainian  independence,  not  turning  Ukraine  into  a  neocolonial  state".  Se  og  dnya, 
11 "One  of  the  main  tasks  of  the  International  Congress  of  Industrialists  and  Entrepreneurs  is  to  defend  the 
interests  of  industrialists  and  entrepreneurs  in  government  circles,  and  to  lobby  in  the  parliament  for  those 
interests.  This  is  the  only  objective  necessity  -  to  represent  the  corporate  interests  of  industrialists  and 
entrepreneurs.  [...  ]  Sometimes  good  laws  are  written,  but  they  do  not  correspond  to  our  necessities. 
Legislative  acts  in  the  economic  area  have  to  converge.  This  is  why  economic  sovereignty  is  not  possible. 
Economics  is  international.  Political  sovereignty  is  essential,  but  it  cannot  leave  citizens  in  the  current 
situation".  21 
The  President  of  the  Kyrgyz  Union  of  Industrialists,  for  example,  argued  that  politicians 
needed  to  be  supported  in  their  planning  and  decision-making  by  economic  agents,  who, 
having  to  deal  with  concrete  issues,  had  a  more  pragmatic  approach  to  the  problems  of 
transitional  economies.  The  conditions  of  economic  interrelation  created  in  the  Soviet  era 
were  looked  at  as  the  promising  ground  for  a  mutually  beneficial  diplomacy.  Only 
economic  co-operation,  and  cross-boarder  exchange  led  by  economic  actors  could 
overcome  the  reciprocal  political  incomprehension  generated  by  the  radicalism  of  the  post- 
Soviet  national  movements.  2 
The  newly  emerging  pragmatist  ideology  seemed  then  to  be  based  on  the  twin  assumption 
that  countries  that  are  economically  dependent  on  each  other  and  are  connected  by  trade 
and  industrial  exchanges  do  not  go  at  war.  And  economic  co-operation  could  switch 
attention  away  from  the  rhetoric  of  professional  politicians,  which  was  more  likely  to 
inflame  rather  than  to  pacify  the  sensitive  relations  of  the  post-Soviet  arena. 
The  July  1994  meeting  between  Aleksander  Moroz  and  Ivan  Rybkin,  speakers  of  the 
Ukrainian  and  the  Russian  Parliament,  followed  this  line  of  bottom-up  economic 
pragmatism  as  the  chief  ingredient  for  renewed  co-operation.  The  two  acknowledged  that 
without  waiting  for  any  legislative  initiative,  the  inhabitants  of  the  two  countries'  border 
regions  had  already  initiated  an  active  collaboration. 
July  27,1994,  p.  5 
21  Rossiskaya  Gazeta  November  11,1995 
22  Ibid. 
12 "One  of  the  main  tasks  of  the  International  Congress  of  Industrialists  and  Entrepreneurs  is  to  defend  the 
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Legislative  acts  in  the  economic  area  have  to  converge.  This  is  why  economic  sovereignty  is  not  possible. 
Economics  is  international.  Political  sovereignty  is  essential,  but  it  cannot  leave  citizens  in  the  current 
situation".  21 
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needed  to  be  supported  in  their  planning  and  decision-making  by  economic  agents,  who, 
having  to  deal  with  concrete  issues,  had  a  more  pragmatic  approach  to  the  problems  of 
transitional  economies.  The  conditions  of  economic  interrelation  created  in  the  Soviet  era 
were  looked  at  as  the  promising  ground  for  a  mutually  beneficial  diplomacy.  Only 
economic  co-operation,  and  cross-boarder  exchange  led  by  economic  actors  could 
overcome  the  reciprocal  political  incomprehension  generated  by  the  radicalism  of  the  post- 
Soviet  national  movements.  22 
The  newly  emerging  pragmatist  ideology  seemed  then  to  be  based  on  the  twin  assumption 
that  countries  that  are  economically  dependent  on  each  other  and  are  connected  by  trade 
and  industrial  exchanges  do  not  go  at  war.  And  economic  co-operation  could  switch 
attention  away  from  the  rhetoric  of  professional  politicians,  which  was  more  likely  to 
inflame  rather  than  to  pacify  the  sensitive  relations  of  the  post-Soviet  arena. 
The  July  1994  meeting  between  Aleksander  Moroz  and  Ivan  Rybkin,  speakers  of  the 
Ukrainian  and  the  Russian  Parliament,  followed  this  line  of  bottom-up  economic 
pragmatism  as  the  chief  ingredient  for  renewed  co-operation.  The  two  acknowledged  that 
without  waiting  for  any  legislative  initiative,  the  inhabitants  of  the  two  countries'  border 
regions  had  already  initiated  an  active  collaboration. 
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12 If  concrete  experience  had  already  preceded  legislation,  they  added,  legislators  had  now  the 
responsibility  for  creating  the  right  conditions  for  the  efficient  activity  of  Russian  business 
in  Ukraine  and  Ukrainian  business  in  Russia.  Enterprises  should  be  allowed  to  open 
branches  in  the  neighbouring  country,  and  participate  in  the  market  of  state  orders. 
Financial-Industrial  groups,  transnational  corporations,  and  joint  banks  should  be 
established  to  revitalise  the  national  economies.  23 
The  View  from  Moscow 
The  endorsement  of  the  pragmatist  approach  in  Kyiv  was  also  matched  by  a  remarkable 
change  of  attitudes  in  Moscow.  At  the  end  of  Ukraine's  third  year  of  independence,  Russia 
was  forced  to  accept  the  reality  that  Ukraine  was,  indeed,  developing  into  a  fully  sovereign 
country.  Hopes  to  restore  the  neighbouring  country  to  a  subservient  position  with  the 
election  of  the  Russophile  Leonid  Kuchma  were  soon  dashed.  Upon  reaching  his 
presidential  chair,  Kuchma  became  a  committed  defendant  of  Ukraine's  sovereignty, 
interested  in  remaining  the  president  of  an  independent  state,  rather  than  becoming  the 
governor  of  a  Russian  province.  24 
It  soon  became  clear  that  while  Ukraine  still  represented  an  area  of  Russia's  vital  interests, 
those  interests  had  to  be  fostered  and  preserved  with  different  methods  than  the  aggressive 
nationalism  voiced  by  some  political  leaders.  Russian  initiatives  had  to  become  more 
positive  and  less  threatening. 
During  his  September  1994  visit  to  Kyiv,  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister  Andrei  Kozyrev 
stressed  that  there  was  no  greater  priority  for  Russian  foreign  policy  than  to  normalise 
relations  with  Ukraine.  The  time  had  come,  Kozyrev  suggested,  to  abandon  divisions 
between  big  brother  and  little  brother,  because  the  two  countries  were  just  "twins".  25 
23  Golos  Ukraine,  July  30,1994,  p.  2 
24  This  comment  was  made  by  Taras  Kuzio  in  a  conversation  with  the  author,  Kyiv,  October  1998 
25  Golos  Ukraine,  September  24,1994,  p.  6 
13 The  academic  Arkadii  Moshes  argued  that  Russia  had  to  learn  to  deal  with  a  sovereign 
state,  whose  position  in  the  world  arena  had  significantly  shifted  in  the  last  years.  Ukraine 
had  been  admitted  to  the  Council  of  Europe,  it  was  working  actively  to  establish  bilateral 
relations  with  other  CIS  countries  without  Moscow's  mediation,  and  also  its  relations  with 
Russia  had  become  more  predictable.  Ukraine  was  visibly  trying  to  move  away  from  the 
Russian  sphere  of  influence. 
The  election  of  President  Kuchma  could  be  perceived  as  a  guarantee  that  special  relations 
between  the  two  countries  would  be  preserved,  but  also  Moscow's  attitude  needed  to 
undergo  a  radical  re-evaluation.  Russia  had  to  establish  "relations  of  stable,  conflict-free, 
and  mutually  non-provocative  co-operation",  as  an  alternative  to  a  "competitive 
partnership".  The  Russian  foreign  policy  elite  had  to  devise  a  new  policy,  asking 
themselves  how  it  could  be  made  possible  for  Russian  private  capital  to  become  actively 
engaged  in  Ukraine,  establishing  fundamentally  new  economic  ties. 
From  this  perspective,  Moshes  questioned  whether  it  was  necessary  to  keep  politically 
controversial  issues  such  as  the  division  of  the  Black  Sea  Fleet  as  a  top  priority  on  the 
agenda  of  relations  between  the  two  countries.  What  kind  of  positive  motivation  could 
Russia  use  to  spark  Ukraine's  interest  and  slow  its  drift  toward  the  West?  What  measures 
could  Russia  adopt  if  a  crisis  did  eventually  erupt?  26 
The  coming  to  power  of  the  Russian  oligarchs  was  not  of  secondary  importance  in  this 
strategic  turn.  The  rapid  privatisation  of  state  property  created  in  Russia  a  strong,  though 
not  compact  group,  which  proved  able  to  introduce  big  business  as  another  variable  into  the 
political  equation.  Talking  about  the  responsibilities  of  Russian  business  in  solving 
situations  of  crisis,  and  also  justifying  his  political  activity,  Boris  Berezovskii  equated  the 
well-being  of  Russia  to  the  prosperity  of  his  own  business,  and  put  forward  a  philosophy  of 
self-interested  business  which  works  to  the  advantage  of  the  community.  "I  am  moved  by 
pragmatism  -  Berezovskii  said  -a  pragmatism  based  on  my  love  for  Russia.  [...  ]  I  do  not 
26  Segodnya,  November  17,1995, 
14 want  to  seem  an  altruist.  I  defend  the  vital  interests  of  Russian  business,  my  own 
interests".  27 
The  approaching  of  the  large-scale  privatisation  in  Ukraine  promised  to  open  up  favourable 
perspective  for  the  penetration  of  Russian  economic  interests  in  the  Ukrainian  arena. 
Moscow  strategy,  or  at  least  the  strategy  of  a  section  of  the  Russian  elite,  seemed  therefore 
to  turn  into  what  a  Ukrainian  scholar  has  termed  a  "creeping  economic  absorption". 
In  the  case  of  relations  with  Ukraine,  Volodymyr  Sidenko  argued,  the  variant  of  an 
"aggressive  expansion",  as  the  model  of  unification  with  Belarus,  was  probably  to  be 
discarded.  The  high  costs  the  move  would  imply,  in  terms  of  levelling  out  wages,  prices 
and  writing  off  the  Ukrainian  debt  would  also  make  this  strategy  improbable.  A  "creeping 
absorption"  would  instead  place  the  costs  of  the  manoeuvre  on  the  shoulders  of  the  big 
financial-industrial  groups  and  the  transnational  corporations,  which  would  penetrate  the 
Ukrainian  market. 
Sidenko  painted  a  scenario  in  which  economic  re-annexation  of  Ukraine  into  Russia  would 
take  place  in  five  successive  stages.  In  the  first  stage,  Russian  investors  would  participate 
in  the  "big  privatisation".  Then,  commercial  credits  would  be  granted  by  Russian 
corporations  to  Ukrainian  enterprises.  Russo-Ukrainian  financial-industrial  groups  would 
be  set  up,  controlled  de  facto  by  Russian  capital.  Inter-company  agreements  on  market 
sharing,  co-ordinated  sales,  and  joint  marketing,  would  be  concluded,  followed  by  mutual 
participation  in  each  other's  business  activity.  Finally,  mergers  and  absorption  would  take 
place.  28 
Big  Russian  companies  would  then  become  the  major  actors  in  bilateral  relations  between 
Russia  and  Ukraine,  thus  realising  what  a  Russian  observer  had  identified  as  their  historical 
mission. 
27  A.  Grishovets  (1996),  "Nado  zaplatit'!  i  nikuda  ne  denesh'sya",  Kommersant',  n.  12,12.11.1996,  pp.  13-15 
28  V.  Sidenko  (1998),  "Russia  in  the  Ukrainian  Policy  of  Socio-economic  and  Geoeconomic  Transformation", 
Political  Thought  (Kyiv),  n.  2,  pp.  161-175 
15 "Lukoil,  YUKOS,  Rosneft,  and  Gazprom  have  long  been  paving  the  way  for  the  restoration  of  a  common 
economic  space  on  the  ruins  of  the  former  Soviet  Union,  showing  in  deed,  not  words,  the  advantages  of 
developing  such  processes  for  the  people  and  for  the  states.  [ 
... 
]  And,  who  knows,  perhaps  not  only  in  the 
economic  but  also  the  political  significance  of  the  role  of  these  companies  will  be  appreciated  and  their  worth 
in  the  future  of  the  CIS.  There  was a  time  when  monuments  were  erected  to  Yermak  and  Khabarov.  But  they 
were  conquerors  in  the  direct  meaning  of  the  word.  Perhaps  a  monument  will  some  day  be  put  up  to  Lukoil 
also  as  the  embodiment  of  the  peaceful  economic  rapprochement  of  the  peoples  and  the  states  that  fled  the 
USSR'  .  29 
The  CIS  Model  of  Integration 
Moscow's  new  approach  to  relations  with  Ukraine  was  in  a  way  an  integral  part  of  the 
doctrine  of  political  and  economic  integration  proposed  for  the  reintegration  of  the 
Commonwealth  of  Independent  States.  Following  a  functionalist  approach  to  European 
integration,  it  was  envisaged  that  the  construction  of  a  new  political  and  economic  entity  in 
the  Eurasian  space  would  take  place  at  a  dual  level,  involving  simultaneously  an  inter- 
governmental,  as  well  as  an  inter-enterprise  level. 
The  role  of  the  national  governments  would  be  to  negotiate  and  sign  bilateral  or  multilateral 
agreements,  primarily  aiming  at  restoring  a  common  economic  environment,  and 
establishing  a  common  legal  framework.  By  doing  so,  they  would  express  apolitical  will 
in  favour  of  economic  integration.  In  order  to  obtain  the  broadest  possible  commitment 
from  all  actors,  however,  political  will  would  have  to  be  coupled  with  an  economic  interest 
at  a  grassroots  level.  The  success  of  the  process  of  integration  could  then  be  guaranteed 
only  if  integration  proceeded  from  above  and  from  below  at  the  same  time  30 
"The  leading  direction  in  the  process  of  reintegration  of  the  CIS  countries  consists  in  strengthening  different 
forms  of  inter-governmental  co-operation,  and  in  promoting  micro-level  ties  between  market  subjects. 
29  Rossiiskaya  Gazeta  August,  3  1996 
30  Memorandum  Sovieta  Glav  Gosudarstv  Sodruzhestva  Nezavisimykh  Gosudarstv,  "Osnovnye  napravleniya 
integratsionnogo  razvitsiya  Sodruzhestva  Nezavisimykh  Gosudarstv",  approved  on  October  21,1995.  Also 
Nikolai  A.  Cherkasov,  Director  of  the  Research  Section  of  the  CIS  Interparliamentary  Assembly,  interview 
with  the  author,  St.  Petersburg,  27  March  1997. 
16 Thereafter  follows  the  need  to  preserve,  develop,  restructure  and  rationalise  the  existing  relations  among 
enterprises,  which  now  happen  to  be  across  different  borders.  This  means,  in  other  words,  creating  different 
transnational  industrial  structures"  31 
Industrial  enterprises  across  the  borders  were  encouraged  to  re-establish  industrial 
connections  from  the  Soviet  era.  Economic  subjects  and  transnational  enterprises  were  to 
act  as  transmission  belts,  able  to  impose  the  impetus  of  integration  to  the  political 
structures.  The  process,  in  the  case  of  the  CIS  and  of  Russian-Ukrainian  relations  in 
particular,  would  be  even  easier  than  integration  within  the  European  space,  because  of  the 
already  existing  network  of  economic  co-operation,  established  in  the  Soviet  period.  32 
"The  members  of  those  structures  would  represent  an  industrial  capital  independent  from  its  territorial 
location,  and  its  forms  of  ownership.  They  will  be  naturally  interested  in  setting  up  an  optimal  level  of 
intersectorial,  industrial  and  techno-scientific  co-operation.  The  same  consideration  applies  for  the 
representatives  of  financial  capital  .  33 
In  a  meeting  with  the  Heads  of  State  of  the  CIS  countries  in  January  1996,  President 
Yel'tsin  also  emphasised  the  importance  of  this  dual  approach.  On  the  one  side,  he  noticed, 
"It  is  not  serious  to  talk  about  integration  without  having  a  clear-cut  organisational 
structure",  such  as  the  Custom  Union,  and  the  Interstate  Economic  Committee,  which  were 
designed  to  become  the  "integration  headquarters".  Within  this  framework,  member  states 
had  to  "discuss  in  principle  the  question  of  the  nature  and  stages  of  economic 
transformations  in  the  Commonwealth  States",  and  "co-ordinate  positions  on  the  questions 
of  forming  a  common  capital  market,  as  well  as  a  rational  system  for  the  interstate  division 
of  labour". 
31  S.  Golubeeva  (1996),  "Transnationalisatisiya  Rossiiskikh  FPG",  Rossiiskii  Ekonomicheskii  Zhurnal,  n.  7, 
pp.  29-36 
32  I.  V.  Vorob'eva  and  E.  G.  Efimova  (1996),  "Torgovo-ekonomicheskie  Interessy  Rossii",  Uchonye  Zapiski, 
St.  Petersburg  State  University,  vol.  32, 
33  S.  Golubeeva  (1996),  Op.  Cit. 
17 On  the  other  side  -  Yeltsin  pointed  out  -  "Joint  investment  programs  should  become  an 
effective  tool  of  structural  policy.  This  should  be  primarily  in  those  spheres  of  the  national 
34  economy  whose  production  is  vitally  important  for  the  partners" 
Plan  of  the  Thesis 
The  main  trajectory  for  the  development  of  bilateral  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine 
in  1994  then  seemed  to  be  one  of  integration.  Growing  dissatisfaction  against  a  nationalist 
rhetoric  used  to  consolidate  Ukraine's  newly  established  independence,  but  also  believed  to 
be  responsible  for  the  deterioration  of  the  economic  situation,  ousted  Kravchuk  from  power 
,-  and  replaced  him  with  the  more  Moscow-friendly  Leonid  Kuchma.  Economic  arguments 
in  favour  of  increased  co-operation  seemed  to  win  the  upper  hand  over  the  "political 
ideology"  of  independence.  This  change  of  spirit  found  fertile  ground  in  the  new  foreign 
policy  strategy  developed  in  Moscow,  which  foresaw  measures  of  economic  expansion 
gaining  preference  over  political  absorption,  and  major  economic  actors  earning  a  definite 
space  in  the  centres  of  Russian  political  power. 
Were  these  factors  the  necessary  preconditions  for  the  emergence  of  transnational 
coalitions?  Did  they  correspond  to  the  grassroots  level  of  co-operation  foreseen  by  the  CIS 
doctrine  of  integration?  In  this  work  I  will  argue  that  these  conditions  were  in  fact 
insufficient  to  foster  increased  co-operation  between  the  two  neighbouring  countries.  The 
emergence  of  national  economic  elites,  which  based  their  political  prestige  on  the 
acquisition  of  property,  represented  one  of  the  strongest  obstacles  towards  the  political  and 
economic  reintegration  between  Russia  and  Ukraine. 
In  particular,  the  consolidation  of  an  economic  elite  in  Ukraine  and  its  ambition  to  increase 
its  power  through  control  over  Ukrainian  national  resources  reduced  the  prospects  for  the 
foreign  expansion  of  Russian  business.  On  the  Ukrainian  side,  the  rhetoric  of  a  national 
bourgeoisie,  based  on  the  need  to  protect  "national  capital",  in  order  to  create  a  fully 
34  Rossiiskie  Vesti.  January  20,1996 
18 developed  economy,  clearly  contrasted  with  the  lexicon  of  international  economic  interest 
heard  in  the  Russian  quarters. 
As  a  nationalist  discourse  was  used  to  oppose  the  expansion  of  Russian  business  in 
Ukraine,  my  conclusion  is  that  nationalist  sentiments  may  play  and  important  role  in 
countries  such  as  Ukraine,  that  had  only  recently  become  independent.  The  coincidence  of 
economic  interests  and  nationalist  aspirations  may  enhance  the  role  of  business  elites  in  the 
struggle  for  independence  and  the  process  of  nation-building.  Economic  elites  may 
ultimately  promote  nationalist  movements  to  be  allowed  to  maintain  control  over  the 
redistribution  of  national  wealth. 
Consequently,  the  pragmatists'  suggestion  that  political  interests  rather  than  economic 
interests  would  be  factors  of  secondary  importance  in  bilateral  relations  between  Russia  and 
Ukraine  appears  unfounded.  Economic  elites  did  not  express  exclusively  economic 
preferences,  but  by  stepping  onto  the  political  scene  they  became  political  agents, 
especially  at  a  time  of  deep  instability,  when  access  to  politics  was  clearly  the  key  to 
enhance  and  protect  economic  well-being. 
The  argument  will  be  made  following  these  points.  In  chapter  one,  I  will  outline  a 
theoretical  framework  based  on  pluralist  theories  of  international  relations.  I  will  stress 
that,  in  order  to  understand  the  process  of  rapprochement  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  the 
study  of  transnational  coalitions  and  international  organisations  is  not  sufficient,  but 
attention  must  be  devoted  to  the  domestic  level  of  politics.  Following  the  tradition  of  the 
"second  image",  I  will  stress  the  importance  of  analysing  elements  such  as  the  role  of 
specific  actors  and  their  preferences,  the  ways  in  which  coalitions  are  built  and  economic 
interests  are  translated  into  political  actions.  35 
35  International  studies  classify  the  constraints  and  opportunities  that  the  international  system  places  on  the 
foreign  policy  decisions  of  individual  countries  as  the  "third  image"  and  the  economic  social  and  political 
characteristics  of  states  as  the  "second  image".  K.  Waltz  (1954),  Man,  the  State,  and  War  (New  York: 
Columbia  University  Press) 
19 On  the  basis  of  this  theoretical  framework,  in  chapter  two,  I  will  provide  an  historical 
account  of  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine.  The  focus  will  be  upon  seeking  to 
explore  the  "bargaining  space"  defined  by  the  socio-economic  systems  shaped  by  the  two 
countries'  common  past.  I  will  discuss  whether  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  were 
historically  those  of  a  colonial  model  of  political  repression  and  economic  exploitation. 
I  will  suggest  that  the  past  of  bilateral  relations  between  the  two  Slavic  countries  cannot  be 
defined  unidimensionally,  and  even  if  coercion  was  exercised  by  Russia  against  Ukraine, 
the  role  of  the  Ukrainian  elites  in  the  process  cannot  be  overlooked.  I  will  conclude  that  the 
various  interpretations  of  the  common  Russian-Ukrainian  history  provide  arguments  both 
to  support  and  to  dismiss  possibilities  of  post-Soviet  co-operation  between  the  two 
countries. 
In  chapter  three,  I  will  turn  to  the  making  of  foreign  policy  in  Russia  and  Ukraine, 
considering  the  opportunities  and  the  restraints  that  the  external  political  and  economic 
situation  imposed  on  the  two  countries  in  the  period  between  1994-98.  I  will  interpret 
policy  choices  as  a  reaction  to  a  combination  of  international  as  well  as  domestic  events. 
In  the  case  of  Russia,  the  emergence  of  a  pragmatist  nationalist  foreign  policy  will  be 
identified  as  a  result  of  three  factors.  First,  disillusion  with  the  Western-oriented  foreign 
policy  of  the  early  1990s  and  the  Russian  post-imperial  crisis  of  identity.  Second,  the 
severe  economic  decline.  And  third,  the  perception  of  risks  deriving  from  the  emancipation 
of  the  CIS  countries  from  a  Russian  sphere  of  influence.  I  will  argue  that  the  emergence  of 
a  consensus  around  pragmatist  nationalist  strategies  coincided  with  the  rise  of  the  oligarchs, 
and  their  interest  in  expanding  their  business  activities  abroad. 
In  the  case  of  Ukraine,  I  will  consider  the  "two-track  foreign  policy"  inaugurated  by 
Kuchma  and  aimed  at  achieving  equally  constructive  relations  with  the  West  and  with 
Russia.  Kuchma's  foreign  policy  course  was  dictated  by  Ukraine's  position  of  weakness  in 
the  international  arena.  So  that,  if  on  the  one  side  Kuchma  aimed  at  Ukraine's  integration 
in  the  Western  structures  of  security  and  co-operation,  on  the  other  side,  economic 
20 dependence  on  Russia  forced  the  country's  foreign  policy  community  to  seek  the 
stabilisation  of  relations  with  its  eastern  neighbour. 
Ukraine's  international  weakness  failed  to  provide  the  domestic  economic  elite  with  the 
institutional  protection  and  support  that  they  required,  on  the  other  hand,  however,  the 
Ukrainian  business  elite  lacked  the  capacity  and  resources  to  play  a  significant  role  in 
foreign  markets.  This  is  why  foreign  policy  issues,  apart  from  the  demand  for  protection  of 
the  internal  market,  did  not  appear  on  the  agenda  of  the  economic  elite. 
In  chapter  four  I  will  examine  the  emergence  of  the  economic  elite  as  a  political  actor  in 
Russia.  I  will  explore  the  relations  between  business  and  politics  in  Yel'tsin's  regime,  and 
the  role  that  privatisation  played  in  the  aggregation  of  economic  interests  around  political 
groups.  I  will  then  consider  the  interests  and  policy  preferences  of  the  major  Russian 
companies  abroad  and  in  Ukraine.  I  will  conclude  that  both  the  interests  and  the  mode  of 
Russian  expansion  in  Ukraine  highlighted  not  only  divergent  but  even  contrasting  interests 
vis-ä-vis  the  Ukrainian  economic  elite. 
The  interests  and  policy  preferences  of  the  Ukrainian  economic  elite  will  be  examined  in 
chapter  five.  I  will  outline  the  emergence  of  an  ideology  in  support  of  the  creation  of  a 
"national  bourgeoisie"  within  which  the  wealth  of  the  economic  elite  was  equated  to  the 
well-being  of  the  country.  I  will  consider  the  political  interconnections  between  politics 
and  business,  which  were  consolidated  during  the  first  term  in  office  of  Leonid  Kuchma. 
Finally,  I  will  outline  the  spread  of  a  protectionist  mood  in  Ukraine  in  the  form  of  an 
institutionally  sanctioned  policy  of  defence  of  "national  capital".  I  will  conclude  that  the 
very  emergence  of  an  Ukrainian  economic  elite,  territorially  limited  to  the  Ukrainian  space, 
relatively  weaker  than  their  Russian  counterpart  and  equally  interested  in  the  privatisation 
of  strategic  assets,  set  relations  between  the  Russian  and  the  Ukrainian  business  community 
on  a  footing  of  competition. 
21 In  the  conclusions  I  will  discuss  how,  in  the  period  between  1994-98,  different  models  of 
business-politics  interrelation  and  an  instrumental  use  of  nationalist  arguments  intertwined 
in  contravening  the  pragmatist  approach  to  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine.  The 
interaction  between  economic  liberalisation,  elite  consolidation  and  nationalism  is 
considered  as  a  powerful  obstacle  to  processes  of  integration  between  newly  independent 
countries. 
22 CHAPTER  ONE 
Theoretical  Background 
Pluralist  theories  of  International  Relations  provide  a  comprehensive  framework  through 
which  to  understand  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  in  the  period  1994-98,  in 
particular  to  identify  the  critical  role  played  by  the  economic  elites  of  the  two  countries  in 
the  tentative  process  of  rapprochement.  Why  do  pluralist  theories  provide  a  more 
parsimonious  account  of  Russian-Ukrainian  relations  rather  than  a  realist  theory  of  co- 
operation? 
The  statist  approach  to  foreign  policy,  on  which  realism  is  based,  has  two  crucial 
assumptions.  First,  that  the  state  is  an  autonomous  (unified)  actor,  and,  second,  that  the 
objectives  pursued  by  the  state  correspond  to  the  national  interest.  According  to  Stephen 
Krasner's  definition,  the  state  is  "a  set  of  roles  and  institutions  [a  set  of  "central  decision- 
making  institutions"]  having  peculiar  drives,  compulsions,  and  aims  of  their  own  that  are 
separate  and  distinct  from  the  interests  of  any  particular  societal  group".  It  is  precisely 
thanks  to  this  isolation  from  societal  pressures  and  particularistic  interests  that  the  state  is 
capable  of  identifying  the  national  interest  as  the  supreme  expression  of  "general  material 
objectives  or  [...  ]  ambitious  ideological  goals  related  to  the  beliefs  about  how  society 
should  be  ordered".  1 
Both  these  assumptions  appear  inadequate  to  depict  post-Soviet  polities,  in  which 
pluralistic  societies  and  a  fragmented  perception  of  the  national  interest  have  replaced  the 
apparent  cohesiveness  of  the  Soviet  years.  Despite  the  pledge  that  "the  interests  of  the 
people  and  the  interests  of  the  Party  are  one,  "  the  definition  of  national  interests  appeared 
1  S.  D.  Krasner  (1978),  Defending  the  National  Interest.  Raw Materials  Investments  and  U.  S.  Foreign  Policy, 
(Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press),  p.  10 
23 controversial  even  in  the  Soviet  period,  given  the  systemic  competition  between  different 
branches  of  the  Soviet  elite  for  the  allocation  of  resources. 
To  a  degree,  the  advent  of  perestroika  provided  only  formal  sanction  for  the  emergence  of 
pluralistic  elements  in  society,  and  for  the  expression  of  a  multiplicity  of  often-contrasting 
interests.  Since  the  early  1990s,  the  processes  of  political  and  economic  liberalisation  have 
further  multiplied  the  number  of  actors  engaged  on  the  domestic  as  well  as  on  the 
international  scene.  The  state  itself  has  become  another  actor  in  the  struggle  for  power, 
often  the  hostage  of  powerful  interest  groups. 
The  unitary  perception  of  national  interests,  as  forged  in  the  Soviet  era,  has  crumbled  in  a 
plethora  of  alternative  preferences,  with  different  segments  of  the  elite  arising  on  the 
political  scene  to  spell  out  their  personal  concept  of  national  interest.  The  resulting  picture 
is best  framed  in  Rober  Keohane  and  Joseph  Nye's  words:  "the  state  may  prove  to  be 
multifaceted,  even  schizophrenic,  [...  ]  national  interests  will  be  defined  differently  on 
i3  different  issues,  at  different  times  and  by  different  governmental  units. 
In  this  study  it  will  be  argued  that  liberal  theories  best  account  for  the  emergence  and 
failure  of  the  loose  set  of  ideas  categorised  as  `the  pragmatist  approach'  to  relations 
between  Russia  and  Ukraine  (see  Introduction).  The  pragmatist  approach  as  emerged  in  the 
years  between  1994-98,  was  based  upon  a  variety  of  assumptions  about  the  key  factors 
determining  the  relationship  between  the  two  countries: 
(i)  That  political  and  economic  interests  are  distinct  from  each  other  and  often 
contradictory. 
(ii)  That  the  politicians'  view  of  co-operation  is  generally  determined  by 
`ideological'  aims,  often  masking  the  goal  of  retaining  or  expanding  political  power 
2  For  a  detailed  account  on  the  evolving  perception  of  interests  under  Gorbachev  see  L.  D.  Nelson  and  I.  Y. 
Kuzes,  (1998),  "Russian  Economic  Reforms  and  the  Restructuring  of  Interests",  Demokratisatsiva,  Vol.  6,  n. 
3,  pp  480-503 
3  R.  0.  Kohane  and  J. S.  Nye  (1977),  Power  and  Interdependence,  Little,  (Boston:  Brown  and  Company),  p. 
16 
24 (defending  independence  in  the  case  of  Ukrainian  politicians  and  asserting  control 
over  Ukraine  in  the  case  of  Russian  politicians). 
(iii)  That  the  business  communities'  view  of  co-operation  is  generally  determined  by 
a  more  `pragmatic'  understanding  of  bilateral  relations,  where  increased  co- 
operation  is  considered  an  instrument  to  overcome  the  countries'  economic  crisis, 
improve  production  and  generate  shared  wealth  for  the  population. 
(iv)  That  the  appointment  of  representatives  from  the  two  countries'  business 
communities  to  leading  policy  making  positions  can  foster  co-operation  by  virtue  of 
their  common  views  and  interests. 
Pluralist  theories  dissect  societies  into  their  component  parts,  investigate  the  different 
preferences  held  by  societal  groups,  the  ways  in  which  these  groups  organise  politically  and 
gain  representation  for  their  preferences,  and  the  ways  that  interests  between  cross-border 
communities  promote  or  hinder  co-operation.  Here  it  will  be  argued  that  the  emergence  of 
the  `pragmatist'  approach  in  the  two  countries  stemmed  from  the  capture  of  key  state 
institutions  by  particular  domestic  interest  groups.  While  the  failure  of  this  approach  to 
provide  the  foundations  for  co-operation  was  the  result  of  the  competing  preferences  of 
these  particularistic  groups. 
Below  I  will  outline  in  more  detail  the  application  of  pluralist  theories  of  international 
relations  to  the  case  of  Russian-Ukrainian  relations.  In  particular,  I  will  examine  the  role 
that  these  theories  identify  for  national  and  transnational  elites  in  the  process  of  co- 
operation.  I  will  start  by  providing  a  definition  of  co-operation  and  integration,  and  a 
classification  of  liberal  theories. 
25 Co-operation  and  Integration 
The  realist  approach  to  international  relations  sees  co-operation  between  two  states  as  an 
attempt  to  balance  the  power  of  or  the  threat  from  a  third  country.  4  Conversely,  in  liberal 
theories,  co-operation  happens  as  the  result  of  a  recognised  commonality  of  interests 
between  states,  which  are  oriented  towards  the  maximisation  of  their  individual  gains,  and 
are  ready  to  engage  in  a  bargaining  process  with  the  final  aim  of  achieving  co-ordinated 
policies.  On  the  basis  of  shared  interests  in  specific  areas,  individual  nation-states  agree  to 
negotiate  a  single  approach  to  the  solution  of  existing  or  foreseen  problems.  As  Robert 
Keohane  puts  it,  during  co-operation  "actors  adjust  their  behaviour  to  the  actual  or 
5  anticipated preferences  of  the  other,  through  a  process  of  co-ordination". 
The  motivation  that  sparks  states'  efforts  is  the  perspective  of  future  gains  arising  from  co- 
ordinated  policies,  even  though,  as  Helen  Milner  points  out,  gains  may  not  be  the  same  for 
all  the  actors.  6  Differences  in  rewards  stem  also  from  patterns  of  "asymmetrical 
interdependence"  existing  between  the  partners,  according  to  which  the  less  dependent 
partner  is  bound  to  face  limited  costs  following  changes  in  the  relationship.  Keohane  and 
Nye  distinguish  between  sensitivity  and  vulnerability  as  the  two  dimensions  of 
asymmetrical  interdependence.  Sensitivity  implies  "liability  to  costly  effects  imposed  from 
outside  before  policies  are  altered  to  try  to  change  the  situation",  whereas  vulnerability  can 
be  defined  as  "an  actor's  liability  to  suffer  costs  imposed  by  external  events  even  after 
policies  have  been  changed"  .7 
Co-operation  is  a  "process  of  exchange",  resulting  from  the  accommodation  of  nations' 
policies.  It  arises  through  a  process  of  bargaining,  which  does  not  require  initial  agreement 
or  the  absence  of  discord:  Discord  and  conflicts  are  instead  channelled,  leading  to  common 
4  For  an  example  of  realist  theories  of  co-operation  see  K.  N.  Waltz  (1979),  Theory  of  International  Politics, 
(New  York:  McGrow-Hill);  and  J.  Grieco  (1990),  Co-operation  Among  Nations:  Europe,  America,  and  Non- 
Tarif  Barriers  to  Trade",  (Ithaca:  Cornell  University  Press) 
S  R.  0.  Keohane  (1984),  After  Hegemony,  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press),  pp.  51-52 
6  H.  V.  Milner  (1997),  Interests,  Institutions  and  Information.  Domestic  Politics  and  International  Relations, 
(Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press),  pp.  7-8 
26 understanding  and  a  way  to  achieve  common  advantages.  Co-operation  can  be  achieved 
through  a  variety  of  political  processes.  It  can  be  tacit  and  occur  without  communication  or 
explicit  agreement,  or  can  be  imposed  to  the  weaker  by  the  stronger  part. 
In  such  a  relation  a  hegemonic  actor  can  serve  as  the  functional  equivalent  of  a  common 
authority  in  international  politics.  8  Hegemonic  stability  theories  have  argued  that  a 
concentration  of  power  resources  in  a  single  state  leads  to  stability  and  openness  in  the 
international  economic  system.  9  Alternative  studies  have,  instead,  concentrated  on 
explaining  the  conditions  for  co-operation  in  a  situation  of  international  anarchy.  to 
Stanley  Fischer  identifies  co-operation  as  a  progressive  (or  incremental)  phenomenon 
moving  through  four  levels: 
   Exchange  of  information  to  facilitate  tacit  policy  co-ordination, 
   Negotiation  of  specific  policy  deals  on  a  one-time  basis, 
   Establishment  of  a  set  of  rules  guiding  policy  choice, 
   Surrender  of  national  policy  instruments  to  form  a  larger  policy  community  (Union/ 
integration).  11 
Co-operation  and  integration  stand  in  an  inverse  relationship.  If  integration  requires  co- 
operation,  co-operation  is  not  necessarily  aimed  at  achieving  integration.  As  opposite  to 
co-operation,  integration  will  ultimately  lead  to  the  creation  of  a  new  community,  whose 
degree  of  interaction,  centralisation,  and  transfer  of  power  from  the  national  to  the 
supranational  level  is  established  by  the  state-members  within  the  framework  of  agreements 
and  common  institutions. 
R.  O.  Kohane  and  J.  S.  Nye  (1977),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  13 
8  J.  Gowa  (1986),  "Anarchy  Egoism  and  Third  Images:  The  Evolution  of  Co-operation  and  International 
Relations",  International  Organization,  Vol.  40,  Winter,  p.  174. 
9  S.  Krasner  (1976),  "State  Power  and  the  Structure  of  International  Trade",  World  Politics,  Vol.  28,  n.  3, 
April,  pp.  317-347 
10  R.  O.  Keohane  (1988),  After  Hegemony:  Co-operation  and  Discord  in  the  World  Political  Economy, 
(Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press.  ),  and  R.  O.  Keohane  (1988),  "International  Institutions:  Two 
Approaches",  International  Studies  Quarterly,  Vol.  32,  December,  pp.  379-396;  K.  A.  Oye  (editor)  (1986), 
"Co-operation  under  Anarchy",  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press) 
11  S.  Fischer  (1988),  "International  Macroeconomic  Co-ordination",  in  International  Economic  Co-operation, 
edited  by  M.  Feldstein  (Chicago:  Chicago  University  Press),  pp.  35-38 
27 In  the  process  of  integration  two  or  more  countries  agree  to  give  up,  partially  or  totally, 
their  sovereignty.  They  will  adopt  common  decisions  in  one,  several  or  all  areas  of 
interaction,  ranging  from  trade,  currency  or  economic  policy,  to  social  policy  or  foreign 
policy  and  defence.  Common  decision-making  will  take  place  within  a  set  of  supranational 
institutions  that  might,  in  time,  replace  the  pre-existing  national  ones.  Political  and 
economic  power  may  ultimately  shift  from  the  national  to  the  supranational  level,  giving 
rise  to  a  new  polity. 
Despite  the  commonality  of  elements  outlined  so  far,  pluralist  theories  present  different 
approaches  as  to  how  co-operation  (or  integration)  can  be  brought  about  and  on  the  role  and 
importance  of  different  actors  in  the  process.  On  this  basis  I  will  divide  pluralist  theories  of 
co-operation  into  three  broad  groups: 
(i)  Institutionalist  theories,  which  emphasise  the  role  of  ad  hoc  institutions; 
(ii)  Transnationalist  theories,  which  emphasise  the  role  of  transnational 
communities; 
(iii)  Theories  of  domestic  politics,  which  concentrate  on  the  domestic  balance  of 
power  as  a  factor  hindering  or  fostering  co-operation. 
It  is  important  to  point  out,  however,  that  this  classification  is  not  rigid,  as  different 
approaches  and  authors  generally  employ  overlapping  understandings  of  the  elements  of 
co-operation. 
28 Institutionalist  Theories 
With  the  term  `institutionalism'  I  refer  to  those  theories  that  see  ad  hoc  functional 
institutions  as  the  core  factor  for  successful  co-operation.  David  Mitrany  is  often  identified 
as  the  early  father  of  this  functionalist  theory  with  his  utopian  proposals  to  replace  nation- 
states  with  international  functional  agencies.  In  Mitrany's  view,  the  continuous  transfer  of 
functions  and  authority  from  national  institutions  to  international  functional  agencies 
provides  an  appropriate  mechanism  to  implement  co-operation. 
Behind  Mitrany's  vision,  formulated  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Second  World  War,  lies  the 
conviction  that  "politics  is  evil",  and  nationalism  is  the  destructive  force  responsible  for  the 
horrors  of  the  war.  Administration,  instead,  with  its  primary  concern  for  the  rational 
allocation  of  resources,  is  the  positive  value  that  can  motivate  individuals  to  co-operate.  12 
In  spite  of  being  deeply  rooted  in  a  realist  view  of  the  state,  Mitrany's  theory  aims  at 
ultimately  dismantling  the  state  structure,  replacing  it  with  a  network  of  supranational 
functional  institutions,  able  to  solve  enduring  conflicts  and  allow  even  countries  that  are 
ideologically  distant  to  co-operate.  13  The  reason  why  functional  institutions  are  more  likely 
to  lead  to  co-operation  and  eventually  to  integration  is  that  they  are  de-politicised,  and  offer 
the  opportunity  to  address  the  concrete  problems  arising  from  the  complexity  of  the  modem 
world.  14  Mitrany  wrote: 
"The  new  problems  are  leading  [...  ]  not  to  create  sovereignty  but  to  deny  it,  not  to  exclusive  political 
integration,  but  to  collective  functional  integration".  '  5 
12  D.  Mitrany  (1968),  "The  Functional  Approach  to  World  Organisation",  in  World  Politics,  edited  by  A. 
Lijphart  (Boston:  Allyn  and  Bacon,  Inc.  ),  pp.  314-326. 
13  Ibid. 
to  D.  Mitrany  (1943),  A  Working  Peace  System:  an  Argument  for  the  Functional  Development  of  International 
Organisation,  (London:  RIIA)  pp.  92-93 
Is  D.  Mitrany  (1975),  "A  Political  Theory  for  the  New  Society",  in  Functionalism:  Theory  and  Practice  in 
International  Relations,  edited  by  A.  J.  R  Groom.  and  P.  Taylor  (London:  University  of  London  Press),  p.  30 
29 A  network  of  functional  institutions  can  be  established  by  virtue  of  "an  index  of  common 
needs"  existing  among  modem  states.  16  Such  institutions  would  be  delegated  specific 
functional  tasks  and  transcend  national  boundaries.  They  would  have  a  limited  existence, 
and  their  structure,  and  power  would  be  as  well  defined  by  the  extension  of  the  task.  They 
would  be  made  up  of  technical  bureaucrats  able  to  propose  impartial  solutions  to  technical 
problems.  '? 
Functional  agencies  promise  to  start  in  the  individuals  an  incremental  process  of  transfer  of 
loyalty  that  will  ultimately  lead  to  total  supranational  co-operation.  Once  they  realise  that 
functional  institutions  provide  better  satisfaction  to  their  needs  than  single  nations  do, 
individuals  will  be  ready  to  shift  their  loyalty  to  the  new  institutions.  Political  loyalty  is 
not,  therefore,  an  indivisible  good,  but  a  "fractionated  one"  and  can  be  gained  by 
supranational  agencies  proceeding  from  function  to  function,  as  the  individuals  experience 
satisfaction  of  their  needs.  18 
Mitrany's  functionalism  found  an  institutional  application  in  the  creation  of  the  European 
Coal  and  Steel  Community  (ECSC),  with  the  Treaty  of  Paris  in  1951.  Jean  Monnet 
conceived  the  new  institution  as  a  program  for  economic  expansion,  able  to  promote 
political  reform,  as  well  as  economic  progress.  Its  task  was  to  co-ordinate  the  industrial 
policies  of  the  six  member  countries  and  restrict  the  powers  of  private  industry.  19 
The  Schumann  plan,  which  produced  ultimately  the  ECSC,  was  the  first  of  a  series  of 
documents  constructed  to  overcome  the  many  constraints  to  international  co-operation 
raised  by  established  national  economic  interests.  The  plan  was  built  on  the  assumption 
16  "The  functionalist  approach  emphasises  the  common  index  of  need.  Very  many  such  needs  cut  across 
national  boundaries,  not  a  few  are  universal,  and  an  effective  beginning  for  building  up  an  international 
community  of  interest  could  be  made  by  setting  up  joint  agencies  for  dealing  with  these  common  needs".  D. 
Mitrany  (1948),  "The  Functionalist  Approach  To  World  Organisation",  International  Affairs  Vol.  24,  pp. 
350-361 
17  D.  Mitrany  (1943),  Op.  Cit..  pp.  72-73  and  92-93 
la  D.  Mitrany  (1975),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  31 
19  J.  Gillingham  (1991),  "Jean  Monnet  and  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community",  in  Jean  Monnet:  The 
Path  to  the  European  Unity,  edited  by  D.  Brienkley  and  C.  Hockett  (London:  McMillan),  pp.  129-162 
30 that  a  modest  surrender  of  national  sovereignty  over  the  control  of  some  commodities  was 
an  acceptable  price  for  the  economic  and  political  welfare  that  would  follow  co-operation. 
In  the  1955  Messina  Conference,  the  European  partners  committed  themselves  to  the 
"establishment  of  a  United  Europe  by  the  development  of  common  institutions,  the 
progressive  fusion  of  national  economies,  the  creation  of  a  common  market  and  the 
progressive  harmonisation  of  national  policies".  20 
The  approach  followed  by  the  European  architects  at  this  stage  was  based  on  the  principle 
of  spill-over  or  chain  reaction  effects.  According  to  it,  integration  would  proceed 
gradually,  starting  from  an  initial  stage  of  sectoral  co-operation  (trade,  currency  or 
economic  co-operation),  later  expanding  co-operation  in  scope  (to  a  related  sector),  or  in 
level  (within  the  same  sector  but  to  a  deeper  extent).  Economic  co-operation  conducted 
through  common  institutions  would  automatically  implant  political  values  and  habits  best 
suited  for  political  integration. 
The  ECSC  represented  an  important  experience  on  the  path  toward  European  integration. 
An  observer  characterised  it,  as  "a  school  in  which  the  six  learned  to  work  together",  so  that 
"when  the  day  of  the  Common  market  dawned  they  were  ready  to  continue  their 
collaboration  in  much  a  wider  area  than  coal  and  steel".  21  Walter  Hallstein,  collaborator  of 
President  Adenauer  and  President  of  the  European  Economic  Commission  between  1958- 
1967  expressed  the  hope  that  "the  forces  released  for  the  creation  of  the  common  market 
will  inevitably  take  Europe  first  to  the  economic  union  and  then  to  the  political  union"  22 
A  more  modem  group  of  institutional  theories  focuses  on  the  study  of  international 
regimes.  Regimes  are  identified  as  a  set  of  rules  and  agreements  that  govern  state  actions 
in  issue-specific  areas  (as,  for  example,  transportation  or  environmental  policies).  Research 
in  this  area  is  concerned  with  the  need  to  clarify  the  conditions  under  which  regimes 
20  Quoted  in  M.  O'Neil,  (1996),  "The  Politics  of  European  Integration:  A  Reader",  (London:  Routledge),  p. 
35 
21  R.  Marjolin  (1991),  "What  type  of  Europe?  ",  in  Jean  Monnet:  The  Path  to  the  European  Unity,  edited  by 
D.  Brienkley  and  C.  Hockett  (London:  McMillan),  pp.  181 
22  Quoted  in  R.  Marjolin  (1991),  Op.  Cit. 
31 emerge,  evolve  and  collapse.  23  Regimes  are  perceived  as  a  valuable  instrument  for 
international  co-operation  as  they  reduce  the  degree  of  uncertainty  and  distrust  among 
states,  and  the  fear  that  a  partner  can  defect.  By  providing  a  constant  flow  of  information, 
and  a  forum  for  negotiations,  international  regimes  make  international  actors'  decisions 
more  predictable,  and  lower  transaction  costs.  Regimes  are  seen  as  an  important  locus  of 
international  learning,  which  can  help  producing  convergent  state  policies.  24 
Transnational  Theories 
Theories  of  transnationalism  concentrate  on  the  increase  in  international  exchanges  and 
observe  the  transformation  that  such  an  event  has  imposed  to  international  relations. 
Individuals  and  groups  become  the  main  actors  of  co-operation.  Robert  Keohane  presents 
co-operation  as  a  necessity  in  a  world  characterised  at  the  same  time  by  the  decline  of  a 
hegemonic  power  and  the  increase  of  interdependence  among  single  countries. 
In  a  realist  view  of  the  world,  co-operation  is  both  made  possible  and  promoted  by  the 
emergence  of  a  world  hegemon.  The  concept  of  "hegemonic  stability"  implies  that  order 
on  the  world  scene  is  created  and  maintained  by  a  single  power,  which,  "possessing 
superiority  of  economic  and  military  resources,  [implements]  a  plan  for  international  order 
based  on  its  interests  and  its  vision  of  the  world".  25 
Increased  economic  interdependence  on  the  international  arena  forces  individual  countries 
to  abandon  their  restricted  vision  of  self-interest  and  engage  in  a  continuous  search  for  co- 
23  S.  Krasner  (editor)  (1983),  International  Regimes,  (Ithaca,  N.  Y.:  Cornell  University  Press) 
24  P.  M.  Haas  (1989),  "Do  Regimes  Matter?  Epistemic  Communities  and  Mediterranean  Pollution  Control", 
International  Organization.  Vol.  43,  n.  3,  Summer,  pp.  377-403;  see  also  E.  B.  Haas  (1980),  "Why 
Collaborate?  Issue-Linkage  and  International  Regimes",  World  Politics,  Vol.  32,  April,  pp.  357-405;  O. 
Young  (1986),  "International  Regimes:  Towards  a  New  Theory  of  Institutions",  World  Politics,  Vol.  30, 
October,  pp.  115-117;  S.  Haggard  and  B.  A.  Simmons  (1987),  "Theories  of  International  Regimes", 
International  Organization,  Vol.  41,  Summer,  pp.  491-517 
32 operation  in  disparate  sectors  of  interaction.  To  use  John  Burton's  analogy,  the  "billiard 
ball  model"  of  a  world  where  nation-states  are  seen  as  coherent,  sovereign  and  independent 
entities,  applies  no  longer.  The  modern  world  is  better  understood  as  a  "cobweb  model",  a 
system  of  "complex  interdependencies".  Z6 
In  a  world  of  complex  interdependence  "actors  other  than  states  participate  directly  in 
world  politics,  [...  ]  a  clear  hierarchy  of  issues  does  not  exist,  and  [...  ]  force  is  an 
ineffective  instrument  of  policy".  "'  Military  concerns  have  shifted  down  from  the  top  ranks 
of  foreign  policy  agenda,  and  economic  and  environmental  problems  have  become  of 
crucial  concern.  The  number  of  issues  on  the  table  of  international  negotiations  has 
expanded  as  a  result  of  this  increased  interaction.  "International  relations  conducted  by 
governments  have  been  supplemented  by  relations  among  private  individuals,  groups,  and 
societies,  that  can,  and  do  have,  important  consequences  for  the  course  of  events".  28 
Societies  are  connected  through  a  network  of  multiple  channels  among  governmental  elites, 
non-governmental  elites,  and  transnational  organisations  (multinational  banks  and 
corporations).  Every  individual  and  every  segment  of  society  becomes  a  potential  actor  on 
the  international  scene.  As  Burton  puts  it, 
"there  is  a  system  of  states,  and  there  are  also  transactions  between  businessmen,  traders,  research  workers, 
television  stations,  drug  peddlers,  students  and  others.  There  are  systems  or  linkages  such  as  those  created  by 
amateur  radio  enthusiasts,  by  people  with  the  same  ideological  or  religious  outlooks,  by  scientists  exchanging 
papers  and  meeting  together,  by  people  behaving  in  different  ways"  29 
The  emergence  of  powerful  economic  subjects,  with  cross-border  interests,  broadens  the 
scope  of  the  government's  domestic  activities  and  blurs  the  line  between  domestic  and 
foreign  policy.  In  this  context  economic  elites  and  transnational  corporations  act  as 
25  R.  Keohane  (1984)  Op.  Cit.,  pp.  9,31  and  32-33.  For  a  classical  statement  of  hegemonic  stability  see  C.  P. 
Kindleberg  (1973),  The  World  in  Depression,  1929-1939,  (Berkley:  University  of  California  Press).  For  a 
more  recent  interpretation  see  J.  Gowa  (1986),  Op.  Cit. 
26  J.  W.  Burton  (1972),  World  Society,  (Cambridge:  CUP),  pp.  28-32  and  pp.  35-45 
27  R.  O.  Keohane  and  J.  S.  Nye  (1977),  Op.  Cit. 
28  J.  N.  Rosenau  (1980),  The  Study  of  Global  Interdependence:  Essays  on  the  Transnationalisation  of  World 
Affairs,  (New  York:  Nichols),  p.  1 
33 "transmission  belts,  making  government  policies  in  various  countries  more  sensitive  to  one 
another".  " 
The  literature  on  transnationalism  has  two  important  precedents  in  the  1950s,  represented 
by  Karl  Deutsch's  study  of  "security  communities",  and  Ernst  Haas'  research  on  European 
integration.  Deutsch  argues  that  the  high  intensity  of  communications  and  transactions 
between  countries  makes  them  less  inclined  to  resolve  their  conflicts  through  resorting  to 
large-scale  physical  force  31 
Security  communities  arise  when  "a  group  of  people  has  become  integrated",  namely  when 
a  "we-feeling",  a  "common  culture  based  on  intense  interactions  and  communications 
between  all  levels  of  society"  has  emerged.  32  In  this  view  integration  and  international 
security  are  equivalent,  and  integration  is  depicted  as  a  set  of  Chinese  boxes  where  "no-war 
communities",  represent  the  lowest  degree  of  integration,  and  "amalgamated  communities" 
the  highest  33 
Ernst  Haas  defines  political  integration  as  "the  process  whereby  political  actors  in  several 
distinct  national  settings  are  persuaded  to  shift  their  loyalties,  expectations  and  political 
activities  toward  a  new  centre,  whose  institutions  posses  or  demand  jurisdiction  over  the 
pre-existing  national  states.  The  end  result  of  a  process  of  political  integration  is  a  new 
political  community,  superimposed  over  the  pre-existing  ones".  "' 
In  his  seminal  work  on  the  establishment  of  a  European Community,  "The  Uniting  of 
Europe",  Haas  applies  a  concept  of  "pluralism  of  groups,  values,  and  institutions"  as  the 
main  characteristic  of  European  political  life.  Through  these  lenses,  Haas  examines  the 
attitudes  of  different  segments  of  European  societies  towards  economic  and  political 
29  J.  W.  Burton  (1972),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  36 
30  R  O.  Keohane  and  J.  S.  Nye  (1977),  Op.  Cit.,  pp.  25-29 
31  K.  W.  Deutsche  et  al.  (1957),  Political  Community  and  the  North  Atlantic  Area.  International 
Organisations  in  the  Light  of  Historical  Experience,  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press),  p.  3 
32  Ibid.,  pp.  17-18 
33  K.  W.  Deutsch  (1954)  Political  Community  at  the  International  level  -  Problems  of  Measurement  and 
Definition,  (Garden  City  N.  Y.:  Doubleday),  p.  34,  and  K.  W.  Deutsch  et  al.  (1957)  Op.  Cit.,  p.  6. 
34  E.  B.  Haas  (1958),  The  Uniting  of  Europe,  (Stanford:  Standford  University  Press),  First  Edition,  p.  16 
34 unification,  and  concludes  that  the  development  of  the  process  of  integration  hinges  upon 
the  perception  of  interests  and  values  of  all  the  actors  who  participate  in  the  process. 
"Major  interest  groups  as  well  as  politicians  determine  their  support  of,  or  opposition  to,  new  central 
institutions  and  policies  on  the  basis  of  a  calculation  of  advantage.  The  `good  Europeans'  are  not  the  main 
creators  of  the  regional  community  that  is  growing  up;  the  process  of  community  formation  is  dominated  by 
nationally  constituted  groups  with  specific  interests  and  aims,  willing  and  able  to  adjust  their  aspirations  by 
turning  to  supranational  means  when  this  course  appears  profitable".  35 
The  consequence  is  that,  if  a  group  perceives  integration  as  being  beneficial  for  the 
development  of  their  individual  or  group  interests,  they  will  be  willing  to  "shift  their 
loyalty"  from  their  national  community  towards  a  "new  political  community".  As  a  result 
"a  larger  political  community  can  be  developed  if  the  crucial  expectations,  ideologies,  and 
behavioural  patterns  of  certain  key  groups  can  be  successfully  refocused  on  a  new  set  of 
central  symbols  and  institutions".  36 
Haas  identifies  the  positions  of  the  key  interest  groups,  the  political  parties  and  the 
governments  towards  concrete  steps  on  the  path  toward  integration,  and  their  "economic 
expectations",  their  "political  fears  or  hopes",  "their  ideologies  or  their  notion  of  the 
national  interest".  37  Different  groups  are  seen  reaching  "identity  of  aspirations",  when  they 
share  basic  values  and  adopt  a  similar  concept  of  interest;  or  "convergence  of  interests", 
when  they  agree  on  the  final  objectives  of  integration,  but  their  basic  values  are  different. 
Groups  may  also  be  opposed  to  integration,  for  identical  or  converging  reasons. 
Following  the  same  path,  Leon  Lindberg  and  Stuart  Scheingold  recognise  the  opportunity 
for  integration  to  occur  when  coalitions  having  identical  or  converging  demands  and 
interests  emerge.  Coalitions  may  be  created  by  four  types  of  mechanism,  of  which 
"functional  spill-over"  and  "actor  socialisation"  appear  the  most  important  ones.  In 
particular,  functional  spillover  takes  place  when  actors  decide  to  co-operate  because  they 
realise  that  a  number  of  tasks  are  functionally  related  to  one  another.  Thanks  to  actor 
35  E.  B.  Haas  (1968),  The  Uniting  of  Europe,  (Stanford:  Standford  University  Press),  Second  Edition,  pp.  34- 
35, 
36  Ibid.,  pp.  34-35 
35 socialisation  individuals  involved  in  an  ongoing  decision-making  process,  which  might 
well  be  extended  over  a  period  of  many  years,  come  into  close  and  frequent  contact.  They 
are  involved  in  a  process  of  problem-solving  and  policy-generating. 
Commonality  of  problems  and  tasks  gives  rise  to  a  common  view  of  the  world  among 
bureaucratic  elites,  that,  for  this  reason  perform  an  especially  important  role  in  fostering 
integration.  Echoing  Haas'  distinction  in  "dramatic-political"  and  "incremental-economic" 
aims  of  integration,  Lindberg  and  Scheingold  maintain  that  "Elites  (or  actors)  with 
dramatic-political  aims  are  those  who  are  concerned  with  `high  politics',  with  `deep 
ideological  or  philosophical  commitment',  with  national  self-assertion,  prestige  and 
grandeur,  power  in  the  world.  Elites  with  incremental-economic  aims  devote  themselves  to 
the  maximisation  of  their  daily-life  welfare  concerns  and  have  `abandoned  an  interest  in 
high  politics"'  38. 
If  transnational  bureaucrats  are  likely  to  become  agents  of  integration  because  of  the 
common  set  of  perceptions  and  interests  they  have  developed,  epistemic  communities  too 
provide  an  important  contribution  to  international  co-operation,  because  of  the  causal 
knowledge  that  they  share  on  specific  issues.  Peter  Haas  defines  an  epistemic  community 
as  "a  network  of  professionals  with  recognised  expertise  in  a  particular  domain  and  an 
authoritative  claim  to  policy-relevant  knowledge  within  that  domain  or  issue-area".  39  An 
epistemic  community  is,  therefore,  a  group  of  scientists  or  technical  experts  that  have  a 
shared  set  of  causal  and  principles  beliefs,  a  consensual  knowledge  base  and  a  common 
policy  enterprise. 
Epistemic  communities  emerge  as  important  actors  on  the  international  arena,  as  a  response 
to  the  complexity  of  the  technical  questions  that  professional  policy-makers  increasingly 
face.  Social  or  physical  processes  and  their  interrelation  with  other  phenomena  require 
37  Ibid.,  p.  15 
38  L.  N.  Lindberg  and  S.  A.  Scheingold  (1970),  Europe's  Would-Be  Policy.  Patterns  of  Change  in  the 
European  Community,  (Englewood  Cliffs:  Prentice-Hall),  p.  123 
39  P  M.  Haas  (1992),  "Introduction:  Epistemic  Communities  and  International  Policy  Co-ordination", 
International  Organization.  Vol.  46,  n.  1,  Knowledge,  Power,  and  International  Policy  Co-ordination,  Winter, 
p.  3 
36 considerable  scientific  and  technical  expertise.  Economic  interdependence  and  a  globalised 
economy  require  policy  co-ordination,  as  international  and  domestic  agenda  become 
increasingly  intertwined. 
Uncertainty  about  the  best  path  to  follow  in  policy-making  or  the  consequences  of 
alternative  policies  gives  rise  to  increasing  demands  for  the  information  that  epistemic 
communities  can  provide.  Epistemic  communities,  then,  illustrate  causal  relations  and 
provide  advice  on  the  possible  results  of  alternative  courses  of  action,  explain  the 
complexity  of  interrelated  issues,  define  (or  help  defining)  the  self-interest  of  a  state,  and 
help  to  formulate  policies  40 
Epistemic  communities  are  not  necessarily  transnational,  but  they  can  become  transnational 
thanks  to  the  diffusion  of  community  ideas  in  international  conferences,  journals,  and 
research  collaborations  or  within  international  organisations.  Scholars  see  epistemic 
communities  behind  the  introduction  of  new  consensus  on  questions  like  nuclear  arms 
control,  or  environmental  threats,  and  the  rise  of  international  regimes  41 
40  Ibid.,  p.  15 
41  See  for  example  E.  Adler  (1992),  "The  Emergence  of  Co-operation:  National  Epistemic  Communities  and 
the  International  Evolution  of  the  Idea  of  Nuclear  Arms  Control",  International  Organization.  Vol.  46,  n.  1, 
Knowledge,  Power,  and  International  Policy  Co-ordination,  Winter,  pp.  101-145;  C.  Enloe  (1975),  The 
Politics  of  Pollution  in  a  Comparative  Perspective,  (New  York:  David  McKay)  P.  M.  Haas  (1990),  Saving  the 
Mediterranean:  The  Politics  of  International  Environmental  Co-operation,  (New  York:  Columbia  University 
Press);  K  Sebenius  (1981),  "The  Computer  as  a  Mediator:  Law  of  the  Sea  and  Beyond",  Journal  of  Policy 
Analysis  and  Management,  Vol.  1,  pp.  77-95 
37 Theories  of  Domestic  Politics 
Theories  of  domestic  politics  are  characterised  by  a  common  concern  with  the  domestic 
political  and  economic  structure  as  the  factor  determining  co-operation  and  integration. 
These  theories  are  devoted  to  an  examination  of  the  components  that  constitute  the 
domestic  political  arena  and  to  the  role  that  these  components  play  in  defining  the 
international  scene. 
Theories  of  domestic  politics  move  from  the  assumption  that  the  structure  of  domestic 
politics  does  not  only  affect  but  determines  the  outcomes  of  foreign  policy.  42  The 
interrelation  between  domestic  and  international  politics  is  manifest  in  both  directions. 
Thus,  on  the  one  side,  a  country's  position  on  the  international  arena  influences  its  domestic 
political  and  economic  situation,  while,  on  the  other  side  its  domestic  structure  shapes  its 
behaviour  in  foreign  relations.  3  In  the  words  of  Andrew  Moravcsik: 
"State-society  relations  -  the  relationship  of  states  to  the  domestic  and  transnational  social  context  in  which 
they  are  embedded  -  have  a  fundamental  impact  on  state  behaviour  in  world  politics.  Societal  ideas,  interests, 
and  institutions  influence  state  behaviour  by  shaping  state  preferences".  44 
American  literature  has  been  particularly  prolific  on  the  analysis  of  the  influence  exerted  by 
domestic  factors  on  foreign  policy.  Following  Peter  Gourevitch's  notion  of  "the  second 
image  reversed",  scholars  have  demonstrated  that  the  structure  of  domestic  power  has  been 
historically  one  of  the  key  factors  behind  US  military  intervention  abroad.  45  The  contrast 
between  domestically  or  internationally  oriented  banks  and  multinational  enterprises  and 
42  Ii.  Milner  (1998),  "Rationalising  Politics:  The  Emerging  Synthesis  of  International,  American  and 
Comparative  Politics",  International  Organization,  Vol.  52,  n.  3,  Autumn,  pp.  759-786 
°'  for  example,  H.  V.  Milner  (1997),  Interests,  Institutions  and  Information:  Domestic  Politics  and 
International  Relations,  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press) 
44  A.  Moravcsik  (1997),  "Taking  Preferences  Seriously:  A  Liberal  Theory  of  International  Politics", 
International  Organization,  Vol.  51,  n.  4,  Autumn,  p.  513 
45  J.  Gowa  (1998),  "Politics  at  the  Water's  Edge:  Parties,  Voters,  and  the  Use  of  Force  Abroad",  International 
Organization.  Vol.  52,  n.  2,  Spring,  pp.  307-324;  P.  A.  Gourevitch  (1978),  "The  Second  Image  Reversed:  the 
International  Sources  of  Domestic  Politics",  International  Organization,  Vol.  32,  n.  4,  Autumn,  p.  904. 
38 their  representatives  in  the  Senate  are  believed  to  have  dictated  US  foreign  policy  in  the 
Cold  War  era.  6  Domestic  motivations  are  recognised  behind  states'  decisions  to  adopt 
costly  international  moral  actions,  and  states'  inclination  towards  conflict  or  peace.  7 
Finally,  foreign  economic  policies  are  seen  as  the  reflection  of  the  "stress  and  contradiction 
in  domestic  structures",  the  product  of  the  struggle  between  export-oriented, 
technologically  advanced  industries  and  import-competing,  technologically  backward  ones, 
between  industry  and  finance,  and  between  organised  labour  and  business.  48 
According  to  Gourevitch,  theories  that  explain  international  co-operation  as  the  outcome  of 
domestic  policies  can  be  divided  into  two  broad  categories:  preference-driven  and 
institution-driven.  In  preference-driven  theories,  foreign  policy  is  the  result  of  ideology, 
economic  context,  self-interest  and  other  factors  related  to  domestic  agents.  Decision- 
makers  have  to  take  into  account  the  preferences  of  state  actors  in  order  to  retain  their 
offices.  Domestic  agents  can  make  their  voices  heard  either  thanks  to  functional  power 
(strikes  and  capital  flight)  or  political  power  (elections).  Institution-driven  models,  on  the 
contrary,  define  foreign  policy  as  the  result  of  a  process  conducted  by  political  institutions; 
the  way  in  which  preferences  are  aggregated,  that  is  the  way  institutions  work,  influences 
the  final  results  of  foreign  policy.  49 
Theorists  of  domestic  politics  aim  to  draw  attention  from  the  international  to  the  domestic 
level  of  diplomacy.  The  domestic  level,  Gourevitch  argues,  is  of  extreme  importance  for 
the  achievement  of  co-operation:  "co-operation  will  in  either  case  require  domestic 
concordances".  "`  Co-operators'  in  each  country  will  have  to  find  common  ground  with 
46  B.  O.  Fordham  (1998),  "Economic  Interests,  Party,  and  Ideology  in  Early  Cold  War  Era  US  Foreign 
Policy",  International  Organization.  Vol.  52,  n.  2,  Spring,  pp.  359-396 
47  C.  D.  Kaufman  and  R  A.  Pape  (1999),  "Explaining  Costly  International  Moral  Action:  Britain's  Sixty-year 
Campaign  Against  the  Atlantic  Slave  Trade",  International  Organization.  Vol.  53,  n.  4,  Autumn,  pp.  631-668; 
D.  P.  Auerswald  (1999),  "Inward  Bound:  Domestic  Institutions  and  Military  Conflicts",  International 
Organization,  Vol.  53,  n.  3,  Summer,  pp.  469-504;  M.  R.  Gordon  (1974),  "Domestic  Conflict  and  the  Origins 
of  the  First  World  War.  The  British  and  the  German  Case",  Journal  of  Modern  History.  Vol.  46,  n.  2,  June, 
pp.  191-226 
48  P.  J.  Katzenstein  (1977),  "Conclusion:  Domestic  Structures  and  Strategies  of  Foreign  Economic  Policy", 
International  Organization.  Vol.  31,  n.  4,  Autumn,  Between  Power  and  Plenty:  Foreign  Economic  Policies  of 
Advanced  Industrial  States,  p.  917 
49  P.  A.  Gourevitch  (1996),  "Squaring  the  Circle:  the  Domestic  Sources  of  International  Co-operation", 
International  Organization,  Vol.  50,  n.  2,  Spring,  pp.  349-73 
39 their  allies  in  other  countries,  constructing  a  regime  that  is  able  to  provide  enough  benefits 
for  the  winners  to  overcome  the  losers  in  each  country  seeking  to  overthrow  the  regime".  5° 
Robert  Putnam's  two-level  game  model  arises  precisely  from  the  consideration  that,  in 
order  to  understand  the  outcome  of  international  negotiations,  the  domestic  as  well  as  the 
international  level  must  be  taken  into  account  simultaneously.  As  Putnam  says,  a  national 
negotiator  is  engaged  in  an  international  as  well  as  a  domestic  action,  exposed  to  pressures 
from  the  domestic  and  the  international  negotiating  table. 
"Across  the  international  table  sits  his  foreign  counterparts,  and  at  his  elbow  sit  diplomats  and  other 
international  advisors.  Around  the  domestic  table  behind  him  sit  party  and  parliamentary  figures, 
spokepersons  for  domestic  agencies,  representatives  of  key  interest  groups,  and  the  leader's  own  political 
advisors".  51 
At  the  national  level,  then,  domestic  groups  pursue  their  interests  by  pressurising  the 
government  to  adopt  favourable  policies,  while  for  politicians  support  of  coalitions  is  vital 
to  retain  their  power.  At  the  international  level,  national  governments  seek  to  maximise 
their  own  ability  to  satisfy  domestic  pressures,  while  minimising  the  adverse  consequences 
of  foreign  developments. 
On  the  basis  of  this  assumption  international  conflict  and  co-operation  can  be  modelled  as 
processes  that  take  place  in  two  stages.  In  the  first  stage  governments  define  the  set  of 
domestic  interests.  At  the  second  stage,  they  bargain  among  themselves  in  an  effort  to 
realise  those  interests.  The  configuration  of  domestically  determined  national  preferences 
defines  a  "bargaining  space"  of  potentially  viable  agreements,  each  of  which  generates 
gains  for  one  or  more  participants.  "Negotiation  is  -  therefore  -  the  process  of  collective 
choice  through  which  conflicting  interests  are  reconciled".  52 
50  Ibid.,  p.  362 
sl  R  D.  Putnam  (1988),  "Diplomacy  and  Domestic  Politics:  the  Logic  of  Two-Level  Games".  International 
Organization,  Vol.  42,  n.  3,  Summer,  p.  434 
sz  A.  Moravcsik  (1993),  "Preferences  and  Power  in  the  European  Community:  A  Liberal  Intergovernmentalist 
Approach",  Journal  of  Common  Market  Studies.  Vol.  31,  n.  4,  December,  p.  497 
40 While  theorists  have  agreed  about  the  necessity  of  considering  the  interrelationship 
between  the  domestic  and  international  level,  the  elements  that  constitute  this 
interrelationship  have  proved  more  contentious.  The  realist  assumption  of  a  unitary 
national  interest  ignores  the  existence  of  multiple  preferences  within  a  polity,  and  with  it 
the  process  whereby  preferences  are  aggregated.  53  Theories  of  domestic  politics,  instead, 
assume  the  centrality  of  individuals  and  interest  groups  in  the  political  process.  Actors  are 
rational  and  risk-adverse  and  organise  their  collective  action  aiming  at  the  maximisation  of 
their  profit  within  the  boundaries  set  by  factors  like  "material  scarcity,  conflicting  values 
and  variations  in  social  influence".  S4  This  is  what  Milner  calls  a  "poliarchy". 
In  poliarchy  "actors  domestically  have  distinct  preferences,  and  fashioning  some  single 
national  preference  is dependent  on  the  resources  the  actors  possess  and  the  institutions  in 
which  they  operate".  According  to  this  picture,  national  interest  becomes  a  "contested 
term",  the  result  of  strategic  games  among  all  the  internal  actors  (decision-makers, 
legislatures,  bureaucracies  and  other  domestic  groups).  55 
The  definition  of  the  national  interest  is  the  result  of  a  complex  process  in  which  many 
factors  intervene.  The  country's  major  interests  groups,  their  position  in  the  domestic 
political  and  economic  structure,  their  relations  to  the  world  system  and  the  possible 
outcomes  of  a  change  of  conditions  on  the  international  arena,  the  commonality  of  interests 
that  prompts  different  groups  to  establish  coalitions,  all  these  factors  play  a  significant  role. 
In  Jeff  Frieden's  words: 
"The  national  interest  is  not  a  blank  slate  upon  which  the  international  system  writes  at  will;  it  is  internally 
determined  by  the  socio-economic  evolution  of  the  nation  in  question.  [...  ]  These  goals  are  set  by  the 
53  Milner  hypothesises  that  preference  aggregation  in  a  realist  perspective  must  respond  to  one  of  the 
following  conditions:  (1)  One  domestic  actor  (one  individual  or  group)  has  control  foreign  policy,  and  its 
preferences  are  elected  to  the  level  of  national  interest.  (2)  On  a  particular  issue  all  members  of  the 
community  share  the  same  vision  and  preferences  (e.  g.  the  national  survival.  (3)  All  national  politics  is 
summarised  in  one  utility  function  that  does  not  correspond  to  the  interests  of  one  specific  group  or 
individual,  but  represents  the  results  of  the  domestic  political  game.  H.  Milner  (1998),  Op.  Cit. 
54  A.  Moravcsik  (1997),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  516 
55  H.  Milner  (1998),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  772 
41 constraints  and  opportunities  that  various  domestic  economic  interests  face  in  the  world  arena  and  by  the 
underlying  strength  of  the  various  socio-economic  groups".  56 
This  consideration  has  two  major  implications.  One,  that  preferences  (actors'  preferences 
and  groups'  preferences)  are  key  in  the  process  of  foreign  policy-making.  Government 
policy  is  "constrained  by  the  underlying  identities,  interests,  and  power  of  individuals  and 
groups  who  constantly  pressure  the  central  decision-makers  to  pursue  policies  consistent 
with  their  preferences".  57  Two,  that  the  concept  of  national  interest  appears  nothing  more 
than  the  screen  behind  which  private  interests  of  powerful  domestic  groups  or 
bureaucracies  are  concealed. 
"States  (or  other  political  institutions)  represent  some  subsets  of  domestic  society,  on  the 
basis  of  whose  interests  state  officials  define  state  preferences  and  act  purposively  in  world 
politics".  The  state  is  not  an  actor  per  se,  but  a  "representative  institution  constantly 
subject  to  capture  and  recapture,  construction  and  reconstruction  by  coalitions  of  social 
actors".  S8 
Policy  preferences  are  then  characterised  as  "a  set  of  fundamental  interests  defined  across 
`states  of  the  world';  [they  are]  causally  independent  of  the  strategies  of  other  actors  and, 
therefore,  prior  to  specific  interstate  political  interactions,  including  external  threats, 
incentives,  manipulations  of  information,  or  other  tactics".  S9  As  preferences  of  societal 
actors  are  determined  by  the  actors'  position  in  the  international  and  domestic  economy, 
societal  actors  apply  pressures  on  the  governments,  and  "form  coalitions,  involving 
bargaining  and  tradeoffs,  to  mobilise  the  consent  they  need  to  prevail".  60 
The  structure  of  policy  preferences  of  domestic  actors  determines,  consequently,  a  country 
and  its  elites'  inclination  towards  international  co-operation.  As  Helen  Milner  points  out: 
F 
56  J.  Frieden  (1988),  "Sectoral  Conflict  and  Foreign  Economic  Policy,  1914-1940",  International 
Organization,  Vol.  42,  n.  1,  Winter,  The  State  and  American  Foreign  Economic  Policy,  pp.  88-89 
57  A.  Moravcsik  (1997),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  518 
5:  Ibid.  p.  518 
59  Ibid.,  p.  519 
6o  P.  Gourevitch  (1986),  Politics  in  Hard  Times.  Comparative  Responses  to  International  Economic  Crises, 
(Ithaca:  Cornell  University  Press),  p.  55 
42 "Co-operation  among  nations  is  affected  less  by  fears  of  other  countries'  relative  gains  than  it  is by  the 
domestic  distributional  consequences  of  co-operative  endeavours.  Co-operative  agreements  create  winners 
and  losers  domestically;  therefore  they  generate  supporters  and  opponents.  The  internal  struggle  between 
these  two  groups  shapes  the  possibility  and  nature  of  international  co-operative  agreements".  61 
Domestic  coalitions  are  constructed  precisely  as  a  result  of  this  dynamic  reaction  between 
winners  and  losers  of  externally  induced  actions  (what  Moravcsik  calls  "domestic 
distributional  conflict").  62  Ronald  Rogowski  relates  the  emergence  and  realignment  of 
domestic  coalitions  to  the  distinctive  factor  endowment  of  each  country  and  to  shifts  in 
international  trade  flows.  Following  the  assumptions  of  the  Stoper-Samuelson  theorem  of 
international  trade,  Rogowski  highlights  the  divergent  effects  that  the  introduction  of 
protectionist  measures  produce  on  different  economic  actors,  motivating  them  to  political 
mobilisation  in  pursue  of  protectionist  measures. 
Protectionism  benefits  owners  of  factors  in  which,  relatively  to  the  rest  of  the  world,  the 
country  is  poorly  endowed,  while  it  penalises  owners  of  factors  which,  relatively  to  the  rest 
of  the  world  the  country  is  richly  endowed  (or  producers  who  use  those  locally  abundant 
factors  intensively).  As  a  result,  those  who  benefit  from  the  change  in  trading  patterns  will 
try  to  continue  accelerating  change,  while  those  who  suffer  from  it  will  try  to  retard  or  halt 
change.  Economic  wealth  is  rapidly  translated  into  political  capital  and  an  expansion  in 
influence  on  (or  within)  policy-making  institutions.  63  Coalitions  can  also  be  based  on 
sectors,  rather  than  on  factors  of  production,  or  they  can  emerge  on  the  convergence  of 
firm's  interests.  64 
The  effects  of  variations  in  international  conditions  on  the  domestic  scene  become  more 
intense  in  a  world  exposed  to  increasing  internationalisation.  Helen  Milner  and  Robert 
61  H.  V.  Milner  (1997),  Op.  Cit.,  pp.  9-10. 
62  A.  Moravcsik  (1997),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  529 
63  R.  Rogowski  (1989),  Commerce  and  Coalitions:  How  Trade  Affects  Domestic  Political  Alignments, 
(Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press) 
, 
Chapter  1,  pp.  3-20 
64  P.  Gourevitch  (1986),  Op.  Cit., 
43 Keohane  define  internationalisation  as  the  "processes  generated  by  underlying  shifts  in 
transaction  costs  that  produce  observable  flows  of  goods,  services  and  capital". 
Internationalisation  is  seen  to  affect  domestic  politics  in  two  ways.  Firstly,  by  modifying 
the  opportunities  and  constraints  facing  social  and  economic  actors,  internationalisation 
influences  the  policy  preferences  of  actors,  that  is  their  choices  about  which  policies  will  be 
more  effective  to  achieve  their  goals.  Secondly,  internationalisation  produces  effects  on  the 
aggregate  welfare  of  countries,  increasing  their  sensitivity  and  vulnerability  to  external 
changes,  and,  therefore,  the  constraints  and  opportunities  that  their  governments  face.  65 
From  an  analytical  perspective  the  concepts  of  coalitions  and  preferences  become  important 
tools  to  decode  the  policy  process.  In  order  to  understand  the  policy  choices  adopted  by  a 
government,  Gourevitch  suggests  the  analysis  to  be  focused  on  the  coalitions  that  were 
formed  in  connection  with  alternative  policy  packages,  on  the  assumption  that  choices 
made  by  politicians  are  constrained  by  "the  need  to  mobilise  or  retain  support". 
"To  understand  a  country's  policy  choice  requires  us  to  do  some  mapping  of  the  country's  production  profile: 
the  situation  of  the  societal  actors  in  the  international  economy,  the  actor's  policy  preferences,  their  potential 
bases  of  alliance  or  conflict  with  other  forces,  and  the  coalitions  that  emerge.  When  countries  converge  (or 
diverge)  on  economic  policy,  they  are  likely  to  do  so  because  of  the  similarity  (or  difference)  in  the  pattern  of 
preferences  among  societal  actors.  , 66 
While  the  concept  of  coalitions  provides  an  important  link  between  the  domestic  and 
international  political  levels,  bureaucratic  politics  too  offers  a  critical  element.  In  theories 
of  domestic  politics  the  state  is depicted  as  neither  the  only  significant  actor,  nor 
necessarily  the  most  important  one.  The  state  does  not  always  act  as  a  rational  unified 
entity.  State  officials  become  themselves  part  of  the  preference-game  using  their  unique 
65  H.  V.  Milner  and  R.  O.  Keohane  (1996),  "Internationalisation  and  Domestic  Politics:  An  Introduction",  in 
Internationalisation  and  Domestic  Politics,  edited  by  H.  V.  Milner  and  R.  O.  Keohane  (Cambridge:  CUP),  p. 
4;  see  also  J.  Frieden  and  R.  Rogowsldi,  (1996),  "The  Impact  of  the  International  Economy  on  national 
Policies:  An  Analytical  Overview",  in  Internationalisation  and  Domestic  Politics,  edited  by  H.  V.  Milner  and 
R.  O.  Keohane  (Cambridge:  CUP),  pp.  25-47 
66  P  Gourevitch  (1986),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  59 
44 position  to  enter  into  transnational  coalitions  and  alter  the  stakes  and  outcome  of  political 
debates. 
Thanks  to  the  administrative  resources  they  manage,  bureaucrats  can  mobilise  otherwise 
inactive  societal  groups  to  counterbalance  the  political  weight  of  their  adversaries. 
Moreover,  they  can  modify  the  state  institutions  and  utilise  their  position  as  the  principal 
makers  of  foreign  policy.  67  This  is  a  situation  in  which,  in  the  words  of  Henry  Kissinger, 
"the  staff  on  which  modem  executives  come  to  depend  develop  a  momentum  on  their  own. 
What  starts  out  as  an  aid  to  decision-makers  often  turns  into  a  practically  autonomous 
organisation  whose  internal  problems  structure  and  sometimes  compound  the  issues  which 
s68  it  was  originally  designed  to  solve. 
The  study  of  bureaucratic  politics  originated  as  a  result  of  the  considerable  growth  of 
bureaucracies  as  complex  and  independent  structures: 
"The  size  of  this  bureaucracy  and  the  scale  of  its  operations  have  become  so  large  that  they  lead  to  a  lack  of 
control  by  central  foreign  policy  decision-makers.  Informal  networks  and  alliances,  reinforced  by  the 
idiosyncratic  factors  tied  to  the  character  and  position  of  particular  individuals,  work  in  the  same  direction".  69 
In  their  classical  analysis  of  the  American  security  system,  Graham  Allison  and  Morton 
Halperin  provide  a  framework  of  interpretation,  which  intends  to  disprove  the  traditional 
assumption  of  "purposive  unitary  nations".  On  the  basis  of  this  assumption  the  actions  of 
international  actors  are  understood  as  the  behaviour  of  unified  national  governments,  and 
the  analysis  of  international  politics  focuses  on  "the  interests  and  goals  of  a  nation,  the 
alternative  courses  of  actions  available,  and  the  costs  and  benefits  of  each  alternative". 
67  G.  J. Ikenberry  et  al.  (1988),  "Introduction:  Approaches  to  Explaining  American  Foreign  Economic 
Policy",  International  Organization,  Vol.  42,  n.  1,  The  State  and  American  Foreign  Economic  Policy,  Winter, 
p.  10 
68  H.  A.  Kissinger  (1977),  American  Foreign  Policy,  (New  York:  W.  W.  Norton  &Company),  Third  Edition,, 
p.  20 
69  P.  J.  Katzenstein  (1977),  "Introduction:  Domestic  and  International  Forces  and  Strategies  of  Foreign 
Economic  Policy",  International  Organization,  Vol.  31,  n.  4,  Autumn,  Between  Power  and  Plenty:  Foreign 
Economic  Policies  of  Advanced  Industrial  States,  pp.  598. 
45 On  the  contrary,  bureaucratic  politics  values  the  fact  that  the  bureaucracy,  in  its  capacity  as 
concrete  maker  of  the  government's  policy,  is  not  "one  calculating  decision-maker,  but 
rather  a  conglomerate  of  large  organisations  and  political  actors,  who  differ  substantially 
about  what  their  government  should  do  [...  ],  and  who  compete  in  attempting  to  affect  both 
governmental  decisions  and  the  actions  of  their  government".  70 
In  a  different  study  on  the  American  decision  to  deploy  a  ballistic  missile  defence  system  in 
the  late  1960s,  Halperin  follows  the  same  methodology  and  dissects  the  main  actors 
involved  in  the  decision-making  process  (the  Army,  the  Directorate  of  Defence,  Research 
and  Engineering).  To  understand  the  final  resolution,  he  argues,  it  is  important  to  identify 
interests  and  preferences  of  the  main  actors.  "When  individuals  in  the  American 
government  consider  a  proposed  change  in  the  American  foreign  policy,  they  often  see  and 
emphasise  quite  different  things  and  reach  different  conclusions".  A  foreign  policy 
decision  then  never  appears  as  the  outcome  of  a  unitary  will,  but  rather  as  the  result  of  the 
"pulling  and  hauling  of  many  different  players  with  different  interests".  1 
Finally,  the  role  of  institutions  needs  to  be  considered  in  the  relationship  between  domestic 
and  international  politics.  Theories  of  domestic  politics  can  be  divided  in  two  sub-groups 
depending  on  whether  they  emphasise  the  role  of  societal  actors  (society-based  theories)  or 
the  role  of  state  institutions  (institution-based  theories)  in  the  process  of  determining 
preferences. 
Society-centred  approaches  (especially  those  studying  American  economic  foreign  policy 
making)  have  been  accused  of  devoting  scarce  attention  to  the  contribution  and  the 
mediating  role  exercised  by  government  institutions.  Institution-based  theorists  lament  that 
in  society-based  approaches  government  institutions  are  seen  as  providing  only  an  arena  for 
group  competition  while  having  no  significant  impact  on  resulting  decisions.  This  is  why, 
it  is  remarked,  society-centred  approaches  risk  overlooking  the  "critical  intervening  role 
70  G.  T.  Allison  and  M.  H.  Halperin  (1972),  "Bureaucratic  Politics:  A  Paradigm  and  some  Policy 
Implications",  World  Politics.  24,  Supplement,  pp.  40-72 
71  M.  H.  Halperin  (1972),  'The  Decision  to  Deploy  the  ABM:  Bureaucratic  and  Domestic  Politics  in  the 
Johnson  Administration".  International  Organization,  Vol.  25,  n.  1,  October,  pp.  65,90 
46 that  state  actors  and  institutions  may  play  in  shaping  the  constellation  and  impact  of  interest 
groups  in  the  policy  process".  72 
In  institution-centred  approaches  institutions  are  presented  as  a  filter  that  selects  and 
channels  societal  pressures.  "By  setting  down  the  rules  of  the  game,  institutions  reward  or 
punish  specific  groups,  interests,  visions,  persons".  The  importance  of  institutions  lies  "in 
the  way  a  given  structure  at  specific  historic  moments  helps  one  set  of  opinions  prevail  over 
another".  73  Milner  defines  institutions  as  "socially  accepted  constraints  or  rules  that  shape 
human  interactions".  In  particular,  political  institutions  "shape  the  process  by  which 
preferences  are  aggregated". 
There  are  four  crucial  powers  that  confer  domestic  actors  authority  in  the  process  of 
aggregating  preferences: 
(i)  Initiating  and  setting  the  agenda 
(ii)  Amending  proposed  policies 
(iii)  Ratifying  or  vetoing  policies 
(iv)  Proposing  public  referenda.  74 
Institutions  and  preferences  interact  according  to  a  `spill-over'  schema.  Policies  influence 
the  structure  of  society,  so  that  uncompetitive  actors  are  eliminated  from  it,  while  strong 
actors  prosper.  Gradually  interests  are  altered  and  reshaped,  and  with  them  preferences. 
Groups  develop  an  interest  in  the  policy  of  the  supranational  state  and  in  its  institutions. 
The  institutions  produce,  then,  their  own  constituencies,  which  have  a  stake  in  the 
perpetuation  and  growth  of  the  system.  "Politicians  judge  the  domestic  political  costs  of 
honouring  the  commitments,  and  voters  and  interest  groups  judge  the  effects  of  those 
72  G.  J.  Ikenberry  et  al.,  (1988),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  9 
73  P.  A.  Gourevitch  (1978),  "The  Second  Image  Reversed:  the  International  Sources  of  Domestic  Politics", 
International  Organization,  Vol.  32,  n.  4,  Autumn,  p.  904 
74  H.  V.  Milner  (1997),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  18 
47 policies  on  their  welfare.  Institutions  alter  these  strategic  judgements,  but  one  of  the 
variables  at  play  is  the  durability  of  the  institutions  themselves".  5 
The  different  response  that  institutions  give  to  societal  pressures  is  the  result  of  historical 
factors  that  characterised  the  development  of  the  state.  Scholars  distinguish  between  weak 
states,  which  have  fragmented  political  institutions  and  are,  therefore,  open  to  pressures 
from  interest  groups  and  parties,  and  strong  states,  which  consist  of  centralised  political 
institutions  with  strong  bureaucracies  and  are,  therefore,  able  to  preserve  a  higher  degree  of 
autonomy  vis-ä-vis  society.  76 
The  nature  of  the  state  (weak  vs.  strong  state)  is  determined  by  a  number  of  factors,  of 
which  difference  in  models  of  economic  growth  is  probably  the  most  important  one. 
Gerschenkron's  theory  on  the  sequence  of  industrialisation  shows  that  late  modernisers 
(France,  Germany,  Japan,  and  Russia)  required  a  massive  intervention  of  the  state  to 
support  a  rapid  rate  of  growth  and  the  development  of  economic  sectors  that  required  a 
heavy  injection  of  capital.  As  Krasner  summarises  it,  "the  state  played  a  direct  role  in 
moving  the  economy  from  a  mercantile  and  agricultural  base  to  an  industrial  one, 
particularly  by  mobilising  resources  and  dispensing  investment  funds".  77 
Also  Katzenstein  stresses  the  influence  exercised  by  historical  factors,  such  as  "  the 
elimination  of  feudalism,  the  unfolding  of  the  industrial  revolution,  the  building  of  a 
modem  state"  on  the  current  shape  of  contemporary  states.  Katzenstein  distinguishes 
between  countries  with  a  democratic  past  that  experienced  the  industrial  revolution  earlier 
(Anglo-Saxon  model),  and  favoured  a  liberal  approach  to  international  political  economy; 
and  countries  with  an  authoritarian  past,  which  experienced  industrial  revolution  later 
(Japan,  "state  capitalism  model")  and  were  supportive  of  mercantilist  strategies.  79 
75  P.  A.  Gourevitch  (1996),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  364 
76  T.  Risse-Kappen  (1991),  "Public  Opinion,  Domestic  Structure,  and  Foreign  Policy  in  Liberal 
Democracies",  International  Organization,  Vol.  53,  N.  4,  July,  p.  484  and  495 
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48 Both  democratic  institutions  and  coalition-building  interact  heavily  to  construct  a  model  of 
foreign  policy  decision-making  that  is  specific  for  each  individual  state.  "State  structures 
do  not  determine  the  specific  content  of  direction  of  policies",  and  coalition-building  takes 
place  in  the  framework  of  political  and  societal  institutions.  The  structures  of  the  society 
and  the  political  system  determine  the  size  and  strength  of  policy  coalitions  needed  to 
create  the  support  basis  for  specific  policies.  79 
Arguments  Against  Institutionalist  and  Transnational  Theories 
In  the  case  of  co-operation  between  Russia  and  Ukraine,  the  institutionalist  and 
transnationalist  theories  outlined  in  the  previous  sections  contain  two  sets  of  problems  that 
together  render  them  insufficient  to  explain  relations  between  the  two  countries. 
First,  these  approaches  take  the  concept  of  interest  for  granted,  so  ignoring  the  domestic 
scene  through  which  these  interests  are  defined,  the  agents  that  participate  in  the  definition 
of  interest,  and  the  possible  changes  in  this  definition  that  can  occur  through  time.  This 
argument  is  important  in  the  case  of  Russo-Ukrainian  relations  because  of  the  special 
position  that  powerful  interest  groups  occupy  in  the  process  of  interest-definition  and  in 
setting  the  agenda  pro  or  against  co-operation. 
The  second  problem  is  related  to  what  Ernst  Haas  calls  "the  end  of  ideology"  and  David 
Mitrany  emphasises  in  the  triumph  of  administration.  Ideology  and  nationalism  (be  it 
genuine  or  an  artificial  construction)  are  factors  that  have  become  an  integral  part  of  the 
political  discourse  in  post-Soviet  Russia  and  Ukraine,  intensified  by  the  complexity  of  their 
common  history  and  interrelation,  and  still  weight  heavily  on  the  course  of  their  bilateral 
relations. 
78  P.  J.  Katzenstein  (1977),  "Conclusion:  Domestic  Structures  and  Strategies  of  Foreign  Economic  Policy", 
International  Organization.  Vol.  31,  n.  4,  Autumn,  Between  Power  and  Plenty:  Foreign  Economic  Policies  of 
Advanced  Industrial  States,  pp.  907-908 
49 When  they  talk  about  interests,  institutional  and  transnational  theorists  present  an 
immutable  concept  of  interests,  consistent  in  time  and  irrespective  of  different  contingent 
situations.  Even  if  they  do  not  presume  complete  harmony  within  the  same  society, 
institutionalists  and  transnationalists  do  not  explain  how  interests  are  aggregated,  how  they 
are  represented  within  the  governmental  institutions,  how  they  come  to  be  put  forward  and 
defended  as  the  national  interest. 
Deutsch's  notion  of  "mutual  responsiveness"  is  an  example  of  this  shortcoming.  By 
establishing  mutual  transactions,  based  on  the  exchange  of  mail,  visits,  and  other  sorts  of 
information,  single  individuals,  he  maintains,  become  the  primary  protagonists  of  the 
integration  process.  They  contribute  to  the  construction  of  a  "we-feeling"  and  a  "special 
relationship"  that  make  violence  an  inconceivable  instrument  for  the  solution  of  conflicts. 
Yet,  shall  we  assume  that  individuals  share  the  same  vision  of  the  world?  Will  they  have 
the  same  interests  irrespectively  of  their  class,  ethnic,  gender,  religious,  or  geographical 
belonging?  80  Increased  communication  does  not  imply  automatic  commonality  of  interests. 
This  seems  particularly  true  in  the  case  of  Russian  and  Ukrainian  economic  elites,  which 
are  indeed  competing  for  control  over  markets  and  limited  resources.  In  this  case,  some 
sections  of  the  economic  elites  become  a  barrier  to  rather  than  a  "transmission  belt"  for  co- 
operation. 
Furthermore,  when  the  international  dimension  is  introduced  into  the  political  game,  neither 
Deutsch  nor  his  fellow  transnationalists  conduct  a  systematic  analysis  of  the  repercussions 
that  the  international  level  produces  on  the  domestic  one.  81  They  seem  to  ignore  effects  of 
economic  fluctuations  on  domestic  economic  agents,  political  pressures  imposed  by 
international  organisations  on  internal  governments,  or  even  effects  of  changes  in  domestic 
regulations  as  a  result  of  international  agreements. 
79  T.  Risse-Kappen  (1991),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  485 
80  For  a  critical  interpretation  of  Deutsch's  work,  and,  in  particular,  of  the  contradictions  inherent  in  the 
concept  of  transactions  see  J.  K.  De  Vree  (1972),  Political  Integration:  The  Formation  of  Theory  and  its 
Problems,  (The  Hague:  Mounton),  chapter  4. 
50 By  ignoring  this  interrelation,  transnationalist  views  fails  to  capture  the  dynamic  dimension 
of  polities  and  societies.  Interests  may  change  over  time,  even  within  the  same  elite  group, 
and  coalitions  may  converge  in  a  certain  period  or  diverge  in  another,  as  a  consequence  of 
alterations  in  the  domestic  as  well  as  in  the  international  arena.  Elite  groups  may  be 
satisfied  with  a  limited  form  of  integration  (or  co-operation)  in  one  period,  and  lobby  for 
more  integration  (or  co-operation)  in  another  period.  82 
Only  an  accurate  analysis  of  the  domestic  structures,  the  weight  of  institutional  and  non- 
institutional  actors  on  the  decision-making  process,  the  groups'  preferences  and  the  effects 
that  on  these  preferences  external  factors  produce  can  help  understanding  the  alternate 
course  of  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine,  and  the  possibility  of  changes  in  a  future 
course. 
Mitrany's  presumption  of  a  bloc  of  "needs",  common  to  the  whole  society,  recognised  and 
attended  by  a  bureaucratic  elite  not  only  presents  an  immobile  vision  of  society,  but 
involves  inherent  risks  of  authoritarian  degeneration.  In  Mitrany's  explanation,  needs  are 
given,  and  factors  like  ideology  or  non-rational  behaviour  play  no  role  in  their 
determination.  Few  individuals  (without  any  specification  of  how  those  individuals  should 
be  selected)  are  allowed  to  participate  in  the  administration,  but  not  in  the  definition  of 
needs,  which  is  a  role  reserved  to  the  bureaucrats. 
The  assumption  that  the  bureaucracy  acts  as  an  impartial  interpreter  of  societal  interests 
presents  problems.  How  do  bureaucrats  understand  societal  interests?  Do  not  technocrats 
have  their  own  values?  Is  not  technocracy  an  ideology  it  itself?  Ideas  like  welfare,  one  of 
the  principal  needs  identified  by  Mitrany,  is  not  a  universal  concept,  and  different  countries, 
differing  in  size,  natural  resource  endowment,  level  of  economic  and  social  development 
and  ideological  orientation,  may  not  share  the  same  interests. 
81  H.  V.  Milner  and  R.  O.  Keohane  (1996),  Op.  Cit., 
82  The  fluctuation  of  interests  and  the  lack  of  immobility  in  elite  coalitions  are  often  brought  in  to  explain,  for 
example,  the  stop-and-go  pattern  of  European  integration.  On  this  point  see  W.  Sandholtz  and  L.  Zysman 
(1989),  "1992:  Recasting  the  European  Bargain",  World  Politics.  Vol.  42,  n.  1,  October,  pp.  95-128. 
51 Centralisation  and  bureaucratisation  can  easily  lead  to  a  world  where  control  and 
administration  are  completely  taken  over  by  a  class  of  bureaucrats  and  technocrats.  The 
ultimate  possible  consequence  is  an  oligarchic  or  totalitarian  structure,  where,  in  the  name 
of  efficiency,  political  debate  and  ideological  disputes  are  reduced  or  banned.  Who  can 
decide  when  activities  are  "inherently  controversial",  and  must  then  be  subjected  to 
political  discussions,  or  are  "inherently  non-controversial"  and  belong,  to  the  realm  of 
technical  evaluations? 
Also  the  architects  of  the  European  integration,  together  with  Ernest  Haas'  theory  of 
convergent  cross-border  coalitions,  believed  in  the  existence  of  a  non-ideological  approach 
based  on  procedural  consensus,  where  the  individual's  choices  are  made  on  the  basis  of 
pure  self-interest.  If,  on  the  one  side,  this  perspective  appears  fascinating  for  its  efficiency- 
boosting  approach,  on  the  other  side  depicting  political  controversies  as  a  surmountable 
inconvenient,  rarely  corresponds  to  reality. 
In  the  case  of  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  this  perspective  ignores  three  main 
aspects.  Firstly,  the  significance  that  post-Soviet  Ukraine  attaches  to  its  sovereignty. 
Secondly  the  fact  that  in  Russia  and  Ukraine  politics  and  economics  are  not  two  divorced 
aspects  of  life.  Thirdly  that  segments  of  society,  which  might  be  conducive  of  increased 
co-operation,  are  part  of  a  finely  tuned  balance  of  institutional  and  societal  forces  that  may 
construct  significant  opposition  on  an  issue  as  sensitive  as  bilateral  relations.  I  shall  return 
on  these  points  after  another  examination  of  Ernst  Haas'  theory  of  transnational  coalitions. 
In  the  first  edition  of  his  work  on  European  integration  Ernst  Haas  prophesised  that  post- 
war  Europe  was  ready  to  give  up  national  sovereignty  and  ideological  confrontation,  as 
nationalism  and  ideology  were  phenomena  that  belonged  to  the  past.  The  end  of  ideology 
was,  Haas  argued,  the  cornerstone  on  which  European  integration  would  be  built.  The 
stalling  of  the  integration  process,  instead,  brought  about  mainly  by  the  leadership  of 
General  De  Gaulle  and  his  policy  of  grandeur,  contradicted  severely  this  belief.  83 
83  The  whole  section  is  based  on  E.  B.  Haas  (1968),  Op.  Cit.,  the  Author's  Preface,  pp.  XI-XXX 
52 With  the  insight  of  ten  years  of  history,  Haas  admits  in  a  further  edition  of  his  book,  the 
limitations  of  his  theory  and  reassesses  it,  pointing  out  a  number  of  alternative  factors  to  the 
"end  of  ideology",  that  took  Europe  to  a  consolidation  of  its  mutual  interrelation.  Haas 
provides  a  new  definition  of  nationalism  and  an  analysis  of  the  conditions  that  at  the  end  of 
the  Second  World  War,  convinced  European  countries  to  relegate  nationalistic  forces  to  the 
margin  of  the  political  panorama. 
Haas  distinguishes  between  three  key  concepts.  First,  an  ideology  of  nationalism,  which 
presents  "positive  values  with  respect  to  one's  own  nation  and  less  positive  ones  for  the 
outsiders".  Second,  a  national  consciousness,  which  corresponds  to  the  feeling  of 
belonging  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  state,  and  finally  a  national  situation,  which  is  a 
"condition  in  time  and  space  describing  the  power,  freedom  of  manoeuvre  and  ranks  of 
one's  nation  vis-ä-vis  others". 
Haas  argues  that,  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Second  World  War,  the  European  nations  shared  a 
very  pessimistic  view  of  their  national  situation,  regarding  themselves  as  either  defeated  or 
dependant  countries,  faced  with  the  gigantic  task  of  post-war  reconstruction.  The  national 
consciousness  reflected  this  negative  perception,  and,  as  a  result,  the  ideologies  of 
nationalism  were  "far  from  ebullient,  self-confident,  assertive  and  hostile".  This  whole 
condition  provided  the  perfect  ground  for  the  demise  of  a  discredited  national  power  in 
favour  of  a  more  reliable  supranational  institution,  which  would  guarantee  "security  and 
welfare,  peace  and  plenty  without  repeating  the  nationalist  mistakes  of  an  earlier  generation 
of  statesmen". 
This  functionalist  approach  was  seen  as  the  winning  attitude  in  the  process  of  European 
integration,  because  the  process  itself  was  set  in  motion  to  "safeguard  an  existing  way  of 
life".  The  establishment  of  a  "welfare  state",  with  its  subordination  of  "world 
commitments  and  an  independent  foreign  policy  to  the  economic  and  fiscal  demands  of 
domestic  welfare",  became  a  crucial  task  of  the  European  countries'  policies.  On  this  basis, 
politics  developed  as  an  instrument  to  achieve  economic  aims.  The  early  architects  of 
European  integration  "had  decided  to  leave  the  game  of  high  politics  and  devote  themselves 
53 to  the  building  of  Europe,  to  achieve  more  modest  aims".  By  doing  so  they  provided  the 
"shelter"  needed  by  the  economic  technicians  to  enhance  their  project. 
In  the  years  to  come,  however,  functionalism  proved  a  short-lived  framework,  unable  to 
respond  elastically  to  a  change  in  the  international  system.  When  the  depressing 
perspectives  of  the  post-war  years  gave  way  to  the  resurgence  of  the  national  state,  the 
defence  of  its  alternative  interests  vis-ä-vis  the  supranational  structure  appeared  again  to  be 
of  primary  importance.  Haas  recognises  the  shortcomings  of  his  theory  as  formulated  in 
1958  in  not  having  foreseen  the  emergence  of  a  figure  like  General  de  Gaulle,  who  gave 
back  his  country  the  vision  of  a  positive  national  situation,  and  restored  politics  in  its 
traditional  position  of  pre-eminence  vis-ä-vis  economics.  With  the  advent  of  General  de 
Gaulle  the  process  of  European  integration  came  to  a  halt. 
The  reliance  of  the  process  of  integration  exclusively  on  the  pursuit  of  welfare  is  what  Haas 
defines  one  of  its  "built-in  limits".  The  primary  shortcoming  of  this  approach  is  precisely 
what  was  originally  seen  as  its  strong  point:  the  absence  of  ideology.  "Pragmatic  interests, 
because  they  are  pragmatic  and  not  reinforced  with  deep  ideological  or  philosophical 
commitment  are  ephemeral".  They  are  fragile  and  can  easily  be  relegated  to  a  marginal 
position,  when  the  general  circumstances  change.  The  consequence  is  that  "a  political 
process  that  is  built  and  projected  from  pragmatist  interests  is bound  to  be  a  frail  process 
susceptible  to  reversal.  And  so  integration  can  turn  into  disintegration". 
The  theory  of  integration  promoted  by  Ernst  Haas  is  given  particular  consideration  here 
because  it  corresponds  very  closely  to  the  theory  of  co-operation  put  forward  by 
pragmatists  in  Russia  and  Ukraine,  and  to  the  CIS  doctrine  of  integration.  The 
shortcomings  illustrated  by  Haas  are  thus  relevant  also  in  the  post-Soviet  case.  There  are 
four  points  particularly  worth  raising. 
First,  the  Ukrainian  "national  situation"  in  the  period  between  1994-1998  did  not  seem 
conducive  of  integration  with  Russia.  The  defence  of  a  newly  acquired  sovereignty  was 
high  on  the  agenda  of  political  forces  and  still  enjoyed  wide  support  among  the  population. 
54 The  signature  of  a  comprehensive  Treaty  of  Friendship  and  Co-operation  in  May  1997, 
repeated  efforts  to  re-orient  energy  supply  markets  to  curb  the  dependence  on  Russia,  and 
improved  links  with  Western  partners  were  evidence  of  an  attempt  to  place  relations  with 
Russia  on  an  equal  footing.  The  recognition  and  safeguard  of  Ukraine's  autonomy  and 
sovereignty  were  key  aspects  of  this  policy. 
Second,  both  in  Russia  and  Ukraine  there  was  no  separation  between  politics  and 
economics,  even  though  technocratic  arguments  acquired  a  wide  audience.  In  the  period 
under  examination,  on  the  contrary,  the  economy  and  politics  were  strongly  intertwined. 
When  members  of  the  economic  elite  joined  together  they  made  a  political  statement. 
When  they  became  engaged  in  political  activities  they  had  an  interest,  often  a  private 
interest,  in  claiming  special  conditions  for  their  business  or  for  their  sector.  In  Russia  and 
Ukraine  access  to  the  political  sphere  enabled  access  to  restricted  markets,  the  creation  of 
monopolies,  the  allocation  of  budget  resources,  and  the  acquisition  of  privatised  assets. 
Third,  Haas'  approach  ignores  the  combination  of  the  social  and  political  forces  in  Russia 
and  Ukraine;  the  relative  force  of  the  economic  elite  vis-ä-vis  the  other  groups,  the 
institutional  settings  and  the  permeability  of  institutions  to  societal  factors,  the  power  of  the 
economic  elite  within  the  institutions. 
All  these  elements  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  a  broad  societal  perspective  cannot  be 
overlooked  in  the  process  of  rapprochement  between  the  two  Slavic  neighbours.  Even  if 
the  forces  that  intended  to  promote  the  process  enjoyed  transnational  connections,  if  they 
had  no  considerable  influence  on  the  social  and  the  institutional  level,  the  process  was 
bound  to  failure.  Control  of  (or  influence  over)  the  institutional  level  allowed  preferences 
towards  integration  and  co-operation  to  find  a  space  on  the  political  agenda. 
Conversely,  opposition  to  integration  and  co-operation  among  segments  of  the  elite  that 
enjoyed  direct  access  to  policy-making  represented  a  severe  impediment  to  a  policy  of 
rapprochement.  Finally,  the  intense  fragmentation  in  the  Ukrainian  polity  along 
institutional  (executive  vs.  legislative),  geographic  (East  vs.  West),  ideological 
55 (Russophiles  vs.  Russophobes),  and  economic  (privatised  vs.  state  economy)  cleavages 
made  it  difficult  for  one  section  of  society  to  appropriate  the  discourse  over  co-operation 
and  to  advance  it  in  the  face  of  opposing  domestic  voices. 
Arguments  in  Favour  of  Theories  of  Domestic  Politics 
For  the  reasons  discussed  above,  institutional  and  transnational  theories  of  international 
relations  are  insufficient  to  provide  a  comprehensive  understanding  of  relations  between 
Russia  and  Ukraine.  Instead,  I  propose  to  supplement  them  with  theories  of  domestic 
politics  as  they  are  better  equipped  to  account  for  relations  between  the  two  countries,  in 
particular  their  dynamic  character. 
The  concept  of  social  identity,  for  example,  is  of  central  importance  for  post-Soviet  Russia 
and  Ukraine  as  it  defines  the  "bargaining  space"  within  which  concessions  can  be  made  and 
a  rapprochement  can  be  negotiated.  Andrew  Moravcsik  defines  social  identity  as  "the  set 
of  preferences  shared  by  individuals  concerning  the  proper  scope  and  nature  of  public 
goods  provision,  which,  in  turn,  specifies  the  nature  of  legitimate  domestic  order  by 
stipulating  which  social  actors  belong  to  the  polity  and  what  is  owed  them". 
Social  perceptions  of  "legitimate  borders,  political  institutions,  and  modes  of  socio- 
economic  regulation"  set  the  ground  for  a  discussion  on  the  terms  of  the  bilateral  relations 
and  inform  the  foreign  policy  of  the  two  countries.  The  hypothesis  being,  to  put  it  again  in 
Moravcsik's  words,  that  if  national  claims  can  be  made  more  compatible  by  reciprocal 
policy  adjustment,  co-operation  is  likely.  Whereas,  if  social  identities  are  incompatible  and 
create  significant  negative  externalities,  tension  and  zero-sum  conflict  are  more  likely.  84 
Furthermore,  because  Ukraine,  and  in  a  different  way  Russia,  are  both  weak  states  it  is 
important  to  define  the  set  of  actors  at  play  and  their  distinct  preferences  in  order  to 
understand  the  process  of  foreign  policy-making.  In  a  weak  state,  "political  power  is 
84  A.  Moravcsik  (1997),  Op..  Cit.,  p.  525 
56 fragmented  and  dispersed.  There  are  many  points  of  access  to  the  decision-making  process. 
Political  leaders  must  struggle  to  maintain  control  when  they  confront  opposition  from 
large  private  corporations"  85  Post-Soviet  societies  have  witnessed  the  fragmentation  of  the 
state,  increased  factionalisation  within  the  polity,  and  the  inter-penetration  of  powerful 
private  interests  with  state  institutions. 
Although  currently  weak,  Russia  and  Ukraine  have  emerged  from  a  historical  form  of 
development  that  gave  primacy  to  a  strong  state.  Within  the  Russian  Empire  and  the  Soviet 
Union  state  institutions  performed  an  entrepreneurial  role  in  the  process  of  industrialisation 
and  economic  growth.  This  understanding  of  the  correct  role  of  the  state  still  informs  the 
political  culture  of  the  region  and  makes  mercantilist  and  protectionist  options  not  only 
legitimate  but  a  defining  activity  of  the  state.  In  the  period  1994-98  this  conception  of  the 
essential  role  of  the  state,  with  its  mercantilist  and  protectionist  assumptions  and  arguments 
of  economic  nationalism,  served  to  justify  the  emergence  of  coalitions  forged  from  political 
and  economic  actors  in  favour  of  narrow  economic  interests. 
The  definition  of  policy  objectives,  therefore,  reflected  the  preferences  and  material 
interests  of  the  ruling  coalition,  which  combined  political  and  economic  forces  often  placed 
in  "institutions  a  step  removed  from  electoral".  86  The  structure  of  the  domestic  political 
system  acquired  then  a  special  importance,  as  the  conditions  of  domestic  political 
representation  determined  whose  social  preferences  were  institutionally  privileged.  As 
Moravcsik  has  noted  "When  political  representation  is biased  in  favour  of  particularistic 
groups,  they  tend  to  `capture'  government  institutions  and  employ  them  for  their  needs 
alone,  systematically  passing  on  the  costs  and  risks  to  others.  The  precise  policy  of 
governments  depends  on  which  domestic  groups  are  represented".  87 
A  final  element  that  requires  consideration  is  the  degree  of  interrelation  between  elements 
of  the  domestic  economy  with  world  markets,  and  the  degree  to  which  domestic  agents  are 
exposed  to  fluctuations  in  the  international  system.  In  countries  like  Ukraine  and  Russia, 
85  S.  D.  Krasner  (1978),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  18 
86  P.  J.  Katzenstein  (1977),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  892 
57 which  are  economically  unstable  and  institutionally  weak,  internationalisation  increased  the 
vulnerability  of  internal  markets  vis-ä-vis  world  markets.  In  the  early  phase  of  transition, 
economic  shocks  from  abroad  were  more  fully  and  quickly  translated  into  the  domestic 
economy. 
At  the  same  time,  the  autonomy  of  the  governments'  macroeconomic  policies  was  severely 
restricted  by  internationalisation,  while  weak  domestic  institutions  were  incapable  or 
unwilling  to  make  appropriate  but  unpopular  responses.  This  phenomenon  was  reflected  in 
the  emergence  of  ephemeral  political-economic  coalitions  exposed  to  and  affected  by 
international  fluctuations,  in  which  mobile  capital,  with  its  increased  opportunities  for  exit, 
easily  translated  its  economic  influence  into  political  power.  88 
Conclusions 
The  pluralist  theories  of  international  relations  outlined  above  contribute  important  insights 
into  the  nature  of  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  in  the  period  1994-98. 
Institutionalist  and  transnationalist  theories,  in  particular,  with  the  emphasis  they  place  on 
supranational  institutions  and  transnational  coalitions  as  agents  of  co-operation,  recall  the 
Russo-Ukrainian  pragmatist  approach  and  the  CIS  doctrine  of  integration.  These  two 
approaches  fail,  however,  to  account  for  the  fluid  and  unstable  situation  that  developed  in 
relations  between  the  post-Soviet  states.  To  understand  the  reality  of  the  bilateral  relations 
and  the  possible  changes  of  course  in  the  future,  the  domestic  balance  of  power  is  a  factor 
that  cannot  be  overlooked. 
Economic  actors  alone  cannot  be  automatically  expected  to  establish  cross-border 
coalitions,  and  join  in  transnational  corporations  to  foster  co-operation,  in  virtue  of  a 
commonality  of  interests  that  goes  back  in  time  to  the  Soviet  era.  Since  independence  the 
87  A.  Moravcsik  (1997),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  530 
88  H.  V.  Milner  and  R.  O.  Keohane  (1996),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  4;  see  also  J.  Frieden  and  R.  Rogowskii  (1996),  Op. 
Cit., 
58 domestic  arena  in  both  countries  has  become  much  more  diversified.  Economic  actors  have 
not  only  developed  interests  that  conflict  with  their  neighbouring  counterparts,  but  also 
acquired  political  positions  that  allow  them  to  transform  their  individual  preferences  into 
foreign  policy  measures.  While  the  interests  of  the  Russian  economic  elite  were  defined 
primarily  by  the  aim  of  gaining  access  to  the  Ukrainian  market  through  acquisition  of  major 
industrial  plants,  the  Ukrainian  economic  elite,  endowed  with  more  limited  resources,  saw 
its  interest  in  raising  institutional  barriers  to  resist  Russian  penetration  and  to  guarantee 
their  own  survival. 
Furthermore,  factors  like  the  two  countries'  institutional  setting,  the  access  they  granted  to 
business  representation,  and  the  importance  that  the  Ukrainian  public  ascribed  to  the  newly 
acquired  sovereignty,  must  be  included  in  a  comprehensive  analysis.  Theories  of  domestic 
politics  allow  one  to  take  all  these  contradictory  elements  into  account  and  to  map  a 
dynamic  picture,  considering  the  nature  of  coalitions  and  the  networks  linking  state  and 
society,  the  form  of  political  institutions  and  the  degree  of  their  centralisation,  and  the 
structure  of  the  economy  and  its  sensitivity  to  international  fluctuations. 
59 Chapter  Two 
Historical  Background 
As  highlighted  in  the  previous  chapter,  pluralist  theories  of  International  Relations 
stress  the  importance  of  such  factors  as  social  identity,  perception  of  legitimacy  of 
borders,  political  institutions  and  socio-economic  models.  Such  elements  mould  the 
definition  of  preferences  and  outline  the  "bargaining  space"  within  which  each  country 
can  make  policy  concessions  to  its  international  partners  and  accept  conditions  of  co- 
operation. 
Some  authors,  in  particular,  have  studied  the  connection  between  identity  formation  and 
foreign  policy  outcomes,  concluding  that  external  relations  often  become  an  instrument 
in  the  process  of  shaping  new  national  identities.  Foreign  states  and  foreign  groups  can 
be  used  as  a  "reference  group",  against  which  the  collective  identity  is  defined.  The 
political  implication  of  this  process  is  that  preferences  towards  integration  or  closer  co- 
operation  will  emerge  with  countries  whose  populations  are  seen  as  culturally  similar, 
while  more  distant  relations  will  be  demanded  with  countries  that  are  seen  culturally 
different.  ' 
In  this  chapter,  I  turn  to  the  historical  background  of  relations  between  Russia  and 
Ukraine,  investigating  the  elements  that  define  their  mutual  "bargaining  space",  and 
asking  whether  national  claims  are  more  or  less  compatible  to  mutual  policy 
concessions.  My  conclusion  is  that  the  common  history  of  Russia  and  Ukraine  does  not 
automatically  guarantee  improved  relations,  nor  does  it  provide  a  clear  source  of 
conflict  in  the  post-Soviet  years.  The  shared  past  of  these  two  countries  offers 
arguments  both  to  those  who  oppose  co-operation,  fearing  renewed  domination  by 
Russia,  and  to  those  who  support  a  strengthening  of  political  and  economic  ties,  in  the 
1  This  tendency  could  lead  to  the  extreme  situation  in  which  "In  states  whose  ethnic  groups  perceive 
substantial  cultural  distance  among  themselves  and  disagree  over  which  foreign  states  serve  as  positive 
and  negative  reference  groups,  there  will  be  conflict  over  foreign  policy.  This  is  because  any  given 
pattern  of  ties  with  foreign  reference  groups  will  strengthen  one  ethnic  identity  over  others  and  elevate  its 
position  in  the  contest  over  which  ethnic  identity,  if  any,  is  to  form  the  core  of  the  national  identity".  S. 
Shulman  (1998),  "National  Integration  and  Foreign  Policy  in  Multiethnic  States",  Nationalism  and  Ethnic 
Politics,  Vol.  4,  n.  4,  pp.  119-120 
60 name  of  a  common  identity  and  the  survival  of  economic  links  inherited  from  the 
USSR. 
Relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  are  not  the  `ordinary'  relations  between  two 
neighbouring  countries.  The  two  Slavic  neighbours  have  been  part  of  each  other's 
history,  identity  and  self-perception  for  centuries.  Russia  and  Ukraine  have  very  close 
languages  and  cultures,  there  are  high  levels  of  intermarriage  and  important  diaspora 
communities  exist  on  each  other's  territory.  The  two  countries  find  it  hard  to  perceive 
each  other  as  foreigners,  and  all  the  more  as  enemies.  As  some  authors  have 
appropriately  pointed  out,  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  must  be  looked  at 
from,  at  least,  two  different  angles:  as  inter-state  relations  and  as  relations  between  the 
populations  who  inhabit  the  two  countries.  2  It  is  true  that  inter-state  relations  have  been 
even  in  post-Soviet  days  harsh  and  confrontational,  but  it  is  also  true  that  they  have 
never  degenerated  into  open  hostility  because  of  the  cultural  and  historical  proximity  of 
the  peoples. 
This  not  withstanding,  the  history  of  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  is  a  history 
of  colonial  rule.  The  common  past  of  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  is  heavily 
weighted  down  by  the  autocratic  and  imperial  power  of  Russia  over  the  smaller  and 
often  politically  unaware  Ukraine.  Several  times  through  the  centuries  Ukraine  was 
deprived  of  the  right  to  use  its  own  language,  promote  its  own  separate  culture  and 
experiment  with  self-rule  for  protracted  periods.  The  legacy  of  this  past  influences 
current  inter-state  relations,  determines  the  scope  for  a  policy  of  rapprochement  and 
justifies  Ukrainian  reluctance  to  join  any  political  or economic  scheme  that  might  imply 
a  renewed  subordination  to  Russia. 
Bohdan  Krawchenko  has  defined  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  in  terms  of 
"European  colonialism".  "Ukraine  -  he  writes  -  was  not  a  colony  in  the  traditional 
sense  of  the  word.  It  was  a  colony  of  the  European  type;  that  is  one  with  an  highly 
advanced  economy  whose  development  was  distorted  by  having  to  meet  the  priorities 
2  A.  Lieven  (1999),  Ukraine  and  Russia,  a  Fraternal  Rivalry,  (Washington  D.  C:  United  States  Institute 
of  Peace  Press),  and  E.  Golovakha  and  N.  Panina,  (1997)  "Rossisko-Ukrainskie  otnosheniya  v 
obshestvennom  mnenii  Ukrainy  I  Rossii",  in  Ukraina  i  Rossiya:  Obshchestva  i  Gosudarstva,  edited  by  D. 
E.  Furman,  (Moscow:  Izdatelstvo  Prava  Cheloveka),  pp.  259-277 
61 established  by  the  Russian  state.  o93  This  reference  to  colonialism,  or  internal 
colonialism,  as  other  authors  have  pointed  out,  identifies  only  some  of  the  aspects  of  the 
complex  relationship  between  Russia  and  Ukraine,  while  it  fails  to  explain  and  it 
misrepresents  other  aspects.  It  overlooks  the  fact  that  the  nature  of  this  relationship  has 
significantly  altered  not  only  in  the  transition  from  the  Russian  Empire  to  the  Soviet 
Union,  but  also  throughout  the  Soviet  period  itself.  Different  patterns  of  interrelation 
can  be  identified  during  the  post-World  War  I  phase  and  the  Stalinist  period,  under  the 
political  and  economic  reforms  conducted  by  Khrushchev  and  in  Brezhnev's  years  of 
stagnation. 
Secondly  the  question  whether  the  Soviet  Union  was  an  empire  or  not  is  still  to  this  day 
object  of  heated  controversy,  with  Russians  vehemently  objecting  to  the  idea  that,  being 
the  centre  of  the  Empire,  they  profited  from  the  exploitation  of  the  peripheral  provinces. 
Russian  authors  note  that  "Russian  imperialism  [was]  peculiar  in  that  the  metropole 
S  failed  to  generate  economic  gains  by  exploiting  the  periphery'  . 
The  problem  of  the  role  of  the  national  elites  and  their  "collaboration"  with  the  colonial 
regime  must  also  be  addressed.  Furthermore,  the  idea  of  economic  exploitation  and  the 
3  B.  Krawchenko  (1985),  Social  Change  And  National  Consciousness  In  Twentieth-Century  Ukraine, 
London:  Macmillan), 
,  p.  185 
This  definition  is  very  close  to  the  definition  of  "internal  colonialism"  used  by  some  scholars  to  explain 
relations,  within  the  same  state,  between  a  dominant  centre  and  a  dependent  periphery.  According  to  this 
theory,  internal  colonial  structures  are  established  to  extract  wealth  from  less  privileged  areas  of  the 
country  (or  social  groups)  to  promote  economic  and  social  development  to  the  advantage  of  the  centre  (or 
the  dominant  social  group).  This  concept  encapsulates  the  essence  of  forced  collectivisation  under  Stalin. 
In  the  process  of  collectivisation,  indeed,  countryside  was  called  upon  to  support  the  industrialisation 
effort  of  the  entire  society  and  promote  "socialist  accumulation".  For  an  example  of  two  separate 
historical  cases  of  internal  colonialism  see  A.  W.  Gouldner  (1977),  "Stalinism,  a  Study  of  Internal 
Colonialism",  Telos,  Vol.  34,  Winter,  pp.  13-25,  and  M.  Hetcher  (1975),  Internal  Colonialism:  the  Celtic 
Fringe  in  British  National  Development,  1536-1966,  (London:  Routledge  and  Kegan).  For  a  cross- 
disciplinary  overview  of  internal  colonialism  see:  R.  J.  Hind(1984),  "The  Internal  Colonialism  Concept", 
Comparative  Studies  in  Society  and  History,  Vol.  26  pp  543-568,  J.  L.  Love  (1989);  "Modelling  Internal 
Colonialism  -  History  and  Prospects",  World  Development,  June,  Vol.  17,  n.  6,  pp.  905-922;  S.  M.  Di 
Giacomo  (1997),  "The  New  Internal  Colonialism",  Critique  of  Anthropology,  March,  Vol.  17,  n.  1,  pp. 
91-97. 
s  M.  A.  Molchanov  (2000),  "Post-communist  Nationalism  as  a  Power  Resource:  a  Russia-Ukraine 
Comparison",  Nationalities  Papers,  Vol.  28,  n.  2,  pp.  263-288  (quotation  p.  266).  Molchanov  maintains 
also  that  Russians  were  discriminated  against  within  the  Soviet  Union  in  terms  of  representation  in  the 
organs  of  Soviet  power  and  access  to  intellectual  professions.  (p.  270)  On  the  debate  about  whether  the 
Soviet  Union  was  indeed  an  empire  see  also:  D.  Lieven  (1995),  "The  Russian  Empire  and  the  Soviet 
Union  as  Imperial  Polities",  Journal  of  Contemporary  History,  Vol.  30,  pp.  607-636;  K.  Dawisha  and  B. 
Parrott  (Eds.  )  (1997),  The  End  of  the  Empire?  The  Transformation  of  the  USSR  in  Comparative 
62 imposition  of  a  set  of  centrally  developed  political  priorities  must  be  considered  within 
the  particular  framework  of  the  ideological  nature  of  the  Soviet  Union.  In  the  USSR  a 
sense  of  collective  mission  was  imposed  onto  the  whole  polity  (including  the  Russian 
majority). 
Finally,  in  its  unequal  relationship  with  Moscow  Ukraine  was,  nevertheless,  one  step  up 
from  other  regions  of  the  USSR,  for  example  Central  Asia.  In  the  latter  territories,  the 
scale  of  natural  resources  extraction  and  ecological  disasters  caused  by  the  model  of 
development  imposed  by  the  centre  fully  justify  the  use  of  the  term  colonialism.  6  All  of 
these  aspects  will  be  considered  in  this  chapter,  in  particular  the  burden  that  they  placed 
on  the  development  of  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  in  the  post-Soviet  period 
will  be  discussed.  I  will  start  with  a  review  of  mutual  perceptions  and  policy  views  in 
the  two  countries. 
Russian  Attitudes  towards  Ukraine 
Defining  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  in  terms  of  colonial  rule  is  a 
controversial  issue.  From  the  Moscow  point  of  view,  Russian  rule  was  never  perceived 
as  colonial  or  as  control  exercised  on  a  foreign  land.  Ukraine  was,  and  still  is, 
recognised  as  an  integral  part  of  Russia  itself  and  Kyiv  as  the  "Mother  of  all  cities  of 
Rus"'.  In  the  words  of  the  Russian  historian  Dmitrii  Likhachev,  even  after  the  split  of 
Kievan  Rus'  "into  two  entities,  Russia  and  Ukraine  formed  not  only  a  political  but  also 
a  culturally  dualistic  unity:  Russian  culture  is  meaningless  without  Ukraine,  as 
Ukrainian  is  without  Russian'  .7 
Even  advocates  of  a  more  "civilised"  relationship  between  the  two  countries,  in  which 
Russia  should  allow  Ukraine  to  assert  its  identity  and  provide  it  with  whatever 
assistance  is  possible,  did  not  fail  to  emphasise  their  shared  destiny.  "Kiev  is  our 
Perspective,  (Armok:  M.  E.  Sharpe,  );  R.  L.  Rudolph  and  D.  F.  Good,  (Eds.  )  (1992),  Nationalism  and 
Empire:  The  Habsburg  Monarchy  and  the  Soviet  Union,  (New  York:  St.  Martin  Press), 
6  B.  Z.  Rumer  (1989),  Soviet  Central  Asia:  a  Tragic  Experiment,  (Boston:  Unwin);  R.  S.  Clem  (1992), 
`"The  Frontier  and  Colonialism  in  Russian  and  Soviet  Central  Asia",  in  Geographic  Perspectives  on  Soviet 
Central  Asia,  edited  by  R.  A.  Lewis,  (London:  Routledge),  pp.  19-3  6 
7  D.  Likhachev  (1991),  Reflections  on  Russia,  (Boulder:  Press),  p.  74 
63 common  home,  the  source  of  our  common  language,  common  religion,  and  common 
culture.  We  share  a  common  value  system".  8 
A  number  of  surveys  conducted  in  Russia  and  in  Ukraine  confirm  the  closeness  between 
Russians  and  Ukrainians.  9  Yet,  Russian  scholars  admit  that,  even  after  Ukrainian 
independence  in  1991,  relations  between  the  two  countries  are  still  based  on  the  trite 
rhetoric  of  the  younger  and  older  brother.  "Russians  and  Ukrainians  are  too  close  in 
terms  of  language  and  culture,  to  perceive  each  other  as  `definitively  different'  peoples, 
as  `totally  different'  or  `definitively  different'  are,  for  example,  in  the  case  of 
Armenians  or  Estonians".  Because  of  this  similarity,  Russians  have  often  failed  to  take 
Ukrainians  seriously,  and  have  adopted  an  attitude  of 
"[...  ]  Categorical  rejection  that  this  is  a  specific  people,  and  not  an  ethnographic  group  of  Russians,  that 
the  Ukrainian  language  is  a  language  and  not  the  southern-Russian  dialect  of  a  simple  people,  and  that  the 
Ukrainian  national  movement  is  a  'serious'  movement,  and  not  an  artificial  construction  or  a  Bulgakov- 
style  'operetta"'.  lo 
This  widespread  lack  of  proper  consideration  has  inevitably  sparked  bitter  resentment  in 
Ukrainian  quarters,  where  officials  have  lamented  that  Ukraine  has  been  relegated  by 
Russia  to  the  role  of  "a  satellite  or  a  diplomatic  junior  partner".  11 
Across  the  political  spectrum  Russian  political  approaches  toward  Ukraine  appear 
vitiated  by  what  Roman  Solchanik  calls  "Russia's  Ukrainian  complex".  For  Solchanik 
Russians'  understanding  of  Ukrainian  identity  not  only  precludes  the  notion  of  an 
independent  Ukraine,  but  also  makes  an  "historical  absurdity"  the  very existence  of 
8  N.  Travkin  (1994),  "Russia,  Ukraine  and  Eastern  Europe",  in  Rethinking  Russia's  National  Interests, 
edited  by  S.  Sestyanovich,  (Washington  D.  C.:  Centre  for  Strategic  And  International  Studies),  pp.  33-41 
9  In  a  poll  conducted  in  July  1996,29%  of  Russian  respondents  characterised  relations  with  Ukraine  as 
"friendly",  and  38%  as  "partner-like".  In  1997,  on  the  eve  of  President  Yel'tsin's  visit  to  Kyiv,  35%  of 
the  Russians  interviewed  stated  their  preference  for  Ukraine  as  Russia's  main  partner  within  the  CIS. 
Similar  perceptions  can  be  found  across  the  border.,  In  a  1993  survey,  50%  of  the  answers  revealed  that 
Ukrainians  consider  Russia  as  their  most  important  partner.  Ukrainians  would  like  to  see  relations  with 
their  neighbour  develop  either  within  the  framework  of  the  CIS  (34%  of  preferences  in  a  1993  survey  and 
24%  in  1997),  or  within  an  Eastern  Slavic  bloc  (10%  in  1993,  and  24%  in  1997).  E.  Golovakha  and  N. 
Panina  (1997),  "Rossisko-Ukrainskie  otnosheniya  v  obshchestvennom  mnenii  Ukrainy  I  Rossii",  in 
Ukraina  i  Rossiya:  Obshchestva  I  Gosudarstva,  edited  by  D.  E.  Furman,  (Moscow:  Izdatel'stvo  Prava 
Chelaveka,  ),  pp.  259-277 
10  D.  Furman  (1995),  "Ukraina  i  My",  Svobodnaya  Mysl'.  n.  1, 
,  pp.  69-83 
64 Russia  without  Ukraine.  12  From  the  democrats  to  the  ultra-nationalists,  Russian 
political  figures  voiced  their  disconcert  towards  Ukrainian  sovereign  existence,  while 
often  articulating  an  incoherent  and  contradictory  political  line.  13 
The  more  verbally  aggressive,  but  politically  powerless  attitude  of  the  parliament  was 
often  contrasted  by  a  more  verbally  cautious  but  politically  effective  strategy  endorsed 
by  the  Presidency,  the  Foreign  Ministry  and  the  government  all  together.  Thus,  on  the 
la  one  side,  Russian  officials  asserted  that  Russia  had  no  territorial  claims  on  Ukraine, 
and  urged  members  of  the  parliament  to  "get  used  to  the  fact  that  Ukraine  is  a  sovereign 
country  and  it  is  entitled  to  decide  its  internal  issues  independently".  15  Yet,  on  the  other 
side,  President  Yel'tsin  repeatedly  succeeded  in  irritating  his  Ukrainian  counterpart  by 
advocating  for  Russia  a  UN  endorsed  "special  authority  as  guarantor  of  peace  and 
stability  in  the  [CIS]  region",  16  and  blaming  the  Ukrainian  side  for  the  failure  of  the 
Black  Sea  Fleet  negotiations.  '7 
In  the  period  following  Ukrainian  independence  in  1991  to  1998  Russian  views  toward 
their  western  neighbour  could  be  broadly  divided  into  three  categories.  The  common 
element  of  these  views  was  the  perception,  expressed  in  either  belligerent  or  restrained 
tones,  that  the  privileged  relation  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  must  be  preserved.  18 
11  D.  Vydrin  (1994),  "Ukraine  and  Russia",  in  Damage  Limitation  or  Crisis?,  edited  by  R.  D.  Blackwill 
and  S.  A.  Karaganov,  CSIA  Studies  in  International  Security,  n.  5,  (Washington  and  London:  Brassey's), 
pp.  123-137 
12  R  Solchanik  (1993),  "Russia,  Ukraine  and  the  Imperial  Legacy",  Post-Soviet  Affairs.  Vol.  9,  n.  4,  pp. 
337-365 
13  On  Russian  political  attitudes  towards  Ukraine  see:  S.  W.  Garnett  (1994),  "The  Ukrainian  Question  and 
the  Future  of  Russia",  Politichna  Dumka/Political  Thought,  n.  4,  pp.  169-177,  R.  Solchanik  (1993), 
"Russia,  Ukraine  and  the  Imperial  Legacy",  Post-Soviet  Affairs.  Vol.  9,  n.  4,  pp.  337-365,  J.  Lester 
(1994),  "Russian  Attitudes  to  Ukrainian  Independence",  Journal  of  Communist  Studies  and  Transition 
Politics,  June,  Vol.  10,  n.  2,  pp.  193-233,  and  Ukrainian  Centre  for  Independent  Political  Research 
Q997),  Russia  That  We...,  (Kyiv:  UCIPR) 
SIT-30.  May  4,1995 
IS  SIT-30.  October,  261994 
16  Ukrainian  News  Bulletin,  March,  281993 
17  UTN,  April  18,1995.  In  the  same  tone,  Russian  members  of  government  protested  that  decisions  on 
IMF  provision  of  financial  aid  to  Ukraine  should  not  be  made  without  the  participation  of  Russia.  SIT- 
3  October  26,1994 
1$  The  results  of  a  survey  conducted  by  a  Ukrainian  research  institute  on  a  sample  of  deputies  of  the 
Russian  State  Duma  seem  to  confirm  this  cross-party  orientation.  The  sample  included  55  deputies  and 
represented  10  factions.  Asked  what  in  their  opinion  should  be  the  Ukrainian  policy  line  towards  Russia, 
41.5%  of  those  interviewed  responded  that  Ukraine  should  aim  at  the  restoration  of  a  federal  state  with 
Russia.  43.4%  recognised  that  Ukraine  should  move  towards  the  creation  of  an  economic,  political  and 
military  union  with  Russia,  while  preserving  its  sovereignty.  20.8%  were  in  favour  of  the  formation  of  an 
equal  partnership  with  Russia  in  the  political  and  economic  but  not  military  sphere.  11.3%  wanted  the 
formation  of  a  mutually  beneficial  partnership  only  in  the  economic  sphere.  Asked  what  should  be  the 
65 Drawing  on  an  "historic  notion  of  Russia",  that  included  Great  Russia,  Little  Russia  and 
White  Russia,  patriots  argued  in  favour  of  the  reunification  of  Russia  and  Ukraine  in  a 
restored  Soviet  Union  or  in  another  unitary  political  entity.  19  The  collapse  of  the  Soviet 
Union  was  branded  as  "neither  natural  nor  unavoidable",  20  and  a  line  of  historical 
continuity  was  called  upon  to  justify  Russian  imperialism.  In  the  words  of  the 
Communist  Party  Duma  deputy  Albert  Makashov,  "We  remain  Slavs  used  to  living  in  a 
great  state.  For  me  Kyievan  Rus',  the  Moscow  Empire  and  the  USSR  are  notions  on  the 
same  level".  21 
Patriots  encompassed  political  orientations  ranging  from  the  National  Salvation  Front,  22 
to  the  CPRF,  to  Vladimir  Zhirinovskii's  Liberal  Democrats,  23  to  Aleksandr  Rutskoi's 
Derzhava.  24  Even  moderate  democrats  were  not  immune  from  nostalgia  towards  a 
unitary  state  including  Ukraine.  State  Duma  deputy  Boris  Fedorov,  leader  of  the 
"Forward  Russia"  movement,  called  for  amendments  to  the  constitution,  to  express  "the 
will  for  reunification  with  Ukraine,  Belarus  and  Kazakhstan  [...  ]  as  an  official  policy  of 
Russias25 
ultimate  goal  of  Russia  in  relations  with  Ukraine  50.9  %  of  the  deputies  interviewed  said  that  they  wanted 
to  see  the  restoration  of  an  economic  and  military  union  with  Ukraine.  23.6%  wanted  to  preserve 
mutually  beneficial  partnership  without  emphasis  on  its  special  importance,  while  another  23.6% 
supported  the  establishment  of  a  real  strategic  partnership.  Ukrainian  Centre  of  Conflict  Studies  and 
Ukrainian  Centre  for  International  Security  Studies  (1998),  "Ukrainian-Russian  Relations  and  the 
prospects  of  the  CIS  from  the  State  Duma  of  Russian  Federation  Deputies  Point  of  View",  Occasional 
Paper  - 
19  N.  Bindyukov  (1995),  Dumskii  vestnik,  n.  2  (7),  pp.  33-34 
20  N.  Rizhkov  (1995),  Ya  iz  politicheskoi  partii  nazvan  Rossiya,  (Moscow:  Information-Analytical 
Agency  Obozrevatel'), 
,  p.  174 
21  Vseukrainskie  Vedomosti,  July  18,1995 
22  In  his  speech  at  the  front's  Foundation  Congress  in  October  1992,  Ilya  Kostantinov  stated  that  "We  will 
never  recognise  independence  of  regimes  in  Ukraine  and  Belarus.  Our  attitude  to  the  regimes  in  Ukraine 
and  Belarus  is  defined  not  by  international  law,  but  by  the  norms  of  the  [Russian]  criminal  code". 
Izvestiva,  October  27,1992 
23  LDPR  protested  against  what  they  called  "the  anti-Russian  hysteria  in  Ukraine",  and  accused  the  press, 
"managed  predominantly  by  people  from  Lviv,  Ternopil  and  Ivano-Frankivsks"  (the  areas  where 
Ukrainian  nationalism  is  traditionally  rooted),  of  staging  an  "anti-Russian  campaign".  They  also 
supported  Russian  nationalists  in  Crimea,  questioning  the  legitimacy  of  the  region's  transfer  to  Ukraine. 
"Crimea  is  our  territory,  Russian  [territory]",  State  Duma  deputy  Aleksei  Zviagin  claimed.  "Zhirinovskii 
and  the  LDPR  faction  in  the  State  Duma",  Information  Bulletin  n.  5,  May  1995,  pp.  21-23 
24  Rutskoi  proposed  to  "encourage  the  process  of  state  re-integration  of  Russia  Ukraine  and  Belarus  as  the 
first  step  towards  the  elimination  of  the  disastrous  aftermath  of  the  liquidation  of  the  Soviet  Union"  A. 
Rutskoi  (1995),  Obretenie  very,  (Moscow:  Sanktpeterburskaya  Tipografiya  n.  6),  pp.  16-17 
25  B.  Fedorov  (1995),  One  Hundred  Questions  to  Boris  Fedorov  About  'Forward,  Russia'  Movement  and 
the  Liberal-Democratic  Fund  (Moscow:  mimeo),  p.  12 
66 Patriots'  claims  generated  alarm  in  Ukrainian  political  circles.  The  Ukrainian 
leadership  was  in  the  difficult  position  of  having  to  appear  determined  in  the  defence  of 
the  country's  independence,  while,  at  the  same  time,  finding  a  diplomatic  approach  to 
solve  incomprehension  with  the  powerful  neighbour.  There  was  a  common 
understanding  within  political  circles  in  Kyiv  that  Ukrainian  internal  stability  depended 
a  great  deal  on  Russia,  and  to  preserve  it  Ukrainian  authorities  adopted  a  dual  strategy. 
Russian  attempts  to  "increase  the  tension"  in  bilateral  relations,  "interfere  with  the 
process  of  normalising"  these  relations  and  "disrupt  negotiations"  for  the  co-operation 
treaty  were  harshly  criticised.  26  On  the  other  side,  however,  a  conciliatory  tone  was 
adopted  and  guarantees  were  provided  that  Ukraine  would  not  take  radical  actions 
"except  for  the  cases  when  certain  politicians  come  to  Ukraine  from  Russia  to  conduct 
propagandistic  and  political  activities".  27 
Given  the  strategic  superiority  of  their  eastern  neighbour,  Ukrainian  policy-makers  had 
to  make  an  effort  and  discriminate  between  the  boisterous  positions  of  the  Russian 
parliament,  blamed  for  its  "overt  interference  with  Ukraine's  internal  affairs",  and  the 
will  of  the  Russian  people,  "who  stand  for  peace  and  friendly  relations  with  Ukraine".  28 
Ukraine,  however,  had  its  own  patriots  too,  represented  by  the  Communist  Party  of 
Ukraine  and  the  Agrarian  Party  of  Ukraine,  who  repelled  the  Belavezha  Agreement  and 
the  dissolution  of  the  Soviet  Union,  and  supported  the  recreation  of  a  unitary  state  with 
Russia.  29 
Russian  moderates  occupied  the  portion  of  the  political  spectrum  between  the  patriots 
and  the  economic  pragmatists.  The  moderates  called  for  a  more  careful  attitude  in  the 
international  arena  and  relations  with  the  CIS  countries  (and  Ukraine),  in  order  to  obtain 
26  UTN.  January  14,1995.  Preoccupation  with  Russian  imperialism  increased  also  as  a  result  of  the  first 
Chechen  campaign  in  1995.  Public  opinion  started  to  fear  that  if  Russia  had  used  tanks  against  one  of  its 
own  regions,  it  could  easily  march  against  Ukraine.  The  press  service  of  President  Kuchma  issued  a 
statement  on  the  events  in  Chechnya  calling  for  "self-control,  consistent  striving  for  peaceful  resolution  of 
the  conflict,  observation  of  human  rights,  first  and  foremost  the  right  to  live",  UTN,  January  5,1995.  On 
Ukrainian  reactions  to  the  war  in  Chechnya  see  also  T.  Kuzio  (1995),  "The  Chechnya  Crisis  and  the  `Near 
Abroad"',  Central  Asian  Survey.  Vol.  14,  n.  4,  pp.  553-572 
27  Kievskie  Novosti.  April  14,1995 
28  Ukrainian  News  Bulletin.  July  12,1993 
29  OMRI  Daily  Digest.  October  19,1995.  As  late  as  March  2001  Gennadii  Zyuganov  and  Petr 
Simonenko,  leaders  of  the  Communist  parties  of  Russia  and  Ukraine,  announced  their  intention  to  work 
more  closely  together,  blaming  the  Ukrainian  institutional  crisis  on  the  "pro-Western  direction  [in 
Ukrainian]  foreign  policy  and  the  complete  dependence  of  Ukraine  [...  ]  especially  in  economics  on  the 
financial  structures  of  the  West  RFE/RL  Newsline  March  26,2001 
67 a  reorientation  of  resources  previously  directed  to  foreign  policy  to  internal  economic 
development  and  improvement  of  living  standards  for  the  Russian  population. 
"National  egoism"  was  presented  as  the  criterion  that  must  shape  Russian  international 
strategy.  30  In  this  perspective  also  policy  towards  Ukraine  had  to  switch  onto  an  equal 
footing,  transforming  relations  between  the  two  countries  into  relations  between 
"allies".  Russia  must  not  deem  itself  responsible  anymore  for  supporting  Ukraine's 
economy  or  bankrolling  its  reforms.  31 
Moderate  attitudes  included  also  the  "wait  and  see"  strategy  advocated  by  former 
presidential  advisor  Andranik  Migranyan,  according  to  which  Ukraine  was  worth  no 
diplomatic  efforts  and  political  campaigns.  Migranyan  predicted  that,  being  an 
"artificial,  heterogeneous,  and  bland  institutional  figure",  Ukraine  would  collapse  as  a 
result  of  the  deteriorating  economic  and  social  situation.  Energy  crisis,  financial 
instability,  the  inexperience  of  the  national  elite  and  interethnic  conflicts  would  destroy 
Ukraine's  dream  of  independence,  without  the  need  for  Russia  to  intervene.  Ukraine 
would  then  fall  into  Russia's  sphere  of  influence  again,  and  thereby  be  forced  to  accept 
political,  economic,  and  military  co-operation  with  Russia  and  with  the  CIS,  or  crumble 
into  a  potentially  disastrous  ethnic  war.  32 
The  approach  that  in  Kyiv  corresponded  to  Russian  moderate  attitudes  was  a  renewed 
emphasis  on  the  Ukrainian  ability  to  survive  and  prosper  without  Russian  help. 
Especially  from  the  nationalist  quarters  it  was  often  claimed  that  Ukraine  had  to 
diversify  its  trade  activities,  reorient  towards  Western  allies  and  adopt  the  economic 
model  of  its  Eastern  European  neighbours.  Ukrainian  academics  close  to  the  President 
portrayed  a  model  of  Ukraine  as  "the  bastion  of  European  peace,  fortress  of  European 
values  and  mentality"  that  would  unfold  in  three  stages  along  a  path  of  "normal 
European  development".  Stage  one  would  involve  the  strengthening  of  economic 
30  "To  be  engaged  in  the  development  of  other  natiöns  means  to  commit  crimes  against  the  Russian 
people.  It  deprives  them  at  a  crucial  moment  of  means  that  could  promote  their  development  into  a  vital 
and  energetic  nation.  We  are  now  national  egoists:  all  our  actions  must  benefit  the  Russian  nation.  It  was 
this  very  national  egoism  that  produced  a  great  power".  A.  Mitrofanov  (1998),  "Russia's  New 
Geopolitics",  Harvard  University.  JFK  School  of  Government,  Strengthening  Democratic  Institutions 
Project,  July,  p.  7 
31  Council  on  Foreign  and  Defence  Policy  (1997),  "Will  the  Union  be  Reborn?  The  Future  of  the  Post- 
Soviet  Region",  Harvard  University,  JFK  School  of  Government.  Strengthening  Democratic  Institutions 
Project,  June,  p.  19 
32  "Russia's  Foreign  Policy  with  Ukraine",  in  Current  Digest  of  the  Post-Soviet  Press,  n.  7,1994,  pp.  6-7 
68 relations  with  Poland  and,  through  it,  with  Germany.  Stage  two  would  foresee  the 
creation  of  a  Baltic-Black  Sea  economic  alliance.  In  stage  three  Ukraine  would  join 
Nato.  33 
The  perspectives  of  Economic  Pragmatists  was  shaped  by  a  recognition  of  economic 
inter-dependence  between  the  two  countries,  and  called  for  a  more  effective  bilateral  co- 
operation.  In  the  words  of  Nikolai  Gonchar,  Chairman  of  the  Budget  Committee  of  the 
Russian  Council  of  the  Federation:  "If  we  want  to  have  an  industrial  economy,  we 
should  recognise  that  it  is  impossible  without  Ukraine,  as  well  as  without  Belarus  and 
Kazakhstan".  In  this  view,  economic  necessities  would  drive  individual  countries  to  a 
closer  interrelation  without  impinging  on  national  sovereignty.  34  Economic  pragmatism 
was  the  spirit  that  animated  bilateral  relations  between  the  Russian  and  the  Ukrainian 
Union  of  Industrialists,  and  inspired  governors  of  13  border  regions  to  lobby  for  special 
legislation  regulating  their  economic  interaction.  Economic  pragmatism  was  advocated 
by  Russian  as  well  as  Ukrainian  political  forces  as  a  means  to  normalise  relations: 
"[...  ]  Deeper  economic  ties  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  may  assist  to  neutralise  political  tension  [...  ] 
[the  level  of]  industrial  co-operation  between  Ukraine  and  Russia  is  extremely  high  [...  ]  the  deeper  the 
economic  ties,  the  better  they  can  neutralise  political  tension.  "35 
33  Oleh  Soskin,  Advisor  to  the  President  of  Ukraine  on  economic  issues,  Director  of  the  Institute  of 
Society  Transformation,  interview  with  the  author,  Kyiv,  27  November  1998. 
34  Vechimiy  Kyiv,  July  29,1993 
35  Prime  minister  Marchuk  in  an  interview  with  Washington  Post  reported  in  UTN,  28  September  1995 
69 The  Weight  of  History 
Russian  failure  to  recognise  Ukrainian  diversity  is  deeply  rooted  in  the  historical  myths 
that  have  been  constructed  to  justify  Ukrainian  submission  to  Russia.  Contrasting 
interpretations  of  crucial  events  punctuate  the  history  of  the  Russian-Ukrainian 
encounter,  and  history  has  become,  in  the  words  of  a  Western  historian,  another 
"battleground".  36  Competing  versions  of  history  correspond  to  contrasting  visions  of 
identity,  and  are  advocated  to  substantiate  territorial  claims  or  pretensions  of  political 
37  legitimacy.  To  assert  a  political  pre-eminence  or  reject  the  colonial  power.  38 
The  common  origin  of  Russia  and  Ukraine  goes  back  to  the  year  882  A.  D.,  when 
Prince  Oleh  established  his  capital  in  Kyiv,  thus  giving  rise  to  the  political  entity  known 
as  Kievan  Rus'.  Kievan  Rus'  was  a  feudal,  decentralised  kingdom,  that  at  the  height  of 
its  power  stretched  from  the  Carpathian  mountains,  in  the  south,  to  Novgorod,  in  the 
North,  comprising  territories  that  belong  today  to  Belarus,  Ukraine  and  are  part  of 
Northern  Russia.  Located  on  the  trade  route  from  the  Baltic  Sea  to  Constantinople, 
Kievan  Rus'  prospered  to  become  a  vibrant  centre  of  cultural  and  religious  civilisation, 
until  1240,  when  Kyiv  was  sacked  by  the  Mongols  and  Rus'  disintegrated  into  several 
rival  principalities. 
Both  Soviet/Russian  and  Ukrainian  historians  have  claimed  continuity  between  Kievan 
Rus'  and  the  successive  state  organisations  that  developed  on  their  respective  territories. 
In  the  Ukrainian  version  of  history,  a  separate  ethnic  group,  which  had  existed  in  the 
territories  around  Kyiv,  was  the  rightful  creator  of  the  medieval  kingdom,  while  the 
36  Z.  E.  Kohut  (1994),  "History  as  a  Battleground.  Russian-Ukrainian  Relations  and  Historical 
Consciousness  in  Contemporary  Ukraine",  in  The  Legacy  of  History  in  Russia  and  the  New  States  of 
Eurasia,  edited  by  S.  F.  Starr,  (Armok:  M.  E.  Sharpe,  ),  pp.  123-145. See  also  G.  Smith  et  al.  (1998), 
Nation  Building  in  the  Post-Soviet  Borderlands:  The  Politics  of  National  Identities,  (Cambridge:  CUP) 
chapter  2,  pp.  23-48 
37  Andrew  Wilson  has  demonstrated  how  two  parallel  but  contradictory  visions  of  the  process  of  the 
population  of  the  Donbass  justify  both  Russian  and  Ukrainian  pretensions  for  the  region  to  be  historically 
part  of  ethnic  Ukraine  and,  at  the  same  time,  of  ethnic  Russia.  A.  Wilson,  The  Donbass  between  Ukraine 
and  Russia:  The  Use  of  History  in  Political  Disputes,  Journal  of  Contemporary  History,  Vol.  30,  (1995), 
pp.  265-289 
311  History  -  or  a  carefully  edited  version  of  history  -  is  used  an  instrument  to  consolidate  the  new 
Ukrainian  state  and  provide  ideological  support  to  the  process  of  nation-building.  "The  post-colonial 
reality,  distorted  by  the  corrupting  influences  of  colonisers,  is  to  be  brought  in  line  with  the  idealised 
image  of  nationhood.  In  order  to  restore  the  lost  purity  the  nation-building  elites  totals  differences,  which 
70 Russians,  descending  from  more  northern  tribes,  only  played  a  minor  role  in  the  Kievan 
state.  9  In  the  Russian  version,  following  the  sack  of  Kyiv  by  the  Mongols,  the  political 
and  cultural  heritage  of  Rus'  was  preserved  in  the  territories  of  Muscovy.  Massive 
migrations  brought  populations  once  living  in  the  core  of  the  proto-state  to  Russian 
lands.  New  populations  from  the  Carpathian  region  settled  in  what  is  today  Ukraine, 
establishing  the  roots  of  the  Ukrainian  language  and  culture,  as  a  corrupted  version  of 
the  original  Kievan  identity.  According  to  the  Russian  version  of  history,  Kievan  Rus' 
was  the  common  cradle  of  the  Slavic  civilisation,  with  Russians  (Great  Russians), 
Ukrainian  (Little  Russians)  and  Belorussians  (White  Russians)  representing  a  single 
united  people,  differentiated  only  as  a  result  of  successive  historical  events.  The 
Ukrainian  historian  Yurii  Badz'o  has  highlighted  effectively  the  paradox  of  this 
interpretation. 
"...  From  the  ninth  to  the  thirteenth  century,  the  Eastern  Slavs  constituted  one  people,  one  ethnos,  which, 
of  course,  was  Russian:  the  Ukrainians  and  the  Belarusian  appeared  only  in  the  fourteenth-fifteenth 
centuries.  They  appeared  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  `dream'  about  `reunification'  with  Russia.  All 
peoples  of  the  world  aspired,  and  still  aspire,  toward  national  independence.  Only  the  Ukrainians  and  the 
Belarusians  are  an  exception:  their  dream  was  to  `reunite'  with  Russia".  4° 
Perfectly  in  line  with  this  explanation,  the  Russian  version  of  the  1654  Treaty  of 
Pereislav  celebrates  the  "reunion"  of  the  two  "brotherly"  peoples.  In  1648,  a  large-scale 
rebellion  started  in  the  Ukrainian  territories  transferred  to  the  Polish  rule  by  the  1559 
Union  of  Lublin.  The  rebellion  was  headed  by  the  Cossack  Hetman  Bohdan 
Khemel'nitskii.  Khemel'nitskii  succeeded  in  establishing  an  embryonic  Cossack- 
Orthodox  state  on  both  the  left  and  the  right  bank  of  the  Dnieper  for  the  first  time  since 
the  thirteenth  century.  Exposed  to  military  pressures  on  three  fronts  (from  the  Poles,  the 
Tatars  and  the  Russians),  Khemel'nitskii  forged  an  alliance  with  Moscow  that  was 
formalised  with  the  Treaty  of  Pereislav. 
are  portrayed  as  irreconcilable".  K.  Wolczuk  (2000),  "History,  Europe,  and  the  'National  Idea',:  the 
"Official"  Narrative  of  National  Identity  in  Ukraine",  Nationality  Papers,  Vol.  28,  n.  4,  pp.  671-694 
39  For  a  summary  of  competing  interpretations  of  Ukrainian  history  see  P.  R.  Magocsi  (1996),  A  History 
ot  Ukraine,  (Toronto:  University  of  Toronto  Press),  Chapter  2 
°  Quoted  in  Ivan  L.  Rudnytsky  (1987a),  "Pereislav:  History  and  Myth",  in  Essays  in  Modern  Ukrainian 
History,  edited  by  Peter  L.  Rudnytsky,  (Edmonton:  Canadian  Institute  of  Ukrainian  Studies,  University  of 
Alberta),  pp.  77-89 
71 In  the  Ukrainian  version  of  the  story,  the  Treaty  was  an  agreement  binding  both 
signatories  to  a  military  alliance  in  the  form  of  a  personal  union  and  protectorate.  In  the 
Russian  version,  the  Treaty  was  portrayed  as  an  act  of  submission  to  the  Tsar's 
authority  and  provided  the  first  step  of  the  incorporation  of  the  Cossack  Hetmanate  into 
what  was  to  become  the  Russian  Empire.  The  process  of  Ukrainian  submission  was 
completed  only  with  the  1709  defeat  in  Poltava  of  the  forces  headed  by  King  Charles 
XII  of  Sweden  and  the  Hetman  Ivan  Mazepa.  Ukraine  was  incorporated  into  the 
Russian  imperial  system,  and  its  status  was  lowered  to  that  of  a  subordinate  entity 
within  the  framework  of  the  Russian  Empire.  In  this  way  what  has  been  called  the 
"Myth  of  Pereislav"  was  born,  with  the  agreement  serving  to  legitimise  the  annexation 
of  Ukraine  by  the  Russian  Empire.  Ukrainian  historians  object: 
"About  one  century  after  the  event,  what  in  fact  had  been  a  bilateral,  negotiated  settlement,  a  treaty,  had 
assumed  the  character  of  a  unilateral,  and  therefore  revocable,  act  of  tsarist  munificence"  41 
Roman  Szporluk  has  criticised  the  Russian  attempt  to  "shape  the  historical 
consciousness  of  the  Ukrainians"  and  has  equated  this  attitude  to  a  form  of  cultural 
colonialism. 
"To  deprive  a  people  of  its  past  may  thus  be  a  colonialism  more  destructive  and  more  vicious  than  the  one 
that  expropriates  a  nation's  mineral  resources,  imposes  discriminatory  terms  of  trade,  disbands  its  army 
and  civil  service,  or  puts  foreigners  in  all  official  positions"42 
The  legacy  of  the  past  is  a  key  factor  in  determining  the  present  and  the  future  of 
relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine.  A  past  of  deceit,  broken  promises  and  violated 
national  identity  is  used  by  some  authors  to  explain  Ukraine's  long  time  reluctance  to 
sign  any  sort  of  agreement  with  Russia,  be  it  bilateral  or  within  the  framework  of  the 
Commonwealth  of  Independent  States.  43  Political,  cultural  and  economic  repression 
imposed  on  the  Ukrainian  population  under  tsarist  as  well  as  under  Soviet  rule  is  viewed 
as  the  basis  for  Ukraine's  mistrust  towards  its  eastern  neighbour.  This  past  of 
41  Ivan  L.  Rudnytsky  (1987a),  Op.  Cit. 
42  R.  Szporluk  (1986),  "The  Ukraine  and  Russia",  in  The  Last  Empire:  Nationality  and  the  Soviet  Future, 
edited  by  R.  Conquest,  (Standford:  Hoover  Institution  Press),  p.  155 
43  J  Morrison(1993),  "Pereislav  and  After",  International  Affairs,  Vol.  69,4,  pp.  677-703 
72 repression  is  also  the  most  significant  impediment  on  the  path  towards  improved 
relations  in  the  post-Soviet  years. 
Political  Rule 
From  Peter  I  onwards,  centralisation  and  the  construction  of  a  strong  bureaucratic  and 
administrative  state  apparatus  on  the  Ukrainian  territories  were  the  most  common 
aspects  of  the  Russian  imperial  rule.  Under  Catherine  II,  in  particular,  the  office  of 
Hetman  was  permanently  abolished  (1764),  enserfment  of  the  peasantry  was  introduced, 
and  the  first  wave  of  Russification  took  place.  The  Ukrainian  population  living  on 
territories  controlled  by  the  Russian  Empire  (close  to  85%  of  the  total),  was  deprived  of 
territorial  autonomy  and  administered  by  regional  governors,  appointed  by  the  tsar  and 
responsible  directly  to  St.  Petersburg.  44 
Between  1917  and  1920  Ukraine  experienced  a  brief  season  as  an  independent  state, 
ruled  by  the  Central  Rada,  until  April  1918,  a  restored  Hetmanate  under  German 
influence  (April  to  December  1918),  and  finally  a  Directory,  until  the  final  eruption  of 
the  Civil  War  and  the  establishment  of  the  Bolshevik  regime.  The  Ukrainian 
government  in  Kyiv  strove  to  set  relations  with  Russia  on  an  equal  basis,  proclaiming 
Ukraine  an  autonomous  land  within  a  federated  Russia,  and  urging  the  formation  of 
Ukrainian  national  units  within  the  former  Imperial  Russian  army.  The  government 
represented  a  moderate  socialist  orientation  and  was  opposed  to  the  Bolshevik  turn  that 
the  revolution  had  taken  in  Petrograd.  In  December  1917  a  first  Soviet  state  was  set  up 
in  Kharkiv  (Respublyka  Rad  Ukrainy),  headed  by  a  government  composed  of  only 
Bolshevik  ministers,  and  subordinated  to  the  Bolshevik  government  in  Petrograd. 
With  the  end  of  the  Civil  War  and  the  final  demise  of  the  ephemeral  Ukrainian  National 
Republic,  Soviet  Ukraine  was  established  as  an  apparently  independent  state,  linked  to 
Soviet  Russia  only  by  a  treaty  of  alliance  concluded  in  December  1920.  In  fact, 
Ukrainian  military  and  economic  decisions  were  subjected  to  decisions  made  in 
Moscow,  and  diplomatic  prerogatives  were  delegated  to  the  Russian  capital.  In 
December  1922,  the  Union  of  Socialist  Soviet  Republics  was  formed  by  the  Russian, 
the  Ukrainian,  the  Belorussian  and  the  Transcaucasian  Soviet  Federative  Socialist 
73 Rebublics.  The  Treaty  of  the  Union  established  the  Ukrainian  Soviet  Socialist  Republic 
as  a  sovereign  state,  federated  as  an  equal  entity  with  Russia  and  the  other  Soviet 
republics.  Despite  Ukraine's  constitutionally  recognised  right  of  secession  from  the 
Union,  however,  Ukrainian  historians  have  branded  Ukrainian  statehood  "a  sheer  myth 
manipulated  to  the  advantage  of  the  rulers"  45 
The  1924  Soviet  Constitution  stripped  Ukraine,  and  the  other  constituent  republics,  of 
any  independent  power,  investing  the  central  authorities  with  decisions  related  to 
education,  justice  and  health,  exploitation  of  natural  resources,  and  foreign  affairs,  plus 
the  power  to  annul  decisions  taken  by  the  union  republics  46  The  application  of  the 
principle  of  "democratic  centralism"  constructed  a  rigid  power  structure  that  ensured  the 
swift  implementation  of  centrally  produced  directives.  In  February  1944,  the 
constituent  Soviet  republics  were  given  back  the  pre-1923  right  to  engage  in  direct 
relations  with  foreign  countries.  Soviet  Ukraine  and  Soviet  Belorussia  were  allowed  to 
establish  their  own  foreign  ministries,  and  by  April  1945  they  were  admitted  as 
constituent  members  of  the  United  Nations. 
Cultural  Repression 
The  1863  Valuev  Decree,  and  the1876  Ems  Ukaze  codified  the  subordination  of  the 
Ukrainian  to  Russian  culture  and  language.  The  publication  of  religious  and 
educational  books  in  Ukrainian  was  banned,  as  was  their  importation  from  abroad. 
Ukrainian  lyrics  to  musical  compositions  were  outlawed.  Ukrainian  organisations  and 
newspapers  were  closed.  Ukrainian  teachers  were  removed  from  office.  With  the 
development  of  a  standard  literary  Russian,  in  the  early  19th  century,  Ukrainian  was 
increasingly  associated  with  peasantry  and  localism,  while  Russian  was  viewed  as  a 
vehicle  to  access  culture  and  achieve  upward  social  mobility.  Also  Ukrainian  writers 
chose  to  write  in  Russian  rather  than  in  Ukrainian  to  broaden  their  audience. 
44  P.  R.  Magocsi  (1996),  A  History  of  Ukraine,  (Toronto:  University  of  Toronto  Press),  p.  305. 
45  Ivan  L.  Rudnytsky  (1987b),  "Soviet  Ukraine  in  Historical  Perspective",  in  Essays  in  Modern  Ukrainian 
History,  edited  by  Peter  L.  Rudnytsky,  (Edmonton:  Canadian  Institute  of  Ukrainian  Studies,  University  of 
Alberta),  pp.  463-473 
46  P  R.  Magocsi  (1996),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  528. 
74 The  years  following  the  end  of  the  First  World  War  and  the  establishment  of  the  Soviet 
Union  were  characterised  by  a  relaxation  of  linguistic  repression  in  Ukraine.  A  first 
wave  of  Ukrainisation,  introduced  by  the  Communist  Party  of  Ukraine  in  1923, 
accompanied  the  New  Economic  Policy.  With  the  beginning  of  the  political  purges  in 
the  1930s,  however,  any  appearance  of  cultural  independence  for  Ukraine  vanished  and 
Ukrainisation  was  reversed.  In  1933  the  alphabet  and  the  language  reforms  approved  in 
1928  were  abolished,  and  decrees  were  passed  requiring  that  the  Ukrainian  alphabet, 
language  and  grammar  were  brought  closer  to  Russian.  By  1938  the  use  of  Russian  had 
been  made  obligatory  in  all  non-Russian  schools  throughout  the  Soviet  Union.  The 
Khrushchev's  school  reform  of  1958-59  further  undermined  the  status  of  the  Ukrainian 
language,  by  removing  it  as  an  obligatory  subject  of  study.  A  new  wave  of 
Russification  followed  the  dismissal  in  1972  of  the  Ukrainian  Communist  Party  First 
Secretary  Petro  Shelest,  who  had  been  an  advocate  of  Ukrainian  language  and  of 
Ukrainian  autonomy.  For  his  stance  Shelest  was  accused  of  "local  patriotism'  .  47 
Russification  policies  had  the  result  of  undermining  the  use  of  Ukrainian  as  a  scientific 
and  academic  language.  In  the  mid-1960s  only  62%  of  the  Ukrainian  school  children  (a 
proportion  significantly  lower  than  the  Ukrainian  population  leaving  in  the  Ukrainian 
SSR)  were  taught  Ukrainian  in  school.  By  1987  the  percentage  had  dropped  to  50.5%. 
The  total  number  of  books  published  in  Ukrainian  was  only  22.1%  in  1987,  while  only 
16.3%  of  the  academic  journals  published  in  Ukraine  in  1989  were  in  Ukrainian.  8 
Language  policies  and  repression  of  cultural  debates  were  used  as  a  common  instrument 
to  suppress  Ukrainian  sense  of  identity.  As  one  author  has  pointed  out,  "Ukrainians  as  a 
method  of  asserting  their  non-Russian  identity,  waged  their  campaign  for  national 
survival  in  terms  of  their  right  to  speak  Ukrainian,  rather  than  Russian".  49 
47  Shelest's  defence  of  Ukraine  was  epitomised  in  his  book  "Our  Soviet  Ukraine".  See  O.  Subtelny 
(1994),  Ukraine:  A  History,  (Toronto:  University  of  Toronto  Press),  second  edition,  p.  512 
48  R.  Solchanyk  (1990),  "Ukraine,  Belorussia  and  Moldovia:  Imperial  Integration,  Russification  and  the 
Struggle  for  National  Survival",  in  The  Nationalities  Factor  in  Soviet  Politics  and  Society,  edited  by  L. 
Hajda  and  M.  Bessinger,  (Boulder.  Westview  Press),  pp.  175-203 
49  B.  Krawchenko  (1985),  Social  Change  and  National  Consciousness  in  Twentieth-Century  Ukraine, 
(London:  St.  Antony/Mcmillan),  p.  198.  On  the  political  significance  of  cultural  debates  R.  Solchanyk 
(1983),  "Politics  and  the  National  Question  in  the  post-Shelest  Period",  in  Ukraine  after  Shelest,  edited  by 
B.  Krawchenko,  (Edmonton:  Canadian  Institute  of  Ukrainian  Studies,  University  of  Alberta);  and  B. 
Lewytskyj  (1984),  Politics  and  Society  in  Soviet  Ukraine,  1953-1980,  (Edmonton  Canadian  Institute  of 
Ukrainian  Studies,  University  of  Alberta),  chapters  4  and  5.  For  the  Ukrainian  perspective  on  Russian 
colonialism  see  Anti-Bolshevik  Bloc  of  Nations  (1969),  Revolutionary  Voices:  Ukrainian  Political 
Prisoners  Condemn  Russian  Colonialism,  (Munich:  Press  Bureau  of  the  Anti-Bolshevik  Bloc  of  Nations), 
especially  I.  Dzyuba,  "Internationalism  or  Russification",  pp.  37-55 
75 Religious  autonomy  was  also  considered  by  the  Russian  authorities  breeding  ground  for 
the  growth  of  Ukrainian  nationalism.  As  a  result  also  the  Uniate  Church  and  the 
Ukrainian  Autocephalous  Church  were  repressed.  The  first  was  ejected  from  eastern 
Ukraine  after  the  Treaty  of  Pereislav,  allowing  for  the  official  Orthodox  Church,  subject 
to  the  Moscow  authority,  to  regain  control  of  the  region.  The  second  was  suppressed  by 
Stalin  in  1929  and  its  hierarchy  was  liquidated.  More  than  3  thousand  churches  were 
so  transferred  to  the  Orthodox  faith. 
Repression  of  the  population  was  a  common  characteristic  in  the  Soviet  totalitarian 
state.  In  the  Stalinist  period  political  opponents  were  purged  and  entire  populations 
were  forced  to  collective  migration  from  their  land  of  origin.  In  the  Brezhnevite  years 
gulags  and  working  camps  in  inhospitable  areas  of  the  country  were  crowded  with 
political  dissidents.  Despite  the  widespread  and  quasi-indiscriminate  repression  of  large 
strata  of  the  Soviet  population,  there  are,  however,  episodes  that  in  the  collective 
memory  of  the  Ukrainian  people  have  gone  down  as  acts  of  specific  persecution.  The 
Great  Famine,  for  example,  whose  occurrence  was  consistently  denied  by  Stalinist 
historians,  has  assumed  the  same  proportions  as  the  Holocaust  for  the  Jews  and  the  1915 
genocide  for  the  Armenians.  Ukrainian  nationalist  writers  have  hypothesised  that  the 
event  was  a  carefully  staged  state-massacre  to  eliminate  the  Ukrainian  people.  51 
Incompetence  in  the  organisation  of  collective  farms,  the  duress  of  the  forced 
collectivisation,  and  indiscriminate  confiscation  of  agricultural  production  to  support 
the  industrial  effort  triggered  the  famine.  In  the  winter  and  spring  of  1933,  at  least  4.8 
million  people,  equal  to  15%  of  the  Ukrainian  population  at  the  time  were  killed  for 
starvation  or  diseases.  52 
50  The  Uniate  Church  emerged  as  a  result  of  the  Union  of  Brest  (1596).  It  is  Catholic  in  essence,  as  it 
accepts  the  authority  of  the  Pontiff,  but  Byzantine  in'  rite.  The  Ukrainian  Autocephalous  Orthodox 
Church  came  into  being  in  October  1921,  by  declaring  its  independence  from  Moscow,  seen  as  an 
instrument  of  Russian  domination.  With  the  synod  of  L'viv  in  1946,  organised  by  Stalin  with  the  support 
of  the  Russian  Orthodox  Church,  the  Autocephalous  Church  rejoined  the  Moscow  authority.  D.  Little 
(1991),  Ukraine.  The  Legacy  of  Intolerance,  (Washington  D.  C.:  United  States  Institute  of  Peace  Press), 
especially  chapter  2 
51  Y.  Bilinsky  (1994),  "Basic  Factors  in  the  Foreign  Policy  of  Ukraine.  The  Impact  of  the  Soviet 
Experience",  in  The  Legacy  of  History  in  Russia  and  the  New  States  of  Eurasia,  edited  by  S.  Frederick 
Starr,  (Armonk:  M.  E.  Sharpe),  pp.  171-191 
52  O.  Subtelny  (1994),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  413 
76 The  interpretation  of  a  voluntary  policy  of  annihilation  pursued  by  the  Soviet  authorities 
against  the  Ukrainian  seems  upheld  by  the  revelation,  made  by  Khrushchev  in  his 
speech  at  the  20`h  Party  Conference,  that  Stalin  had  probably  in  store  mass  deportations 
for  them.  "The  Ukrainians  -  Khrushchev  said  -  avoided  meeting  this  fate  because  there 
were  too  many  of  them,  and  there  was  no  place  to  deport  them".  53 
Encouraged  immigration  of  Russians  in  regions  with  a  strong  Ukrainian  tradition  was 
another  instrument  used  to  diminish  the  power  of  the  Ukrainian  population.  This 
happened  especially  in  the  Western  regions  of  the  country  which  had  become  part  of  the 
Soviet  Union  only  after  the  second  World  war.  Russians  were  called  there  to  occupy 
key  political  and  economic  positions.  4  In  the  face  of  a  more  advantaged  Russian 
minority,  Ukrainian  representation  in  party  leadership,  scientific  personnel  and  student 
population  in  institutions  of  higher  education  was  reported  considerably  lower  than  the 
ss  percentage  of  Ukrainian  population  in  the  Ukrainian  SSR. 
The  Role  of  National  Elites 
Throughout  the  Russian  Empire  and  the  Soviet  Union  Ukrainian  national  elites  were 
progressively  assimilated  into  Russian  culture,  with  only  a  limited  minority  preserving  a 
distinct  Ukrainian  national  identity  (more  on  Ukrainian  nationalism  below).  The  reign 
of  Catherine,  in  particular,  inaugurated  a  practice  re-proposed  also  in  the  Soviet  era, 
whereby  the  Cossack  aristocracy  was  promised  equality  to  the  Russian  aristocracy  if 
they  proved  loyal  to  the  Russian  Empire  and  committed  to  its  grandeur.  Equally,  in  the 
Soviet  Union,  individuals  devoted  to  the  common  cause  of  socialism  and  affiliated  to 
the  right  patronage  lines  were  admitted  to  join  the  nomenklatura,  often  with  little  regard 
for  their  ethnic  belonging. 
53  Quoted  in  G.  P.  Holman,  Jr.  (1994),  "Russo-Ukrainian  Relations:  the  Containment  Legacy",  in  Ethnic 
Nationalism  and  Regional  Conflict:  The  Former Soviet  Union  and  Yugoslavia,  edited  by  W.  R.  Duncan 
and  G.  P.  Holman  Jr.,  (Boulder:  Westview  Press),  p.  84 
54  The  western  regions  of  Ukraine,  which  had  never  been  part  of  the  Russian  Empire  or  the  Soviet  Union, 
were  exposed  to  a  rapid  process  of  integration  into  the  Soviet  environment,  with  forced  collectivisation 
between  1948  and  1951,  the  introduction  of  heavy  industry,  and  the  exploitation  of  natural  resources.  The 
Russian  population  in  the  region  increased  substantially  (with  a  total  of  more  than  300  thousand  Russian 
immigrants  in  the  region,  primarily  involved  in  activities  in  the  Party  and  the  emerging  heavy  industries). 
This  occurred  against  the  backdrop  of  a  remarkable  exodus  of  Ukrainians  to  Poland.  P.  R.  Magocsi 
(1996),  Op.  Cit.,  pp.  648-49.  For  a  more  general  overview  on  internal  migration  patterns  see  Krawchenko 
c1985)  Op.  Cit. 
5  R.  Solchanyk  (1990),  Op.  Cit. 
77 The  social  and  economic  privileges  it  was  afforded  and  the  political  power  it 
administered  ensured  that  the  Soviet  elite  developed  into  a  cohesive  stratum,  with 
common  values  and  prepared  to  defend  its  class  interests.  56  Data  collected  by  Evan 
Mawdsley  and  Stephen  White  show  that  from  1961  to  1986,  the  representation  of 
Ukrainians  in  the  Central  Committee  was  second  only  to  the  Russians,  with  a  proportion 
between  17  and  12%  (against  a  proportion  between  56  and  71%  for  the  Russians).  57 
This  notwithstanding,  an  embryonic  national  elite  started  to  appear  as  a  result  of  the 
consolidation  of  the  Ukrainian  Communist  party  in  the  aftermath  of  World  War  Two, 
and  the  economic  reforms  pushed  through  by  Khrushchev.  The  increased  powers 
awarded  to  the  Republic  at  the  end  of  the  war  reinforced  a  mood  of  self-confidence 
within  the  Ukrainian  leadership,  which  had  fought  to  defend  its  territory  in  the  face  of 
the  rapid  German  advance.  At  the  18th  Congress  of  the  CPSU  a  new  Ukrainian  political 
generation  emerged,  the  first  one  to  hold  the  majority  of  key  posts  in  the  republic. 
Following  its  important  role  in  support  of  Khrushchev's  leadership  bid,  the  Ukrainian 
party  leadership  began  to  demand  a  greater  role  in  managing  the  republic. 
The  question  was  posed  with  more  urgency  after  Khrushchev's  reform  of  the  economic 
administration,  when  it  became  evident  that  the  majority  of  the  staff  to  the  eleven 
sovnarkhozy  created  in  Ukraine  were  sent  from  Moscow;  from  the  former  union 
ministries.  "A  new  Ukrainian  political  elite  comprised  of  individuals  with  modem  skills 
had  come  into  being  and  found  itself  frustrated  politically  and  economically  by  a  hyper- 
centralised  system,  which  refused  to  recognise  it  as  a  force,  or  share  power  with  it".  58 
In  the  light  of  increased  republican  economic  autonomy,  members  of  the  party  elite, 
who  were  close  to  the  central  party  institutions  (high  level  ministerial  bureaucrats  and 
Gosplan  officials),  tried  to  limit  the  number  of  emerging  economic  regions,  in  order  to 
ensure  their  control  on  economic  institutions.  Members  of  the  regional  administrations 
56  On  the  structure  of  the  Soviet  elite  M.  M.  Voslenskii  (1984),  Nomenklatura:  Anatomy  of  the  Soviet 
Ruling  Class,  (London:  The  Bodley  Head),  especially  chapter  5.  On  the  shared  values  of  the  Soviet  elite 
J,  Klugman  (1989),  The  New  Soviet  Elite.  How  They  Think  and  What  They  Want,  (New  York:  Praeger) 
57  E.  Mawdsley  and  S.  White  (2000),  The  Soviet  Elite  from  Lenin  to  Gorbachev,  (Oxford:  OUP),  p.  175 
58  B.  Krawchenko  (1985),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  249 
78 supported  instead  the  reforms,  hoping  to  increase  their  authority  on  the  economic 
process.  s9 
The  removal  in  1972  of  Petro  Shelest,  the  vocal  First  Secretary,  who  in  more  than  one 
case  had  advocated  Ukrainisation  and  increased  economic  powers  to  the  republican 
leadership,  was  read  as  a  manoeuvre  of  the  Brezhnev  era  leadership  in  the  direction  of  a 
new  centralist  initiative.  0  During  the  Brezhnevite  regime  pressure  on  intellectuals 
increased  and  restrictions  on  national  cultures  and  political  dissent  were  re-introduced. 
The  Ukrainian  national  elite  that  had  emerged  in  the  previous  decades  was  again 
silenced,  while  the  loyalist,  pro-Moscow  leadership,  represented  by  first  secretary 
Volodymir  Sherbitskyi,  re-occupied  the  Republic's  top  positions. 
The  Path  of  Economic  Development 
The  process  of  economic  development  pursued  in  the  Soviet  era  highlights  the 
contradiction  of  the  central  planning  system.  On  the  one  side,  industrial  growth  was 
promoted  on  a  scale  that  would  have  been  difficult  to  realise  without  the  massive 
investment  allocated  from  Moscow.  Yet,  on  the  other  side,  central  planning  imposed  a 
line  of  development  that  was  instrumental  to  the  interests  of  the  whole  Soviet  Union,  as 
perceived  by  the  central  authorities. 
Within  the  framework  of  the  First  Five  Year  Plan,  republican  commissariats  were  made 
subordinate  to  the  central  commissariat  for  agriculture,  and  all  heavy  industry  and 
forestry  were  separated  from  the  republic's  control.  Schools  and  public  health  facilities 
were  also  subjected  to  the  central  structures,  as  were  the  new  economic  regions 
established  on  the  territory  of  Ukraine.  61  Within  the  socialist  power  system,  the 
priorities  and  directions  of  growth  were  established  by  the  Central  Committee  and  the 
Gosplan.  Within  the  comprehensive  plan  for  the  development  of  the  Soviet  Union, 
Ukraine  was  assigned  the  role  of  producing  raw  materials  (metallurgy,  coal  and 
agricultural  products),  while  the  production  of  finished  goods,  especially  consumer 
goods,  was  concentrated  in  Russia. 
59  B.  Lewytskyj,  (1984),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  74 
60  B.  Krawchenko  (1985),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  249 
61  P.  R.  Magocsi  (1996),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  557 
79 The  First  Five  Years  Plan  brought  the  development  of  heavy  industry  and  transformed 
Ukraine  into  the  leading  industrial  centre  for  coal  extraction  and  metallurgy,  as  well  as  a 
primary  source  of  grain  and  sugar  provisions.  Ukraine  received  20%  of  the  total  Soviet 
investment,  and  400  of  the  1500  plants  planned  for  the  whole  Soviet  Union  were  placed 
on  Ukrainian  territory.  Smaller  investments  were  allocated  to  Ukraine  during  the 
Second  and  Third  plan,  but  the  country's  newly  acquired  industrial  base  was 
nonetheless  strengthened.  By  the  1970s-80s,  however,  as  a  result  of  the  ageing  and 
inefficiency  of  the  industries  located  in  Ukraine  and  the  failure  to  implement  new 
technologies,  the  country's  growth  rate  dropped.  Between  1981  and  1985,  Ukraine's 
performance  in  terms  of  technological  progress  had  slipped  to  ninth  place  vis-ä-vis  the 
other  republics'  economy,  and  productivity  was  below  the  union  average.  62  Ukraine's 
agricultural  sector,  though,  was  still  very  active,  providing  the  Soviet  Union  with  more 
than  23%  of  its  total  production  (against  only  19%  of  the  total  population). 
By  the  1980s,  investment  in  the  Ukrainian  economy  had  fallen  dramatically  and 
Ukraine's  share  of  total  USSR  investment  appeared  consistently  below  its  population's 
percentage.  It  was  as  low  as  13.6%  in  1982  against  a  population  that  was  19%  of  the 
total  Soviet  population  (compared  to  the  60.8%  of  investment  and  53.8%  of  population 
in  Russia,  and  6.2%  of  investment  and  5.4%  of  population  in  Khazakhstan).  63  The 
eminent  Canadian-Ukrainian  economist  Ivan  Koropeckyj  has  rejected  the  theory  that  the 
drop  in  investment,  coupled  with  unrequited  transfers  of  national  income,  were  all  part 
of  a  strategy  to  exploit  Ukraine  to  the  advantage  of  other  regions  of  Russia  and  the 
Soviet  Union.  Geopolitical  considerations,  rather  than  national  considerations,  he 
believes,  were  at  work  in  defining  the  priorities  for  regional  development  in  the  post- 
war  years.  64 
62  I.  S.  Koropeckyj  (1992),  "Introduction",  in  The  Ukrainian  Economy,  edited  by  I.  S.  Koropecyj, 
Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  Harvard  University  Press,  ),  pp.  6-7 
3  I.  S.  Koropeckyj  (1990),  Development  in  the  Shadow:  Studies  in  Ukrainian  Economics,  (Edmonton: 
Canadian  Institute  of  Ukrainian  Studies  press,  University  of  Alberta),  p.  51 
64  After  the  war,  it  was  considered  strategically  important  to  develop  the  huge  areas  east  of  the  Urals. 
Defence  and  political  criteria  were  key  determinants  in  this  decision.  Moscow  aims  were:  1.  To  shift 
economic  activity  from  West  to  East,  disperse  territorially  industry,  strengthen  regions  bordering  with 
China,  and  the  exploitation  of  resources  in  the  Asiatic  regions.  The  Ukrainian  economy  was  never 
attractive  for  these  purposes,  but  was  relegated  to  be  the  "resource  base"  for  the  development  of  other 
more  strategically  important  regions.  I.  S.  Koropeckyj  (1970),  "Industrial  Location  policy  in  the  USSR 
during  the  Post  War  Period",  in  Economic  Performance  and  the  Military  Burden  in  the  Soviet  Union, 
Joint  Economic  Committee  (Washington:  US  Government  Printing  Office). 
80 It  is  undisputed,  however,  that  the  development  of  the  Ukrainian  economy  was  distorted 
to  meet  the  political  and  economic  priorities  identified  by  the  central  planners.  The 
chronic  shortages  of  consumer  goods  in  the  late  Soviet  years,  for  example,  have  been 
explained  as  a  consequence  of  an  investment  policy  that,  giving  preference  to  the 
growth  of  the  heavy  industry  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  light  industry,  directed  two 
thirds  of  scientific  resources  only  to  the  defence  industry.  65  The  inefficient  structure  of 
the  Ukrainian  economy  (too  high  a  share  of  agricultural  production,  raw  and  industrial 
materials,  against  too  low  a  share  of  industrial  production)  was  also  dictated  by  the 
orientation  towards  the  CMEA  markets.  Within  Soviet  foreign  policy  strategy,  the 
Ukrainian  economy  was  locked  into  a  plan  that  saw  it  supporting  the  alliance  with  the 
Eastern  European  countries,  through  a  system  of  preferential  trade.  This  subordinated 
the  possibility  of  correcting  its  structural  unbalances  to  a  radical  change  in  Soviet 
foreign  policy  priorities.  66 
The  energy  system  provided  a  further  distortion  of  the  Ukrainian  economy.  As  a 
consequence  of  short-sighted  policies  of  energy  intensive  development,  the  republic's 
energy  situation  deteriorated  in  less  than  two  decades,  from  enjoying  a  small  energy 
surplus  to  a  42%  overall  net  energy  deficit.  In  1970  Ukraine  met  100%  of  its  energy 
needs,  98%  in  1980  and  only  58%  in  1985.67 
An  accurate  calculation  of  who  won  and  who  lost  from  the  game  of  transfers  in  the 
Soviet  economy  has  proved  difficult.  Estimates  produced  by  the  nationalist  party  Rukh 
present  a  catalogue of  centrally  imposed  distortions  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  Ukrainian 
economy.  During  the  Soviet  years,  it  is  argued,  "some  113  billion  rubles  were  taken 
from  Ukraine  to  the  centre  annually,  thorough  taxation  and  profits".  Prices  imposed  on 
Ukrainian  products  were  highly  discriminatory  (48  rubles  per  tonne  of  sugar  paid  to 
65  I.  Lukinov  (1992),  "Radical  Reconstruction  of  the  Ukrainian  Economy:  Reasons,  Reforms,  Outlook", 
in  The  Ukrainian  Economy,  edited  by  I.  S.  Koropeckyj  (Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  Harvard  University 
Press), 
,  pp.  21-43 
66  "As  long  as  the  Moscow  leadership  has  the  ambition  and  power  to  dominate  the  COMECON  countries 
economically,  substantial  structural  changes  in  Ukrainian  trade  with  other  countries  are  unlikely. 
Domestically,  since  the  role  of  Ukraine  in  attaining  Moscow's  geopolitical  goals  is  supportive,  there  is  no 
chance  for  structural  change  in  Ukrainian  trade  within  the  USSR  either".  I.  S.  Koropeckyj  (1990),  Op. 
Cit.,  p.  37 
67  L.  Dienes  (1992),  "Energy,  Minerals  and  Economic  Policy,  in  The  Ukrainian  Economy,  edited  by  I.  S. 
Koropeckyj,  (Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  Harvard  University  Press),  pp.  123-147 
81 Ukraine,  against  73  paid  in  Russia),  and  expenditures  on  the  development  of  basic 
science  research  per  capita  in  Ukraine  was  only  6.3  rubles,  against  the  25.5  rubles  per 
capita  in  Russia.  8 
A  comparative  analysis  of  direct  (fiscal  and  budget  expenses)  and  indirect  (inter- 
republican  trade)  transfers,  conducted  by  western  researchers,  however,  suggests  that 
the  argument  of  Ukrainian  economic  exploitation  needs  reconsideration.  Trade  flows 
and  artificially  inflated  or  decreased  prices,  vis-ä-vis  world  prices,  were  used  by  the 
central  authorities  tö  subsidise  some  regions.  In  particular,  the  strongly  underpriced 
trade  in  oil  and  gas  was  matched  by  overpriced  trade  in  the  light  and  food  industries. 
As  a  result  of  these  unbalances,  in  1990  Russia  and  Turkmenistan  appeared  to  be  the 
only  two  republics  in  a  position  of  net  donors  to  the  federal  budget.  In  fact,  Ukraine 
received  net  transfers  equal  to  3.61%  of  its  GDP,  thanks  to  the  flow  of  subsidised  oil 
and  gas  products  from  Russia.  69 
Was  Russia  a  Colonial  Power? 
A  German  historian  has  defined  colonialism  as 
"A  relationship  of  domination  between  an  indigenous  (or  forcibly  imported)  majority  and  a  minority  of 
foreign  invaders.  The  fundamental  decisions  affecting  the  lives  of  the  colonised  people  are  made  and 
implemented  by  the  colonial  rules  in  pursuit  of  interests  that  are  often  defined  in  a  distant  metropolis. 
Rejecting  cultural  compromises  with  the  colonised  population,  the  colonisers  are  convinced  of  their  own 
superiority  and  their  ordained  mandate  to  rule"  7° 
To  which  extent  does  this  definition  of  colonialism  apply  to  the  relations  between 
Russia  and  Ukraine?  Can  Russia  be  defined  tout-court  a  colonial  power?  How  do 
68  Report  of  the  First  Rukh  Congress,  quoted  in  B.  Krawchenko  (1993),  "Ukraine:  the  Politics  of 
Independence",  in  Nations  and  Politics  in  the  Soviet  Successor  States,  edited  by  I.  Bremmer  and  R.  Taras, 
Cambridge:  CUP)  pp.  75-98,  (quotation  p.  87) 
9  L.  T.  Orlowski  (1993),  "Indirect  Transfers  in  Trade  among  Former  Soviet  Union  Republics:  Sources, 
Patterns  and  Policy  Responses  in  the  Post-Soviet  Period",  Europe-Asia  Studies,  Vol.  45,  n.  6,  pp.  1001, 
1024.  See  also  S.  S.  Brown  and  M.  V.  Belkindas  (1993),  "Who's  Feeding  Whom?  An  Analysis  of  Soviet 
Interrepublican  Trade",  in  The  Former  Soviet  Union  in  Transition,  edited  by  R.  F.  Kaufman  and  J.  P. 
Hardt,  (Armok:  M.  E.  Sharpe),  pp.  163-183 
70  J.  Osterhammel  (1997),  Colonialism.  A  Theoretical  Overview,  (Princeton:  Markus  Wiener  Publishers), 
pp.  16-17 
82 historical  relations  affect  the  future  development  of  bilateral  relations  and  the 
perspectives  of  improved  co-operation? 
Both  the  Russian  Empire  first  and  the  Soviet  Union  indeed  established  a  "relation  of 
domination"  over  Ukraine,  in  the  sense  that  they  dismantled  any  vestige  of  a  self-ruled 
state  structure  on  the  Ukrainian  territory.  The  authorities  in  Russia  imposed  a  highly 
centralised  form  of  state  that  was  administered  by  a  governor  sent  in  and  subjected  to 
the  government  in  the  capital,  thus  leaving  little  space  for  local  powers  to  grow.  Yet, 
with  the  creation  of  the  Ukrainian  SSR,  the  Soviet  government  unintentionally  laid  the 
foundations  of  the  independent  state  that  was  to  emerge  more  than  seventy  years  later. 
Soviet  policies  not  only  set  up  the  bureaucratic  system  that  would  provide  the  skeleton 
for  sovereign  Ukraine;  but  also  created  a  national  elite  that,  through  the  decades, 
acquired  an  interest  and  the  confidence  to  administer  the  country.  71 
The  policy  of  korenizatsiya  (or  "indigenisation"),  promoted  by  the  party  in  the  1920s, 
was  the  first  step  towards  the  "indigenisation  of  the  local  political  leadership"  and  the 
consolidation  of  the  local  intelligentsia.  72  The  decentralisation  of  economic  power 
during  the  Khrushchev  years  represented  another  stage  in  this  process.  As  a  result,  by 
the  time  that  perestroika  started,  "practically,  everyone  who  is  active  in  politics, 
including  the  Communist  Party  of  Ukraine,  was  a  nationalist  in  the  sense  of  being  an 
advocate  of  the  primacy  of  the  republic's  rights  over  those  of  the  Centre.  Practically 
everyone  was  in  favour  of  a  Ukrainian  cultural  rebirth"  73 
It  is,  therefore,  difficult  to  say  that  the  monopoly  of  power  was  detained  in  the  exclusive 
hands  of  Russians  as  the  "external  colonisers".  During  the  Russian  Empire,  Ukrainian 
elites  were  Russified  and  absorbed  into  the  Russian  table  of  ranks.  Also  in  the  Soviet 
Union,  part  of  the  Ukrainian  elite  accepted,  on  ideological  grounds,  or  in  the  hope  to 
share  the  advantages  afforded  to  the  elite,  the  prominence  of  the  Soviet  state.  These 
members  of  the  elite  became  the  "agents  of  mediation"  between  local  society  and 
71  Some  authors  argue  that  the  existence  of  a  bureaucratic  structure  was  the  factor  that  determined  the 
failure  of  the  1918  Ukrainian  National  Republic  and  the  success  of  the  1991  movement  towards 
independence.  A.  J.  Motyl  (1993),  Dilemmas  of  Independence:  Ukraine  after  Totalitarianism,  (New 
York:  Council  of  Foreign  Relations,  p.  35 
72G.  Smith  et  al.  (1998),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  6 
73  B.  Harasymiw  (1992),  "Uk  ainian  Nationalism  and  the  Future",  in  Nationalism  and  the  Break-up  of  an 
Empire:  Russia  and  its  Periphery,  edited  by  M.  Rezun,  (Westport,  Connecticut:  Praeger),  pp.  57-69 
83 central  power,  recruited  with  the  twin  purpose  of  promoting  "modernisation  and 
imperial  control".  74  They  were  "collaborators",  who  experienced  what  a  scholar  of 
colonialism  has  called  a  "convergence  of  interests"  between  their  own  aspirations  and 
the  objectives  of  the  colonial  state.  5 
Elevating  to  the  level  of  ideology  the  historical  mission  of  the  empire,  Russia  offered 
Ukraine  and  its  elites  a  partnership  (Ukraine  was  to  become  the  "second  among  equals", 
as  Khrushchev  put  it)  that  exempted  them  from  being  treated  as  a  simple  colony.  In  the 
Russian  iconography,  Ukraine  was  portrayed  as  the  "younger  brother"  to  be  protected 
and  looked  after  by  the  "older  brother".  The  Russian  Empire  and  the  Soviet  Union  were 
presented  as  an  historical  opportunity  for  the  Slavic  peoples  to  be  finally  reunited  within 
the  successor  of  the  Kievan  kingdom. 
In  this  perspective,  the  national  interests  of  Ukraine  were  certainly  defined  by  the  centre 
(as  were  the  interests  of  any  other  Soviet  Republic,  including  the  RSFSR),  but  such  a 
process  would  take  place  in  the  light  of  the  historical  mission  of  the  Soviet  Union.  With 
this  aim  in  sight,  other  elements  (such  as  political  opposition  of  the  Ukrainian  people 
and  their  yearning  to  preserve  their  cultural  identity  or  exercise  political  autonomy) 
were  viewed  as  perfectly  expendable  elements:  either  an  instrument  to  achieve  the  final 
purpose  of  the  empire,  or  an  obstacle  to  be  eliminated.  In  an  undoubted  colonial 
attitude,  Russia  proceeded  in  a  move  of  systematic  denial  of  the  Ukrainian  diversity, 
either  in  linguistic,  cultural  or  historical  terms,  because  the  recognition  of  such  a 
difference  would  most  probably  undermine  the  empire's  mission  of  civilisation. 
Russian  chauvinism  became  one  of  the  ideological  pillars  of  the  empire,  and 
institutionalised  the  preponderance  of  the  Russians  over  the  Ukrainians  and  other 
minorities  in  the  Empire.  Thus,  if  it  is  true,  as  Alexandr  Motyl  points  out,  that  "life  in 
the  totalitarian  Soviet  Empire  was  difficult  for  everyone",  it  is  also  true  that  "Russian 
elites  enjoyed  the  prerequisites  of  imperial  authority,  and  Russians  in  general  had  the 
74  M.  R.  Bessinger  (1992),  "Elites  and  Ethnic  Identities  in  Soviet  and  Post-Soviet  Politics",  in  The  Post- 
Soviet  Nations:  Perspectives  on  the  Demise  of  the  USSR,  edited  by  A.  J.  Motyl,  (New  York:  Columbia 
University  Press),  p.  150 
75  J.  Osterhammel  (1997),  Op.  Cit.,  pp.  16-17 
84 satisfaction  of  being  masters,  even  if  decidedly  impoverished  ones,  of  an  empire,  in 
which  their  language,  culture,  symbols  and  values  reigned  supreme".  76 
Because  of  all  these  contradictions  (structure  of  the  state,  role  of  the  elites,  use  of 
historical  myths,  cultural  repression,  submission  of  the  local  interests  to  centrally 
identified  objectives)  the  relation  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  is  best  described  in  terms 
of  what  Graham  Smith  and  others  have  defined  as  "federal  colonialism".  Relations 
between  Russia  and  Ukraine  within  the  Imperial  and  Soviet  framework  were  therefore 
"neither  wholly  `federal'  nor  `colonial',  but  [contained]  elements  of  both  systems".  77  In 
relation  to  our  analysis  it  must  be  asked  whether  this  form  of  partial,  or  collaborative 
colonialism  has  left  permanent  scars  in  the  collective  political  conscience  of  the 
Ukrainian  population  and  its  elite.  In  particular,  whether  the  history  of  this  complex 
relationship  would  constitute  an  element  strong  enough  to  inhibit  a  post-Soviet 
rapprochement. 
Ukrainian  Nationalism  and  Independence 
The  Ukrainian  reply  to  the  constraints  of  "federal  colonialism"  was  the  emergence  of  a 
national  movement  that  initially  flourished  within  the  wave  of  national  resurgence  that 
shook  Europe  in  the  second  half  of  the  19`h  century.  78  Starting  from  the  1820s,  a 
process  of  "ethnicisation  of  the  enlightened  elites"  occurred.  Local  elites  became  aware 
of  the  history  of  their  national  community,  promoted  research  into  their  local  folklore 
and  expressed  "emotional  attachment"  to  the  homeland.  This  process  was  followed  by 
a  stage  of  "patriotic  agitation",  in  which  the  elite  attempted  an  organised  reaction  to 
their  state  of  subordination. 
Th  eElite's  reaction  to  the  Russian  pre-eminence  was  motivated  by  the  awareness  that, 
in  order  to  achieve  upward  mobility,  they  were  forced  to  accept  a  process  of  cultural 
assimilation.  A  "reactive  ethnicity",  thus,  developed  as  a  result  of  growing  perceptions 
76  A.  J.  Motyl  (1993),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  34 
77  G.  Smith  et  al  (1998),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  4 
78  For  an  historical  background  on  Ukrainian  nationalism  see  J.  Armstrong  (1963),  Ukrainian 
Nationalism,  (New  York:  Columbia  University  Press) 
85 of  "relative  deprivation".  79  The  sacred  Brotherhood  of  Sts.  Cyrill  and  Methodius, 
attended  by  figures  like  the  historian  Mikola  Kostmarov  and  the  poet  Taras 
Shevchenko,  was  the  first  organised  Ukrainian  national  group.  80  The  Ukrainian  national 
movement  was  not,  however,  a  powerful  and  widespread  movement.  Mainly  limited  to 
the  western  and  central  regions  of  the  country,  the  nationalists  had  to  compete  with  the 
prevailing  "Little  Russian"  identity  and  Russophile  doctrines.  81  After  centuries  of 
Russian  cultural  assimilation  and  political  domination,  Ukrainian  national  identity  was 
weakened,  relegated  to  the  countryside  and  heavily  discredited.  82 
In  the  Soviet  period  Ukrainian  nationalism  was  revived  in  the  OUN  (Organisation  of 
Ukrainian  Nationalists),  radical  right-wing  partisan  groups  that  during  the  Second 
World  War  fought  the  Soviets,  either  allied  with  the  German  invading  troops  or 
independently.  It  was  only  with  the  advent  of  de-Stalinisation,  however,  that  renewed 
enthusiasm  for  the  Ukrainian  cause  gave  rise  to  a  new  national  movement  led  by 
members  of  the  Soviet  Ukrainian  intelligentsia  (the  shestidesyatikh).  Poets,  like  Ivan 
Drach,  and  writers,  like  Vasyl'  Symonenko,  initiated  a  campaign  for  the  defence  of 
Ukrainian  linguistic  and  cultural  prerogatives,  promoted  an  open  critique  of  Russian 
power,  and  claimed  political  autonomy  for  Ukraine. 
Repression  of  dissent  from  the  1960s  to  the  1980s  draw  the  Ukrainian  nationalistic 
movement  underground,  prompted  the  diffusion  of  illegal  publications  (samydav),  and 
filled  Soviet  prison  camps  of  Ukrainian  activists.  Ukrainian  nationalism  acquired  the 
character  of  a  movement  for  the  defence  of  democracy  and  human  rights  (epitomised  in 
the  establishment  of  the  Ukrainian  Helsinki  Group,  called  to  monitor  the  Helsinki 
79  R.  J.  Kaiser  (1994),  The  Geography  of  Nationalism  in  Russia  and  the  USSR,  (Princeton:  Princeton 
University  Press),  pp.  36-41 
80  A.  Wilson  (1997),  Ukrainian  Nationalism  in  the  1990s:  A  Minority  Faith,  (Cambridge:  CUP),  p.  28 
81  Ibid.,  chapters  2  and  5. 
82  A  passage  of  General  Petro  Grigorenko's  autobiography  gives  a  sense  of  these  feelings.  "Mass  terror 
campaigns  were  carried  out  against  the  Ukrainian  population  together  with  a  cruel  system  of  serf 
exploitation.  As  a  result,  in  one  century  a  country  of  universal  literacy  was  transformed  into  a  dark  and 
forgotten  province.  [...  ]  During  the  centuries  they  spent  in  the  Russian  imperial  state,  the  Ukrainian 
began  to  forget  their  national  name  and  became  accustomed  to  the  name  their  colonisers  had  bestowed  on 
them-  the  Malorosii,  or  Little  Russians;  or  the  Kholkhi  or  Topknots".  P.  Grigorenko  (1983),  Memoirs, 
(London:  Harvill  Press),  p.  345 
86 Accord).  83  In  the  Ukrainian  experience  the  democratic  movement  and  national 
movement  coincided.  84 
Despite  such  a  relentless  tradition,  fuelled  also  by  an  active  diaspora,  nationalism,  and 
with  it  the  national  movement,  was  only  one  of  the  forces  that  brought  Ukraine  to 
independence.  The  influence  of  mass  mobilisation  was  indisputably  large,  but 
nationalist  and  democratic  groups  were  obviously  not  strong  enough  to  bring  about,  on 
their  own,  independence  and  the  demise  of  the  Soviet  Union.  85  In  the  words  of 
Aleksandr  Motyl,  "Nationalists  pushed  the  process  along  -  and  they  certainly  chronicled 
it  -  but  without  the  decay  of  totalitarianism  and  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  empire  their 
efforts  could  not  have  transformed  Ukraine  from  a  colonial  territory  into  an  independent 
polity".  86  A  nationalist  discourse  was  adopted  by  the  former  communist  leadership  to 
legitimise  its  permanence  in  power  and  to  substantiate  the  successive  process  of  state- 
building.  The  realignment  of  the  national  elites  was  certainly  one  of  the  most  important 
forces  behind  the  achievement  of  independence. 
Towards  the  end  of  the  1980s  the  Soviet  Union  had  lost  its  appeal  for  citizens  of  the 
non-Russian  republics.  Shaken  by  an  economic  crisis  that  the  central  leadership 
appeared  incapable  of  controlling,  impaired  by  political  anarchy,  diminished  in  its 
international  prestige,  "Moscow  had  nothing  to  offer  -  it  was  neither  a  source  of 
technological  know-how,  nor  an  international  financial  centre.  It  was  merely  an 
apparatus  of  repression  and  control".  87  The  central  bureaucracy  was  perceived  as  an 
obstacle  to  economic  progress,  while  it  seemed  that  local  economies  would  become 
83  A.  Wilson  (1997),  Op.  Cit.,  chapter  2 
84  B.  Krawchenko  (1993),  "Ukraine:  the  Politics  of  Independence",  in  Nations  and  Politics  in  the  Soviet 
Successor  States,  edited  by  I.  Bremmer  and  R.  Taras,  (Cambridge:  CUP),  p.  86 
85  A  number  of  "informal  groups"  emerged  between  1987  and  1988.  Among  these  the  Ukrainian  Helsinki 
group,  the  Ukrainian  Association  of  Independent  creative  Intelligentsiya,  the  Culturological  Club,  the 
Student  Organisation  Hromada  and  the  Ecological  organisation  Zelenyi  Svit  ("Green  World").  Themes 
addressed  by  these  groups  were  the  abolition  of  party  privileges,  opposition  to  the  construction  of  new 
nuclear  plants,  economic  sovereignty,  Ukranisationpolicies,  and  even  the  formation  of  a  Ukrainian  army. 
The  Chernobyl  catastrophe  in  1986,  in  particular,  had  represented  an  occasion  of  massive  political 
mobilisation  and  open  critique  of  Soviet  power.  Defence  of  the  environment  became  a  synonym  for 
defence  of  national  interests  as  differentiated  from  Soviet  interests.  On  informal  groups  T.  Kuzio  (1992), 
"Restructuring  from  Below:  Informal  Groups  in  Ukraine  under  Gorbachev,  1985-89",  in  Ukrainian  Past, 
Ukrainian  Present,  edited  by  B.  Krawchenko,  (New  York:  St.  Martin  Press),  pp.  107-123.  On  the  role  of 
Eco-nationalism  J.  I.  Dawson  (1996),  Eco-nationalism:  Antinuclear  Activism  and  National  Identity  in 
Russia,  Lithuania  and  Ukraine,  (Durham  N.  C.:  Duke  University  Press) 
86  A.  J.  Motyl  (1993),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  23 
87  B.  Krawchenko  (1993),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  84 
87 more  effective  and  prosper  under  the  management  of  local  elites.  88  Hopes  for  social  and 
economic  improvement  in  a  state  ruled  from  Kyiv,  rather  than  national  awareness, 
motivated  popular  support  for  independence  in  some  parts  of  the  population  (especially 
in  the  central  and  the  eastern  regions  of  the  country).  89 
The  increasing  mobilisation  of  the  population  along  a  nationalistic  strategy  induced  part 
of  the  local  elites  to  build  its  authority  within  this  framework.  In  January  1990  a  human 
chain  of  nearly  one  million  people  joined  L'viv  and  Kyiv,  in  commemoration  of  the 
1918  declaration  of  independence.  In  the  1990  parliamentary  elections  the  pro- 
independence  party  Rukh  (the  "Popular  Movement  of  Ukraine  for  Restructuring")  won 
one  fourth  of  the  seats  in  the  Verkhovna  Rada,  three  regional  governments  in  Galicia, 
and  city,  municipal  and  rural  Soviets  (among  them  also  the  city  of  Kyiv).  By  mid-1990, 
the  Rukh  claimed  to  have  a  membership  of  half  a  million  people.  Students  and  workers 
went  on  hunger  strikes  demanding  more  democratisation  and  national  autonomy.  The 
Declaration  of  Sovereignty  was  approved  by  the  Verkhovna  Rada  on  16  June  1990  in 
this  exhilarated  climate  in  an  attempt  to  moderate  pressures  from  below.  90 
Between  January  and  March  1991,  the  Communist  Party  of  Ukraine  (CPU)  split.  A 
"national  communist"  section,  headed  by  former  ideology  secretary  and  Speaker  of  the 
Verkhovna  Rada  Leonid  Kravchuk,  emerged  in  opposition  to  a  group  loyal  to  Moscow 
and  headed  by  the  first  Secretary  Stanislav  Hurenko.  The  nationalistic  argument  was 
hijacked  by  the  national  communists  and  absorbed  into  their  political  program.  To 
which  extent  the  conversion  from  communism  to  nationalism  corresponded  to  a  genuine 
ideological  transformation  or  a  "marriage  of  interest"  is  disputable.  There  were 
certainly  reasons  to  justify  the  local  elites'  disaffection  towards  the  central  structures 
and  their  demands  for  direct  political  and  economic  power.  Yet,  it  is  a  fact  that  the 
88  A  1990  report  sponsored  by  the  Deutsche  Bank  increased  confidence  that  Ukraine  was  in  a  better  shape 
than  Russia  to  face  the  economic  transition  and  it  would  be  better  off  by  severing  its  economic 
connections  with  it.  J.  Corret  and  A.  Gummich  (1990),  The  Soviet  Union  at  the  Crossroad:  Fact  and 
Figures  on  the  Soviet  Republics,  (Frankfurt:  Deutsche  Bank) 
89  B.  Krawchenko  (1993),  Op.  Cit. 
90  P  Kubicek  (1996),  "Dynamics  of  Contemporary  Ukrainian  Nationalism:  Empire-Breaking  to  State- 
Building",  Canadian  Review  of  Studies  on  Nationalism  Vol.  23,  n.  1-2,,  p.  40 
88 defence  of  the  national  cause  proved  fruitful  for  Kravchuk,  whose  rating  rose 
remarkably  from  November  1990  to  June  1991.91 
By  cmbracing  the  nationalist  cause,  the  local  elites  had  an  opportunity  to  re-gain  their 
breathing  space  against  the  interference  of  the  centre.  In  the  Gorbachev  years  local 
elites  had  been  blamed  for  the  failure  of  the  reforms,  while,  at  the  same  time,  the 
provision  of  those  resources  that  could  have  made  reforms  possible  was  severely 
curtailed.  Nationalism  was  for  these  elites  the  opportunity  to  "secure  themselves  from 
any  attack  from  the  centre"  while  "distancing  themselves  from  Russia".  92  A  nationalist 
discourse  gave  national  elites  the  opportunity  to  redistribute  local  resources  excluding 
central  clitcs.  That  fraction  of  the  political  and  economic  elite  that  had  learnt  to 
administer  power  during  the  Khrushchcv  period,  and  had  seen  their  hopes  frustrated  in 
the  Brczhncv  years  by  a  renewed  centralisation,  looked  at  the  emancipation  from 
Moscow  as  an  opportunity  to  gain  real  political  power.  This  is  the  process  described  by 
Mark  ßcissingcr. 
"(The]  indigenisation  of  administration  (had]  made  possible  the  penetration  of  nationalism  into  local 
elites  and  the  co-option  of  administration  by  local  structures.  At  times,  native  elites  ostensibly  recruited 
to  mediate  imperial  domination  over  indigenous  society  instead  defended  the  interests  of  indigenous 
society  before  the  centre,  even  seeking  to  build  authority  on  the  basis  of  such  an  appeal".  91 
This  interpretation  would  be  substantiated  by  the  claim  made  by  Ukrainian  emigres  in 
the  1960s  that  nationalism  was  at  its  peack  in  the  republican  economic  structures  where 
frustration  for  Moscow's  bureaucratic  inefficiency  was  coupled  with  a  sense  of  injustice 
for  the  oppressive  nature  of  central  planning-94  The  other  face  of  this  same  coin  was 
that  a  nationalistic  cover  allowed  elites  already  in  power  not  to  be  displaced  by  an 
incoming  elite  rooted  in  the  national  and  democratic  movement.  Staying  in  power,  the 
national  communist  elites  could  consolidate  the  networks  of  patronage  that  had  been 
active  in  the  Soviet  days,  keeping  control  over  the  resources  that  they  had  been 
"A  survey  conducted  in  Kyiv  in  November  1990  failed  to  include  Kravchuk  in  a  list  of  the  twenty  most 
popular  politicians.  In  June  1991  he  was  considered  the  favoured  candidate  to  the  Presidency  by  54%  of 
the  respondents  of  another  survey.  Quoted  in  B.  Krawchcnko  (1993).  Op.  Cit..  p.  81 
11  M.  A.  Molchanov  (2000).  Op.  Cif.  p.  278 
M.  R. ßessingcr  (1992),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  153 
1.  S.  Koropeckyj  (1990),  Op.  Cit.,  chapter  5 
89 "authorised  to  managt  on  behalf  of  the  centre.  93  As  a  result,  a  nationalistic  approach 
pervaded  the  process  of  state-building  in  the  post-independence  years  and  characterised 
the  strained  relations  with  Moscow  during  Kravchuk's  presidency. 
The  Kravchuk  Presidency 
In  the  first  years  of  independence,  the  political  debate  in  Ukraine  was  characterised  by  a 
strong  nationalist  rhetoric,  and  relations  with  Russia  were  marked  by  the  post-colonial 
urge  to  defend  the  newly  acquired  independence  even  with  aggressive  tones. 
Nationalism  was  used  as  "spiritual  cement"  to  unify  society.  96  The  inclusive  character 
of  Ukrainian  nationalism,  however,  and  the  fact  that  it  did  not  define  the  nation  along 
ethnic  lines,  but  in  terms  of  "territorial  patriotism",  allowed  non-ethnic  Ukrainians 
(Russian,  Poles,  Jews)  to  feel  part  of  the  emerging  state.  97  Citizenship  and  language 
policies  were  liberal  and  contrasted  strikingly  with  those  adopted  in  other  post-Soviet 
countries  98  On  the  other  side,  however,  attitudes  towards  Russia  were  inspired  by  the 
need  to  establish  a  clear-cut  separation  between  the  two  countries.  Because  of  Russia's 
difficulty  in  accepting  an  independent  Ukraine,  and  because  of  Ukraine's  antagonistic 
tones,  the  relationship  reached  breaking-point  several  times  during  Leonid  Kravchuk's 
presidency. 
An  eloquent  example  of  such  strategy  of  "separation"  implemented  during  the 
Kravchuk  years  was  the  "Fundamentals  of  National  Economic  Policy".  Launched  in 
March  1992,  the  plan  envisaged  the  introduction  of  the  Ukrainian  national  currency  by 
November  of  the  same  year.  As  a  reaction  to  price  liberalisation  and  a  tightening  of 
monetary  policy  in  Russia,  Ukraine  decided  to  leave  the  ruble  zone,  in  order  to  avoid  a 
'Price  competition  with  Russia,  which  is  moving  toward  hyperinflation"99. 
The  introduction  of  the  hryvna  was  expected  to  produce  a  rapid  reduction  of  imports 
from  Russia  and  a  reorientation  of  trade  towards  Western  markets  and  the  other 
M.  A.  Molchanov  (2000).  Op.  Cif.  p.  279 
P.  Kubicek  (1996),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  42 
97  Wilson  (1997).  Op.  Cit..  p.  148  and  Motyl  (1993),  Op.  Cit..  p.  47 
"T"or  a  comparative  view  on  nationality  policies  in  the  post-Soviet  arena  see  N.  Melvin  (1995),  Russians 
Beyond  Russia:  The  Politics  of  National  Identity,  (London:  RIIA) 
"l  imolsk  Pravda.  March  26,1992 
90 countries  of  the  former  Soviet  Union.  By  pushing  through  a  monetary  reform  without 
co-ordination  with  its  economic  partners,  it  was  argued,  Russia  had  provided  a  clear 
signal  that  it  intended  to  decide  alone  the  pace  of  economic  reforms,  ignoring  potential 
consequences  for  the  economics  of  the  other  former  republics. 
The  Ukrainian  economic  program,  however,  did  not  contain  a  clear  framework  for 
reform  and  seemed  to  be  motivated  primarily  by  nationalist  aims,  while  the  leadership 
was  coming  under  increasing  popular  pressures.  1°°  Western  observers  judged  the  move 
a  "nasty  response"  to  the  Russian  liberalisation  of  prices,  and  warned  on  the  adverse 
effects  that  "isolationist  policies"  could  produce  on  the  Ukrainian  economy".  1°' 
Economic  confrontation  was  not  the  only  issue  between  Russia  and  Ukraine,  and  the 
number  of  pending  issues  was  multifaceted.  A  sizeable  Russian  diaspora  lived  on 
Ukrainian  territory,  and  regions  with  a  Russian  majority  population,  like  Crimea  and  the 
Donbass,  made  no  secret  of  their  hostility  towards  a  Ukrainian  state  disconnected  from 
Russia. 
From  1992,  in  the  Crimea  hostility  degenerated  into  an  open  challenge  to  Kyiv,  fuelled 
by  the  support  provided  by  some  Russian  political  forces.  The  Russian  parliament 
decided  to  address  the  question  directly,  and  political  figures  like  Speaker  of  the 
Parliament  Alcksander  Rutskoi,  presidential  advisor  Stanislav  Stankevich,  and  General 
Gromov  travelled  to  the  Crimea  claiming  that  the  region  was  an  integral  part  of  Russia. 
After  the  May  1992  declaration  of  independence  by  the  Crimean  parliament,  and  the 
response  of  the  Vcrkhovana  Rada  of  the  declaration's  unconstitutionality,  the  crisis 
subsided  until  the  election  in  January  1994  of  a  new  Crimean  president.  '°2 
In  the  question  of  Crimea,  Russia  and  Ukraine  were  tied  to  the  power  struggle  taking 
place  in  Moscow  between  the  President  and  the  parliament.  The  factor  that  prevented 
10°Leonid  Kravchuk  justified  the  decision  as  follows.  "Now,  when  Ukraine  becomes  an  independent  state, 
and  when  the  Union  has  ceased  to  exist,  our  economy  continues  to  be  managed  from  the  outside,  but  now 
through  financial,  monetary  and  price  policy.  For  all  practical  purposes,  Ukraine  has  not  made  and  could 
not  make  any  serious  independent  decision  on  economic  questions".  omsomolskaya  Pravda,  March  26, 
1992.  See  also  $  [/R[.  Research  Report.  October  30,1992 
101  A.  Sekarev  (1992)  "Ukraine's  Policy  Structure",  RF  IRL  Research  Report 
. 
Vol.  1,  n.  32,  August  14, 
PX.  60-63.  Also  Journal  of  Commerce.  August  7,1992,  p.  5 
For  a  more  detailed  analysis  of  the  Crimean  issue  see  D.  R.  Marple  and  d.  F.  Duke  (1995).  "Ukraine, 
Russia  and  the  Question  of  Crimea",  Nationalities  Papm,  Vol.  23,  n.  2,,  pp.  261-280 
91 the  deterioration  of  the  crisis  was  Yel'tsin's  refusal  to  support  the  independence 
movement,  as  he  realised  that  Crimea  would  constitute  a  precedent  for  separatist 
movements  in  non-Russian  regions  within  the  Russian  Federation  (Chechnya, 
Ingushetiya,  and  Tatarstan).  By  not  addressing  the  Crimean  question  in  the  agreements 
signed  with  Kravchuk  in  June  and  August  1992,  Ycl'tsin  signalled  that  Crimea  was  an 
exclusively  Ukrainian  internal  question. 
The  alarm  caused  in  Kyiv  by  the  Crimean  crisis  and  the  ambiguous  attitude  of  the 
Russian  establishment  towards  the  question  of  Ukrainian  borders,  however,  combined 
with  the  perception  of  risk  caused  by  the  presence  of  700,000  Soviet  soldiers  stationed 
on  Ukrainian  territory.  The  presence  of  these  troops  convinced  Ukraine  of  the  need  to 
build  its  own  army.  The  army was  designed  to  be  smaller  than  the  Soviet  army  in 
Ukraine,  and  it  was  to  be  composed  of  the  Ukrainian  share  of  the  Soviet  forces  (with  the 
rest  of  the  army  to  be  withdrawn).  Between  January  and  March  1992,500,000  troops 
and  half  of  the  officers  of  the  Black  Sea  Fleet  swore  loyalty  to  Ukraine.  Ukraine  agreed 
to  surrender  strategic  and  tactical  nuclear  weapons  and  claimed  neutrality. 
Inevitably,  Kyiv's  decision  sparked  new  controversies  with  Russia.  First  of  all  around 
the  question  of  the  Black  Sea  Fleet.  Ukraine  initially  claimed  the  totality  of  the  Fleet, 
reducing  its  demands  to  30%  at  a  later  stage.  Yet,  the  Fleet  was  still  based  in  the 
Crimean  port  of  Sevastopol,  and  Ukrainian  requests  were  perceived  by  Russian 
nationalists  as  a  challenge  also  to  the  status  of  the  city,  traditionally  viewed  as  Russian 
land,  and  the  glory  and  pride  of  Russian  maritime  history.  The  September  1993 
Massandra  Agreement  temporarily  resolved  the  issue  by  placing  the  fleet  under  a  joint 
Ukrainian  and  Russian  command  for  a  period  of  three  years,  after  which  the  question 
would  be  permanently  settled. 
The  second  controversial  question  related  to  the  Ukrainian  decision  to  create  its  own 
army  was  that  it  forced  Russia  to  establish  it  separate  Ministry  of  Defence  and  a  Russian 
army,  against  previous  expectations  that  military  issues  would  be  dealt  with  within  the 
Commonwealth  of  Independent  States.  103  This  appeared  to  be  the  first  blow  against  the 
Russian  strategy  towards  the  former  Soviet  space,  and  demonstrated  the  different 
92 understanding  that  Russia  and  Ukraine  had  of  the  CIS.  Ukraine  perceived  the 
Commonwealth  as  a  loose  association  of  fully  independent  states,  with  no  common 
monetary  and  economic  policy  and  no  common  army.  The  CIS  was  for  Kyiv  an 
organisation  aimed  at  providing  a  "civilised  divorce"  from  the  USSR,  while  the  country 
was  waiting  to  join  European  structures.  104  Russia,  on  the  other  hand,  saw  the  CIS  as  a 
federation,  within  which  some  powers  (especially  economic  and  military)  would  be 
managed  by  the  centre,  giving  ground  to  Ukraine's  fears  that  the  CIS  would  become  an 
instrument  to  preserve  the  Russian  pre-eminence  in  the  region. 
Not  surprisingly,  the  Belavezha  Pushcha  Agreement,  which  set  up  the  CIS,  was  rejected 
by  the  Ukrainian  nationalists  as  a  betrayal  of  the  national  interest,  and  a  threat  to  the 
country's  sovereignty.  Ukraine  appeared  to  be  the  most  reluctant  member  of  the 
organisation,  especially  between  1992-93.  After  that  first  year,  though,  the  grip  of  the 
economic  crisis  and  the  energy  dependence  on  Russia  forced  Kyiv  to  a  more 
accommodating  approach  towards  the  CIS  and  even  convinced  Kravchuk  to  sign  the 
Agreement  for  the  Economic  Union. 
Negotiations  with  Moscow  on  energy  imports  had  indeed  revealed  the  virtues  of 
Russian  "energy  diplomacy",  and  led  the  Ukrainian  leadership  to  believe  than  the 
Russians  were  using  the  "oil  whip"  on  Kyiv.  1°5  On  more  than  one  occasion,  it  appeared 
that  Ukraine's  vulnerability  to  threats  or  actual  reductions  in  energy  provisions  made 
the  country's  leadership  more  "inclined"  to  compromise  on  other  important  bilateral 
issues. 
Aware  of  what  Prime  Minister  Kuchma  acknowledged  to  be  "total  dependence  on 
Russia",  Ukrainian  energy  strategy  in  the  first  years  of  independence  was  to  diversify  its 
markets,  reaching  agreements  on  the  importation  of  energy  supplies  from  Turkmenistan, 
103  In  January  1992,  Russia,  Ukraine  and  other  states  of  the  former  Soviet  Union  sign  an  agreement  that 
placed  USSR  strategic  forces  under  a  CIS  command. 
a  The  CIS  was  also  considered  a  framework  to  solve  the  issues  related  to  the  succession  of  the  USSR. 
The  1991  Minsk  and  Alma  Ary  agreements  recognised  Moscow  as  the  successor  of  the  USSR  only  in  the 
United  Nations  Security  Council.  Instead,  Russia  assumed  the  prerogatives  of  the  successor  state  in  many 
different  aspects:  debt  repayment,  disarmament.  Soviet  property  (including  hard  currency  and  gold 
reserves,  and  all  USSR  embassies  and  consulates).  After  successive  negotiations  Russia  agreed  to 
transfer  to  Ukraine  16.37%  of  Soviet  assets  (including  property  overseas).  1°)  O.  M.  Smolansky  (1995),  "Ukraine's  Quest  for  Independence:  the  Fuel  Factor",  Europe-Asia  Studies. 
Vol.  47,  n.  1,  p.  75 
93 Uzbekistan,  Kazakhstan  and  Oman.  The  construction  of  a  tanker  fleet  was  planned  to 
import  oil  from  countries  other  than  Russia.  Yet,  given  its  limited  extraction 
capabilities  (Ukraine  could  meet  only  15-20%  of  its  annual  gas  and  only  8%  of  its  oil 
requirements),  and  the  high  rate  of  energy  imports,  mainly  from  Russia  (90%  of  the  gas 
consumed  was  Russian),  diversification  proved  a  difficult  task.  'o6 
Withdrawal  from  the  ruble  zone  meant  also  that,  from  February  1993,  energy  deliveries 
had  to  be  paid  in  hard  currency.  As  a  result,  prices  increased  suddenly  by  ten  times,  but 
provisions  of  Russian  energy  resources  at  prices  below  the  world  market  continued  to 
take  place  occasionally  in  exchange  for  cheap  Ukrainian  foodstuff.  Reductions  in 
Russian  supply,  motivated  by  the  Ukrainian  increasing  difficulty  in  paying,  were 
reciprocated  by  Ukrainian  diversions  for  its  own  use  of  Russian  gas  passing  through  its 
territory  cn-route  to  European  markets. 
By  late  1993  Ukrainian  energy  debt  with  Russia  had  reached  the  sum  of  $2.5  billion. 
The  country  was  subjected  to  recurrent  power  cuts,  and  the  economy  as  a  whole  had 
plunged  into  a  climate  of  stagnation  (inflation  in  1993  was  reported  at  4,735%  a  year). 
The  crisis  convinced  Ukraine  to  rcconsidcr  its  policy  towards  Russia.  107  The  "Concept 
of  Economic  Union",  signed  in  September  1993,  was  seen  as  an  instrument  to  stabilise 
trade  relations  with  Russia,  restoring  historical  trade  patterns  and  even  obtaining 
favourable  energy  prices.  The  agreement  envisaged  the  free  circulation  of  goods, 
capital  and  labour,  the  co-ordination  of  fiscal  policies,  trade  policies  with  third 
countries,  and  the  harmonisation  of  monetary  policies  within  a  sort  of  monetary  union. 
1"  E.  Whitlock  (1993).  "Ukrainian-Russian  Trade:  the  Economics  of  Dependency",  RFEIRL  Research 
Fs  Vol.  2,  n.  43,29  October.  pp.  38-42 
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94 The  Kuchma  Presidency 
The  election  of  Leonid  Kuchma  to  the  Ukrainian  presidency  in  July  1994  marked  a 
radical  change  in  relations  with  Russia.  Kuchma  had  been  particularly  critical  of 
Kravchuk's  foreign  policy  line,  his  isolationism  from  Russia  and  the  CIS  and  his 
unrealistic  plans  of  a  reorientation  towards  Western  markets.  He  conducted  his 
campaign  on  a  pro-Russian,  pro-economic  reform  ticket,  reminding  the  population  that 
"the  West  has  no  need  for  us  on  account  of  our  low  level  of  technology,  and  besides 
80%  of  our  production  depends  on  Russia's  supply  of  raw  materials".  108  Kuchma 
promised  an  economic  policy  that  would  give  priority  to  those  sectors  whose  production 
cycles  involved  Russia,  but  reassured  his  audience  that  Ukraine  intended  to  build 
equally  good  relations  with  Asian  as  well  as  European  countries,  becoming  a  "bridge 
between  Russia  and  the  technologically  developed  West".  109. 
Kuchma's  first  term  in  office  was  characterised  by  a  more  constructive  approach  to 
Russia,  as  many  of  the  issues  stemming  from  independence  were  finally  resolved.  The 
President's  greatest  achievement  was  the  1997  Treaty  of  Friendship,  Co-operation  and 
Partnership,  which  provided  Russia  and  Ukraine  with  an  entirely  new  framework  for 
bilateral  relations.  The  agreement  had  taken  two  years  of  preparatory  work.  President 
Ycl'tsin's  visit  to  Kyiv  had  been  scheduled  six  times,  but  had  always  been  postponed 
because  of  new  obstacles  emerged  in  the  negotiations.  10  The  importance  of  the  Treaty 
and  its  urgency  for  the  Ukrainian  part  lay  mainly  in  the  fact  that  it  set  relations  between 
the  two  countries  on  an  equal  footing.  In  the  agreement  Russia  and  Ukraine  were 
defined  "friendly,  equal  and  sovereign  states",  committed  to  base  their  relations  on 
"mutual  respect  and  trust,  strategic  partnership  and  co-operation".  The  countries' 
territorial  integrity  and  the  immutability  of  the  borders  between  them  were  confirmed. 
For  Ukraine  the  Treaty  meant  that  Russia's  territorial  claims  on  Ukraine,  and  especially 
on  Crimea  and  Sevastopol,  were  to  cease.  to  indicate  the  importance  they  attached  to 
pos  Nciavisimayi  eazcta.  June  18,1994 
1  p9  Ibid..  and  Izvestiva  July  13,1994 
110  For  more  details  on  the  history  of  the  failed  visits  to  Kyiv  see  "Istoricheskii  put'  B.  N.  E1'tsina  na 
Ukrainu".  Kgmmcrsant'.  n.  20  (226),  3,  June  1997,  pp.  23-24 
111  For  an  English  version  of  the  Treaty  sec  SWI3  SU1293.1.  SI,  June  2,1997 
95 the  treaty,  the  Ukrainian  parliament  ratified  it  on  its  first  reading,  112  as  opposite  to  the 
Russian  Parliament  which  took  more  than  one  year  to  finally  approve  the  Treaty.  113 
Demonstrating  that  the  significance  of  the  Treaty  was  measured  on  different  scales  in 
Moscow  and  Kyiv,  after  the  Duma's  ratification  Russian  Deputy  Foreign  Minister 
Ivanov  commented  that  the  treaty  "will  become  a  step  towards  the  unification  of  the 
three  Slavic  nations".  "4 
Despite  rumours  that  his  presidential  bid  had  been  heavily  sponsored  by  Moscow, 
Kuchma  turned  out  to  be  a  more  cautious  and  less  obedient  leader  than  the  Russians  had 
hoped  for.  Once  he  had  acquired  the  presidency,  Kuchma  proved  to  be  highly  interested 
in  preserving  the  sovereignty  of  his  country.  In  the  face  of  continuos  pressure  from 
Russian  nationalists  and  Ukrainian  populists,  Kuchma  firmly  and  repeatedly  denied  any 
opportunity  for  the  establishment  of  a  three-way  union  with  Russia  and  Belarus,  which 
from  Minsk  President  Lukashenka  considered  "inevitable".  '  15  The  Crimean  crisis 
became,  in  this  respect,  one  of  the  most  difficult  testing  grounds  of  Kuchma's  response 
to  Russian  nationalism. 
After  almost  two  years  of  quite,  tension  erupted  again  in  Sevastopol  in  August  1994, 
when  the  city  council  proclaimed  the  Russian  status  of  the  city.  A  decision 
subsequently  upheld  by  the  regional  parliament.  The  Verkhovna  Rada  annulled  the  City 
Council's  decision,  the  Crimean  constitution  and  its  presidency,  and  threatened  to 
disband  the  regional  legislature  if  it  did  not  refrain  from  separatist  tendencies.  The 
112  More  details  on  the  ratification  in  Kompanyon  n.  42,  January  1998,  pp.  8-9  and  Kievskie  Vedomosti, 
January  15,1998 
1  13  Primakov  intervened  to  the  Council  of  the  Federation  discussion  on  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  of 
friendship.  Urging  the  senators  to  vote  in  favour  of  ratification  he  said:  "Do  we  like  everything  in  our 
relations  with  Ukraine?  No  this  is  absolutely  clear.  Where  should  we  go?  Should  we  boost  our 
contradictions  or  smooth  them  down.  Should  we  draw  closer  to  the  fraternal  nation  on  the  issues  of 
strategic  importance  or  should  we  push  it  away?  "  He  suggested  that  the  decision  stipulated  that  the  treaty 
would  come  into  force  when  -the  Verkhovna  Rada  had  ratified  the  three  agreements  on  the  Fleet.  The 
Council  of  the  Federation  finally  approved  the  treaty  on  February  17,1999,  with  a  106-25  majority.  V. 
Musatov  (1999),  "Russian-Ukrainian  Treaty  Ratified",  International  Affairs  (Moscow).  Vol.  45,  Part  2,  p. 
160 
114  RFEIRL  Newsline.  December  28,1998 
115  Pressing  for  a  Duma  ratification  of  the  friendship  Treaty,  Ukrainian  parliamentary  speaker  Oleksand 
Tkachenko  visited  the  Duma  and  spoke  in  favour  of  working  out  a  common  defence  doctrine  and  a 
common  Russian-Ukrainian  position  towards  Nato  enlargement,  merging  the  Russian  and  Black  sea 
Fleets,  creating  a  common  currency,  a  common  economic  space,  and  a  common  broadcasting  space.  In 
Kyiv  Rukh  leaders  pointed  out  that  Tkachenko's  proposal  had  not  been  authorised  by  the  parliament. 
Kuchma's  representative  in  the  parliament  suggested  that  Tkachenko  had  probably  started  his  own 
96 region  was  placed  under  direct  presidential  rule  until  a  new  constitution,  more 
favourable  to  Kyiv,  but  still  respectful  of  regional  autonomy  and  cultural  identity  was 
passed.  '  16  Even  though  the  Russian  government  had  reassured  Kyiv  that  Russia  had  no 
intention  of  interfering  in  Ukraine's  internal  affairs  and  respected  the  country's 
territorial  integrity,  an  appeal  of  members  of  the  Crimean  parliament  to  the  Russian 
parliament  attracted  Moscow's  attention  to  the  peninsula  once  again.  117 
By  April  1995  the  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  had  become  so  tense  that 
Yel'tsin  announced  he  would  not  sign  the  Friendship  Treaty,  which  had  already  been 
initialled  by  the  two  Prime  Ministers,  unless  the  Crimean  question  was  resolved.  '  18  In 
December  1996  the  Russian  Council  of  the  Federation  adopted  a  statement  calling 
Sevastopol  a  "part  of  Russia's  territory",  and  urging  the  observance  of  Russia's 
territorial  integrity.  '  19 
Even  after  the  signature  of  the  Treaty  of  Friendship,  which  Russian  nationalists 
condemned  as  recognition  of  Ukrainian  right  on  Sevastopol,  protests  over  the  status  of 
the  city  and  the  peninsula  did  not  diminish.  Moscow  mayor  Yurii  Luzhkov  demanded 
again  that  the  city  be  placed  under  Russian  jurisdiction,  denounced  the  "forced 
Ukrainisation"  of  ethnic  Russians  and  warned  that  relations  between  Russia  and 
Ukraine  will  never  be  transparent  or  sincerely  fraternal  if  injustice  towards  Sevastopol 
and  Crimea  continues.  120 
personal  campaign  as  a  leftist  candidate  to  the  post  of  president.  Jamestown  Monitor  December  19,12 
1998.  RFE/RL  Newsline  September  30,1998,  and  RFE/RL  NewsLine  August  4,1998 
116  The  1995  constitution  still  recognised  the  autonomous  status  of  the  region,  and  it  allowed  it  to 
maintain  foreign  economic  relations  and  special  economic  co-operation  with  Moscow.  The  official 
language  of  the  region  was  established  as  Ukrainian,  but  citizens  are  authorised  to  use  their  own  national 
language  (Russian  or  Crimean  Tatar)  for  education  culture  or  in  the  administrative  sphere. 
'"  Head  of  the  State  Duma  Committee  on  CIS  Affairs,  Konstantin  Zatulin,  called  for  sanctions  to  be 
considered  against  Ukraine,  state  visits  to  be  cancelled,  trade  agreements  suspended  and  immediate 
repayment  of  Ukrainian  debt  demanded.  (OMRI  Daily  Digest.  March  29,1995).  First  deputy  Prime 
Minister  Oleg  Soskovets  was  accused  by  the  Duma  of  having  betrayed  the  interests  of  Russia  and 
Russians  living  abroad  in  his  negotiations  with  Ukraine.  Nine  Duma  factions  (including  the  Agrarian 
party,  The  Communist  Party,  The  Liberal  Democratic  party,  the  Democratic  Party  of  Russia  and  Yabloko) 
appealed  for  a  special  session  to  discuss  Russia's  relations  with  Ukraine  (OMRI  Daily  Digest,  March  27, 
1995).  A  Duma  deputy,  member  of  the  right-wing  National  Republican  Party,  reacted  by  tearing  up  a 
Ukrainian  flag  in  the  parliament.  He  was  reprimanded  by  the  speaker.  (OMRI  Daily  Digest,  April  10, 
1995). 
118  OMRI  Daily  Digest,  April  18,1995 
119  Jamestown  Monitoring,  December  6,1996 
120  RFE/RL  NewsLine,  February  21,1998 
97 The  Crimean  question  was  naturally  intertwined  with  the  problem  of  the  division  of  the 
Black  Sea  Fleet,  and  the  city's  vociferous  campaign  was  largely  motivated  by  the 
preoccupation  with  losing  the  high  income  and  status  deriving  from  being  home  port  to 
the  Fleet.  121  Russian  nationalists  had  not  accepted  yet  the  idea  of  conceding  sovereignty 
over  a  land  that,  in  Luzhkov's  words,  was  "packed  with  Russian  bones".  122  At  the  same 
time,  Ukrainian  concerns  were  justified  by  the  presence  of  a  considerable  Russian 
military  contingent  on  Ukrainian  territory,  which  could  diminish  the  country's 
sovereignty  and  undermine  its  security.  As  Kuchma  put  it,  Ukraine's  opposition  to  the 
Russian  plans  was  a  matter  of  territory,  not  ships.  123 
A  final  agreement  on  the  division  of  the  fleet  was  reached  only  on  the  eve  of  Ye'tsin's 
visit  to  Kyiv,  under  the  pressure  of  the  need  to  sign  the  Friendship  Treaty.  The 
agreement  stipulated  that  the  Russian  part  of  the  fleet  (4/5  of  the  total,  338  ships,  106 
planes  and  up  to  25  thousand  men)  would  be  stationed  in  Sevastopol,  in  the  Yuzhnyy 
bay,  while  the  Ukrainian  part  would  be  stationed  in  the  Streletskaya  bay  and  Karantiya 
bay  would  be  demilitarised.  The  right  of  the  Russian  fleet  to  use  Gvardieysk  airport, 
and  Yalta  military  sanatorium  was  also  recognised.  124  Russia  would  lease  Sevastopol 
for  20  years,  after  which,  by  common  agreement  of  the  two  parties,  the  lease  could  be 
renewed  for  a  further  five  years.  Russia  would  also  participate  in  the  development  of 
the  infrastructure  of  the  base,  and  it  would  guarantee  not  to  deploy  nuclear  weapons  in 
the  area.  125  The  price  of  the  lease  was  agreed  at  $2,5  billion,  to  be  detracted  from  the 
Ukrainian  outstanding  debt  towards  Russia.  126 
The  agreement  was  heavily  criticised  on  both  sides  of  the  border  by  nationalist  forces, 
but  it  was  welcomed  by  moderates  as  the  first  step  towards  improved  co-operation.  127 
121  After  Crimea  was  transferred  to  Ukraine  in  1954,  the  city  started  to  receive  money  from  the  Ukrainian 
budget,  as  well  as  from  the  USSR  Ministry  of  Defence  as  the  main  Black  Sea  naval  base.  Defence 
enterprises  of  Union  jurisdiction  also  invested  in  city  development.  V.  Musatov  (1999),  Op.  Cit. 
122  RFE/RL  NewsLine,  February  21,1998 
123  OMRI  Daily  Digest,  April  26,1995 
124  Vseukrainskie  Vedomosti,  June  8,1997 
125  Den',  May  29,1997 
126  The  agreement  was  also  motivated  by  also  another  economic  reason,  the  recognition  that  Ukraine 
would  not  be  able  to  support  the  repair  of  the  fleet  on  its  own.  Over  70%  of  the  vessels  of  the  Fleet  were 
in  disrepair.  There  was  no  procedure  to  pay  for  maintenance  work,  and  no  contracts  had  been  signed  with 
Russian  enterprises  to  carry  on  the  work,  as  the  fleet  still  had  to  pay  $  2.65  million  debt  for  past  repairs. 
OMRI  Daily  Digest,  October  24,1995 
127  The  leader  of  the  CPRF  Gennadii  Ziuganov  said  that  the  agreement  meant  "the  destruction  of  the 
Black  Sea  Fleet".  Rukh  leader  Vyacheslav  Chornovil  called  the  agreement  a  "big  surrender  on  the 
98 The  unresolved  question  of  the  Black  Sea  Fleet  had  been  indeed  the  main  obstacle  to  the 
long-awaited  Friendship  Treaty. 
Russia's  attitude  towards  Ukraine  also  changed  in  the  years  1994-98  with  the 
emergence  of  a  pragmatist  approach  to  foreign  policy.  The  Russian  establishment 
switched  from  a  more  openly  confrontational  relationship,  to  one  based  on  an  increased 
use  of  extra-political  leverages  (trade  wars,  debt  repayment,  energy  deliveries)  to 
achieve  political  objectives.  The  final  accord  on  the  Friendship  Treaty  was  attributed  by 
Ukrainian  sources  to  the  use  of  economic  pressures  based  on  inaccurate  calculations  of 
the  Ukrainian  debt  to  Russia.  128  In  September  1996  Russia  introduced  a  10%  VAT  on 
goods  imported  from  Ukraine.  The  move  caused  a  loss  of  $300  million  to  Kyiv  as  a 
result  of  the  drop  in  price  competitiveness.  Ukrainian  Prime  Minister  Pavlo  Lazarenko 
tried  to  play  down  the  asymmetrical  taxation  problems  denying  any  trade  war  and 
attributing  them  to  the  fact  that  the  two  countries'  tax  policies  were  "just 
uncoordinated".  129 
In  May  1997  a  25%  tariff  on  the  import  of  Ukrainian  sugar  was  introduced.  The 
intention  was  to  support  the  growth  of  Russian  sugar  production,  but  the  result  was  a 
severe  blow  to  Ukrainian  producers  who  enjoyed  a  position  of  quasi-monopoly  on  the 
Russian  market.  130  Even  President  Yel'tsin  acknowledged  that  economic  pressure  had 
been  used  as  an  instrument  to  force  Ukraine  into  positions  more  favourable  to  Moscow. 
At  the  press  conference  following  the  signature  of  the  Friendship  Treaty  he  said: 
Ukrainian  side".  The  leader  of  the  parliamentary  fraction  of  the  Republican  party  of  Crimea  Sergei 
Tsekov  defined  the  agreement  as  a  "betrayal  of  the  interests  of  Russia  and  of  those  Russians  who  live 
abroad  [...  ]  the  Russian  in  Crimea  are  in  a  state  of  semi-shock  for  the  signature  of  the  agreement'.  en' 
May  31,1997)  While  Arkadii  Vol'skii,  President  of  the  Russian  Union  of  Industrialists  and 
Entrepreneurs  commented  that  "it  was  about  time"  to  conclude  the  negotiations,  as  the  uncertainty  was 
slowing  down  the  process  of  "further  economic  integration  and  friendly  political  relations".  Den'  May 
31,1997) 
,  12a  Leading  the  Russian  delegation  which  preceded  Yel'tsin's  visit  to  Kyiv,  Viktor  Chernomyrdin 
commented  that  the  Ukrainian  debt  towards  Ukraine  was  in  the  range  of  $4.5  billion  and  Kyiv  would  not 
be  able  to  pay  that  sum  even  in  a  hundred  years.  Ukrainian  deputies  protested  that  the  debt  was 
"increased  and  created  artificially",  as  Russian  estimates  voluntarily  excluded  money  owed  by  Russia  to 
Ukrainian  enterprises.  Den'.  May  31,1997 
129  0.  Medvedev  (1996),  "There  will  be  no  Trade  War",  Business  in  Russia.  22  December,  pp.  46-47 
130  A  Pyatnitskii  (1997),  "Chem  bagaty,  to  iv  Radu",  Kommersant',  n.  20  (226),  3  June,  pp.  20-22.  In 
1997  Ukraine  exported  to  Russia  only  600  thousand  tones  of  sugar  against  the  usual  1.1/1.3  million  tons 
per  year.  (RFE/RL  Newsline,  September  17,1997).  In  November  the  parties  agreed  to  remove  VAT  on 
each  other's  products  (RFEIRL  NewsLine,  November  17,1997) 
99 "We  [Russia  and  Ukraine]  are  blood  brothers.  But  now  we  are  arguing  all  the  time,  either  [on]  this 
subject  or  that.  If  transit  goods  cannot  pass  [through  Ukraine],  let's  either  cut  off  gas  or  double  VAT  on 
all  Ukrainian  goods  coming  to  Russia.  What  robbery!  Of  course  this  happens  not  on  the  instructions  of 
the  presidents,  but  someone  does  this.  This  is  inadmissible.  This  is  inadmissible  towards  any  state,  let 
alone  Ukraine.  "131 
Despite  the  more  favourable  climate  between  the  two  countries,  Russia  still  maintained 
an  obvious  position  of  superiority,  on  the  economically  unstable  and  heavily  indebted 
Ukraine.  The  signature  of  the  February  1998  Programme  of  Economic  Co-operation 
until  the  year  2007,  which  promised  Russian  investors  favourable  conditions  to 
participate  in  Ukrainian  large-scale  privatisation,  was  interpreted  as  a  way  to  secure 
Moscow's  favour. 
By  inviting  Russian  capital  into  the  Ukrainian  game,  Kuchma  closed  the  circle  with 
Russia.  In  his  first  term  in  office  the  Ukrainian  President  had  certainly  established  that 
bilateral  relations  with  the  powerful  neighbour  should  be  set  on  the  principle  of  the 
inviolable  sovereignty  of  the  two  countries.  But  Kuchma  had  also  created  the 
conditions  to  strengthen  the  special  relationship  with  the  powerful  neighbour  on  terms 
that,  in  the  era  of  economic  pragmatism,  were  well  accepted  in  Moscow. 
Conclusions 
In  this  chapter  I  have  identified  the  impact  of  history  on  the  development  of  the 
relationship  between  Russia  and  Ukraine.  In  Andrew  Moravcsik's  terms,  this  meant 
outlining  the  "social  identity"  of  the  two  partners  and  the  resulting  "bargaining  space" 
that  could  promote,  or  hinder,  the  move  towards  co-operation.  The  numerous  factors 
that  defined  the  relationship  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  were  not  automatically 
conducive  to  a  climate  of  co-operation  or  conflict. 
F 
The  closeness  of  this  relationship  based  on  the  similarity  of  language  and  mentality,  the 
high  degree  of  inter-marriage  between  the  populations,  feelings  of  mutual  belonging, 
and  the  level  of  economic  interdependence,  were  all  elements  that  gave  support  to  the 
rhetoric  a  renewed  Slavic  Union.  On  the  contrary,  memories  of  political  and  cultural 
131  SWB  SU/2934  S  1/9,  June  2  1997.1  grateful  to  Graeme  Herd  for  this  reference 
100 repression  during  the  Russian  empire,  first,  and  the  Soviet  Union  later,  together  with  the 
Russian  hostility  to  recognise  Ukrainian  sovereignty  suggest  that  there  would  be 
resistance  towards  increased  co-operation  with  Russia. 
Which  of  these  two  interpretations  of  history  prevailed  depended  mainly  on  what  Ernst 
Haas  calls  the  "national  situation",  that  is  the  self-perception  of  Ukrainians  in  a  specific 
historical  moment  and  in  their  relation  of  power  with  Russia  and  with  other 
international  partners.  Factors  such  as  changes  on  the  international  arena,  fluctuations 
in  the  foreign  market  conditions,  competitiveness  of  the  country's  economic  actors 
abroad,  the  standard  of  living  of  the  population  vis-ä-vis  their  neighbours,  had  important 
consequences  on  Ukraine's  decisions  to  preserve  its  independence  no  matter  the  costs, 
or  abdicate  to  some  sort  of  Russian  protection. 
The  role  of  domestic  institutions  and  of  domestic  actors  (such  as  members  of  the 
economic  elites)  was  no  less  important.  Such  actors  could  contribute  by  influencing 
popular  perception  and  modifying  the  national  situation  as  a  result  of  specific  interests, 
as  President  Kuchma's  ambivalent  attitudes  towards  Moscow  showed.  Domestic  forces 
then  could  use  the  historical  background  of  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine 
instrumentally,  to  defend  their  own  political  or  economic  position.  The  influence  of 
international  and  domestic  forces  will  be  examined  in  more  detail  in  the  next  chapters. 
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CHAPTER  THREE 
The  Development  of  Foreign  Policy 
in  Russia  and  Ukraine 
In  order  to  understand  the  policy  preferences  of  economic  elites  in  Russia  and  Ukraine  and 
choices  vis-ä-vis  co-operation  or  even  reintegration  between  their  two  countries  it  is 
important  to  define  the  domestic  and  the  international  scene  on  which  they  operate.  The 
purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  outline  the  space  for  action  afforded  to  the  economic  elites, 
highlighting  the  constraints,  the  opportunities  and  the  incentives  that  the  international 
environment  imposed  on  them. 
In  the  case  of  the  Russian  foreign  policy,  the  emergence  of  what  can  be  termed  as  a 
pragmatist  approach  signalled  the  achievement  of  a  temporary  consensus  between  parts  of 
the  foreign  policy  establishment  and  the  rising  oligarchic  powers.  In  the  years  between 
1994  and  1998,  a  reaction  to  the  victimisation  of  Russian  national  pride  combined  with 
deteriorating  economic  conditions  and  the  perceived  risks  to  Russian  national  security 
deriving  from  the  independence  of  the  former  Soviet  republics.  The  interaction  of  these 
three  factors  fostered  a  change  in  foreign  policy  priorities,  with  a  shift  from  a  post-imperial 
approach  to  a  less  ideological  attitude,  in  which  economic  interests  took  central  stage. 
The  sense  that  Russia  was  missing  out  on  significant  economic  opportunities  in  the  former 
Soviet  space,  while  foreign  companies  were  gradually  eroding  what  had  traditionally  been 
Russian  markets  was  key  in  convincing  Moscow  of  the  need  to  moderate  the  terms  of  its 
foreign  policy.  As  Paul  Goble  points  out,  this  implied  a  major  shift  for  the  Russian 
leadership,  moving  away  from  the  concept  of  "a  mission  oriented  foreign  policy  to  an 
interest-driven  one".  For  perhaps  the  first  time  in  its  millennial  history,  Russia  had  been 
left  with  no  special  mission  in  the  world,  no  third  Rome  to  build,  or  Marxist  gospel  to 
102 spread.  '  Russia  was  confronted  with  a  situation  in  which  issues  of  domestic  economic, 
social  and  political  development  had  become  compelling  and  had  come  to  determine  the 
foreign  policy  agenda. 
This  change  provided  a  particularly  convenient  setting  for  economic  actors  to  promote  their 
interests  on  the  international  scene.  The  pragmatist  doctrine  of  foreign  policy,  assimilated 
also  in  a  number  of  official  documents  summarising  the  medium-term  objectives  of 
Russian  foreign  policy,  provided  an  institutional  mandate  for  big  companies.  Groups  like 
Gazprom,  Lukoil,  Yuksi  and  Alfa  Capital  engaged  in  expansionary  operations  on  the 
territories  of  the  former  Soviet  Union,  and  came  to  be  seen  as  the  most  powerful 
ambassadors  for  Moscow,  while  their  prosperity  was  increasingly  equated  to  the  national 
interest  and  the  well-being  of  the  whole  country. 
Ukrainian  foreign  policy  also  went  through  a  major  transformation  in  the  period  between 
1994-98.  After  the  election  of  President  Leonid  Kuchma,  Kyiv  moved  from  the 
vehemently  anti-Russian  policy  adopted  under  Leonid  Kravchuk's  presidency,  to  a 
"multivectorial  strategy".  Within  this  line,  the  new  president  defined  Ukraine's  priority  as 
developing  simultaneously  good  relations  with  Russia,  as  well  as  with  Western  Europe  and 
the  United  States.  Kuchma's  ultimate  foreign  policy  aim  was  the  acceptance  of  Ukraine 
into  the  European  and  North  Atlantic  structures  of  economic,  political  and  military  co- 
operation.  At  the  same  time,  however,  an  improvement  in  relations  with  Moscow  was 
viewed  as  the  inevitable  precondition  for  stability  on  the  internal  scene. 
Political  uncertainty  in  Ukraine,  and  the  country's  fragmentation  along  geographical, 
political  and  socio-economic  faults  was  reflected  in  the  President's  attempts  to  seek  a 
counterbalancing  support  abroad.  The  deteriorating  economic  situation,  with  Ukraine's 
acute  energy  dependence  on  Russia,  and  the  rapidly  changing  international  environment  in 
the  post-cold  war  world  contributed  to  sharpening  Kyiv's  urgency  in  defining  its  strategic 
position.  Kuchma's  ambivalent  policy  towards  Russia  and  the  West  was,  therefore, 
1  P.  A.  Goble  (1994),  "Russia  as  and  Eurasian  Power:  Moscow  and  the  Post-Soviet  Successor  States",  in 
Rethinking  Russia's  National  Interests,  edited  by  S.  Sestyanovich,  (Washington  D.  C.:  Centre  for  Strategic 
103 dictated  by  the  stringent  necessity  to  obtain  political  as  well  as  financial  aid,  turning  to  one 
bloc  when  the  other  appeared  less  inclined  to  compromise.  The  President  tried  to  use  a 
geographical  position  that  would  have  otherwise  condemned  Ukraine  to  the  role  of  buffer 
state  between  Russia  and  Europe  to  his  country's  advantage. 
In  this  general  perspective,  the  Ukrainian  economic  elite  found  fertile  ground  in  an  already 
active  debate  which  focused  on  defending  the  country's  newly  acquired  sovereignty.  The 
question  whether  an  autarchic  economic  system  or  balanced  economic  relations  with  Russia 
and  the  West  would  provide  the  most  effective  guarantee  to  Ukrainian  independence 
became  central  in  this  debate.  The  weakness  of  the  Ukrainian  economic  elite,  however,  and 
its  inability  to  engage  in  foreign  markets  limited  their  business  interests  to  the  domestic 
arena. 
Foreign  policy  issues,  other  than  the  demand  for  protection  of  the  internal  market  did  not 
appear  on  the  agenda  of  the  Ukrainian  rising  oligarchs,  and  economic  actors  played  very 
little  role  in  defining  Ukrainian  foreign  policy.  Yet,  as  it  will  be  seen  in  chapter  five,  the 
economic  elite's  quest  to  exclude  Russian  competitors  from  ownership  of  strategic  assets 
became  an  integral  part  of  a  nationalist  strategy  to  reject  Moscow's  attempts  at  reasserting 
political  and  economic  control  over  the  newly  independent  state. 
The  chapter  is  divided  in  two  halves  in  which  I  examine  the  Russian  foreign  policy  first  and 
then  the  Ukrainian  foreign  policy.  The  identity  crisis  that  derived  from  the  loss  of  Russia's 
imperial  status  is  discussed  in  section  one.  In  section  two  and  three  I  look  at  the  Russian 
economic  crisis  and  the  increasing  independence  of  the  former  Soviet  republics  as  elements 
that  caused  a  shift  towards  a  pragmatist  nationalist  approach  to  Russian  foreign  policy.  The 
emergence  of  Pragmatist  nationalism  is  discussed  in  the  following  section. 
From  section  five  I  turn  to  the  Ukrainian  foreign  policy,  examining  its  nationalist  character. 
In  the  following  sections  I  consider  the  Ukrainian  economic  decline  and  the  unfolding  of 
regional  co-operation  blocs  as  the  two  major  constraints  to  Ukriane's  foreign  policy.  The 
and  International  Studies),  pp.  42-51 
104 adoption  of  a  "two-track  foreign  policy",  designed  to  balance  the  country's  domestic  and 
international  weakness  is  analysed  in  section  eight.  Some  conclusions  sum  up  my 
argument. 
Russian  Identity  Crisis 
Pragmatist  Nationalism  emerged  in  Russia  as  a  reaction  to  Foreign  Minister  Andrei 
Kozyrev's  foreign  policy  line,  which  by  the  beginning  of  1993  was  perceived  to  be  too 
submissive  towards  Western  interests.  The  years  between  1991-1993  were  characterised  by 
a  sense  of  bewilderment  amongst  a  section  of  the  Russian  foreign  policy  elite  on  the 
interpretation  of  national  interests  and  the  understanding  of  national  identity  in  the 
aftermath  of  the  dissolution  of  the  Soviet  Union.  The  rise  of  a  pragmatist  foreign  policy 
represented,  on  the  contrary,  an  advance  from  this  state  of  confusion  and  testified  of  the 
achievement  of  a  wider  foreign  policy  consensus  on  the  role  for  Russia  to  play  in  a  post- 
Cold  War  world. 
Andrei  Kozyrev  had  worked  to  change  the  image  of  Russia  as  a  closed  and  predominantly 
aggressive  country,  having  realised  that  military  confrontation  was  moving  off  the  foreign 
policy  agenda.  The  foreign  policy  course  was  to  be  forged  so  as  to  correspond  to  the 
priorities  of  domestic  reforms.  In  the  Foreign  Minister's  vision,  the  fact  that  military 
threats  from  Western  powers  had  indeed  evaporated  reduced  the  need  for  ideology  and 
militarism.  Russia,  he  believed,  had  to  be  established  as  a  "normal  state",  a  democratic 
market  economy.  An  "imperial  syndrome"  had  to  be  abandoned,  while  other  sorts  of 
considerations,  such  as  the  country's  position  in  the  world  economy,  in  science,  in  culture, 
and  the  living  standards  of  its  population,  had  to  become  priority  issues  in  the  process  of 
foreign  policy-making. 
Kozyrev  placed  on  top  of  his  strategic  task-list  the  urgent  need  for  Russia  to  attract  foreign 
capital  for  industrial  modernisation,  to  access  the  most  sophisticated  modern  technology, 
and  to  expand  the  market  for  its  products.  The  Foreign  Minister  presented  the  opportunity 
105 for  economic  co-operation  with  neighbouring  and  Western  countries  as  the  most  effective 
tactics  to  preserve  national  security.  "Buffer  zones"  or  "zones  of  Russian  priority  interests" 
could  also  be  turned  into  areas  of  economic  integration. 
This  switch  from  a  strategy  of  military  domination  to  one  of  economic  influence,  Kozyrev 
maintained,  would  serve  a  twin  purpose.  It  would  challenge  the  traditional  mistrust  and 
seclusion  that  the  capitalist  world  had  imposed  on  Russia  during  the  Soviet  era,  while,  at 
the  same  time,  it  would  liberate  Russia  from  the  economic  burden  of  supporting  a 
"confrontational  climate".  The  preservation  of  the  country's  military  arsenal  and  the 
establishment  of  a  new  cordon  sanitair  with  the  West  were  a  price  too  high  for  Russia  to 
paY  2 
The  foreign  policy  strategy  that  was  adopted  as  a  result  of  these  considerations  was  blamed, 
in  the  nationalistic  circles,  as  the  embodiment  of  a  defeatist  spirit.  Nationalists  suggested 
that  Russia,  having  lost  the  Cold  War  was  now  forced  into  an  isolationist,  inward  looking 
policy.  Many  democratically  oriented  scholars  and  politicians  maintained,  indeed,  that,  as 
Japan  and  Germany  had  done  after  World  War  II,  Russia  had  to  concentrate  on  its  internal 
situation,  promote  economic  and  political  reforms,  and  thus  recover  its  international 
prestige.  A  report  published  by  the  Academy  of  Science  in  1995  articulated  this  perception. 
"Given  the  conditions  of  its  socio-economic  development,  Russia  cannot  be  a  superpower.  At  the  present 
stage  it  does  not  need  that  status,  which  is  beyond  its  capabilities.  Even  with  the  role  of  great  power  Russia  is 
currently  encountering  huge  difficulties,  since  it  lacks  the  political,  economic,  and  military  resources 
necessary  to  perform  this  role.  Russia  is  not  in  the  position  to  carry  on  a  global  foreign  policy  similar  to  that 
of  the  former  Soviet  Union,  and  bear  responsibility  for  global  international  security".  3 
Along  the  same  lines,  Yabloko's  Deputy  President  Vladimir  Lukin  noted  that 
2  A.  Kozyrev  (1995),  Preobrazhenie,  (Moscow:  Mezhdunarodnie  Otnoshenie),  pp.  35-48 
S.  Kolchin  (1995),  "Rossiya-  blizhnyeye  zarubez'ye:  vzaimothosheniya,  interessy,  tseli  politild",  Mirovava 
ekonomika  i  mezhdunarodnie  otnosheniya,  n.  4,  pp.  47-56 
106 "Our  top  priority  is  putting  our  own  civilised  home  in  order  gradually,  displaying  every  skill  we  are  capable 
of,  weighting  our  strengths,  and  the  price  we  must  pay  for  whatever  moves  we  are  taking,  to  heal  our  wounds 
and  to  draw  plans  for  the  future'  .4 
With  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  loss  of  control  over  the  former  republics,  it 
had  become  particularly  difficult  for  Russians  to  agree  on  the  best  foreign  policy  line  to 
pursue  in  the  years  of  transition.  Many,  however,  did  share  the  view  that  "the  starting  point 
of  any  discussion  about  the  interests  of  Russia  has  to  be  a  discussion  about  Russia  itself. 
What  kind  of  country  are  we  are  talking  about  -  territorially,  politically  and 
ideologically?  ".  Finding  an  accord  on  the  very  essence  of  the  Russian  identity  and  its 
s  foreign  policy  implications  turned  out  to  be  a  much  more  troublesome  task  to  address. 
Russia  had  undergone  an  epochal  shock,  even  more  severe  than  it  had  been  for  the  other 
former  republics.  In  most  of  these  states  a  distinct  national  identity  had  endured 
persecution  and  repression  under  the  Russian  and  the  Soviet  empires.  Independence  had 
coincided  with  the  triumph  of  the  nation-state,  when  an  historical  opportunity  of  self-rule 
along  nationalist  or  ethnic  lines  was  finally  afforded.  Being  the  centre  of  the  empire,  the 
focus  from  which  political  and  economic  decisions  departed,  Russia  had  instead  failed  to 
develop  its  identity  as  a  distinct  nation-state.  For  many  Russians,  the  establishment  of  the 
new  polity  in  December  1991  meant  only  the  shrinking  of  the  Russian  borders,  not  the 
enhancement  of  the  Russian  State. 
Throughout  much  of  its  history  Russian  statehood  had  grown  simultaneously  with  the 
empire:  "We  cannot  separate  the  Russian  Republic  from  the  centre  -  the  literary  critic  Yurii 
Burtin  remarked  -  we  look  back  in  history,  and  the  centre  is  somehow  ourselves".  6  Russian 
identity  had  then  been  defined  by  the  common  history  of  the  components  of  the  empire. 
4  International  Affairs  (Moscow)  (1995),  "Election  1995.  Parties'  Foreign  Policy  Views",  n.  11-12,  special 
issue 
5  V.  P.  Lukin  (1994),  "Russia  and  its  Interests",  in  Rethinking  Russia's  National  Interests,  edited  by  S. 
Sestyanovich,  (Washington  D.  C.:  Centre  for  Strategic  and  International  Studies),  pp.  106-115 
. 
6  V.  Tolz  and  E.  Teague  (1992),  "Russian  Intellectuals  Adjust  to  Loss  of  Empire",  RFE/RL  Research  Report 
Vol.  1,  n.  8,21  February,  pp.  4-8 
107 Ninth  century  Kievan  Rus'  represented  the  root  of  the  modem  Russian  state,  while  Moscow 
had  emerged  as  a  separate  political  entity  only  in  the  fourteenth  century.  For  Russians  it 
was  difficult  to  accept  that  Ukraine  was  now  an  independent  country  separated  by  an 
international  border:  "millions  of  Russians  are  convinced  that  without  Ukraine,  it  is 
impossible  to  speak  not  only  of  a  great  Russia,  but  of  any  kind  of  Russia  at  all"  7  As 
political  commentator  Sergei  Kortunov  summarised,  "Russians  are  defined  more  by  their 
geopolitical  location  than  by  blood.  [...  ]  [They]  never  equated  the  nation  to  the  state".  8 
Shrunken  frontiers  made  Russians  question  who  they  really  were  (Asians?  Europeans? 
Eurasians?  ),  and  who  their  friends,  and  who  their  enemies.  "It  is  important  to  determine 
who  we  are,  where  we  are  going,  what  lind  of  brains  we  have  in  our  heads".  The 
confidence  of  the  past  had  crumbled.  "In  what  borders  do  we  exist?  What  relations  should 
we  have  with  our  neighbours,  who  just  recently  were  part  of  a  single  state?  [...  ]  What  is  in 
store  for  twenty  five  million  Russians  who  have  found  themselves  abroad?  "  9 
The  loss  of  the  Empire  had  happened  so  abruptly  that  Russians  had  not  had  the  time  yet  to 
develop  an  extra  imperial  identity.  Russian  nationalists,  like  Aleksandr  Tsipko,  argued  that 
decisions  over  the  future  of  the  Soviet  state  had  been  made  by  a  small  number  of  ambitious 
politicians,  over  the  head  of  the  population.  This  represented  a  de  facto  usurping  of  "the 
power  to  speak  in  the  name  of  Russian  history  and  the  Russian  Empire".  10 
The  inability  to  come  to  terms  with  this  new,  reduced  identity  explains  the  difficulties  in 
defining  a  foreign  policy  concept  for  independent  Russia.  The  foreign  policy  elite  agreed 
only  as  far  as  outlining  a  set  of  "fundamental  interests",  survival,  prosperity,  and  security. 
The  country's  geography,  history,  culture,  ethnic  composition  and  political  tradition 
defined  the  implications  of  these  "immutable"  interests  and  the  way  they  would  be 
implemented.  Yet,  a  further  layer  of  national  interests,  reflecting  the  "national  idea",  the 
7  Ibid. 
8  S.  Kortunov  (1998),  Russia's  National  Identity  in  a  New  Era,  J.  F.  Kennedy  School  of  Governance.  Harvard 
University.  Strengthening  Democratic  Institutions  Project,  September,  p.  8 
9  S.  Kondrakov  (1996),  "National  Interests  in  Russian  Foreign  Policy",  International  Affairs  (Moscow),  n.  2, 
pp.  1-24 
10  Ibid. 
108 "nation's  self-identity",  the  country's  "visualisations  of  the  national  past  and  the  national 
future",  presented  more  serious  problems  of  identification.  "  Political  opinions  on  the 
essence  of  national  interests  diverged  widely,  ranging  from  "Liberal-Westernisers"  to 
"National  Patriots"  (see  table  3.1).  12 
Michael  McFaul  has  argued  that  the  prevalence  of  a  strategy  of  liberal  foreign  policy,  in  the 
immediate  post-Soviet  years,  was  the  result  of  the  polarisation  of  ideology  occurred  in  the 
late  Soviet  era.  Then,  in  order  to  propose  themselves  as  the  only  viable  ideological 
alternative  to  the  communists,  the  democrats  were  forced  to  adopt  even  more  radical 
positions  than  Gorbachev.  The  rejection  of  liberal  policy  and  the  renewed  pre-eminence  of 
nationalism  once  power  was  safely  in  the  hands  of  Yel'tsin's  democrats,  represented,  in  this 
context,  the  return  to  a  natural  state  of  things.  Russia  was  a  great  power,  had  traditionally 
harboured  a  vision  of  itself  as  a  great  power,  and  it  was  only  natural  for  it  to  go  back  to  a 
policy  of  a  great  power  on  the  international  arena.  13 
After  the  inauguration  of  Glasnost',  Russians  had  endured  almost  a  decade  of  "self- 
flagellation".  They  were  faced  with  revelations  that  pricked  their  national  pride:  the  scale 
of  the  horrors  perpetrated  in  the  Stalinist  period,  the  devastation  of  the  environment,  the  rise 
of  crime,  the  decay  of  traditional  social  values,  the  condemnation  of  Russian  colonial 
exploitation  of  the  other  Soviet  Republics.  This  was  combined  with  a  "feeling  of 
victimisation"  that  had  been  present  in  the  Russian  conscience  since  the  Soviet  era. 
Then,  the  "practice  of  damning  Russian  imperialism",  along  with  the  perception  that  large 
resources  were  being  transferred  out  of  Russia  to  promote  social  and  economic 
11  S.  B.  Stankevich,  (1994).,  `Towards  a  New  `National  Idea"',  in  Rethinking  Russia's  National  Interests, 
edited  by  S.  Sestyanovich,  (Washington  D.  C.:  Centre  for  Strategic  and  International  Studies),  pp.  24-32 
12  For  an  accurate  account  of  the  debate  on  the  definition  of  the  national  interests  see  M.  Light(1996),, 
"Foreign  Policy  Thinking",  in  Internal  Factors  in  Russian  Foreign  Policy,  edited  by  N.  Malcolm  et  al., 
(Oxford:  OUP),  pp.  33-101;  J.  Valdez  (1995),  "The  Near  Abroad,  the  West,  and  National  Identity  in  Russian 
Foreign  Policy",  in  The  Making  of  Foreign  Policy  in  Russia  and  the  New  States  of  Eurasia,  edited  by  A. 
Dawisha  and  K.  Dawisha  (New  York:  M.  E.  Sharpe),  pp.  84-109;  L.  Aron  (1998),  "The  Foreign  Policy 
Doctrine  of  Post-Communist  Russia  and  Its  Domestic  Context",  in  The  New  Russian  Foreign  Policy,  edited 
by  M.  Mandelbaum,  (New  York:  A  Council  of  Foreign  Relations  Book),  pp.  23-63 
109 development  in  the  non-Russian  republics,  had  contributed  to  the  spread  of  the  feeling  that 
Russia  was  indeed  feeding  the  empire  while  being  blamed  for  keeping  it  together.  14  There 
was  only  that  much  that  Russians  could  take  before  "the  reaction  of  a  proud  people  began 
to  set  in".  The  wave  of  renewed  nationalism  that  shook  Moscow's  political  circles  in  the 
second  part  of  Kozyrev's  office  came  as  a  "direct  response"  to  the  loss  of  this  pride  and 
national  self-assuredness.  15 
13  M.  McFaul  (1995a),  "Revolutionary  Ideas,  State  Interests  and  Russian  Foreign  Policy",  in  Political  Culture 
and  Civil  Society  in  Russia  and  the  New  States  of  Eurasia,  edited  by  V.  Tismaneanu,  (Armonk:  M.  E.  Sharp), 
pp.  27-54 
1  I.  Prizel  (1998),  National  Identity  and  Foreign  Policy:  Nationalism  and  Leadership  in  Poland,  Russia  and 
Ukraine,  (Cambridge:  CUP),  pp.  180-238.  An  example  of  this  attitude  can  be  found  in  the  June  1997 
Statement  by  the  Council  on  Foreign  and  Defence  Policy.  "In  most  of  the  republics,  the  document  says,  there 
was a  widely  current  myth  that  Russia  was  "robbing"  them,  whereas  in  fact  Russia  was  providing  for  them". 
Council  on  Foreign  and  Defence  Policy  (1997),  Will  the  Union  be  Reborn?,  J.  F.  Kennedy  School  of 
Government,  Harvard  University,  Strengthening  Democratic  Institutions  Proiect,  June,  p.  3 
15  G.  Guroff  and  A.  Guroff  (1995),  "The  Paradox  of  Russian  National  Identity",  in  National  Identity  and 
Ethnicity  in  Russia  and  the  New States  of  Eurasia,  edited  by  R.  Szporluk,  (New  York:  M.  E.  Sharpe  ),  pp.  78- 
100 
110 Table  3.1.  Political  Orientations  in  the  Foreign  Policy  Debate,  1991-1993 
LIBERAL 
WESTERNISERS 
KEY  FIGURES  Foreign  Minister  Andrei 
Kozyrev  before  1993 
AREAS  OF 
RUSSIA'S 
PRIORITY 
INTEREST 
VIEW  ON  THE 
ECONOMY 
VIEW  ON 
RELATIONS  WITH 
THE  WEST 
VIEW  ON 
RELATIONS  FSU 
Europe,  United  States, 
Japan 
In  favour  of  market 
reforms 
Pro-Western  orientation. 
Partnership  with  the  West 
Independence  of  the  FSU 
countries  is  accepted. 
They  are  likely  to  be  a 
burden  to  Russia  for  their 
economic  backwardness. 
Co-ordination  with  CIS 
rather  than  integration. 
PRAGMATIC 
NATIONALISTS 
Yabloko  Deputy 
President  Vladimir 
Lukin,  Prime  Minister 
Viktor  Chernomyrdin, 
Foreign  Minister 
Evgenii  Primakov, 
Foreign  Minister  Andrei 
Kozyrev  after  1993 
Countries  of  the  Former 
Soviet  Union 
In  favour  of  cautious 
economic  reforms,  with 
large  controls  on  part  of 
the  state 
More  sceptical  towards 
the  West.  In  relations 
with  the  West  Russian 
National  Interest  must 
be  defended 
Independence  of  FSU 
countries  is  accepted. 
Strengthen  economic 
and  military  co- 
operation  within  the 
framework  of  the  CIS. 
Russia  should  be  the 
unifying  force. 
FUNDAMENTAL 
NATIONALISTS 
Speaker  of  Parliament 
until  1993  Aleksandr 
Rutskoi,  Secretary  of  the 
CPRF  Gennadii 
Zyuganov,  Leader  of 
LDPR  Vladimir 
Zhirinovskii 
Eurasian  continent,  from 
Turkey  to  Afghanistan 
Reject  economic 
liberalism  and 
individualism. 
Favoured  corporatism. 
Extreme  nationalism. 
Mistrust  towards  the 
West.  American  plot  to 
create  a  world 
government  absorbing 
also  Russia. 
FSU  belong  to  the 
sphere  of  Russian 
interests. 
The  URSS  should  be 
restored. 
Source:  M.  Light(l  996),,  "Foreign  Policy  Thinking",  in  Internal  Factors  in  Russian  Foreign  Policy,  edited  by 
N.  Malcolm  et  al.,  (Oxford:  OUP),  pp.  33-101 
111 Economic  Deterioration 
Another  factor  that  affected  the  change  in  direction  of  foreign  policy  was  the  deepening  of 
the  economic  crisis.  The  further  deterioration  of  the  economic  situation  from  1993  on 
increased  the  identity  crisis  and  the  difficulty  of  identification  in  the  reduced  political  entity 
that  had  replaced  the  Soviet  Union.  The  failure  of  a  pro-Western  foreign  policy  to  stabilise 
the  economy,  and  the  general  perception  that  economic  welfare  and  living  standards,  as  low 
as  they  might  have  been,  were  guaranteed  in  the  Soviet  Union,  contributed  to  strengthen  a 
sentiment  of  nostalgia  for  the  USSR.  This  mood  translated  into  the  conviction  that 
economic  interests  and  relations  with  the  former  republics  had  to  be  restored  to  a  central 
position  in  the  Russian  foreign  policy  strategy. 
In  1993  real  GDP  fell  by  a  further  12  %  in  comparison  to  the  previous  year,  after  a  drop  of 
13  %  in  1991  and  19  %  in  1992.  Inflation  reached  an  annual  rate  of  915.3  %  after  having 
peaked  at  1,353  %  in  1992.16  The  economic  crisis  was  steadily  getting  worse.  After  years 
of  unsatisfactory  economic  reforms,  of  steep  decline  in  living  standards  and  in  industrial 
production  and  of  deterioration  in  the  patterns  of  trade,  there  was  a  widespread  awareness 
that  the  threats  this  never-ending  crisis  posed  were  real. 
Perceptions  that  the  internal  stability  was  at  stake  were  so  high  that  economic 
commentators  posed  the  issue  in  terms  of  the  country's  "economic  security".  The  chaotic 
and  under-regulated  environment  resulting  from  the  rapid  pace  of  economic  liberalisation, 
added  with  the  economic  degradation  and  structural  deformities  of  the  years  of  stagnation 
created  a  dangerous  combination,  which  could  explode  into  social  and  political  unrest  at 
any  time.  17 
16  International  Monetary  Fund  (1994),  World  Economic  Outlook.  October 
"On  economic  security  see  the  two  special  issues  of  Voprosy  Ekonomiki  devoted  to  the  topic.  n.  12/1994, 
and  n.  1/1995.  Articles  published  in  these  issues  had  the  distinctive  feature  of  a  "call-up"  to  all  the  relevant 
institutions  to  take  part  in  joint  efforts  and  confront  the  seemingly  irreversible  deterioration  of  the  social  and 
economic  environment.  Economic  threats  were  presented  as  the  consequences  of  internal  instability,  rather 
112 In  his  1995  speech  on  the  State  of  the  Nation,  President  Yel'tsin  also  recognised  that: 
"Russia  will  not  have  reliable  guarantees  of  sovereignty,  independence  and  territorial 
integrity  until  it  overcomes  the  economic  crisis".  18  Russian  academics  raised  the  alarm. 
Comparing  Russian  economic  indicators  to  economic  indicators  that  in  the  West  signalled  a 
situation  of  risk,  they  pointed  out  that  Russia  was  already  beyond  the  minimal  levels  (see 
table  3.2).  They  warned  that,  in  halting  the  structural  deterioration  of  the  country,  timing 
was  essential.  National  authorities  were  urged  to  act  while  resources  and  reserves  were  still 
available,  the  human  capital  was  still  highly  qualified,  and  a  reorganisation  of  the  industrial 
base  was  still  possible.  19 
Table  3.2.  Indicators  of  Economic  Security  in  1994 
INDICATORS  CRITICAL  LEVEL  1994  LEVELS  POSSIBLE 
IN  THE  WESTERN  IN  THE  RF  CONSEQUENCES  AT  A 
ECONOMIES  SOCIO-POLITICAL  AND 
ECONOMIC  LEVEL 
FALL  IN  GNP  30-40  %  50  %  De-industrialisation  of 
the  economy 
PERCENTAGE  OF 
FOODSTUFF  IMPORTED  30  %  40  %  Strategic  dependency  of 
the  country  on  vital 
imports 
PERCENTAGE  OF 
INDUSTRIAL  EXPORTS  40  %  12  %  Colonial  structure  of  the 
economy 
PERCENTAGE  OF  HIGH- 
TECHNOLOGY  10-15  %  1%  Technological  lag 
EXPORTED 
PERCENTAGE  OF 
STATE-FUNDED  R&D  2%  0.32  %  Destruction  of 
EXPENDITURES  intellectual  capital 
Source:  Vladimir  Medvedev  (1997),  "Problemy  ekonomicheskoi  bezopasnosti",  Voprosy  Ekonomiki,  n.  3,  p. 
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than  as  the  effects  of  an  unfriendly  international  environment.  The  irrevocability  of  market  reforms  was  never 
questioned,  but  a  substantial  adjustment  in  the  state's  role  as  the  major  economic  actor  was  urged. 
18  Rossiiskiye  Vesti,  February  17,1995,  pp.  1,3-7 
19  L.  Abalkin  (1994),  "Ekonomicheskaya  bezopasnost'  Rossii:  ugrozy  i  ikh  otrazhenie",  Voprosy  Ekonomiky, 
n.  12,  pp.  4-13 
113 The  striking  contrasts  of  the  model  of  development  pursued  in  the  post-independence  years 
was  condemning  Russia  to  a  "structural  trap",  typical  of  developing  countries.  In  the  face 
of  a  general  decline  in  industrial  production,  the  raw  material  sector  appeared  to  be  the  only 
profitable  industry,  and  capable  of  generating  hard  currency  revenues.  Raw  materials 
production  had  maintained  almost  the  same  level  as  in  the  pre-crisis  years.  In  1995  output 
was  70  %  of  the  1990  level,  with  maximum  rates  in  the  gas  industry  (93  %),  oil  (56  %),  and 
rolled  iron  (61  %).  Given  the  large  reserves  and  the  low  salary  rates,  Russian  natural 
resources  were  the  only  competitive  goods  on  the  world  markets.  In  1995  raw  materials 
accounted  for  80  %  of  Russian  exports,  equal  to  20  %  of  the  GNP.  20 
On  the  other  side,  however,  the  scientific  potential  of  the  country  was  exposed  to  a  rapid 
and  apparently  inexorable  decline.  As  a  result  of  sharp  cuts  in  the  budget,  expenditures  for 
research  and  development  fell  to  0.32  %  of  the  GNP  in  1993.  The  number  of  scientists  and 
researchers  also  dropped,  and  the  number  of  research  institutes  attached  to  enterprises 
diminished  from  a  total  of  400  in  1990  to  276  in  1994.  A  massive  migration  of  science 
workers,  either  towards  foreign  countries,  or  towards  more  profitable  and  prestigious 
positions  outside  research,  contributed  heavily  to  the  decline  of  the  country's  scientific 
potential. 
Russia  had  slipped  into  a  situation  of  economic  insecurity.  According  to  the  description 
provided  by  a  Russian  author,  internal  and  external  factors  [were]  disturbing  the  normal 
functioning  of  social  reproduction,  destroying  the  living  standard  of  the  population,  and,  at 
the  same  time,  provoking  a  rise  in  social  tension.  This  condition  had  come  to  threaten  the 
very  existence  of  the  state  itself.  21  The  risks  that  the  Russian  population  was  facing  - 
famine,  cold,  and  epidemics  -  were  as  concrete  as  in  a  war-like  situation.  These  problems 
20  V.  Medvedev  (1997),  "Problemy  ekonomicheskoi  bezopasnosti",  Voprosy  Ekonmiki,  n.  3,  pp.  11-127 
21  Institut  Mirovoi  Ekonomiki  i  Mezhdunarodnykh  Otnoshenii  RAN  (1994),  Aktualnie  problemy 
vneshneekonomicheskoi  bezopaznosti  Rossii,,  (Moscow:  RAN),  p.  14 
114 were  coupled  with  the  deterioration  of  the  transport  and  information  network,  the  energy 
system  and  the  technological  and  scientific  potential  of  the  country.  22 
In  concrete  political  terms  these  considerations  were  translated  into  the  urge  to  establish 
dignified  living  conditions  for  the  population,  secure  social  and  political  security  and  foster 
the  emergence  of  a  stable  system  of  national  values  and  interests.  23  In  order  to  do  this,  the 
state  was  required  to  perform  a  number  of  tasks  to  stimulate  competitiveness  within 
national  industry,  provide  all  the  possible  guarantees  for  private  economic  activity,  and 
establish  a  climate  favourable  to  innovation,  investment  and  modernisation  of  the  county.  24 
In  the  international  arena,  foreign  policy  institutions  were  called  upon  to  avoid  the  danger 
of  economic  dependence  on  foreign  countries,  which  could,  in  turn,  induce  risks  of  political 
dependence.  25  The  urgent  rapprochement  with  the  countries  of  the  former  Soviet  Union 
was  perceived  as  instrumental  to  counter  increasing  economic  decline. 
Emancipation  of  the  Former  Soviet-Republics 
One  of  the  strongest  accusations  that  critics  aimed  at  Kozyrev's  foreign  policy  was  that,  in 
its  urge  to  strengthen  relations  with  the  Western  countries,  it  had  overlooked  the  newly 
independent  states.  It  is  a  telling  fact  that  a  department  in  charge  of  relations  with  the 
countries  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  was  established  only  six  months  into 
Kozyrev's  mandate.  By  1994  it  had  not  been  decided  yet  whether  the  issue  of  relations 
with  the  FSU  countries  belonged  to  the  realm  of  foreign  or  internal  affairs.  A  ministry  for 
CIS  Co-operation  was  set  up  only  at  a  later  stage.  26  A  further  clear  sign  of  Kozyrev's 
underestimation  of  the  former  Soviet  republics'  importance  was  the  fact  that  he  undertook 
22  K.  Samsonov  (1994),  "Elementy  kontsepsii  ekonomicheskoi  bezopasnosti",  Voprosy  Ekonomiki,  n.  12,  pp. 
14-12 
23  S.  Lykshin  and  A.  Svinarenko  (1994),  "Razvitie  ekonomiki  Rossii  i  ee  restructurizatsiya  kak  garantiya 
ekonomicheskoi  bezopasnosti",  Voprosy  ekonomiki,  n.  12,  pp.  115-125 
24  L.  Abalkin  (1994),  Op.  Cit. 
25  O.  Bogomolov  (1996),  "National  Interests  in  Russian  Foreign  Policy",  International  Affairs  (Moscow),  n.  2, 
pp.  1-24 
26  R.  de  Nevers  (1994),  "Russia's  Strategic  Renovation",  Adelphi  Papers,  n.  289,  July 
115 his  first  tour  in  the  region  only  at  the  end  of  1992,  after  he  had  already  visited  Scandinavia 
and  a  group  of  African  countries. 
With  the  continuing  deterioration  of  the  internal  economic  situation,  however,  the  argument 
that  improvement  of  the  domestic  economic  and  political  situation  of  Russia  could  not  be 
separated  from  a  course  of  reintegration  with  the  countries  of  the  near  abroad  gained 
momentum.  There  was  already  a  shared  understanding  among  foreign  policy  students  and 
practitioners  that  the  country's  foreign  policy  course  and  the  definition  of  its  national 
interests  must  take  into  account  components  like  its  "geographic  position,  the  kind  of 
countries  surrounding  it,  their  traditional  policy  and  civilisation  orientation".  7 
The  lack  of  success  of  policies  oriented  towards  the  West,  though,  reinforced 
considerations  on  the  role  of  CIS  co-operation  in  preserving  acceptable  rates  of  growth  and 
stability  for  the  Russian  economy.  Countries  of  the  former  Soviet  Union  provided  Russia 
with  a  space  in  which  national  producers  enjoyed  guaranteed  access  to  raw  materials, 
unrestricted  entrance  to  their  markets,  and  unlimited  possibilities  of  co-operation  with 
related  enterprises.  8  The  loss  of  these  markets,  as  a  result  of  possible  geopolitical 
reorientation  of  the  neighbouring  countries,  started  to  be  perceived  in  Russia  as  a  renewed 
threat  to  its  economic  security. 
A  Russian-based  survey  published  in  1994  demonstrated  that,  in  the  hypothetical  event  of  a 
total  break  down  of  economic  links  with  the  former  Republics,  Russia  would  be  the  post- 
Soviet  state  most  capable  of  achieving  self-sufficiency.  Should  the  new  independent  states 
resort  to  an  autarkic  regime,  Russia  would  still  be  able  to  guarantee  65  %  of  its  production, 
while  only  27  %  of  the  Kazakh,  15  %  of  the  Ukrainian,  and  4%  of  the  Belarusian  output 
would  be  maintained.  29  The  survey  was  obviously  designed  to  demonstrate  Russia's 
superiority  in  the  post-Soviet  environment,  but  it  inevitably  emphasised  also  the  country's 
dependence  on  its  neighbours.  ` 
27  N.  Narochnitskaya  (1992),  "Russia's  National  Interests",  International  Affairs  (Moscow),  n.  8,  pp.  134-143 
28  I.  Faminski  (1994),  "Otkritaya  ekonomika  i  vneshneekonomicheskaya  bezopasnost"',  Voprosy  Ekonomiki, 
n.  12,  pp.  65-78 
116 The  break  up  of  the  Soviet  Union  had  induced  catastrophic  effects  for  all  the  national 
economies;  Russia  had  certainly  the  most  solid  economic  structure  in  the  region,  but 
consequences  of  the  abrupt  dislocation  were  nonetheless  felt  there  as  well.  Russian 
observers  listed  the  following  as  the  most  critical  consequences  of  the  collapse  of  the 
USSR: 
   Disintegration  of  the  economic  potential; 
   Diminished  economic  space; 
   Diminished  access  to  foreign  economic  infrastructure,  loss  of  ports  and  individual  types 
of  raw  materials; 
   Increased  transportation  costs; 
   Threat  of  loosing  traditional  markets  for  the  sale  of  Russian  machine-building  products 
(for  which  it  was  difficult  to  find  alternatives  under  the  existing  conditions); 
   Direct  loss  of  a  number  of  markets  for  military-technical  products,  and  for  consumer 
goods  30 
As  a  direct  result  of  the  highly  ineffective  trade  arrangements  put  in  place  in  the  post-Soviet 
times  among  the  former  Soviet  Republics  (bilateral  agreements  and  barter  trade),  the  shift 
to  world  prices  starting  from  1992,  the  collapse  of  the  ruble  zone,  and  attempts  at  trade 
reorientation  of  the  former  Soviet  partners,  trade  flows  decreased  steeply.  In  the  period 
January-June  1992,  the  overall  Russian  trade  turnover  was  down  30  %  in  comparison  with 
the  same  period  of  the  previous  year,  with  export  cut  by  35  %  and  imports  by  24  %.  31  As 
Figures  3.1  and  3.2  show,  trade  with  the  former  Soviet  republics  was  the  most  severely 
affected. 
t 
29  Quoted  in  V.  Savin  (1995),  '°Torgovlye  otnosheniya  i  vneshekonomicheskaya  politika  ",  Vneshnyaya 
Torgovlya,  n.  5,  pp  13-15 
30  V.  Sil'vestrov  and  S.  Filatov  (1994)  "Vneshneekonomicheskaya  politica  i  sistemniy  vzgliad",  Rossiiski 
Ekonomicheski  Zhurnal,  n.  10,  pp.  46-58 
31  J.  H.  Noren  and  R.  Watson  (1992),  "Interrepublican  Economic  Relations  After  the  Disintegration  of  the 
USSR".  Soviet  Economy,  Vol.  8,  n,  2,  pp.  89-129 
117 Figure  3.1.  Russian  Exports  in  the  Period  1990-1993 
(Millions  of  current  US  dollars) 
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Source:  C.  Michalopoulos  and  D.  G.  Tarr  (1994),  Trade  in  the  New 
Independent  States,  (Washington  D.  C.:  The  World  Bank),  pp.  3-5 
Figure  3.2.  Russian  Imports  in  the  Period  1990-1993 
(Millions  of  current  US  dollars) 
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Source:  C.  Michalopoulos  and  D.  G.  Tan  (1994),  Trade  in  the  New 
Independent  States,  (Washington  D.  C.:  The  World  Bank),  pp.  3-5 
According  to  data  provided  by  the  World  Bank,  over  the  period  1990-1993  trade  among  the 
newly  independent  states  decreased  by  more'than  60  percent.  Exports  to  the  rest  of  the 
world  dropped  from  $105  billion  in  1990  to  $58  billion  in  1993,  equal  to  46  %  of  the  initial 
figure.  Imports  fell  even  more  from  $121  billion  to  $45  billion,  equal  to  63  %  of  the  initial 
118 figure.  Interstate  trade  shrank  more  than  trade  with  the  rest  of  the  world;  the  total  was 
estimated  to  be  65  %  over  three  years.  32 
These  figures  not  withstanding,  interdependence  among  the  former  republics  remained 
high.  In  the  Soviet  years  individual  republics  had  become  monopolist  manufacturers  of 
specific  components  and  technological  equipment,  or  exclusive  producers  of  specific  raw 
materials  and  semi-finished  products.  Now  the  failure  of  Russian  enterprises  to  penetrate 
international  markets,  as  obsolete  production  and  non-competitive  prices  contributed  to 
make  their  merchandise  less  appealing  for  Western  buyers,  was  matched  by  the  conviction 
that  the  sheltered  environment  of  the  CIS  would  provide  in  any  case  an  alternative  output 
market  33 
In  addition  to  this  direct  influence  over  the  Russian  economy,  CIS  countries  played  a 
significant  role  in  controlling,  indirectly,  Russia's  routes  to  the  Western  markets.  After  the 
collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union,  the  majority  of  the  westward  Soviet  rail  and  track  routes, 
pipelines,  and  seaports  had  been  inherited  by  Ukraine,  Belarus  and  the  Baltic  States. 
Russia  had  been  left  either  with  no  control  over  vital  transportation  lines,  or  with 
infrastructures  able  to  provide  services  below  international  standards. 
Russian  ports  could  satisfy  only  60  %  of  the  capacity  required.  Of  the  gas  shipped  to 
Europe  94  %  went  through  pipelines  on  Ukrainian  territory,  3%  through  Belarusian 
territory.  The  gas  pipeline  Druzhba,  for  example,  crossed  Ukrainian  territory  on  its  way  to 
the  European  markets,  and  Ukraine  inevitably  used  its  control  over  it  to  increase  its 
bargaining  power  vis-ä-vis  Russia.  Ukraine's  allegedly  arbitrary  use  of  these  transport 
32  C.  Michalopoulos  and  D.  G.  Tan  (1994),  Trade  in  the  New  Independent  States,  (Washington  D.  C.:  The 
World  Bank),  pp.  3-5 
33  An  example  of  the  high  degree  of  interdependence  was  the  machine-building  sector.  According  to  data 
published  in  1998,  in  the  aircraft  industry  about  100  Russian  enterprises  received  up  to  130  components  or 
semi-finished  products  from  Ukraine.  More  than  80  %  of  these  products  were  provided  by  8  Ukrainian 
monopolistic  enterprises  in  the  aircraft  sector.  One  sixth  of  the  Russian  aircraft  market  was  occupied  by  the 
Zaporizhe  enterprise.  The  car  industry  proved  unable  to  work  without  the  industrial  co-operation  of  the  CIS 
countries,  where  the  thousand  of  enterprises  that  provided  Russian  companies  with  the  semi-finished  products 
were  located.  Finansovie  Izvestiya,  n.  6,29  January  1998,  see  also  S.  Kolchin  (1995),  "Rossiya-blizhe 
zarubezh'e:  vzaimotnosheniya,  interessy,  tseli  politiki",  Mirovaya  ekonomika  i  mezhdunarodnie  otnosheniya, 
n.  4,  pp.  47-56. 
119 facilities  was  blamed  for  causing  severe  damage  to  Russian  exports  (see  Box  3.1),  giving 
rise  to  prolonged  tension  between  the  two  Slavic  neighbours.  34 
The  gravity  of  the  transit  problem  forced  Moscow  to  look  into  alternative  solutions,  leading 
to  the  identification  of  two  viable  options.  Either  Russian  companies  assumed  control  over 
strategic  plants  on  the  former  Soviet  territories,  by  acquiring  the  controlling  shares  of 
privatised  assets.  Or  exit  routes  to  foreign  markets  needed  to  be  diversified.  With  the 
privatisation  process  in  the  neighbouring  countries  still  lengthy  and  controversial,  the 
second  option  was  often  considered  to  be  the  most  effective  solution.  35 
Because  of  the  irreplaceable  role  played  by  the  CIS  countries  in  the  Russian  economy,  the 
establishment  of  mutually  advantageous  relations  came  to  be  indicated  as  the  top  priority 
for  the  Russian  survival  strategy.  These  relations  were  seen  as  the  "minimum 
compensation  for  the  loss  of  the  Soviet  Union".  Normalisation  of  economic  and  trade 
relations,  and  the  development  of  industrial,  technical  and  scientific  ties  with  the  former 
republics  were  presented,  by  Russian  scholars,  as  absolutely  essential  conditions  to 
guarantee  the  healthy  state  of  the  Russian  economy  in  the  short-run.  In  the  future  these 
relations  would  preserve  and  extend  existing  positions  in  the  CIS  emerging  markets,  and 
would  help  Russia  to  earn  its  fully-fledged  membership  of  the  international  community.  36 
From  1993  onwards,  however,  it  became  evident  that  hopes  to  revive  the  former  Soviet 
economy  within  the  artificial  boundaries  of  the  Commonwealth  would  not  be  automatically 
successful,  as  had  initially  been  hoped.  7  Frustrated  by  the  inefficiency  of  the  CIS  and 
34  Institut  Mirovoi  Ekonomiki  i  Mezhdunarodnykh  Otnoshenii  RAN  (1994),  Aktualnie  problemy 
vneshneekonomicheskoi  bezopaznosti  Rossii,  (Moscow:  RAN),  p.  61 
35  This  is  how  the  ambitious  projects  for  the  Yamal,  and  the  Blue  Flow  pipeline  were  born.  The  first  one 
shipping  Russian  gas  through  the  Polish  territory  to  Germany,  is  expected  to  carry  65.7  billion  cubic  metres 
per  year  by  the  year  2010.  The  second  one  runs  from  Tyumen  across  Russian  and  Turkish  territories, 
bypassing  the  North  and  the  South  Caucasus,  and  avoiding  Ukraine,  Romania  and  Bulgaria,  with  whom  the 
bitterest  disputes  had  taken  place.  In  2010  the  pipeline  is  expected  to  reach  its  full  capacity  and  annual 
deliveries  should  increase  fivefold  the  current  gas  flow  to  16  billion  cubic  metres.  Moscow  News,  February 
5-11,1998,  p.  8 
36  S.  Kirichenko  (1994)  "Evolutsiaya  i  perspektivy  ekonomicheskikh  otnoshenii  Rossii  so  stranami  SNG", 
Svobodnaya  Mysl',  n.  9,  pp.  3-14 
37  For  an  overall  evaluation  of  the  CIS  see  R.  Sakwa  and  M.  Webber  (1999),  "The  Commonwealth  of 
Independent  States,  1991-1998:  Stagnation  and  Survival",  Europe-Asia  Studies,  Vol.  51,  n.  3,  pp.  379-415 
120 afraid  to  compromise  their  newly  acquired  sovereignty,  the  partners  started  to  shift  away 
from  Moscow's  sphere  of  influence  by  diversifying  their  diplomatic  efforts. 
The  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  had  been  created  to  provide  a  safety  net  for  the 
state-members,  to  help  them  integrating  gradually  into  the  world  economy.  Among  the 
former  Soviet  republics  there  had  been  a  shared  belief  that  they  should  back  each  other,  and 
offer  protection  against  the  unsustainable  competition  of  the  world  market.  Still  in  1992, 
while  listing  the  advantages  of  a  common  approach  to  the  international  markets,  Stanislav 
Shuskevich,  Chairman  of  the  Belarusian  Supreme  Soviet  urged:  "There  will  be  no  miracle 
with  the  world  market  [...  ]  If  they  divide  us  up,  we  will  loose  everything  [...  ]  They  are 
dividing  us  up  and  fleecing  us.  We  must  unite  in  our  poverty"  38  Also  Kazakh  President 
Nursultan  Nazarbayev  noted  "Except  for  ourselves  no  one  in  the  world  has  any  use  for  our 
products".  39 
A  few  years  later  the  former  Soviet  republics  started  to  develop  an  intricate  network  of 
strategic  alliances  and  preferential  trade  blocks,  using  these  alternative  groups  as  a 
powerful  counterbalance  to  Russia's  overwhelming  influence  (see  table  3.3). 
Table  3.3.  Co-operation  and  Trade  Blocks  in  the  FSU 
ORGANISATION  WHEN  ESTABLISHED  MEMBERS  OBJECTIVES  AND 
ACHIEVEMENTS 
BLACK  SEA  ECONOMIC  June  1992  11  countries:  all  littoral  Examine  potential  for 
CO-OPERATION  states  plus  Albania,  regional  integration 
Armenia,  Azerbaijan  and  Projects  in  banking,. 
Greece  finance,  environment, 
trade  industry, 
infrastructure,  and  the 
development  of  the 
private  sector 
ECONOMIC  Co-  1970  Established  by  Turkey,  Increase  economic  co- 
OPERATION  'Iran  and  Pakistan  operation,  facilitate 
ORGANISATION  expanded  to  Kazakhstan,  flows  of  aid. 
Uzbekistan,  1  Opercent  decrease  of 
Turkmenistan,  preferential  tariffs  among 
38  Izvestiya,  December  14,1992,  p.  1 
39  Segodnva,  December  15,1994,  p.  2 
121 Kyrgyzstan,  Tajikistan  members  included  in 
and  Azerbaijan  in  March  1992. 
November  1992  Projects  of  regional 
investment  and 
development  bank 
initiated  in  November 
1992 
CASPIAN  SEA  CO-  February  1992  Iran,  Azerbaijan,  Russia,  Increase  co-operation  in 
OPERATION  ZONE  Kazakhstan  and  the  fields  of  shipping, 
Turkmenistan  fisheries,  and  the 
exploitation  of  oil  and 
gas. 
CENTRAL  ASIA  January  1993  Kazakhstan,  Uzbekistan,  Create  a  common 
Turkmenistan,  market. 
Kyrgyzstan,  Tajikistan  In  January  1994 
Kazakhstan,  Uzbekistan, 
and  Kyrgyzstan  decided 
to  establish  a  custom 
union  and  explore  the 
potential  for  multilateral 
co-ordination  Of 
monetary  and  fiscal 
policies. 
GUAM  (GUUAM  FROM  1997  Georgia,  Ukraine,  Combating  internal 
1998)  Armenia,  Moldova,  and  separatism,  promoting 
in  1998  Uzbekistan  integration  into  European 
and  Euro-Atlantic 
structures 
Oil  extraction  and 
transportation  (ship 
energy  resources  from 
Azerbaijan  to  the  West 
through  the  Ukrainian 
and  the  Moldovan 
territory) 
Sources:  M.  Nicholls  and  H.  Potter,  "Regional  Initiatives  in  the  Former  Soviet  Block:  A  Review  of  Multi- 
country  Trade  Groups,  Environment  Initiatives  and  Infrastructure  Projects",  Communist  Economies  & 
Economic  Transformation.  Vol.  6,  N.  3,1994,  pp.  315-340;  Rossiiskaya  Gazeta,  December  2,1997,  p.  7 
122 Pragmatic  Nationalism  in  Foreign  Policy 
Pragmatist  Nationalism  emerged  in  the  period  1994-1998  in  response  to  the  sense  that 
Russia  had  been  victimised,  the  deterioration  of  the  internal  economic  situation  and  the 
perceived  risks  deriving  from  the  breaking  away  of  the  former  Soviet  republics.  The 
unexpected  electoral  victory  of  Vladimir  Zhirinovskii's  Liberal  Democratic  Party  (LDPR) 
in  1993  and  of  the  Communist  Party  in  1995  gave  a  further  impulse  to  nationalist  claims. 
This  political  change  translated  into  concrete  demands  raised  by  representatives  of  diverse 
political  orientations  for  a  radical  correction  in  the  foreign  policy  course  to  give  back  to 
Russia  its  role  as  a  great  power.  The  aspect  on  which  politicians  of  all  parties  seemed  to 
agree  was  the  rejection  of  Western  attempts  to  reduce  Russia  to  a  regional  power.  Russia 
was  still  a  Great  Power,  and  its  main  strength  was  to  be  found  in  its  Eurasian  position,  "the 
continent  where  the  main  sources  of  energy,  the  main  areas  of  conflicts,  and  the  main 
interests  of  other  key  actors  on  the  world  stage  are  located".  0 
The  question  was,  however,  what  sort  of  strategy  should  be  adopted  to  regain  central  stage 
in  the  Eurasian  arena,  as  geo-political  and  geo-economic  interpretations  of  the  country's 
national  interests  were  perceived  as  intrinsically  contradictory.  A  view  of  international 
relations  as  based  on  the  rivalry  among  alternative  centres  of  military,  political  and 
economic  power  was  opposed  to  the  idea  that  the  country's  position  in  the  world  scene 
depended  on  the  well-being  and  stability  of  its  economy. 
Advocates  of  a  geo-political  approach  argued  that  manifestation  of  the  Great  Power  status 
coincided  with  the  country's  ability  to  exert  political  and  military  influence  over  as  larger 
an  area  of  foreign  territories  as  possible.  Supporters  of  geo-economic  approaches,  instead, 
40  A.  Pushkov  (1996),  "National  Interests  in  Russian  Foreign  Policy",  International  Affairs  (Moscow),  n.  2, 
pp.  1-24 
123 emphasised  that  factors  like  the  country's  share  in  the  world  economy,  the  flow  of  foreign 
investment,  and  technological  capability  were  more  telling  indicators.  41 
From  the  beginning  of  1994  relations  with  the  former  Soviet  republics  were  restored  in  a 
central  position  within  the  Russian  foreign  policy  agenda.  This  move  had  its  official 
endorsement  in  the  words  of  Foreign  Minister  Kozyrev,  who  recognised  that  "the  CIS  and 
the  Baltics  are  regions  where  Russian  vital  interests  are  concentrated".  42  In  February  1993 
President  Yel'tsin  had  already  required  the  United  Nations  and  other  international 
organisations  to  grant  Russia  a  mandate  to  act  on  the  territories  of  the  newly  independent 
states  to  protect  its  interests.  Russian  intervention  would  include  humanitarian  and 
peacekeeping  operations,  political  mediation  in  the  region,  and  defence  of  the  interests  of 
ethnic  Russians  living  in  the  "Near  Abroad"  43 
Two  different  and  contrasting  approaches  towards  relations  with  the  post-Soviet  countries 
appeared  evident  at  this  stage:  imperial  and  ideological,  the  first,  and  post-colonial  and 
economic,  the  second.  In  the  version  formulated  by  Andranik  Migranyan,  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  claimed  for  Russia  a  "special  role  in  the  entire  geopolitical  space  of  the  former 
USSR"  44  Politicians  like  Speaker  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  Aleksandr  Rutskoi,  LDPR  leader 
Vladimir  Zhirinovskii  and,  at  a  later  stage,  Moscow  mayor  Yurii  Luzhkov,  underlined  this 
claim  with  controversial  trips  to  areas  of  contested  sovereignty,  like  the  Crimea. 
The  LDPR  included  in  its  -1995  electoral  manifesto  objectives  such  as  the  restoration  of 
"Russia's  strategic  boundaries  and  its  historical  and  geo-political  space",  primarily  by 
"bringing  Ukraine  and  Belarus  back  into  the  single  Russian  state".  Russia's  role  as  a  world 
super  power  was  seen  as  part  of  its  "geopolitical  predestination".  5  The  State  Duma's 
refusal  in  March  1996  to  ratify  the  Belovezha  Agreements,  which  had  marked  the 
41  A.  Torkunov  (1996),  "National  Interests  in  Russian,  Foreign  Policy",  International  Affairs  (Moscow),  n.  2, 
pp.  1-24 
°  Rossiskaya  Gazeta.  January  19,1994,  p.  1 
43  This  request  was  later  backed  by  the  November  1993  military  doctrine,  which  recognised  the  geopolitical 
space  of  the  former  Soviet  Union  (excluding  the  Baltic  States)  as  an  "area  of  Russian  vital  interests  and 
primary  responsibility".  S.  Kolchin  (1995),  Op.  Cit. 
as  Rossiiskaya  Gazeta,  August  14,1992,  p.  7 
45 
, 
International  Affairs  (Moscow)  (1995),  Op.  Cit. 
124 dissolution  of  the  Soviet  Union,  was  also  part  of  this  same  strategy.  Nationalist  political 
forces  aimed  at  rejecting  the  break  up  of  the  Soviet  Union  (in  its  extreme  form)  and  re- 
imposing  a  stricter  control  over  the  new  independent  states  (in  its  milder  form). 
On  the  opposite  side  of  the  political  spectrum,  acknowledging  the  importance  of  the  CIS  for 
Russian  economic.  and  political  interests,  "Pragmatic  Nationalism"  warned  of  the  dangers 
and  costs  of  a  policy  that  used  military  instruments  and  imperial  arguments.  Outlining  some 
of  the  problems  connected  with  the  Russian  Monroe  Doctrine,  Aleksei  Arbatov  presented 
three  of  the  main  elements  of  the  Pragmatist  concept. 
First,  by  embracing  a  Monroe  Doctrine,  Russia  would  give  up  its  option  to  exercise  an  ad 
hoc  "rational  and  pragmatic"  distinction  between  situations  in  which  Russia's  intervention 
would  indeed  protect  the  country's  interests,  and  situations  in  which  Russia's  interests 
would  be  best  served  by  a  non-interventionist  attitude.  Second,  the  price  of  an  involvement 
in  the  domestic  problems  of  the  CIS  countries  could  be  too  high.  Russia  would  probably  be 
sucked  into  ethnic  wars  causing  heavy  casualties,  massive  flows  of  refugees  and  possible 
retaliatory  attacks  to  Russian  interests  abroad.  Third,  a  militarist  course  would  impinge  on 
the  continuation  of  democratic  reforms,  producing,  most  likely,  "the  revival  of  an 
authoritarian,  besieged,  militarised  state,  with  a  large  degree  of  central  economic  planning, 
and  the  reintroduction  of  rationing"  46 
In  contrast  to  an  approach  that  stressed  military  supremacy,  Pragmatic  Nationalists 
proposed  a  strategy  that  endorsed  "leadership  rather  than  control,  economic  dominance 
rather  than  political  responsibility".  Any  project  for  the  restoration  of  the  Soviet  Union  was 
rejected  as  "pure  utopian  fantasy".  A  pragmatic  nationalist  policy  towards  the  "Near 
Abroad"  was  to  be  based  on  a  strategy  that 
"Would  be  aimed  at  alleviating  the  negative  consequences  of  disintegration  for  Russians  especially,  that 
would  be  relatively  cost-effective  and  stable,  that  would  reduce  the  likelihood  of  conflict,  and  [...  ]  that  would 
46  A.  G.  Arbatov  (1994),  "Russian  National  Interests",  in  Damage  Limitation  or  Crisis?  Russia  and  the 
Outside  World,  edited  by  R.  D.  Blackwill  and  S.  A.  Karaganov  (Washington:  Brassey's,  INC),  pp.  61-62 
125 conform  to  the  main  strategic  goal  of  bringing  about  the  economic,  political  and  spiritual  rebirth  and 
ascendancy  of  Russia".  7 
Rebuffing  more  militant  claims  on  territories  now  located  within  the  boundaries  of  the  new 
independent  states,  Nikolai  Travkin  recognised  that: 
"What  is  needed  now  is  not  the  reconstruction  of  the  Soviet  Union,  but,  instead,  the  restoration  of  some  of 
those  beneficial  ties.  Integration  cannot  be  forced  on  the  countries  of  the  former  Soviet  Union.  Only  a 
rational  assessment  of  and  respect  for,  the  needs  of  each  country  can  lead  to  the  reintegration  of  the  region".  8 
The  aspects  of  economic  security  and  consolidation  of  the  Russian  positions  in  the  "Near 
Abroad"  become  intertwined  in  the  pragmatist  vision.  A  survey  conducted  in  the  aftermath 
of  the  1996  presidential  elections  confirmed  that  an  orientation  towards  a  foreign  policy 
aimed  at  protecting  Russian  economic  interests  and  restoring  relations  with  the  countries  of 
the  former  Soviet  Union  was  widespread. 
Of  respondents  in  a  general  public  survey  94  %  mentioned  defence  of  national  economic 
interests  as  the  top  priority  for  Russian  foreign  policy.  The  percentage  rose  to  95  %  when 
the  interviews  were  conducted  among  members  of  the  foreign  policy  elite.  67  %  of  the 
general  public  considered  development  of  relations  with  the  `Near  Abroad'  the  most 
important  issue.  83  %  of  the  foreign  policy  elite  shared  the  same  position.  While  93  %  of 
the  general  public  and  97  %  of  the  foreign  policy  elite  shared  the  belief  that  Russia's 
internal  situation  was  indeed  affecting  the  country's  foreign  policy  goals.  9 
By  the  time  this  survey  was  conducted  pragmatic  nationalism  had  penetrated  the  official 
circles  of  foreign  policy-making.  A  number  of  documents  approved  by  President  Yel'tsin 
in  this  period  reflected  this  general  mood.  From  the  "Basic  Provisions  of  the  Russian 
47  Council  on  Foreign  and  Defence  Policy  (1997),  Op,  Cit. 
as  N.  Travkin  (1994),  "Russia,  Ukraine  and  Eastern  Europe",  in  Rethinking  Russia's  National  Interests,  edited 
by  S.  Sestyanovich,  (Washington  D.  C.:  Centre  for  Strategic  and  International  Studies),  pp.  33-41 
49  Elena  Bashk:  irova  (1998),  "Democracy,  Foreign  Policy  and  the  Media  in  the  Russian  Federation",  final 
report  drawn  under  Nato  Democratic  Institution  Fellowship,  http:  //www.  nato.  inVacad/fellow/96- 
9801zaa-shkirova.  pdf.  The  elite  sample  included  members  of  the  foreign  policy  committees  of  the  Duma,  editors 
and  foreign  policy  commentators  in  the  media,  senior  staff  officers,  major  figures  at  foreign  policy-related 
institutes,  and  persons  in  economic  ministries  and  privatised  enterprises  that  had  foreign  trade  components. 
126 Federation  Foreign  Policy  Concept",  to  the  "Strategic  Course  of  Russia  with  the  State- 
Members  of  the  CIS",  to  the  "Concept  of  National  Security",  the  importance  of  domestic 
and  economic  issues  in  setting  the  agenda  for  foreign  relations  was  spelled  out  clearly  (see 
Box  3.2). 
An  indissoluble  link  was  established  between  the  country's  economic  well-being  and  the 
conditions  met  by  Russian  agents  on  the  world  markets.  The  government  was  required  to 
play  a  more  active  role  in  protecting  Russian  enterprises  that  were  facing  at  the  same  time  a 
hostile  environment  on  the  international  arena  and  the  "unscrupulous"  competition  of 
Western  corporations  on  its  internal  markets  (in  these  documents  CIS  markets  were 
considered  internal). 
Russian  companies  were  presented  as  the  agents  capable  of  bridging  the  gap  that  ideology 
had  created  between  Russia  and  its  CIS  neighbours.  Boris  Nemtsov,  then  governor  of 
Nizhnii  Novgorod,  suggested  that  in  order  to  solve  the  Crimean  crisis  Russian  business 
ought  to  be  encouraged  to  buy  up  property  and  business  in  Sevastopol,  thus  "restoring 
historical  justice  by  capitalist  means".  50  "If  enterprises,  hotels,  restaurants  and  cafes  are 
bought  by  Russian  banks,  then  wages  and  salaries  will  be  paid  in  rubles  -  he  argued  -  This, 
in  fact  will  make  Sevastopol  a  de  facto  Russian  town".  51 
Other  prominent  political  advisers  were  impressed  with  this  new  role  identified  for  the 
Russian  enterprises.  In  the  words  of  Mikhail  Delyagin,  of  the  Russian  Federation 
President's  Analytical  Centre: 
"The  force  that  has  the  greatest  stake  in  uniting  democracy  and  patriotism  is  national  capital,  as  it  moves  out 
into  world  markets.  It  needs  a  powerful  Russia  capable  of  supporting  it  on  an  interstate  level.  It  needs  a  free 
Russia  that  does  not  threaten  it  with  nationalisation  or  terrof'.  52 
50  0MRI  Daily  Digest,  February  20,1997 
sl  C.  Caryl  (1998),  "Who  Makes  Russia's  Foreign  Policy  Anyway?  "  World  Repo  February  16, 
52  Izvestiva,  January  6,1995,  p3 
127 In  the  pragmatist  doctrine  the  conquest  of  new  markets  under  the  standard  of  Russian 
capital  was  viewed  as  a  peaceful  invasion  that  would  make  Russia's  name  great  again.  At  a 
time  when  Russia  felt  its  grip  on  the  countries  of  the  Near  Abroad  loosening,  the  rhetoric  of 
national  capital  gradually  replaced  the  traditionally  aggressive  nationalistic  slogans.  This 
new,  civilised  Russian  nationalism  appeared  no  longer  interested  in  the  political  domination 
of  the  countries  of  the  Near  Abroad.  Political  or  military  domination  would  imply 
additional  costs  that  Russia  was  no  longer  in  the  position  to  afford. 
The  viable  alternative  proposed  by  the  theorists  of  national  capital  was  then  to  gain  access 
to  the  natural  resources  and  the  strategic  infrastructure  of  the  newly  independent  states  via 
economic  means.  Prosperity  of  Russian  business  was  equated  to  the  prosperity  of  the 
country,  and  economic  losses  for  national  companies,  caused  by  the  "invasion  of  foreign 
investors",  were  presented  as  a  threat  to  the  country's  national  security.  "We  cannot 
allow",  the  Concept  of  National  Security  read,  "foreign  companies  to  seize  control  over 
strategically  relevant  economic  sectors,  the  military  industry,  and  the  natural  monopolies". 
The  strongest  supporter  of  this  political  trend  was  Our  Home  is  Russia  (OHR),  the  then 
"party  of  power".  "Expansion  of  the  exports  and  reasonable  protectionism"  was  one  of  the 
slogans  echoed  in  the  OHR  Party  Conference  in  July  1995.53  The  party's  electoral 
platform  made  clear  that  Our  Home  is  Russia  considered  the  raw  materials  sector  and  the 
industries  engaged  in  processing  raw  materials  as  the  primary  sources  of  economic  growth, 
at  least  in  the  short  run.  The  financial  basis  for  those  companies  would  come  from  the 
rapidly  growing  large  banks.  The  state's  role  would  be,  in  their  view,  to  secure  favourable 
conditions  for  those  companies  which  proved  able  to  accumulate  the  necessary  capital  to 
initiate  a  process  of  growth.  54 
The  party  was  to  seek  a  "steady  economic  development  on  the  basis  of  national  capital".  55 
Finding  inspiration  in  the  principle  "a  mighty  state  means  a  clear  economy"  it  proclaimed 
53  Rossiya,  n.  23,  July  26-31,1995,  p.  3 
sa  Segodnya,  December  6,1995,  p.  5 
55  Segodnya.  July  21,1995,  p.  2 
128 the  abandonment  of  liberal  policies.  56  "The  liberal  stage  of  reforming  the  economy,  which 
prepared  the  way  for  the  modernisation  of  the  country's  economy  is  already  coming  to  an 
end,  and  therefore  a  fundamental  change  of  direction  is  needed.  Instead  of  financial 
stabilisation  at  any  price,  a  new  core  of  reforms  providing  incentives  for  the  accumulation 
of  national  capital  is  being  built".  57 
"Social  state  liberalism"  was  the  solution  to  Russian  problems  also  on  the  world  arena. 
Sergei  Belaev,  First  Deputy  Chairman  of  OHR  explained  the  party's  foreign  policy  aims  as 
trying  to  "provide  the  most  favourable  international  setting  in  which  this  country  feels 
absolutely  secure,  with  its  hands  free  to  proceed  with  economic  and  social  reforms".  58 
In  the  promotion  of  national  capital,  the  party  of  government  coincided  with  the  less 
belligerent  positions  of  the  national  patriots,  who  urged  the  return  of  a  great  Russia,  armed, 
this  time,  with  the  more  powerful  weapons  of  the  market  economy.  In  the  fragmented 
political  space  of  Russia  in  this  period  the  unifying  idea  of  national  capital  found  fertile 
ground. 
'The  idea  of  a  great  Russia  expresses  something  more  -a  need  to  create  a  new  national  ideology  that  would 
reflect  both  the  corporate  interests  of  the  Russian  political  leadership  and  the  growing  power  of  Russian 
national  capital.  59 
It  would  be  misleading,  however,  to  think  that  the  policy  of  protecting  national  capital  in 
the  name  of  the  country's  common  good  was  free  from  controversies.  A  voice  of  dissent 
was  raised  by  those  economic  sectors,  which  felt  not  only  that  they  were  misrepresented  by 
the  official  government  line,  but  also  that  government  policy  was  harming  their  growth. 
Russian  companies  were  certainly  not  all  in  the  same  situation,  as  their  performance  on  the 
world  markets  diverged  widely.  On  the  basis  of  their  interests  and  foreign  policy 
preferences,  Prime  Minister  Chernomyrdin  divided  them  in  three  categories: 
56  Rossiya,  n.  23,  July  26-31,1995,  p.  3 
57  Kommersant'  Daily,  August  15,1995,  p.  1 
58  International  Affairs  (Moscow)  (1995),  Op.  Cit. 
59  Nezavisimaya  Gazeta,  November  16,1995,  p.  16 
129 1.  Export-oriented  sectors  with  a  high  price  margin,  including  producers  of  natural  gas, 
oil,  power  station  coal,  and  non-ferrous  metal. 
2.  Industries  oriented  towards  the  internal  market,  including  natural  monopolies,  ferrous 
metallurgy,  instrument  and  motor  vehicle  manufacturers,  consumer  goods,  food  and 
medical  products.  Industries  in  this  sector  did  not  have  an  open  interest  in  foreign  policy 
orientations,  but  tended  to  assume  pro-protectionist  positions. 
3.  Old  and  inefficient  industries,  which  did  not  fit  the  international  or  the  internal  market, 
and  had  practically  no  buyers  60 
According  to  the  Prime  Minister's  interpretation  there  was  a  sharp  divide  between 
productive  and  unproductive  enterprises,  between  those  who  could  face  the  capitalistic 
challenge  and  those  who  were  being  defeated  by  it.  Representatives  of  those  sectors  that 
appeared  the  weakest  shared  the  same  impression  that  there  was  indeed  a  rigid  fracture 
between  enterprises'  performance  on  the  foreign  markets.  Yet,  they  blamed  the 
government  and  its  policies  for  creating  that  divide. 
Yurii  Skokov  and  Sergei  Glaz'ev  of  the  Congress  of  Russian  Communities,  for  example, 
ascribed  the  responsibility  for  the  industrial  crisis  to  the  nasty  alliance  between  business 
and  politics.  The  protection  granted  to  the  most  powerful  sectors  and  enterprises,  in  their 
view,  was  seriously  undermining  the  entire  Russian  economy,  while  considerably 
benefiting  only  a  small  group  of  people.  61 
"Economic  Policy  is  being  conducted  in  the  interests  of  the  comprador  bourgeoisie,  foreign  capital,  the 
bigwigs  of  speculative  business  and  organised  criminal  groups.  Its  continuation  over  the  next  several  months 
will  lead  to  profound  and  irreversible  destruction  of  the  scientific  and  industrial  potential,  the  final  loss  of  the 
country's  independence,  and  the  loss  to  Russia's  producers  not  only  of  the  foreign  markets  but  also  of  the 
domestic  market".  62 
60  Y  Fedorov  (1998),  "Interest  Groups  and  Russia's  Foreign  Policy",  International  Affairs  (Moscow),  Vol. 
44,  n.  6,  pp.  173-183.  See  also  S.  A.  Karaganov  (1994),  "Russia's  Elites",  in  Damage  Limitation  or  Crisis. 
Russia  and  the  Outside  World,  edited  by  R.  D.  Blackwill  and  S.  A.  Karaganov  (Washington:  Brassey's,  Inc.  ), 
pp.  41-53 
61  Nezavisimaya  Gazeta,  Oct  19,1995,  p.  2 
62  Nezavisimaya  Gazeta,  Sept  22,1994,  pp.  1-2 
130 A  document  published  on  the  eve  of  the  1995  Duma  elections  by  the  Defence  Research 
Institute  pointed  out  at  the  "New  Russians"  as  the  only  social  group  that  was  in  fact 
benefiting  from  this  situation.  The  Russian  elite,  and  Russian  business,  especially  those 
sectors  engaged  in  banking,  finance  and  export-oriented  activities,  had  signed  a  Faustian 
pact  with  the  West.  They  had  traded  the  degradation  of  the  country's  economic  potential 
and  the  elimination  of  the  single  market  with  the  former  Soviet  republics  for  the  largest 
stake  in  the  exploitation  of  the  national  wealth. 
The  existing  economic  model,  based  on  the  export  of  raw  material,  had  practically  been 
imposed  on  Russia  to  the  advantage  of  the  West.  Over-reliance  on  the  primary  sector,  it 
was  argued,  would  impede  the  modernisation  of  national  manufacturing  industry  and 
agriculture,  the  conversion  and  maintenance  of  the  military-industrial  complex's  high 
technological  capability,  and  the  preservation  of  the  Armed  Forces'  fighting  strength.  The 
inevitable  consequence  would  be  the  permanent  relegation  of  Russia  to  the  status  of  a 
second  grade  power.  63 
Other  commentators  highlighted  the  paradox  that  the  business  elite,  the  very  same  people 
who  had  worked  to  demolish  the  state  in  the  late  Soviet  days,  were  now  committed  to 
building  it  up  again,  reviving  a  "state  power  ideology".  Corporate  structures  and  specific 
individuals  had  already  seized  the  key  seats  in  politics,  economics,  and  finance,  and,  as  a 
result,  decisions  were  being  made  on  the  basis  of  the  interests  of  specific  groups,  restricted 
to  members  of  the  elite  or  individuals  in  proximity  of  it  64 
In  the  years  after  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union,  Russia  went  through  an  identity  crisis 
caused  by  the  loss  of  its  imperial  status.  The  need  to  accept  a  "reduced  identity"  was 
coupled  with  the  deterioration  of  the  economic  situation  and  the  perception  that  also 
independence  of  the  former  Soviet  republics  was  now  imposing  severe  risks  to  Russian 
national  security.  This  sense  of  drift  prompted  a  significant  change  in  the  Russian  foreign 
policy  course. 
63  Segodnya,  October  20,1995,  p.  3 
131 From  1994  onwards  a  growing  consensus  emerged  among  the  Russian  foreign  policy  elite 
that  the  country's  great  power  status  was  to  be  re-established  on  the  basis  of  economic 
rather  than  military  power.  A  course  of  pragmatic  nationalism  demanded  that  also  relations 
with  the  CIS  countries  were  reoriented,  moving  away  from  a  strategy  aimed  at  imposing  on 
them  the  Russian  political  hegemony.  Following  the  consolidation  of  the  newly 
independent  states,  policies  towards  the  CIS  were  now  to  be  inspired  to  the  principles  of 
profit  and  were  to  be  aimed  at  increasing  economic  power  through  the  acquisition  of 
strategic  assets  and  access  to  foreign  markets.  This  ideological  background  provided  a 
favourable  situation  for  the  expansion  abroad  of  Russian  economic  actors,  whose  interests 
were  associated  to  the  national  interest  of  Russia. 
What  was  instead  the  relationship  between  foreign  policy  and  interests  of  the  economic 
elite  in  Ukraine?  The  inherent  weakness  of  the  Ukrainian  economic  elite  meant  that  their 
interests  were  limited  to  the  national  territory,  and  their  foreign  policy  preferences 
amounted  to  nothing  more  than  the  protection  of  the  domestic  market  against  foreign 
competition.  Instability  of  the  Ukrainian  economy,  and  the  country's  dependence  on 
foreign  aid,  however,  implied  that  foreign  policy  institutions  could  not  fully  satisfy  the 
economic  elite's  demands  for  protection,  as  a  balance  had  to  be  maintained  between 
international  organisations  and  foreign  donors'  pressures  to  liberalise  the  economy. 
Yet,  a  foreign  policy  debate  centred  on  the  need  to  preserve  the  country's  sovereignty 
provided  the  Ukrainian  economic  elite  with  a  powerful  nationalist  vocabulary  to  articulate 
its  interests  (see  chapter  5).  In  the  remaining  of  this  chapter  I  will  outline  the  main  aspects 
of  the  foreign  policy  adopted  by  presidents  Kravhcuk  and  Kuchma. 
64  A.  Tret'yakov  (1996),  "Growing  support  for  New  Foreign  Policy  in  Russia",  International  Affairs 
(Moscow),  n.  5-6,  pp.  15-31 
132 Ukrainian  Nationalism  and  Foreign  Policy 
After  four  hundred  years  as  part  of  the  Russian  Empire  first  and  then  of  the  USSR,  post- 
Soviet  Ukraine  faced  the  challenge  to  establish  its  own  independent  state.  Such  a  long  time 
spent  as  a  province,  had  significantly  weakened  the  sense  of  a  Ukrainian  statehood.  As  its 
national  identity  needed  to  be  vigorously  re-asserted  within  the  domestic  as  well  as  the 
international  arena,  Ukraine  went  through  a  phase  of  intense  nation-building,  which  was 
inevitably  reflected  also  in  the  foreign  policy  course  adopted  by  the  country's  leadership. 
While  under  Kravchuk'spresidency  Ukrainian  foreign  policy  was  inspired  to  a  nationalist 
anti-Russian  rhetoric,  the  advent  to  power  of  Leonid  Kuchma  marked  the  beginning  of  a 
"multivectorial  strategy".  From  1994  onwards,  the  aim  to  establish  equally  beneficial 
relations  with  the  West  as  well  as  with  Russia  served  the  need  to  consolidate  the  newly 
acquired  sovereignty. 
The  task  of  nation-building  implied  that  not  only  state  institutions  had  to  be  established,  but 
"a  new  sense  of  history  and  new  symbols"  had  to  be  provided  as  unifying  elements  for  the 
whole  population.  65  The  lack  of  a  common  national  mythology  emerged  as  a  result  of  the 
national  struggle,  the  virtual  divide  between  Ukrainian-speaking  and  Russian-speaking 
regions  within  the  country,  and  the  weakness  of  nationalist  sentiments  in  the  largest  part  of 
the  population  further  complicated  the  efforts  of  national  development.  66 
The  process  of  nation-building  had  to  operate  simultaneously  at  two  levels.  Kyiv  was  in 
the  situation  of  having  to  justify  its  own  existence  to  the  external  world,  build  credibility 
for  itself  and  demonstrate  that  its  independence  would  not  be  an  ephemeral  phenomenon. 
Nonetheless,  trust  and  credibility  had  to  be  established  also  within  the  boundaries  of  the 
new  country.  A  distinctive  social  identity  wi,  th  which  the  whole  population  could  recognise 
65  I.  Prizel  (1994),  "The  Influence  of  Ethnicity  on  Foreign  Policy.  The  Case  of  Ukraine",  in  National  Identity 
and  Ethnicity  in  Russia  and  the  New  States  of  Eurasia,  edited  by  R.  Szporluk,  (Armonk:  M.  E.  Sharpe),  pp. 
103-128 
661.  Prizel  (1998),  Op.  Cit.,  pp.  372-373 
133 themselves  had  to  be  outlined.  This  needed  to  be  a  social  identity  that  was  inclusive  of  all 
the  ethnic  minorities  living  on  Ukrainian  territory  and  yet  strong  enough  to  convince  its 
citizens  to  shift  their  loyalty  from  the  old  Soviet  to  the  new  Ukrainian  state. 
Struggling  to  assert  its  independence,  Ukraine's  strategy  followed  closely  a  post-colonial 
pattern  in  which  "the  growth  of  positive  sovereignty  through  state  and  nation-building  is 
often  conducted  [...  ]  by  distancing  to  the  maximum  the  newly  independent  state  from  the 
former  imperial  metropolis".  67  Under  these  circumstances  it  is  not  surprising  that  from  the 
outset  Ukrainian  independence  came  to  be  defined  not  in  absolute  terms,  but  in  relative 
terms:  as  independence  from  Russia.  68 
The  preservation  of  the  newly  acquired  sovereignty  came  to  be  seen  as  a  crucial  matter  of 
survival  for  the  Ukrainian  civilisation  after  past  traumatic  experiences.  "For  Ukraine, 
independence  is  not  a  luxury  but  the  only  means  for  survival  in  the  face  of  both  physical 
and  cultural  genocide"  -  was  the  justification  provided  by  a  Ukrainian-American  author.  69 
The  importance  that  the  Ukrainian  leadership  ascribed  to  the  need  to  create  international 
underpinnings  to  safeguard  the  newly-acquired  independence  was  reflected  in  the 
documents  issued  in  the  early  1990s  to  outline  the  country's  foreign  policy  priorities.  The 
1990  Declaration  of  Independence,  for  example,  identified  as  the  primary  national  interest 
the  attainment  of  international  recognition  for  the  country's  sovereignty.  Ukraine's 
neutrality  was  also  proclaimed  as  an  additional  guarantee  to  its  independence.  A  Ukrainian 
analyst  commented: 
67  T.  Kuzio  (1998),  "The  Domestic  Sources  of  Ukrainian  Security  Policy",  The  Journal  of  Strategic  Studies. 
Vol.  21,  n.  4,  p.  19 
68  A.  Moshes  (1999),  "Ukraine  and  Russia:  A  Chronic  Crisis",  in  Between  Russia  and  the  West:  Foreign  and 
Security  Policy  in  Independent  Ukraine,  edited  by  K.  R.  Spillmann,  et  at,  (Bern:  Peter  Lang),  p.  258 
69  Y.  Bilinsky  (1994),  "Basic  Factors  in  the  Foreign  Policy  of  Ukraine",  in  The  Legacy  of  History  in  Russia 
and  the  New States  of  Eurasia,  edited  by  S.  F.  Starr,  (Armonk,  New  York:  M.  E.  Sharpe),  p.  187 
134 "Ukraine  does  not  need  neutrality  for  the  sake  of  neutrality,  but  as  a  means  to  achieve  its  main  national 
interest:  absolute  sovereignty  and  independence,  consolidation  of  statehood,  provision  of  territorial  integrity 
and  inviolability  of  borders,  political  stability  and  economic  prosperity".  70 
The  1993  Main  Directions  of  Ukrainian  Foreign  Policy,  defined  security  in  terms  of 
national  sovereignty  and  state  independence,  territorial  integrity,  ethnic  minorities'  rights, 
the  economic  situation,  ecology  and  information.  Most  importantly,  however,  the  Main 
Directions  strove  to  find  a  geopolitical  location  for  Ukraine  that  was  more  appropriate  to  its 
ambition  for  a  European  identity.  Thus,  while  the  document  pledged  that  Ukraine  would 
enhance  bilateral  relations  and  deepen  the  special  partnership  with  Russia,  it  also  expressed 
willingness  to  participate  in  regional  co-operation  (the  OSCE,  European  Security  structures, 
the  UN),  seek  active  co-operation  with  NATO  and  ultimately  the  country's  full 
membership  in  the  European  Union. 
CIS  co-operation  was  to  be  improved,  but  the  Commonwealth  was  inevitably  classified  as  a 
mechanism  of  multilateral  consultations  to  manage  the  "peaceful  divorce"  within  the 
former  Soviet  area.  The  development  of  bilateral  relations  was  to  be  given  priority  to 
multilateral  co-operation  within  the  CIS.  Finally  bilateral  relations  with  neighbouring 
states,  geographically  close  countries  and  NATO  and  EU  structures  were  to  be  developed.  7' 
Confronted  with  the  urgent  task  of  finding  a  unifying  element  for  an  otherwise  divided 
population,  and  lacking  a  strong  political  legitimisation,  the  post-Soviet  Ukrainian 
leadership  used  nationalism  and  foreign  policy  as  instruments  of  nation-building. 
Nationalism  became  the  main  framework  to  read  Ukrainian  current  events,  to  make 
decisions  on  the  country's  place  on  the  international  arena,  to  establish  alliances  and  to 
identify  enemies.  2  President  Kravchuk  used  strong  foreign  policy  statements  and  a 
70  N.  A.  Kulinich  (1995),  "Ukraine  in  the  New  Geopolitical  Environment.  Issues  of  Regional  and  Subregional 
Security",  in  The  Making  of  Foreign  Policy  in  Russia  . and  the  New  States  of  Eurasia,  edited  by  A.  Dawisha 
and  K.  Dawisha,  (Armonk,  New  York:  M.  E.  Sharpe),  pp.  113-139 
71  0.  Alexandrova  (1999),  "The  Premises  of  Ukrainian  Foreign  and  Security  Policy",  in  Between  Russia  and 
the  West:  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  in  Independent  Ukraine,  edited  by  K.  R.  Spillmann  et  al.,  (Bern:  Peter 
Lang),  pp.  31-52 
72  Discussing  the  role  of  nationalism  in  foreign  policy,  Charles  Furtado  notes  that  nationalism  provides  "a 
belief  system  that  consciously  or  unconsciously  structures  the  perception  of  the  world.  Through  its 
identification  with  the  nation,  the  ideology  establishes  moral,  pragmatic,  and  cognitive  priorities  that  aid  its 
135 nationalist  rhetoric,  especially  against  Russia,  to  make  up  an  international  role  for  the 
newly  independent  state  and  thus  define  the  contents  of  its  national  identity.  73 
In  the  early  1990s  Ukrainian  foreign  and  security  policy  was  centred  on  the  assumption  of 
potential  threats  from  Moscow.  Threats  were  identified  in  the  form  of  Russian  interference 
in  Ukraine's  internal  affairs,  territorial  and  other  claims  on  state  sovereignty,  political  and 
military  instability  and  violent  conflicts  in  neighbouring  states,  and  in  separatist  tendencies 
in  some  regions  of  the  country  fomented  by  Russian  forces.  74  Moscow  became  the  main 
target  of  Ukrainian  criticism.  Kravchuk,  for  instance,  blamed  the  Russians  for  the  Great 
Famine  and  presented  it  as  an  episode  of  planned  genocide  against  the  Ukrainian 
population,  hinting  that  in  the  1990s  as  in  the  1930s  Ukraine  should  not  trust  Russian 
motives. 
"[The  Great  Famine]  was  an  action  planned  by  the  state  and  by  the  Communist  Party  authorities.  One  in  five 
Ukrainians  starved  to  death.  This  was genocide  against  one's  own  people  on  the  basis  of  instructions  issued 
from  outside.  The  dreadful  pressure  put  on  Ukraine  was  based  on  striving  to  uproot  the  entire  Ukrainian  soul. 
Unacceptable  living  conditions  were  created  to  destroy  a  nation".  75 
At  the  same  time,  however,  the  Ukrainian  president  pushed  through  what  two  Ukrainian 
economists  have  defined  as  "an  economic  policy  destructive  and  absurd  from  the  standpoint 
of  general  national  interests",  dictated  more  by  a  nationalistic  agenda  than  by  objective 
economic  concerns  (more  details  on  Kravchuk's  economic  nationalism  in  chapter  two).  76 
adherents  in  distinguishing  which  beliefs  are  indisputable  and  which  intolerable,  which  actions  acceptable  and 
which  unacceptable,  which  course  is  true  and  wholesome  and  which  is  false  and  baleful,  and  where  lies 
security  and  danger.  As  it  filters  experience,  nationalism  automatically  heightens  the  salience  of  certain 
events,  while  downplaying  the  importance  of  others".  C.  F.  Furtado  (1994),  "Nationalism  and  Foreign  Policy 
in  Ukraine",  Political  Science  Quarterly,  pp.  81-104  (quotation  p.  85) 
73  Lowell  Dittmer  and  Samuel  Kim  argue  that  the  behaviour  of  a  nation-state  in  the  international  arena 
contributes  to  the  overall  content  of  its  national  identity.  A  state  can  be  defined  by  what  it  does.  "What  the 
state  does  is  engage  in  various  exploits  on  behalf  of  the  nation  it  represents,  most  visibly  in  foreign  policy. 
These  actions  make  up  a  role,  and  the  accumulated  roles  constitute  an  identity".  Quoted  in  S.  Shulman 
(1998),  "National  Integration  and  Foreign  Policy  in  Multiethnic  States",  Nationalism  and  Ethnic  Politics,  Vol. 
4,  n.  4,  p.  115 
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75  Y.  Bilinsky  (1994),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  179 
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136 In  opposition  to  its  stated  intentions,  Kravchuk's  assertive  nationalism  and  anti-Russian 
spirit  burdened  Ukraine  with  a  negative  international  reputation  that  his  successor  managed 
only  partly  to  amend.  By  creating  Ukraine's  armed  forces,  issuing  the  Ukrainian  national 
currency  and  obstructing  CIS  co-operation,  Ukraine  appeared  to  the  West  as  unpredictable 
and  unreasonable  a  subject  to  be  kept  at  bay  rather  than  welcomed  as  a  partner.  Kravchuk's 
reinterpretation  of  Ukrainian  obligations  under  the  START  1  and  Lisbon  Protocols  gave 
Western  countries  the  impression  that  Ukraine  was  trying  to  use  the  country's  control  over 
nuclear  weapons  as  an  instrument  to  pressurise  the  international  community  into  providing 
additional  financial  aid. 
The  deteriorating  economic  conditions  and  a  rapidly  changing  regional  scenario  convinced 
Leonid  Kuchma  that  Ukraine's  foreign  policy  strategy  was  in  need  of  a  radical 
reassessment  in  which  relations  with  the  West  and  with  the  East  were  to  be  given  equal 
priority. 
Economic  Decline 
Despite  the  most  optimistic  expectations  of  the  pre-independence  period,  Ukraine  was 
severely  hit  by  the  economic  consequences  of  the  dissolution  of  the  Soviet  Union.  The 
rapid  economic  decline  that  accompanied  the  early  years  of  independence  was  probably  the 
single  most  important  factor  that  convinced  Kuchma's  administration  to  re-orient  Ukrainian 
foreign  policy. 
In  view  of  the  heavy  economic  interdependence  with  Russia,  and  of  the  urgent  necessity  to 
reform  the  industrial  system,  the  country's  leadership  decided  that  the  only  possibility  for 
Ukraine  to  recover  would  be  to  seek  simultaneously  economic  co-operation  with  the  East 
and  financial  support  from  the  West.  Conversion  of  economic  sectors  connected  to  the 
Soviet  industrial  infrastructure  and  restructuring  of  sectors  dependent  on  Russian  supplies 
appeared,  in  fact,  desperate  tasks  that  Ukraine  could  not  face  without  external  help. 
137 Ukraine's  dependence  on  Russian  energy  deliveries  was  a  particular  problem.  According 
to  data  published  in  the  mid-1990s,  Kyiv  relied  on  Russia  for  90%  of  its  oil  imports,  while 
it  managed  to  produce  internally  about  20%  of  the  gas  it  required.  Turkmenistan  could 
provide  an  alternative  supply  of  gas  for  another  20%.  Ukraine's  five  nuclear  stations 
produced  about  one-third  of  the  country's  total  electricity  needs,  but  Ukraine's  potential  for 
energy  output  was  much  larger,  thanks  to  the  Donbass  coal-mining  industry  and  the  many 
rivers  that  could  be  dammed  to  produce  hydroelectric  power. 
Since  independence  Ukraine  had  nonetheless  been  under  extreme  pressure  for  energy 
deliveries.  It  was  threatened  by  continuous  cuts  in  supplies  caused  not  only  by  its  growing 
indebtedness  with  its  Russian  providers,  but  also  by  internal  instability  on  the  Russian 
market.  For  example,  the  March  1994  strikes  by  gas  workers  in  Siberia.  7 
Kyiv  tried  repeatedly  to  restructure  its  energy  sector  and  find  alternative  energy  suppliers. 
In  early  1994  an  energy  plan  promised  to  make  Ukraine  independent  by  2010.  The  plan 
foresaw  an  increase  of  nuclear  energy  supplies  to  40%  of  the  total  electric  consumption. 
Domestic  gas  and  oil  production  was  expected  to  double,  reaching  7.5  million  tons  of  oil 
and  35  billion  cubic  meters  of  gas  annually.  The  gas  and  oil  reserves  off  the  country's 
Black  Sea  coast  and  the  87  oil  fields  already  active  would  be  pivotal  in  this  strategy.  The 
G7  agreed  to  provide  an  aid  package  to  build  alternative  power  stations  to  replace  the 
Chernobyl  nuclear  plant.  The  lack  of  progress  in  addressing  effectively  the  country's 
energy  problems,  however,  appeared  as  one  of  the  many  consequences  of  the  Ukrainian 
unsuccessful  economic  reforms.  8 
It  was  estimated  that  60%  of  Ukraine's  coal  resources  were  unexploited,  but  the 
obsolescence  of  the  plants  and  dangerous  state  of  repair  (the  Donbass  mines  had  the  highest 
rate  of  accident  related  deaths  in  the  world)  made  the  full  use  of  Ukrainian  coal  an 
77  U.  Markus  (1996),  "Energy  Crisis  Spurs  Ukraine  and  Belarus  to  Seek  Help  Abroad",  Transition,  3  May 
1996,  pp.  14-18 
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138 extremely  hazardous  operation.  9  Co-operation  with  external  partners  was  indispensable 
for  an  effective  closure  of  the  mines. 
The  military-industrial  complex  was  another  sector  of  the  Ukrainian  economy  to  be 
severely  hit  by  the  disruption  of  industrial  co-operation  in  the  Former  Soviet  Union.  The 
military  industry  located  on  Ukrainian  territory  represented  almost  30%  of  the  former 
Soviet  defence  industry,  with  hundreds  of  large  defence-related  companies  and  1.45  million 
people  directly  employed.  According  to  1992  data,  1,870  enterprises,  scientific  research 
institutes,  and  construction  offices,  with  a  total  of  three  million  employees,  were  involved 
in  the  defence  industry.  Of  these  enterprises,  about  700  employed  one  million  people.  In 
total  60%  of  the  Ukrainian  industries  worked  in  defence.  80 
In  the  USSR  Ukraine  was  the  leading  producer  of  military  ships,  space-rockets,  and 
ballistic  missiles,  air  defence  and  air-to-air  missiles,  tanks,  advanced  radar,  laser  and  optical 
equipment,  and  aircraft  avionics.  Even  in  the  post-Soviet  period,  the  defence  industry 
could  still  sell  $  8-10  billion  per  year.  The  industry,  however,  required  substantial 
upgrading  amounting  to  approximately  $  28  billion,  which  the  government  could  not 
provide.  Ukraine  was  ranked  among  the  top  ten  arms  exporters  in  the  world.  Yet  the 
country's  sale  potential  was  hampered  by  the  fact  that  only  few  complete  competitive  arms 
production  cycles  were  located  on  the  territory  of  the  newly  independent  state,  while  a  large 
part  of  production  was  still  oriented  towards  Russia  and  thus  dependent  on  Russian  co- 
operation.  8' 
The  energy  sector  and  the  military-industrial  complex  were  only  two  of  the  industries  that 
were  affected  by  the  break  up  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  by  the  economic  mismanagement 
that  followed  independence.  Yet,  the  whole  Ukrainian  economy  was  badly  hit  by  the  crisis. 
In  the  five  years  up  to  1995,  total  production  in  the  state  sector  fell  my  more  than  a  half, 
manufacturing  declined  by  slightly  less  than  half,  agriculture  by  35%  and  consumer  goods 
79  Ibid. 
80  N.  A.  Kulinich  (1995),  Op.  Cit. 
139 production  by  56%.  82  The  economic  slowdown  reverberated  immediately  onto  the  living 
standards  of  the  population. 
Table  3.4.  Ukrainian  Main  Economic  Indicators,  1991-1996 
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
REAL  GDP  -8.7  -9.9  -14.2  -23  -11.8  -10 
CAPITAL  INVESTMENT  -7.1 
INFLATION  * 
PRODUCTIVITY  OF 
39 
-36.8  -10.5  -22.8  -35  -20.1 
210  10255  501  282  139.7 
-7.3  -8.1  -12  -20  -4.8  n.  a. 
LABOUR 
*Consumer  Price  index,  December  to  December  of  previous  year 
Source:  UNDP  (1996),  Ukraine  Human  Development  Report.  Beyond  the  Triple  Transition,  (Kyiv:  LJNDP),  p. 
11  and  UNDP  (1997),  Ukraine  Human  Development  Report,  (Kyiv:  UNDP),  p.  15 
In  1996  employment  of  the  working  age  population  was  as  low  as  77.6%,  namely  8%  less 
than  in  1990.  On  the  contrary,  employment  in  agriculture  grew  from  19.5%  in  1990  to 
21.8%  reflecting  the  increasing  number  of  people  working  their  personal  land  plots  to 
provide  foodstuff  that  low  salaries  and  the  growing  inflation  could  not  afford.  Throughout 
1996  real  wages  decreased  by  14%,  while  during  the  previous  five  years  the  decline  in 
wages  had  been  fourfold.  From  January  1995  to  June  1997,  wage  arrears  rose  16  times; 
throughout  1996  the  sum  of  back  wages  rose  by  another  7  times.  In  January  1995  wage 
arrears  were  equal  to  7%  of  the  aggregate  payroll  fund,  two  years  later  this  indicator  rose  to 
19%  at  all  enterprises 
As  a  consequence  of  the  difficult  economic  situation  the  level  of  nutrition  of  the  population 
worsened.  The  portion  of  income  spent  on  food  went  up  to  57%  in  1996,  and  the  dietary  , 
composition  deteriorated,  with  an  increase  in  the  consumption  of  corn  products  and  a 
decrease  in  the  consumption  of  meat  products.  In  1996  meat  consumption  was  down  by 
81  A.  Grytsenko  (1999),  "Ukraine's  Defence  Sector  in  Transition:  Impacts  on  Foreign  and  Security  Policy,  in 
Between  Russia  and  the  West:  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  in  Independent  Ukraine,  edited  by  K.  R. 
Spillmann  et  al.,  (Bern:  Peter  Lang),  pp.  95-120 
82  UNDP  (1996),  Ukraine  Human  Development  Report:  Beyond  the  Triple  Transition,  (Kyiv:  UNDP),  p.  11 
140 46.2%  compared  to  1990,  while  consumption  of  milk  and  diary  products  dropped  by 
38.4%,  fruit  by  21.9%,  and  of  eggs  by  40%.  83 
Inevitably,  the  population's  trust  in  the  national  economy  and  the  government's  ability  to 
solve  the  crisis  fell  sharply,  and  Ukrainians  manifested  their  lack  of  confidence  in  the 
country's  financial  institutions  preferring  to  save  in  dollars  rather  than  in  hyrivnas  or 
investing  in  the  country's  failing  industrial  system.  According  to  the  National  Bank  of 
Ukraine,  the  equivalent  of  US$1.2  billion  were  spent  in  1995  buying  foreign  currency, 
thirteen  times  more  than  in  1994,  leaving  the  country  heavily  dependent  on  foreign 
government  and  international  organisations  to  support  its  economic  and  social  policy.  84 
Opinion  polls  reflected  effectively  the  gloomy  perceptions  of  the  population.  According  to 
a  survey  conducted  in  1997  by  the  Democratic  Initiative  Foundation  and  National  Academy 
of  Sciences,  the  percentage  of  those  who  considered  the  economic  situation  in  Ukraine  very 
bad  rose  from  38.4%  in  1994  to  43.3%  in  1997.11.3  %  of  the  population  rated  their  own 
family's  material  situation  very  bad  in  1994,  while  a  similar  perception  was  shared  by 
18.8%  of  the  respondents  in  1997.  The  vast  majority  of  people  interviewed  in  1997  (38%) 
confessed  to  be  willing  to  return  to  a  pre-Perestroika  situation  (the  percentage  was  30.9% 
in  1994).  Only  20.3%  agreed  that  a  complete  transition  to  the  market  was  required  (29.6% 
in  1994).  85 
It  has  been  argued  that  the  loyalty  of  some  parts  of  Ukraine,  especially  the  eastern  regions, 
to  the  new  state  entity  was  tightly  tied  to  the  central  authorities'  ability  to  deliver 
satisfactory  economic  conditions.  In  1991  and  1994  the  Russified  areas  of  the  country  had 
voted  for  the  candidate  who  seemed  to  guarantee  an  improvement  in  their  economic 
situation.  In  the  same  way,  the  deterioration  of  the  economic  conditions  in  Ukraine,  against 
the  backdrop  of  a  stable  or  improving  economy  in  neighbouring  Russia  could  convince 
83  UNDP  (1997),  Ukraine  Human  Development  Report,  (Kyiv:  UNDP),  pp.  23-38 
84  UND?  (1996),  Op.  Cit.,  pp.  11,12,15 
85  Democratic  Initiative  Foundation  and  National  Academy  of  Sciences  (1998),  Ukrainian  Society:  1994-97, 
(mimeo:  Kyiv) 
141 Eastern  Ukrainian  electors  to  shift  their  support  from  Kyiv  to  Moscow.  86  In  this 
perspective,  a  falling  economy  would  pose  serious  risks  for  the  credibility  of  the  new 
Ukrainian  state  and  endangered  its  very  existence. 
Public  polls  confirmed  this  tendency.  In  a  1997  national  survey,  approximately  one  third  of 
the  respondents  declared  that  for  them  the  country's  sovereignty  was  of  little  or  no 
importance  at  all.  One  fifth  of  the  population  was  unable  to  remember  exactly  how  they 
voted  in  the  1991  referendum  on  independence,  and  52%  declared  that  should  the 
referendum  take  place  again,  they  would  support  Ukraine's  independence  within  a  Union  of 
Soviet  Sovereign  States.  23%  would  be  completely  against  independence.  87  In  a  second 
survey  conducted  in  1997,33%  of  the  respondents  revealed  their  support  for  a  reunification 
with  Russia,  while  34%  were  in  favour  of  a  balanced  development  of  Ukrainian  relations 
both  with  Russia  and  the  West.  88 
The  perception  of  the  threats  to  the  stability  and  unity  of  the  country  deriving  from  the 
economic  uncertainly  were  so  acute  that  even  the  1997  Concept  of  National  Security  of 
Ukraine  defined  the  national  interests  in  terms  of: 
   Elevating  living  standards, 
   Improving  social  security, 
   Reforming  the  national  economy, 
   Enhancing  the  efficiency  of  government  structures,  strengthening  civil  society, 
   Fighting  corruption, 
   Protecting  national  resources. 
In  particular,  in  the  economic  sphere  elements  such  as: 
86  J.  E.  Mroz  and  O.  Pavliuk  (1996),  "Ukraine:  Europe's  Linchpin",  Foreign  Affairs,  Vol.  75,  n.  3,  May/June 
1996,  pp.  52-62 
87  Monitoring  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  (1997b)  "Sovereignty  and  Reforms  in  Ukraine:  Public  Opinion", 
Occasional  Pap  n.  19,  httD:  //www.  cpcfipu.  org 
88  Monitoring  Foreign  and  Security  Policy,  (1997c)  "Foreign  Policy,  Electoral  and  Political  Attitudes:  Public 
Opinion  in  Ukraine",  Occasional  Paper  n.  37,  littp:  //www.  cycfpu.  org 
142    The  inefficiency  of  the  state  management  of  the  economy, 
   The  persistence  of  monopolies, 
   The  economic  and  technological  dependency  on  other  countries, 
   The  economic  isolation  from  international  institutions, 
   The  lack  of  control  on  the  drain  of  intellectual,  material  and  financial  resources, 
   Crime  and  the  shadow  economy 
were  indicated  as  factors  of  risk  for  Ukraine's  security.  89  Such  alarming  economic  and 
social  indicators  provided  the  background  for  the  launch  by  Kuchma's  administration  of  a 
"multivectored"  foreign  policy  strategy.  This  coincided  with  a  momentous  reconsideration 
of  the  regional  geopolitical  balance  in  the  Eurasian  continent  by  both  Western  governments 
and  international  organisations. 
Regional  Co-operation 
The  international  arena  in  which  the  young  Ukrainian  state  was  taking  its  first  diplomatic 
steps  was  characterised  by  two  parallel  phenomena.  On  the  one  side  the  post-communist 
set  of  alliances  was  disappearing,  leaving  space  for  an  unsteady  Commonwealth  of 
Independent  States  on  the  territories  of  the  Former  Soviet  Union  and  to  a  Central  and 
Eastern  European  region  eager  to  find  a  more  "appropriate"  geopolitical  orientation.  On 
the  other  side  European  unification  was  proceeding  fast,  raising  hopes  for  its  Eastern 
neighbours  to  be  admitted  in  a  promised  land  of  political  stability  and  economic  prosperity. 
Also  the  Ukrainian  leadership  was  confronted  with  the  inevitable  dilemma: 
"Either  enter  the  civilised  area  of  geopolitically  integrated  Europe,  confirming  and  installing  Ukraine's 
historic  place  in  it,  or  be  reintegrated  into  the  Eurasian  geopolitical  environment  constituted  by  the  post- 
Soviet  states,  with  Russia  as  the  neutral  nucleus  of  integration":  90 
89  Kontseptsiya  (Osnovy  gosudarstvennoi  politiki)  natsionalnoi  bezopasnosti  Ukrainy,  Decree  of  the  Supreme 
Rada  of  Ukraine  n.  3/97,16  January  1997 
90  N.  A.  Kulinich  (1995),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  126 
143 Integration  in  European  structures,  however,  was  not  a  real  option  and  co-operation  with 
Western  governments  proceeded  erratically  and  with  difficulty  while  Leonid  Kravchuk 
retained  the  Ukrainian  presidency,  the  Ukrainian  nuclear  problem  was  unsolved,  and  the 
West  feared  that  their  close  relations  with  Ukraine  would  hinder  relations  with  Russia.  A 
number  of  events  contributed  subsequently  to  a  significant  shift  of  European  and  US 
diplomacy.  The  war  and  interethnic  strife  in  Yugoslavia,  the  1993  bombing  of  the  Russian 
Parliament  and  the  electoral  success  of  Vladimir  Zhirinovskii's  extremism  in  Russia  raised 
Ukraine's  strategic  profile  on  the  international  scene. 
Given  its  multiethnic  composition,  Ukraine  came  to  be  seen  as  a  potential  source  of  "soft 
security  risks";  the  possibility  of  its  "Yugoslavisation",  the  explosion  of  an  ethnic  conflict 
and  the  consequent  migration  flows  from  the  country  were  rated  as  a  large  threat  on  the 
European  borders.  91  Moreover,  Ukraine's  geographical  position  between  East  and  West 
made  it  a  natural  buffer  against  the  re-emergence  of  an  internationally  assertive  Russia  92 
At  the  same  time,  the  Ukrainian  ratification  of  the  STARTI  treaty,  the  trilateral  agreement 
between  the  United  States,  Russia  and  Ukraine  on  Ukrainian  nuclear  disarmament,  and 
launching  of  the  economic  reform  in  October  1994  gave  Western  partners  the  impression 
that  Ukraine's  policies  were  becoming  more  reliable.  3 
In  view  of  Ukraine's  strategic  importance  for  the  continent's  security,  political 
commentators,  both  in  Ukraine  and  in  the  West,  argued  vehemently  in  favour  of  a  more 
active  participation  of  the  country  in  the  European  structures. 
"Ukraine  is  crucial  for  the  stability  of  the  continent,  and  uncertainty  there  would  reverberate  throughout 
Europe.  An  independent,  democratic,  and  reform-oriented  Ukraine  can  provide  a  model  for  Russia's 
development,  prevent  the  emergence  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  as  a  political  and  military 
alliance  under  Moscow's  control,  and  promote  stability  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe"  94 
91  Izvesti  ya,  8  February  1994 
92  I.  Kempe  (1999),  "The  European  Union  and  Ukraine:  Interests  and  Strategies",  in  Between  Russia  and  the 
West:  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  in  Independent  Ukraine,  K.  R.  Spillmann  et  al.,  (Bern:  Peter  Lang),  pp. 
167-184 
93  0.  Alexandrova  (1998),  Op.  Cit. 
144 Not  only  could  Ukraine  provide  a  model  for  Russian  civilised  development,  but  Russian 
political  and  military  power  appeared  significantly  curbed  by  the  very  existence  of  an 
independent  Ukrainian  state.  Ukraine  represented  a  guarantee  of  security  for  Poland, 
Romania  and  Turkey,  which  could  also  infuse  a  new  spirit  of  co-operation  in  the  CIS  to 
contrast  the  design  of  a  centrally  integrated  community  envisaged  by  Russia.  95 
An  intense  shuttle  diplomacy  between  Kyiv  and  the  European  capitals  in  the  autumn  of 
1993  (Chancellor  Kohl  visited  Ukraine  for  the  first  time)  marked  the  change  of  direction  in 
relations  between  Ukraine  and  the  European  Union.  Already  in  1993  negotiations  began 
over  a  Partnership  and  Co-operation  Agreement  between  Ukraine  and  the  European  Union, 
that  was  finally  signed  in  May  1994.  The  Agreement  provided  a  framework  for  political 
dialogue,  promised  to  promote  trade,  investment  and  economic  co-operation  and  to  support 
Ukraine's  efforts  to  promote  democracy.  96  Equally,  in  November  1994  the  Council  of 
Europe  emphasised  the  need  for  a  strong  political  relationship  with  Ukraine,  support  for  the 
country's  independence  and  territorial  integrity,  backing  for  political  and  economic 
reforms,  improvement  of  nuclear  safety  and  integration  into  the  world  economy.  97 
Ukraine's  decision  to  comply  with  the  START  1  and  the  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Treaty, 
followed  by  the  election  of  President  Kuchma  represented  a  turning  point  also  in  relations 
between  Ukraine  and  the  United  States.  The  Clinton  Administration  proclaimed  1994  the 
"Year  of  Ukraine".  In  November,  for  the  first  time,  a  Ukrainian  president  was  invited  to  a 
state  visit  in  Washington.  98  During  the  visit  a  Charter  of  Ukrainian-American  Partnership, 
Friendship  and  Co-operation  was  signed.  99 
94  J.  E.  Mroz  and  O.  Pavliuk  (1996),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  52 
95  Z.  Brzezinski  (1998),  "Ukraine's  Critical  Role  in  Post-Soviet  Space",  in  Ukraine  in  the  World.  Studies  in 
the  International  Relations  and  Security  Structure  of  q  New  Independent  State,  edited  by  L.  A.  Haida, 
(Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  Harvard  University  Press),  pp.  3-8 
96  O.  Alexandrova  (1998),  Op.  Cit. 
97  J. Shen  (2001),  "A  Failing  Partnership?  Ukraine  and  the  West",  Conflict  Studies  Research  Centre.  G89,  p. 
8 
98  A.  Moshes  (1996),  "Politika  zapada  v  otnoshenii  Ukrainy",  Mirovaya  ekonomika  i  mezhdunarodnie 
otnosheniva,  n.  2,  pp.  90-98 
99  For  the  text  of  the  Charter  see  Golos  Ukraine.  November  20,1994,  p.  3 
145 The  Clinton  administration  also  promoted  the  creation  of  a  bilateral  commission  headed  by 
the  Ukrainian  President  Leonid  Kuchma  and  the  American  Vice-President  Al  Gore  to  keep 
under  permanent  scrutiny  foreign  policy,  security  and  economic  issues.  Ukraine  became 
the  third  largest  recipient  of  US  foreign  assistance.  In  an  attempt  to  deflate  the  risks  of  a 
possible  conflict  between  the  two  countries,  Washington  provided  mediation  in  the 
Russian-Ukrainian  energy  debt  crisis,  100  while  condemning  the  Russian  parliament's 
denunciation  of  the  Belovezha  Agreements  as  an  "irresponsible  step".  '°'  Finally,  in 
October  1996,  the  United  States  and  Ukraine  declared  their  relationship  a  "strategic 
partnership".  '°2 
In  February  1994  Ukraine  joined  the  NATO  Partnership  for  Peace  program.  Following  the 
1996  decision  of  the  Russian  parliament  to  revoke  the  Belavezha  Agreement,  President 
Kuchma  and  Foreign  Minister  Hennadii  Udovenko  signalled  Ukraine's  eagerness  to  expand 
ties  with  NATO.  In  July  1997  a  Distinctive  Partnership  between  NATO  and  Ukraine  was 
initialled,  according  to  which  NATO  members  pledged  to  "support  Ukraine  in  its  efforts  to 
protect  its  sovereignty,  political  independence,  territorial  integrity  and  inviolability  of 
frontiers,  promote  its  democratic  development  and  economic  prosperity".  103 
From  late  1993  then,  the  European  and  United  States  governments'  approach  to  Ukraine 
changed  radically,  establishing  a  pattern  of  active  engagement  in  the  region.  The  West 
agreed  to  provide  financial  and  technical  assistance  to  prevent  the  deterioration  of  the 
country's  economic  and  political  situation,  and  opened  the  institutions  of  European  political 
and  security  co-operation  to  Ukraine.  From  within  an  international  framework,  it  was 
argued,  Europe  could  more  successfully  control  and  manage  Ukraine's  soft  security 
'°°  The  US  mediation  rose  harsh  criticism  in  Moscow,  where  the  intervention  was  judged  the  "pointless  and 
inappropriate".  Golos  Ukrainy,  February  1,1995 
lot  Segodnya,  March  21,1996 
102  S.  Garnett  (1998),  "U.  S.  -Ukrainian  Relations:  Past,  Present  and  Future,  in  Ukraine  in  the  World:  Studies  in 
the  International  Relations  and  Security  Structure  of  a  Newly  Independent  State,  edited  by  L.  A.  Hajda 
(Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  Harvard  University  Press),  pp.  103-124 
103  O.  Potekhin  (1999),  "The  NATO-Ukraine  Partnership:  Problems,  Achievements  and  Perspectives",  in 
Between  Russia  and  the  West:  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  in  Independent  Ukraine,  edited  by  K.  R. 
Spillmann  et  al.,  (Bern:  Peter  Lang),  p.  146 
146 risks.  '04  Visiting  Ukraine  in  February  1995,  the  American  Ambassador  Thomas  Simons 
stressed  that  it  was  the  responsibility  of  the  international  community  to  support  political 
and  economic  reforms  in  the  country,  and  indicated  that  the  United  States  and  the 
los  international  financial  organisations  wanted  to  play  a  significant  role  in  the  process. 
According  to  European  governments'  estimates,  in  1994  Ukraine  was  granted  $367  million 
credit,  while  international  organisations  provided  $472.6  million.  In  1995  the  figures  were 
respectively  $207  million  and  $1746.3  million.  A  1995  IMF  stand-by-credit  gave  Ukraine 
$801  million  to  guarantee  the  stabilisation  of  the  national  currency,  balance  of  payments, 
and  payment  of  crucial  imports  (energy).  In  the  period  1991-96  Ukraine  secured  a  total  of 
$1.6  billion  from  European  institutions  to  strengthen  the  country's  reserve  position  and  to 
support  restructuring  of  the  economy.  In  1996  seven  credit  lines  were  operating,  allocating 
Ukraine  a  total  of  $1050  million,  five  times  more  that  the  previous  year.  Between  1991-96 
the  United  States  granted  Ukraine  $2  billion.  106 
On  top  of  financial  assistance,  Western  governments  and  international  organisations 
provided  Ukraine  with  technical  support  for  the  industrial  conversion  of  the  country  and  the 
modernisation  of  its  infrastructure.  The  introduction  of  energy  and  resource-saving 
technologies,  the  development  of  the  fuel  and  energy  complex,  of  the  medical  and 
microbiological  industry,  support  to  ship-building,  aircraft  building,  transport  and 
communication  infrastructure  were  rated  as  absolute  priorities  to  enhance  Ukraine's 
economic  independence.  Environmental  and  natural  resources  protection,  development  of 
the  privatisation  program,  support  of  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  and  social 
protection  of  the  population  were  also  targeted.  Total  international  technical  assistance 
amounted  to  $369.9  million  in  1995,  and  $467.3  million  in  1996.107 
104  I.  Kempe  (1999),  "The  European  Union  and  Ukraine:  Interests  and  Strategies",  in  Between  Russia  and  the 
West:  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  in  Independent  Ukraine,  K.  R.  Spillmann  et  al.,  (Bern:  Peter  Lang),  pp. 
167-184 
105  Golos  Ukraine,  February  8,1995 
106  Monitoring  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  of  Ukraine  (1997a),  "Financial  and  Technical  Assistance  to 
Ukraine",  Occasional  Paper  n.  6,  http:  //wvww.  cpcfpu.  org 
107  Monitoring  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  of  Ukraine  (1997),  Op.  Cit. 
147 Table  3.5.  Official  External  Debt,  1995-1998  (In  million  US  dollars,  end  of  period) 
1995  1996 
TOTAL  OFFICIAL  DEBT  8,142  9,170 
RUSSIA,  BALTICS  AND  OTHER  FSU  COUNTRIES  4,913  4,400 
RUSSIA  4,185  3,690 
TURKMENISTAN  710  710 
REST  OF  THE  WORLD  3,229  4,770 
GERMANY  753  704 
UNITED  STATES  157  302 
EUROPEAN  UNION  110  235 
IMF  1,590  2,368 
WORLD  BANK  499  905 
EBRD  7  30 
Source:  IMF  (1999),  Ukraine  Country  Report,  p.  128 
The  increased  engagement  of  Western  governments  and  international  organisations  in 
Ukraine  was  certainly  the  result  of  a  changed  geopolitical  situation  on  the  European 
continent.  Nonetheless,  the  more  active  foreign  policy  of  President  Kuchma  played  an 
indisputable  role  in  attracting  the  European  countries'  attention  to  Ukraine. 
Two-Track  Foreign  Policy 
The  appearance  on  the  Ukrainian  political  scene  of  Leonid  Kuchma  determined  a 
significant  reconsideration  of  the  Ukrainian  foreign  policy.  Kuchma  inaugurated  what  he 
called  a  "two-track"  policy  line  aimed  at  overcoming  his  predecessor's  antagonism  to 
Russia,  while,  at  the  same  time,  fostering  a  more  effective  partnership  with  the  West. 
Kuchma  refused  to  look  at  the  choice  of  a  Ukrainian  foreign  policy  in  terms  of  mutually 
exclusive  options.  Instead  the  President  stressed  that  a  well-balanced  relation  with  Russia 
R 
and  the  CIS  as  well  as  with  the  EU,  the  US  and  the  Central  and  Eastern  European 
neighbours  met  Ukraine's  natural  vocation  as  trait-d'union  on  the  European  continent. 
148 "We  have  to  move  towards  Europe,  without  moving  away  and  cutting  ourselves  off  from  Russia,  but  we  have 
to  do  this  with  Russia,  we  have  to  gather  all  the  forces  for  the  consolidation  of  the  Euro-Atlantic  environment, 
fulfilling  an  integrating  role  at  the  core  of  the  European  region".  '°8 
In  the  president's  perception,  both  orientations  presented  their  advantages.  Ukraine  shared 
not  only  a  "civilisation"  and  common  interests  with  Europe,  which  could  provide  "the 
valuable  experience  of  rights  and  means,  the  standard  of  a  modem  state".  As  for  Russia, 
the  relation  between  the  two  Slavic  neighbours  needed  to  be  based  on  "brotherly"  co- 
operation.  109 
An  active  foreign  policy  agenda  confirmed  Kuchma's  multivectored  foreign  policy 
strategy.  In  November  1994  the  Verkhovna  Rada  approved  the  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation 
Treaty,  following  which  Ukraine  became  an  active  member  of  the  NATO  Partnership  for 
Peace  Program.  In  November  1995  Ukraine  was  accepted  as  a  fully-fledged  member  of  the 
Council  of  Europe.  In  June  1996  Ukraine  and  Poland  declared  their  relationship  a 
"strategic  partnership",  and  in  October  1996,  also  US-Ukraine  relations  were  defined  as  a 
"strategic  partnership".  In  May  1997  the  Polish  and  the  Ukrainian  Presidents  signed  a  Joint 
Statement  on  Mutual  Reconciliation  between  the  two  countries.  In  May  1997  the  Treaty  of 
Friendship,  Co-operation  and  Partnership  with  Russia  was  signed,  and  in  June  of  the  same 
year  the  Treaty  on  Good  Neighbourly  Relations  and  Co-operation  with  Rumania  was 
finalised.  In  July  1997  the  Charter  on  a  Distinctive  Partnership  between  the  North  Atlantic 
Organisation  and  Ukraine  was  initialled.  In  February  1998  the  Ten  Years  Agreement  on 
Economic  Co-operation  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  was  signed,  while  in  March  the 
Partnership  and  Co-operation  Agreement  between  the  EU  and  Ukraine  came  into  force. 
Kuchma's  views  on  the  need  to  achieve  a  balanced  relationship  both  with  the  East  and  with 
the  West  reflected  a  widespread  perception  in  Kyiv.  It  was  believed  that,  given  the 
extension  of  the  borderline  between  Russia  and  Ukraine,  the  many  economic  and 
technological  connections  and  the  long  common  history,  Moscow  could  not  be  ignored  in 
los  L.  Kuchma  (1999),  0  samom  glavnom,  (Kyiv:  USPP),  p.  330 
109  Ibid.,  p.  309-332 
149 developing  a  long-term  foreign  policy  strategy.  Relations  between  the  two  countries  had  to 
be  founded  on  principles  of  mutual  benefit  and  friendship. 
Nonetheless,  because  of  Russia's  difficulty  in  establishing  an  equal  relationship  with 
Ukraine,  the  country  needed  to  diversify  its  co-operation  plans,  embracing  the  EU,  the  CIS 
and  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries,  as  well  as  the  United  States.  The  creation  of  a 
suitable  "vital  space"  for  Ukraine  was  viewed  as  the  only  way  to  guarantee  the  proper 
development  of  its  population.  l  lo  Ukrainian  commentators  presented  the  country's 
geopolitical  choice  in  terms  of  an  alternative  between  socialism  and  the  East  or  the  market 
and  the  West.  111 
Finding  the  right  balance,  however,  was  the  object  of  a  long  and  complex  process,  in  which 
different  political  forces  and  segments  of  the  state  administration  were  revealed  to  be 
harbouring  very  different  understandings  of  the  country's  geopolitical  priorities  (see  table 
3.6).  1  12  A  real  foreign  policy  consensus  was  never  fully  achieved  and  dramatic  splits 
remained  within  the  political  elite  on  crucial  issues  such  as  Ukraine's  approach  to  NATO. 
In  1998,  for  example,  69%  of  foreign  policy-makers  indicated  themselves  in  favour  of  co- 
operation  with  NATO.  Yet,  opinions  on  the  role  of  the  North-Atlantic  organisation  in 
Eastern  Europe  appeared  sharply  divided.  According  to  another  survey  conducted  in  1998, 
32%  of  ordinary  citizens  considered  NATO  a  defence  alliance,  while  11%  saw  it  as  a 
peace-making  organisation  and  22%  feared  it  as  an  aggressive  military  bloc.  25%  of  those 
interviewed  expected  Ukraine  would  join  NATO  in  the  future,  and  40%  revealed  a  positive 
attitude  towards  the  alliance.  Interestingly,  the  percentage  of  those  who  declared  support 
for  a  closer  relationship  with  NATO  was  30%  among  ordinary  citizens,  and  twice  as  many 
among  members  of  the  political  elite.  113 
110  Golos  Ukraine.  February  16,1995,  p.  14,  and  17  February  1995,  p.  5 
111  Golos  Ukraine,  February  21,1995,  p.  2 
112  Golos  Ukraine,  February  16,1995,  p.  14,  and  17  February  1995,  p.  5 
113  O.  Potekhin  (1999),  "The  NATO-Ukraine  Partnership:  Problems,  Achievements  and  Perspectives",  in 
Between  Russia  and  the  West:  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  in  Independent  Ukraine,  edited  by  K.  R. 
Spillmann  et  al.,  (Bern:  Peter  Lang),  pp.  145-165 
150 Table  3.6.  Foreign  Policy  Orientation  of  Main  Ukrainian  Political  Parties,  1998 
PARTY  %  OF  N.  OF  ORIENTATION  ORIENTATION 
VOTES  (*)  SEATS  TOWARDS  CISIRUSSIA  TOWARDS 
(**)  NATO/WEST 
COMMUNIST  PARTY  24.65  120  Voluntary  union  of  Away  from  NATO  and 
OF  UKRAINE  fraternal  peoples.  the  West. 
RuKH  9.4  50  Withdrawal  of  foreign 
, 
Economic,  political  and 
troops  from  Ukraine,  military  integration  into 
mutual  beneficial  Europe 
relations  with  all 
countries. 
SOCIALIST  PARTY  OF  8.5  30  Fraternal  economic  and  Rejection  of  dictates  of 
UKRAINE  AND  political  relations  with  international 
PEASANT  PARTY  the  Slavic  world.  organisations. 
PEOPLE'S  5.01  72  Priority  to  friendly  Gradual  integration  in 
DEMOCRATIC  PARTY  relations  with  European  structures 
neighbours  and  world  community 
IHROMADA  4.6  41  Renovation  of  lost  Integration  into  world 
markets  in  the  CIS.  economy,  strategic 
Friendly  relations  with  partnership  with  USA 
CIS/Russia 
GREEN  PARTY  5.4  25  Ukraine  should  be  non-aligned  country 
SOCIAL  DEMOCRATIC  4  30  Priority  to  domestic  manufacturers,  protection  of 
PARTY  domestic  markets,  lower  dependence  on  foreign 
energy  sources 
PROGRESSIVE  4  16  Protectionism  in  Denunciation  of  IMF 
SOCIALIST  PARTY  OF  foreign  economic  agreements,  and  NATO 
UKRAINE  relations.  partnership. 
Russia  and  Belarus  Proscription  of  Western 
strategic  allies  advisors. 
REFORMS  AND  ORDER  3.13  4  Co-operation  with  CIS  Role  in  the  EU,  joining 
countries.  US  security  Council. 
Co-operation  with 
regional  collective 
security  structures. 
Source:  O.  Dergachev  and  O.  Potekhin  (1998),  "Parliamentary  Elections  and  Foreign  Policy  in  Ukraine", 
Monitoring  Foreign  and  security  Policy  of  Ukraine.  Occasional  Paper  n.  11,  http:  //www.  cpcfpr.  org 
(*)  Percentage  of  votes  received  at  the  1998  parliamentary  elections  in  multi-mandate  districts 
(**)General  number  of  mandates  out  of  413  total  number  of  seats 
151 Relations  with  the  European  Union  were  a  less  controversial  issue,  and  a  large  part  of  the 
foreign  policy  community  seemed  to  agree  that  a  common  European  identity  had  to  shape 
Ukraine's  foreign  policy  orientations. 
"Ukraine  should  `return'  to  Europe,  to  the  family  of  civilised  nations.  Ukraine  must  do  so  independently,  and 
not  `at  the  tail  of  the  Moscow  fleet',  moving  towards  an  integrated  Europe.  This  does  not  mean  that  Ukraine 
should  neglect  its  interests  in  the  East.  Normal  interaction  with  Russia  and  the  CIS  states  is  one  of  the 
preconditions  of  Ukrainian  integration  into  Europe".  114 
To  testify  Ukraine's  commitment  to  joining  the  European  Union,  in  1998  President 
Kuchma  passed  a  decree  "On  Endorsing  the  Strategy  of  Ukraine's  Integration  into  the 
European  Union".  The  document  outlined  a  ten  year  program  to  meet  the  preconditions 
required  for  associate  membership,  promising  radical  transformations  in  areas  as  different 
as  legislation,  economy  and  trade,  security,  political  consolidation  and  strengthening  of 
democracy,  social  policy,  culture,  education,  science,  technology,  regional  co-operation  and 
the  environment.  '  is  Ukraine's  eagerness  to  be  accepted  into  the  EU,  however,  was  matched 
by  a  more  cautious  approach  within  the  European  institutions,  where  the  possibility  of 
European  enlargement  to  include  Ukraine  was  excluded  for  the  foreseeable  future.  116 
The  Kuchma  administration  was,  therefore,  left  to  voice  the  country's  frustration  and 
disappointment  at  the  pace  of  its  relations  with  Brussels.  Foreign  Minister  Borys  Tarasyuk 
noted  in  front  of  an  audience  of  Western  diplomats: 
"There  is  a  wide  consensus  in  the  country  that  Ukraine's  return  to  Europe  is  beneficial  for  all  -  for  ourselves, 
for  our  neighbours,  for  Europe  itself.  But  this  consensus  is  seriously  damaged  by  procrastination  of  time  and 
lack  of  adequate  reaction.  Discreditation  of  Ukraine's  European  integration  policy  may  trigger  a  chain  of 
unpredictable  and  dangerous  geopolitical  changes  which  shall  know  no  borders  indeed!  17 
114  N.  A.  Kulinich  (1995),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  131 
15  Embassy  of  Ukraine  to  the  United  States,  Press  Release  (1998),  "Ukraine  Marks  the  7t'  Anniversary  of  its 
Independencel8  August  1998,  http:  //www.  brama.  com/ukraine-embassyllpre08l8.  html 
116  Kilian  Strauss,  EU  Economic  Affairs  Officer,,  interview  with  the  author,  Kyiv,  7  June  1997 
117  B.  Tarasyuk  (1998),  "Borderline  Case  Europe:  Chances  and  Risks  of  the  New  Neighbourhood",  Statement 
pronounced  at  the  International  Bertelsman  Forum,  Berlin  July  4th 
, 
1998,  as  reprinted  in 
hqp:  //www.  brama.  conVukr,,  tine-embassy/pre07O4.  litmi 
152 Economic  pressures  and  the  awareness  that  the  perspective  of  European  integration  would 
not  provide  a  short-term  solution  for  Ukraine's  problems  forced  Kuchma  to  balance 
carefully  between  Ukraine's  Western  and  Eastern  neighbours.  In  the  face  of  the 
international  agencies'  threat  to  cut  aid  to  Ukraine  as  a  result  of  unsatisfactory  economic 
reforms,  the  lack  of  internal  resources  to  support  the  economy,  and  the  outflow  of  foreign 
investment,  Kuchma  turned  for  help  to  Russia  once  again.  Complaining  that  Russian 
investment  in  Ukraine  was  as  low  as  Russian  investment  in  Cyprus,  Kuchma  promised  to 
open  the  doors  of  the  Ukrainian  economy  to  Russian  capital.  118  The  February  1998 
Programme  of  Economic  Co-operation  until  the  year  2007,  initialled  by  Prime  Ministers 
Pustoyvotenko  and  Chernomyrdin  was  meant  to  provide  the  legal  framework  for  Russian 
investment  in  Ukraine.  After  the  drop  experienced  in  the  previous  years  the  programme 
was  expected  to  more  than  double  bilateral  trade  in  the  decade  ahead,  counterbalancing 
previous  anticipations  of  increased  exchanges  with  Europe.  119 
Conclusions 
The  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  affected  the  foreign  policy  of  Russia  and  Ukraine  in  two 
different  ways.  Russia's  identity  crisis  following  the  loss  of  an  imperial  status  was  coupled 
with  a  serious  economic  decline  and  the  perception  that  increasing  consolidation  of  the  new 
independent  states  would  impose  risks  to  Russia's  security.  From  1994  onwards  the 
preoccupation  that  the  foreign  policy  course  adopted  under  Andrei  Kozyrev's  direction  had 
failed  to  understand  and  address  these  problems  translated  into  a  growing  consensus  around 
"pragmatic  nationalist"  positions. 
Moving  away  from  a  conception  that  equated  state  power  to  military  power,  pragmatic 
nationalists  suggested  Russia  should  aim  to  re-acquire  its  influence  over  its  neighbouring 
118  RFE/RL  Newsline,  February  25,1998 
19  RFE/RL  Newsline  February  23,1998.  In  1995-96  Russia's  share  in  Ukraine's  foreign  trade  was  47%,  in 
1997  40%,  and  in  1998  33%.  This  decline  was  mainly  due  to  the  Russian  perception  that  Ukraine  was  an 
unreliable  partner,  unwilling  to  pay  for  goods  and  services  it  receives.  V.  Musatov  (1999),  Op.  Cit. 
153 countries  through  economic  rather  than  political  means.  Expansion  on  external  markets 
and  control  over  foreign  assets  were  indicated  as  a  more  effective  path  to  win  back  Russia's 
pride  and  improve  the  population's  living  standards. 
Against  this  background,  big  Russian  companies  were  viewed  as  the  most  effective 
representatives  of  Russian  interests  abroad,  as  their  prosperity  was  increasingly  equated  to 
the  country's  prosperity.  Foreign  policy  documents  published  in  the  period  1994-98 
presented  the  protection  of  big  companies'  activity  as  an  inherent  part  of  the  Russian 
national  interest,  and  through  pragmatist  nationalism  Russian  financial-industrial  groups 
received  the  state  endorsement  to  pursue  their  individual  interests  on  foreign  markets. 
The  foreign  policy  setting  did  not  provide  an  equally  favorable  environment  for  the 
Ukrainian  economic  elite,  as  the  country's  economic  situation  was  not  stable  enough  to 
allow  the  foreign  policy  institutions  to  implement  self-sustaining  policies.  Ukraine  was 
faced  by  the  urgent  necessity  to  attract  Western  financial  and  technical  aid  to  conduct  a 
programs  of  structural  transformation,  while,  at  the  same  time  it  needed  to  secure  credits 
and  energy  supplies  from  Russia. 
This  double  constraint  imposed  on  the  Ukrainian  leadership  the  choice  of  an  ambivalent 
policy  of  balanced  relations  with  both  its  Eastern  and  Western  neighbours.  The  interests  of 
the  economic  elite  did  not  find  an  explicit  articulation  in  this  context.  As  a  result  of  the 
Ukrainian  economic  elite's  lack  of  sufficient  resources  and  experience  to  engage  on  foreign 
markets  Ukrainian  economic  actors  failed  to  formulate  a  set  of  foreign  policy  interests  other 
than  demands  for  domestic  protectionism. 
The  background  of  a  foreign  policy  aimed  at  consolidating  Ukraine's  statehood,  however, 
provided  the  economic  elite  with  a  valuable  nationalist  vocabulary.  In  chapter  five  it  will 
be  shown  that  economic  actors  succeeded  in  articulating  their  policy  preferences  within  the 
framework  of  a  foreign  policy  discourse  that  prioritised  the  preservation  of  the  country's 
independence  and  the  establishment  of  sufficient  guarantees  against  Russian  attempts  of  re- 
establishing  conditions  of  political  or  economic  subordination. 
154 The  fragmentation  of  Russia  and  Ukraine's  economic  elites  along  lines  that  represented 
their  economic  resources,  their  political  power  and  their  foreign  policy  interests  translated 
into  conflicting  policy  preferences.  In  order  to  understand  what  influence  economic  actors 
could  exercise  on  the  structure  of  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  two  elements  need 
to  be  kept  into  account.  The  first  element  is  the  political  authority  that  certain  segments  of 
the  economic  elite  enjoyed  and  their  access  to  policy-making  institutions.  The  second 
element  is  the  specific  set  of  preferences  of  these  segments  towards  the  neighbouring 
country.  This  analysis  will  be  the  object  of  the  next  two  chapters. 
155 CHAPTER  FOUR 
The  Russian  Economic  Elite 
Foreign  policy  preferences  of  individual  social  groups  stem  from  the  perceived  benefits  or 
damages  that  individual  foreign  policy  decisions  can  pose  on  the  interest  of  the  group. 
Policy  preferences  can  then  be  translated  into  foreign  political  decisions  depending  on  the 
degree  of  influence  and  control  that  that  specific  group  exercises  over  the  state  institutions.  ' 
The  convergence  of  interests  and  policy  preferences  among  social  groups  in  two  or  more 
countries  fosters  a  process  of  co-operation, which  may  ultimately  lead  to  economic  or 
political  integration.  In  Ernst  Haas'  account  of  early  integration  within  the  European 
community  (see  chapterl),  the  perception  that  integration  could  be  beneficial  for  the 
development  of  individual  or  group  interests  convinced  social  groups  to  shift  loyalty  and 
support  to  the  creation  of  a  new  transnational  entity. 
Similarly,  the  approach  to  co-operation  within  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States 
assumes  the  existence  of  convergent  economic  interests  among  business  elites  across  the 
territory  of  the  Former  Soviet  Union.  It  was  argued  that  the  urgency  to  re-start  industrial 
relations  interrupted  by  the  collapse  of  the  USSR,  and  to  invert  the  catastrophic  economic 
decay  experienced  within  the  former  Soviet  space  created  the  conditions  for  a  pragmatic 
view  of  business  interests  common  to  all  economic  actors  in  the  CIS.  "Economic 
pragmatism",  as  opposed  to  "political  romanticism",  was  presented  as  the  approach  able  to 
overcome  nationalistic  preconceptions  against  co-operation.  In  this  view,  economic  actors 
were  to  become  the  very  agents  of  economic  and  possibly  political  reintegration  in  the  post- 
Soviet  arena. 
In  this  chapter  I  turn  to  the  domestic  level  of  foreign  policy,  exploring  first  the  structure  of 
the  Russian  economic  elite  and  its  access  to  political  power.  I  will  then  identify  the 
interests  of  the  Russian  economic  elite  towards  Ukraine,  illustrating  how  in  the  period 
156 1994-98,  the  interests  and  attitudes  of  the  Russian  economic  elite  were  in  fact  not  only 
divergent  but  antagonistic  vis-ä-vis  the  interests  of  the  Ukrainian  economic  elite.  The 
predatory  character  of  the  Russian  economic  elite  and  its  anxiety  to  secure  property  rather 
than  foster  a  process  of  economic  development,  based  on  joint  medium-to-long-  term 
investment  programmes,  were  the  main  factors  of  this  antagonism. 
The  intertwining  of  economic  and  political  power  allowed  the  Russian  business  elite  to 
translate  their  policy  preferences  into  political  decisions.  Since  the  first  years  of 
perestroika,  distinctive  economic  actors  had  emerged  in  the  shadow  of  the  nomenklatura, 
as  a  result  of  a  process  of  converting  political  authority  into  economic  power.  In  the  mid- 
1990s,  large-scale  Russian  capital  consolidated  into  financial-industrial  groups.  The 
combination  of  the  economic  resources  of  these  conglomerates  and  the  increasing  weakness 
of  the  Yel'tsin's  presidency  were  the  two  main  conditions  through  which  the  business  elite 
gained  direct  access  to  policy-making. 
The  presence  of  representatives  of  the  economic  elite  in  the  centres  of  decision-making 
allowed  economic  interests  to  be  articulated  also  in  the  foreign  policy  arena.  The  interests 
of  big  business  were  absorbed  into  and  presented  as  state  interests  in  the  Concept  of 
National  Security  and  a  string  of  other  foreign  policy  documents  published  during 
Yel'tsin's  presidency  (see  chapter  3).  Business  elite  interests,  however,  did  not  necessarily 
correspond  to  Russia's  foreign  policy  interests  and,  as  a  result,  the  Russian  economic  elite 
never  performed  the  role  of  agent  of  integration  in  the  CIS  or  defender  of  the  Russian 
national  interests  abroad. 
The  business  elite  was  not  a  compact  stratum  and  the  interests  of  specific  groups  were  often 
contradictory  and  in  conflict  with  the  interests  of  other  economic  sectors,  regional  groups  or 
state  institutions.  Furthermore,  the  attitude  Russian  business  adopted  towards  Ukraine 
showed  that  the  economic  elite  considered  participation  in  the  local  markets  as  a  chance  to 
expand  their  own  power-base,  after  privatisation  opportunities  dried  up  in  Russia. 
1  H.  V.  Milner  (1997),  Interests,  Institutions  and  Information.  Domestic  Politics  and  International  Relations, 
(Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press),  pp.  9-10 
157 As  the  establishment  of  strategies  of  co-operation  with  Ukrainian  economic  elites  did  not 
seem  to  be  on  the  agenda  of  the  most  visible  Russian  businessmen,  penetration  of  Russian 
capital  in  Ukraine  was  perceived  by  local  elites  as  a  zero-sum  game.  Finally,  the  1998 
economic  crash  interrupted  most  plans  for  economic  expansion  abroad.  As  Russian 
financial  institutions  became  more  vulnerable  and  unstable,  and  many  were  forced  to  close 
or  merge,  a  strategy  of  survival  replaced  a  strategy  of  expansion. 
The  substantial  failure  of  the  state-sponsored  project  to  establish  Transnational  Financial- 
Industrial  Groups  (TFIGs)  as  an  instrument  to  foster  bilateral  economic  co-operation 
indicated  a  clear  lack  of  common  interests  between  business  groups  in  Russia  and  in 
Ukraine. 
Business  and  Politics 
Contiguity  to  the  political  and  administrative  power  was  the  key  factor  for  the  Russian 
economic  elite's  ability  to  establish  their  business  activities  in  the  late  Soviet  years.  A 
Russian  author  has  called  the  special  relation  forged  between  political  and  economic  agents 
in  that  period  "bureaucratic  and  social  capital"  2  Bureaucratic  capital  allowed  future 
entrepreneurs  to  capitalise  on  the  Communist  Party's  assets,  drawing  from  CPSU  funds  or 
making  use  of  the  Party's  structures.  A  large  segment  of  that  early  economic  elite  has  been 
identified  as  the  "Komsomolers",  precisely  because,  as  former  officers  of  the  Komsomol', 
many  individuals  started  their  new  economic  activities  under  the  auspices  of  the  Youth 
Organisation  or  other  related  structures.  3 
2N.  Shmatko  (1995),  "Stanovlenie  Rossiiskogo  patronata  i  biurokraticheskii  kapital",  Sotsiologicheskie 
Issledovanii  a,  n.  6,  pp.  24-36 
3  I.  Kukolev  (1996),  "Formirovanie  biznes-elity",  Obshchestvennye  nauki  i  sovremennost',  n.  2,  pp.  12-23. 
On  this  point  also  O.  Kryshtanovskaya  and  S.  White  (1996),  "From  Soviet  Nomenklatura  to  Russian  Elite", 
Europe-Asia  Studies,  Vol.  48,  n.  5,  pp.  711-733,  and  D.  M.  Kotz  (1997),  Revolution  from  Above,  (London: 
Routledge),  pp.  120-121 
158 Significantly,  Russian  sociologists  have  confirmed  that  a  large  part  of  the  economic  elite 
originated  in  the  Soviet  nomenklatura.  According  to  a  survey  conducted  in  1994  among 
business  people,  44%  of  the  respondents  were  revealed  to  have  been  previously  employed 
in  nomenklatura-related  positions  (see  table  4.1)  4 
There  was,  however,  another  group,  called  by  Olga  Kryshtanovkaya  the  nomenklatura's 
"fiduciary  agents",  who,  despite  the  fact  that  they  were  not  themselves  part  of  the 
nomenklatura,  was,  nonetheless,  "authorised"  by  the  nomenklatura  to  engage  in  profitable 
economic  activities.  Thanks  to  the  persisting  disparities  between  internal  and  international 
prices  and  official  and  black  market  exchange  rates,  foreign  trade  and  financial  speculation 
became  a  secure  path  toward  wealth  and  success.  s 
4  A.  B.  Babaeva  and  A.  E.  Chirikova  (1996),  "Lidery  biznesa  o  sebe  i  ob  obshchestve",  in  Rossiskaya  Elita: 
opyt  sotsiologicheskogo  analiza  (part  I1),  (Moscow:  Nauka),  p.  17.  The  dispute  over  the  origin  of  the 
economic  elite  is  only  part  of  the  controversial  debate  among  students  of  Russian  politics  on  the  reproduction 
or  circulation  of  the  Soviet  elite.  For  a  view  upholding  the  thesis  of  circulation,  D.  Lane  and  C.  Ross  (1997), 
"Russian  Political  Elites,  1991-1995:  Recruitment  and  Renewal",  International  Politics.  Vol.  34,  pp.  169-192 
and  D.  Lane  and  C.  Ross  (1999)  The  Transition  from  Communism  to  Capitalism.  Ruling  Elites  from 
Gorbachev  to  Yeltsin,  (New  York:  St.  Martin's  Press).  For  a  study  focussing  on  the  top  political  elites,  T.  H. 
Rigby  (1999),  "New  Top  Elites  for  Old  in  Russian  Politics",  British  Journal  of  Political  Science,  Vol.  29,  pp. 
323-343.  For  a  regional  perspective,  J.  Hughes  (1997),  "Sub-National  Elites  and  Post-Communist 
Transformation  in  Russia:  A  Reply  to  Kryshtanovskaya  and  White",  Europe-Asia  Studies.  Vol.  49,  n.  6,  pp. 
1017-1036,  and  S.  Werning  Rivera  (2000),  "Elites  in  Post-Communist  Russia:  A  Changing  of  the  Guard?  ", 
Europe-Asia  Studies,  Vol.  52,  n.  3,  pp.  413-432 
S  O.  Kryshtanovskaya  (1996),  "Post-Soviet  Elites:  Parlaying  Power  into  Property",  Izvestiya,  January  10, 
1996,  as  reported  in  Current  Digest  of  the  Post-Soviet  Press,  Vol.  48,  n.  4,  February  21,  pp.  1-5.  See  also  A. 
Aslund  (1999),  "Russia's  Collapse",  Foreign  Affairs,  September/October,  pp.  64-77.  For  an  anthropological 
portrait  of  the  emerging  economic  elite  see  O.  V.  Perepelkin  (1995),  "Rossiiskii  predprinimatel':  shtrikhi  k 
sotsialnomu  portretu",  Sotsiolo  'cam  heskiye  Issledovaniya,  n.  2,  pp.  35-40;  A.  B.  Babaeva  and  A.  E.  Chirikova 
(1996),  Op.  Cit.;  R.  Medvedev  (1997),  "Novy  klass  rossiiskogo  obshestva",  Svobodnaya  Mysl',  n.  8,  pp.  58- 
71.  For  a  review  in  English,  B.  Silverman  and  M.  Yanovich  (1997),  New  Rich,  New  Poor,  New  Russia, 
(Armonk:  M.  E.  Shape),  chapter  6 
159 Table  4.1.  Background  Of  The  Economic  Elite,  By  Type  Of  Enterprises  And 
Geographical  Location 
NOMENKLATURA  OR  "SELF-MADE  PREVIOUS  JOB  NOT 
POLITICAL  ELITE  MEN"  (%)  DECLARED 
POSITIONS  (%)  (%) 
TOTAL  IN  1994  44.2  55.8  0 
TOTAL  IN  1995  26.2  49.7  24.1 
BANKS  31.3  39.1  29.7 
STOCK-COMPANIES  IN  33.3  51.3  15.4 
THE  REGIONS 
STOCK-COMPANIES  IN  16  72  12 
Moscow 
FIRMS  IN  THE  REGIONS  16.7  33.3  50 
FIRMS  IN  MOSCOW  0  81.8  18.2 
Source:  A.  B.  Babaeva  and  A.  E.  Chirikova  (1996),  "Lidery  biznesa  o  sebe  i  ob  obshchestve",  in  Rossiskaya 
Elita:  opyt  sotsiologicheskogo  analiza  (part  II)  (Moscow  Nauka),  p.  66 
With  the  break  up  of  the  command  economy  in  1987-88  and  the  weakening  of  state  control 
over  the  means  of  production,  the  Party  nomenklatura  promoted  a  process  aimed  at  the 
conversion  of  power  into  property.  6  In  his  book  "The  State  and  Evolution",  Egor  Gaidar 
maintains  that  the  Soviet  nomenklatura  had  not  only  been  in  favour  but  strongly  supportive 
of  initiating  economic  reforms  in  the  late  1980s.  Convinced  that  under  capitalism  they 
would  still  be  in  charge  of  the  political  and  economic  system,  members  of  the 
nomenklatura  pushed  towards  a  process  that  Gaidar  calls  "privatisation  of  power",  finally 
establishing  a  "nomenklatura  capitalism".  7 
"Spontaneous  privatisation"  ensured  that  the  direction  of  state  properties  was  gradually 
transferred  to  the  state  property's  administrators,  at  least  four  years  before  the  outset  of  the 
official  privatisation  in  1991-92.  Michael  McFaul  argues  that  "during  the  Soviet  era 
enterprise  directors  had  de  facto  seized  many  of  the  rights  associated  with  ownership  of 
property",  as  a  result  of  the  state's  weakened  ability  to  control  the  performance  and 
°  N.  Ryabotyazhev  (1998),  "K  voprosu  o  ginezise  i  sushnosti  nomenklaturnogo  kapitala",  Mirovava 
ekonomika  i  mezhdunorodnie  otnosheniya,  n.  2,  pp.  38-51 
7  Quoted  in  L.  D.  Nelson  and  I.  Y.  Kuzes  (1998),  "Russian  Economic  Reform  and  the  Restructuring  of 
Interests",  Demokratisatsiya,  Vol.  6,  n.  3,  pp.  480-503 
160 behaviour  of  directors.  8  Spontaneous  privatisation  gave  the  economic  elite  an  advantage 
over  ordinary  citizens  and  allowed  them  to  realise  a  "primary  accumulation  of  capital"  in 
anticipation  of  official  privatisation.  9  According  to  a  survey  conducted  by  Joseph  Blasi  and 
others,  in  1996  58%  of  Russian  enterprises  were  owned  by  insiders.  Of  this  percentage, 
18%  of  shares  was  owned  by  the  enterprises'  management.  '0 
The  1992-94  liberal  reforms  represented  a  further  development  of  this  tendency,  as  they 
favoured  the  establishment  of  a  property  class  within  a  general  environment,  in  which 
small-scale  ownership  had  been  severely  curtailed.  Some  Russian  scholars  have  seen  a 
deliberate  plan  behind  the  1992  price  liberalisation,  and  have  stressed  the  role  that  the 
consequent  hyperinflation  played  as  a  "confiscation  measure".  By  wiping  out  of  the  market 
many  of  the  small  enterprises  and  co-operatives  that  had  emerged  in  the  late  1980s, 
hyperinflation  removed  potential  competitors  for  the  more  established  entrepreneurs. 
While,  by  eroding  deposits  of  small  and  medium  savers,  price  growth  ensured  that,  when 
privatisation  started,  small  potential  buyers  lacked  the  resources  to  take  part  in  the 
auctions.  " 
The  nomenklatura  was  also  the  main  beneficiary  of  the  restructuring  of  the  sectoral 
ministries  as  concerns  and  associations,  as  former  ministers  or  their  deputies  were  absorbed 
into  the  management  structures  of  the  new  companies  and  became  their  majority  share- 
holders.  Gazprom  (gas  extracting  industry  with  control  over  the  pipelines),  Rostekstil' 
(textile  industry),  Lesprom  (timber  industry),  and  Roslegprom  (light  industries)  were  all 
established  by  dismantling  the  relevant  ministries,  and  creating  shareholding  companies, 
involving  a  mixed  ownership  structure  consisting  of  state,  workers  and  outsiders. 
Proximity  to  the  centre  of  policy-making,  then,  allowed  a  section  of  the  Soviet 
nomenklatura  to  turn  into  a  "property  class".  Yet,  if  in  the  first  stage  of  reforms  it  was 
8  M.  McFaul  (1995b),  "State  Power,  Institutional  Change  and  the  Politics  of  Privatization  in  Russia",  World 
Politics,  Vol.  47,  n.  2,  p.  211,  and  M.  McFaul  (1996)  "The  Allocation  of  Property  Rights  in  Russia:  The  First 
Round",  Communist  and  Post-Communist  Studies.  Vol.  29,  n.  3,  pp.  287-308 
9  N.  Shmatko  (1995),  Op.  Cit. 
10  J.  R.  Blasi  et  al.  (1997),  Kremlin  Capitalism,  (Ithaca:  Cornell  University  Press),  table  4,  p.  193 
11  N.  Ryabotyazhev  (1998),  Op.  Cit. 
161 access  to  political  power  that  guaranteed  the  new  entrepreneurs  control  over  economic 
resources,  with  the  consolidation  of  the  economic  empires,  that  relationship  was  inverted 
and  economic  capital  proved  an  important  instrument  to  gain  access  and  to  keep  control 
over  politics. 
Economic  actors  became  increasingly  engaged  in  the  political  sphere  to  preserve  and 
expand  their  recently  acquired  property  rights.  In  an  environment  in  which  economic 
transformations  did  not  look  irreversible,  and  control  over  property  was  perceived  as  the 
distinctive  trait  of  the  economic  elite's  authority,  fears  that  a  sudden  change  in  the  political 
landscape  would  challenge  their  ownership  prompted  the  new  entrepreneurs  to  take  direct 
political  action.  This  process  generated  a  circular  flow  of  power  at  the  top  of  the  Russian 
leadership,  whereby  economic  power  was  employed  to  acquire  political  influence,  which, 
in  turn,  generated  further  economic  advantages.  12 
The  Oligarchic  Regime 
The  relationship  between  political  and  economic  power  that  developed  in  the  years  of  the 
Yel'tsin's  presidency  goes  beyond  the  traditional  pattern  of  lobbying  for  the  allocation  of 
better  economic  conditions  (budget  subsidies,  quotas  and  licences,  tax  exemptions).  13  The 
rapacious  attitude  of  the  economic  elite,  the  often-illegal  character  of  their  operations,  and 
the  scandals  that  punctuated  the  second  stage  of  privatisation  gained  them  the  title  of 
"robber  barons"  and  the  system  they  created  the  name  of  "kleptocracy". 
The  distinguishing  attribute  of  this  business  elite  was  its  parasitic  nature;  as  Louise  Shelley 
puts  it,  "[the  economic  elite]  does  not  trade  in  goods  or  produce  anything  of  value.  Instead, 
12  N.  Shmatko  (1995),  Op.  Cit. 
13  For  an  overview  of  lobbying,  S.  Peregudov  and  I.  Semenenko  (1996),  "Lobbying  Business  Interests  in 
Russia",  Democratization,  Vol.  3,  n.  2,  p.  115-139;  for  a  comparative  view  of  lobbying  in  Russia  and  Ukraine 
see  P.  Kubicek  (1996),  "Variations  on  a  Corporatist  Theme:  Interest  Associations  in  Post-Soviet  Ukraine  and 
Russia",  Europe-Asia  Studies.  Vol.  48,  n.  1,  pp.  27-46 
162 it  merely  drains  the  state".  14  In  draining  the  state,  the  oligarchs  became  co-responsible  for 
the  emergence  of  the  "virtual  economy"  that  burst  with  the  1998  financial  meltdown.  Up  to 
then  the  Russian  economy  had  been  governed  under  the  "illusion"  that  it  was  larger  than  it 
really  was,  "producing  larger  governments  and  budgets  than  Russia  could  really  afford".  15 
From  a  political  point  of  view,  the  oligarchic  regime  contributed  to  discrediting  the  state 
institutions  and  further  alienated  civil  society,  by  de  facto  limiting  free  elections,  workers 
rights  and  freedom  of  the  press.  From  an  economic  point  of  view  the  oligarchs  became 
engaged  "in  heavy  predation  and  capital  flight"  resulting  in  "an  industrial  waste  land 
specked  with  islands  of  speculative  financial  prosperity".  16 
The  oligarchic  regime  that  emerged  in  the  years  between  1995  and  1998  was  the  product  of 
the  alliance  between  the  economic  elite  and  the  Yel'tsin's  presidency.  This  was  a  relation 
based  on  mutual  advantage  and  mutual  need,  generated  by  a  situation  in  which  the  ailing 
presidential  power,  finding  itself  isolated  from  the  parliament  and  society  at  large,  sought 
the  support  of  forces  external  to  the  institutional  arena.  The  presidential  administration 
traded  access  to  the  oligarchs'  economic  resources,  needed  to  pay  for  the  1996  electoral 
campaign,  against  guaranteed  access  to  privatising  assets,  and  increased  political  influence. 
The  character  of  the  presidential  system  created  by  Yel'tsin  became  key  for  the 
consolidation  of  the  oligarchs'  power.  Scholars  have  disputed  at  length  whether  a 
presidential  or  a  parliamentary  system  would  be  best  suited  for  a  transitional  democracy.  '7 
In  Guillermo  O'Donnell's  model  of  "delegative  democracy",  a  presidential  system  is  seen 
as  conflicting  with  the  very  purpose  of  institution-building  and  democratisation.  Presidents 
14  L.  I.  Shelley  (1997),  "Stealing  the  Russian  State",  Demokratizatsiva,  Vol.  3,  n.  2,  pp.  115-139  (quotation  p. 
482) 
15  C.  G.  Gaddy  and  Barry  W.  Ickes  (1998),  "Beyond  Bailout:  Time  to  Face  Reality  About  Russia's  `Virtual 
Economy"',  httv:  //www.  brookinRs.  or0fa/w-papers/gaddy/jzaddickl.  htm 
16  S.  Hedlund  (1999),  Russia's  "Market"  Economy.  A  Bad  Case  of  Predatory  Capitalism,  (London:  UCL 
Press),  p.  261 
17  J.  J.  Linz  (1990),  "The  Perils  of  Presidentialism",  The  Journal  of  Democracy.  Vol.  1,  n.  1  pp.  51-69,  S. 
Mainwaring  (1993),  "Presidentialism,  Multipartism  and  Democracy:  the  Difficult  Combination", 
Comparative  Political  Studies.  Vol.  26,  n.  2,  pp.  198-228,  A.  Stepan  and  C.  Skach  (1993),  "Constitutional 
Framework  and  Democratic  Consolidation:  Parliamentarism  versus  Presidentialism",  World  Politics 
_Vol. 
46, 
October,  pp.  1-22 
163 present  themselves  as  being  "above  parties",  while  institutions  such  as  the  parliament  and 
the  judiciary  are  viewed  as  a  "nuisance",  and  accountability  to  them  is  considered  by  the 
president  an  unnecessary  impediment.  In  this  framework,  the  president  and  his  staff 
become  "the  alpha  and  the  omega  of  politics",  as  the  president  insulates  himself  from  most 
existing  political  institutions  and  organised  interaction,  becoming  the  sole  agency 
responsible  for  his  policies.  18 
So  designed,  a  presidential  system  increases  the  risks  of  polarisation  as  elections  and 
conflict  between  political  groups  and  institutional  branches  are  perceived  as  a  zero-sum 
game,  in  which  the  winner  takes  all.  19  The  Yel'tsin  presidency  was  not  an  exception  to  this 
general  rule.  Having  failed  to  carry  on  fundamental  political  reforms,  disbanding  the 
Supreme  Soviet  and  calling  for  elections  before  a  course  of  economic  transformations  was 
initiated,  the  presidency  became  locked  in  a  constant  struggle  for  power  with  a  conservative 
parliament. 
The  reformist  governments  of  Egor  Gaidar  and  later  Anatolii  Chubais  faced  repeated 
opposition  by  the  legislature  trying  to  impose  fiscal  austerity,  reform  the  tax  system,  and 
resist  the  pressure  for  subsidies  to  loss-making  enterprises.  In  their  efforts  to  implement  a 
policy  of  de-regulation,  the  "reformers"  sought  the  support  of  prominent  figures  in  the  fuel 
and  energy  complex,  the  banking  sector  and  financial  industrial  groups,  who  had  a  personal 
interest  in  replacing  the  withdrawing  state  institutions  in  the  economic  management  of  the 
country. 
Yet,  the  support  that  the  oligarchs  could  provide  was  not  only  in  the  area  of  economic 
policy.  Throughout  his  two  terms  in  office,  Yel'tsin  maintained  a  confrontational  relation 
with  the  parliament.  This  resulted  in  the  1993  bombing  of  the  White  House,  the 
centralisation  of  powers  in  his  hands,  stipulated  by  the  new  constitution,  and  the  emergence 
of  an  illiberal  political  system  based  on  a  strategy  of  divide  et  impera.  As  Stefan  Hedlund 
is  Quoted  in  A.  Stepan  and  C.  Skach  (1993),  "Constitutional  Framework  and  Democratic  Consolidation: 
Parliamentarism  versus  Presidentialism",  World  Politics 
_Vol. 
46,  October,  pp.  1-22  (quotation  pp.  19-20) 
19  J.  J.  Linz  (1990),  "The  Perils  of  Presidentialism",  The  Journal  of  Democracy  Vol.  1,  n.  1  pp.  51-69 
164 has  pointed  out,  the  contest  between  the  executive  and  the  legislative  was  increasingly 
fought  "with  weapons  out  of  the  democratic  arsenal.  2v20 
Frequent  government  re-shuffles  and  the  tendency  to  refuse  responsibility  for  political  and 
economic  mistakes  transformed  Yel'tsin  into  a  figure  who  resembled  more  a  medieval 
prince  than  a  modem  president.  The  institutionalised  fora  of  decision-making  were 
progressively  undermined,  while  the  political  system  came  to  be  built  on  the  president's 
personal  charisma. 
The  discrediting  of  parties  and  social  movements  reinforced  a  pattern  according  to  which 
policy-making  took  place  increasingly  outside  political  institutions  and  within  the  inner 
circle  of  the  president's  loyal  entourage;  the  "family".  The  system  turned  into  what  George 
Breslauer  calls  "patriarchalism".  Yel'tsin,  the  "patriarch",  treated  "his  political  dependants 
as  his  extended  family,  within  which  he  demands  obedience  and  dispenses  absolution  to 
those  who  have  `sinned"';  the  Russian  government  became  "his  patrimony,  within  which 
he  dispenses  both  challenges  and  rewards".  21 
In  this  charged  climate,  presidential  elections  still  remained  the  only  legitimate  and 
recognised  instrument  to  change  the  system  and  replace  the  leadership.  In  the  wake  of  the 
1996  presidential  election,  facing  the  perspective  of  a  rising  communist  electorate,  the 
interests  of  the  presidential  administration  and  of  the  nascent  oligarchs  came  to  coincide. 
In  fear  of  a  classical  "winner-takes-all"  scenario,  in  which  the  victory  of  a  communist 
president  would  result  in  the  ousting  from  power  of  political  and  economic  figures  close  to 
Yel'tsin,  the  presidency  revealed  its  need  for  the  oligarchs'  support.  Financial  backing 
from  the  large  financial-industrial  groups  allowed  to  conduct  an  effective  electoral 
campaign,  and  control  over  the  media  helped  to  win  back  the  popular  favour.  The  electoral 
20  S.  Hedlund  (1999),  Op.  Cit.,  quotation  p.  325 
21  G.  W.  Breslauer  (1999),  "Boris  Yel'tsin  as  Patriarch",  Post-Soviet  Affairs.  Vol.  15,  n.  2,  p.  188.  For  a  first 
assessment  of  the  Yel'tsin  era  D.  Glinksi  and  P.  Reddaway  (1998)  "The  Yeltsin  Era  in  the  Light  of  Russian 
History:  Reform  or  Reaction?  ",  Demokratizatsiya,  Vol.  6,  n.  3,  pp.  518-534 
165 victory  marked  the  institutionalisation  of  the  presence  of  business  interests  within  the 
political  sphere,  which  lasted  intermittently  until  the  end  of  the  Yel'tsin's  presidency. 
What  the  oligarchs  had  to  offer  were  the  advantages  of  the  economic  wealth  they  had 
accumulated  since  the  late  1980s;  what  they  required  in  exchange  was  the  government's 
endorsement  to  expand  further  that  wealth  through  a  system  of  "personalised  political 
redistribution".  22  The  "blender  of  power  and  property"  that  the  oligarchs'  political  rise 
fostered  has  been  effectively  framed  in  Stefan  Hedlund's  words: 
"Present  day  boyar  capitalists  have  become  dependant  on  straight  links  to  the  government  for  their  own 
enrichment  [...  ].  The  boyars  lack  real  security  of  tenure:  both  accumulating  and  holding  onto  wealth  is 
conditional  upon  service  and  loyalty  to  the  tsar.  [...  ]  The  modern  day  boyars  have  been  rewarded  for  their 
services  and  loyalty  in  monetary  terms  [...  ],  a  siphoning  off  of  money  from  the  federal  budget  and  [...  ]  a 
transfer  of  wealth  out  of  the  government's  hands.  , 23 
The  perception  of  the  financial-industrial  groups'  economic  strength  in  an  economy 
afflicted  by  de-monetisation  and  disinvestment  put  the  oligarchs  in  a  position  of  quasi-equal 
partners  with  the  President  and  his  administration.  24 
22  D.  Treisman  (1995),  "The  Politics  of  Soft  Credit  in  Post-Soviet  Russia",  Europe-Asia  Studies,  Vol.  47,  n.  6, 
967 
23  S.  Hedlund  (1999),  Op.  Cit.,  pp.  252-253 
24  For  an  overview  of  the  Russian  economy  M.  Ellman  (2000),  "The  Russian  Economy  under  El'tsin", 
Europe-Asia  Studies,  Vol.  52,  n.  8,  pp.  1417-1432  and  P.  Hanson  (1997),  "What  Sort  of  Capitalism  is 
Developing  in  Russia?  ",  Communist  Economies  and  Economic  Transformation  Vol.  9,  n.  1,  pp.  27-42 
166 The  Emergence  of  "Big  Capital" 
There  are  two  paradoxes  related  to  the  appearance  of  financial-industrial  groups  (FIGs)  on 
the  Russian  scene.  The  first  is  that  even  though  FIGs  were  originally  designed  as  an 
instrument  for  a  statist  industrial  policy,  their  project  was  successively  adopted  by  the 
emerging  economic  elite  and  turned  into  an  opportunity  to  pursue  their  economic  interests. 
The  second  paradox  consists  in  the  fact  that,  despite  the  allegations  of  great  financial  power 
attached  to  those  groups  and  to  the  banks  that  presided  over  them,  the  economic  empires 
emerged  in  the  mid-1990s  were  in  fact  considerably  small.  It  has  been  estimated,  for 
example,  that  before  the  1998  crisis  Vladimir  Potanin's  Oneksimbank  would  not  rank 
among  the  top  100  US  banks.  25  The  implications  of  the  oligarchs'  financial  weakness  was 
that,  as  their  wealth  was  large  only  in  relative  terms,  in  order  to  prosper  further  and  to  keep 
their  grip  on  the  privatised  assets,  oligarchs  needed  the  protection  of  the  government  and 
the  President. 
The  project  of  financial-industrial  groups  was  originally  part  of  a  state-led  industrial  and 
investment  policy  to  counter  the  devastating  post-Soviet  industrial  collapse,  designed  on 
the  model  of  the  Korean  Chaebol  and  the  Japanese  Zaibatsu26  Through  the  FIGs  the 
Russian  leadership  intended  to  reaffirm  its  leading  role  as  a  developmental  state,  assuming 
the  task  to  identify  priority  sectors  in  the  national  economy  and  establish  a  stimulating  (or 
protecting)  environment  for  them. 
25  C.  G.  Gaddy  and  B.  W.  Ickes  (1998),  Op.  Cit. 
26  S.  Mizobata  (1998),  "Financial  Relations  in  the  Russian  Financial-Industrial  Groups:  A  Comparison  of 
Russia  and  Japan",  Kyoto  Institute  of  Economic  Research,  Discussion  Paper  n.  480.  For  an  overview  of 
FIGs,  their  functions  and  structure,  J.  Johnson  (1997),  "Russia's  Emerging  Financial-Industrial  Groups",  Post- 
Soviet  Affairs,  Vol.  3,  n.  4,  pp.  333-365,  L.  Gorbatova,  (1995),  "Formation  of  Connections  Between  Finance 
and  Industry  in  Russia:  Basic  Stages  and  Forms",  Communist  Economies  and  Economic  Transformation,  Vol. 
7,  n.  1,  pp.  21-34,  L.  Freinkman  (1995),  "Financial-Industrial  Groups  in  Russia:  Emergence  of  Large 
Diversified  Private  Companies",  Communist  Economies  and  Economic  Transformation  Vol.  7,  n.  1,  pp.  51- 
66,  I.  Starodubrovskaya  (1995),  "Financial-Industrial  Groups:  Illusion  and  Reality",  Communist  Economies 
and  Economic  Transformation,  Vol.  7,  n.  1,  pp.  5-19,  J.  E.  Prokop  (1995),  "Industrial  Conglomerates,  Risk 
Spreading  and  the  Transition  in  Russia",  Communist  Economies  and  Economic  Transformation  Vol.  7,  n.  1, 
pp.  35-50 
167 The  state  would  supplement  private  initiative  in  those  sectors  where  risks  were  perceived  to 
be  too  high  and  revenue  too  low  to  invest  in  production.  27  FIGs  would  restore  the 
interrupted  productive  chain,  and  would  constitute  the  "nucleus  to  revitalise  relations 
among  the  different  economic  spheres",  restoring  the  contradiction  between  the  shortage  of 
investment  capital  in  industry  and  the  excessive  resources  within  the  financial  sector.  28 
Legislation  established  that  groups  could  be  created  by  the  autonomous  initiative  of 
members  or  by  state  intervention.  The  state  would  step  in  to  fill  the  gap  in  spontaneous 
enterpreneurship,  "supporting  the  process  of  de-monopolisation  and  industrial 
restructuring"  and  orienting  dynamic  market  forces  towards  the  "restoration  of  the  export  of 
technical  and  scientific  potential  of  the  Russian  industry".  The  purpose  was  to  form  a  new 
system  of  industrial  investment  and  integrated  structures,  capable  of  self-development  in  a 
market  environment.  A  framework  of  preferential  conditions,  tax  privileges,  and  state 
guarantees,  was  initially  set  up  to  boost  the  creation  of  those  groups  whose  investment 
projects  and  economic  programs  met  objectives  and  priorities  of  the  socio-economic 
policy.  29 
The  original  plan  foresaw  the  creation  of  FIGs  as  vertically  and  horizontally  integrated 
institutions,  linking  a  number  of  industrial,  trade  and  service  structures  with,  generally,  a 
bank  at  its  core  to  guarantee  the  financial  stability  of  the  group  and  attract  potential 
investors.  Thanks  to  this  structure,  FIGs  would  then  produce  virtuous  economies  of  scale, 
pooling  resources  together  to  implement  joint  research  and  development  investment,  and  to 
upgrade  the  technological  assets  of  individual  enterprises.  30 
27  A.  Seleznev  (1997),  `Bankovskaya  sistema  -  yadro  infrastructuryfinansovovo  rynka",  Ekonomist.  n.  7,  pp. 
29-38 
28  V.  V.  Bolotin  (1995),  "Finansovo-Promyshlennie  Gruppy:  vozmozhnosti,  realnost'  i  normativnost"', 
Finansy,  n.  7,  pp.  8-12 
,  29  The  first  piece  of  legislation  on  financial-industrial  groups  was  in  fact  enacted  only  in  December  1993 
(Presidential  decree  no.  2096,5.12.1993,  "On  the  creation  of  Financial-Industrial  Groups  in  the  Russian 
Federation"),  and  it  was  then  followed  by  the  Government's  Program  (decree  no.  48,16.01.1995),  the  Federal 
Law  on  "Financial-Industrial  Groups"  (November  1995),  and  the  Presidential  Decree  "On  measures  to 
stimulate  the  creation  and  the  activity  of  Financial-Industrial  Groups"  (no.  433,01.04.1996). 
30  Yu.  Vinslav  and  E.  Guskov  (1996),  "Faktory  i  put'  effektivnosti  raboty  otechstvennykh  finansovo- 
promyshlennykh  grup",  Rossisskii  Ekonomicheskii  Zhurnal.  n.  7,  pp.  20-25 
168 It  was  believed  that  the  existence  of  large  conglomerates  would  positively  affect  also 
macroeconomic  stabilisation,  slowing  inflation  by  means  of  a  voluntary  price  regulation, 
implemented  through  cartel  agreements.  31  FIGs  would  as  well  lower  the  risks  for  enterprise 
restructuring,  by  building  up  a  portfolio  of  different  business  units,  which  would  cope  with 
shifts  in  competitive  advantage  and  insure  strategic  planning.  32  Product  diversification 
would  also  soften  the  ups  and  downs  of  the  economic  cycle,  by  allowing  swift  capital 
transfers  from  a  temporary  stagnant  sector  to  a  more  productive  one.  33 
Despite  the  original  statist  design,  however,  it  soon  became  clear  that  the  model  of 
financial-industrial  groups  had  also  been  adopted  by  default  by  the  private  sector,  outside 
the  government's  official  developmental  framework.  FIGs  suited,  for  different  reasons,  the 
interests  of  both  industrial  enterprises  and  commercial  banks.  Strangled  by  the  payments 
crisis  and  the  lack  of  funds  for  structural  investments  and  every  day  spending,  enterprises 
hoped  to  find  a  preferential  source  of  credit  to  foster  their  development  or,  at  least, 
guarantee  their  survival.  34  Endangered  by  the  increasing  number  of  insolvent  clients,  banks 
hoped  to  exert  a  more  effective  control  over  enterprises,  and  guarantee  their  short-  and 
medium-  term  investment. 
A  year  after  the  law  on  financial-industrial  groups  had  come  into  force  a  report  of  the  Inter- 
ministerial  Analytical  Centre  emphasised  the  success  of  spontaneous  FIGs,  which  had 
indeed  outnumbered  the  groups  created  by  direct  state  intervention.  Only  five  groups  were 
registered  in  the  first  months  of  1995.35  By  January  1996,  the  figure  had  reached  28.  They 
consisted  of  326  enterprises  and  74  financial  institutions,  employing  an  average  of  2 
million  people.  The  consolidated  capital  of  these  groups  amounted  to  about  2  trillion 
roubles,  while  the  annual  volume  of  production  was  more  than  3  trillion  roubles. 
31  I.  Starodubrovskaya  (1995),  Op.  Cit. 
32  J.  E.  Prokop  (1995  Op.  Cit. 
33  Yu.  Vinslav  and  E.  Guskov  (1996),  Op.  Cit. 
34  Starodubrovskaya  differentiates  between  groups  for  development,  "oriented  to  finding  the  most  effective 
market  strategy  and  exploiting  the  most  profitable  opportunities  presented  by  the  market  environment",  and 
groups  for  survival,  aiming  at  "maximum  isolation  from  the  market  by  means  of  closed  economic  links  within 
the  group".  I.  Starodubrovskaya  (1995),  Op.  Cit. 
35  S.  Batchikov,  Y.  Petrov  (1995),  "Formrovanie  FPG  i  Gosudarstvo",  Rossiiskii  Ekonomicheskii  Zhurnal,  no. 
2,  pp  3-10 
169 A  mere  10.2%  of  the  FIGs  members  were  state-owned  enterprises.  The  sources  of 
investment  were  55.3%  funds  belonging  to  the  group  itself,  42.2%  external  funds  attracted 
by  the  group's  investment  policy,  and  2.5%  funds  coming  from  the  central  budget  36  Ten 
more  groups  were  reported  to  be  operating  without  formal  registration.  7A  total  amount  of 
50  FIGs  was  estimated  to  be  active  throughout  the  Russian  Federation.  8  Among  these,  the 
so-called  bank-led  FIGs,  which  had  emerged  when  the  large-scale  accumulation  of 
financial  capital  from  the  late  1980s  had  been  injected  into  the  1992-93  process  of  voucher 
privatisation. 
Even  in  the  Soviet  period  trade,  and  especially  foreign  trade,  had  traditionally  been 
considered  a  highly  profitable  activity.  In  the  late  1980s  access  to  foreign  trade  was  de- 
monopolised,  but  internal  prices  failed  to  equalise  quickly  to  world  market  prices, 
generating  large  financial  capitals,  which  were  successively  put  into  circulation  through  a 
rapidly  expanding  banking  and  financial  system.  Cheap  state  credits  issued  in  the  face  of 
rapidly  rising  inflation  also  contributed  to  the  creation  of  this  initial  capital.  9 
The  patchy  and  contradictory  legislation  regulating  financial  activities  made  it  easy  to  enter 
the  banking  system.  The  1990  "war  of  banks"  between  the  Soviet  Gosbank  and  the 
Russian  Central  Bank  (CBR),  allowed,  for  example,  a  relaxation  in  the  regulatory 
requirements  of  commercial  banks,  since  both  CBR  and  Gosbank  tried  to  offer  convenient 
deals  to  attract  banks  to  register  with  them.  About  750  banks  were  then  created  from  the 
different  branches  of  the  Soviet  specialised  banks  40 
36  y  Vinslav  (1996),  "Rossiiskie  FPG  proidennyi  put'  i  imperativy  rosta",  Rossiiskii  Ekonomicheskii 
Zhurnal,  n.  5-6,  pp  29-39 
37  A.  Kulikov,  A.  Svortsov  (1997),  "Mesto  Finansovo-promyshlennykh  grupp  v  ekonomike",  Ekonomist  n.  3, 
pp  53-59 
,  A.  Seleznev  (1997),  "Bankovskaya  sistema  -  yadro  infrastructury  finansogo  rynka",  Ekonomist,  n.  7,  pp.  32- 
38 
39  A.  Aslund  (1999),  "Russia's  Collapse",  Foreign  Affairs,  September/October,  pp.  64-77,  and  H.  Schroder 
(1999),  "El'tsin  and  the  Oligarchs:  the  Role  of  Financial  Groups  in  Russian  Politics  between  1993  and  July 
1998",  Europe-Asia  Studies,  Vol.  51,  No.  6,  pp.  957-988 
40  J.  Johnson  (1996),  "Banking  in  Russia.  Shadows  of  the  Past",  Problems  of  Post-Communism,  May/June,  pp 
49-59 
170 Thanks  to  low  interest  rates  and  low  capital  requirements,  commercial  banks  were  set  up 
also  by  industrial  enterprises,  (the  so  called  "pocket  banks"),  with  the  purpose  of  providing 
preferential  credits  to  the  parent  enterprise.  When  the  liberalisation  of  banking  activity 
started  in  1989,  state-owned  industrial  enterprises  had  a  considerable  amount  of  capital 
available,  thanks  to  easy  centralised  credit.  Enterprises  became  at  the  same  time 
shareholders  and  clients  of  the  new  financial  institutions. 
With  the  liberalisation  of  prices,  however,  the  consequent  inflation,  and  the  payment  crisis 
in  1992,  the  relationship  reversed.  By  performing  currency  operations,  commercial  banks 
had  raised  their  profits  and  accumulated  adequate  resources  for  short  and  medium-  term 
investment  funds.  Industrial  enterprises  became  increasingly  dependent  on  them.  Affected 
by  an  unreliable  payment  system,  the  lack  of  market  discipline,  and  bad  debts,  commercial 
banks  "found  themselves  in  a  situation  where  they  had  to  take  final  responsibility  for  the 
whole  chain  of  debts  between  enterprises".  41 
In  1993,  and  then  in  1994  the  CBR  increased  the  minimum  capital  requirement  for 
commercial  banks  and  financial  institutions,  leading  to  a  massive  concentration  of  banking 
operations  in  a  rather  limited  number  of  large  banks.  According  to  data  published  at  the 
end  of  1993,  "only  6%  of  banks  had  capital  exceeding  200  million  roubles,  in  particular 
sixty  banks  had  capital  worth  1  to  5  billion  roubles,  nine  banks  over  5  billion  roubles  and 
only  a  handful  of  banks  had  15  to  20  billion  roubles"42  . 
When  privatisation  started  in  1993,  however,  only  few  banks  took  an  active  role  in  it.  The 
lack  of  opportunity  to  acquire  a  controlling  block  of  shares  and  secure  an  influencing 
position  on  the  enterprise's  policy  deterred  most  of  them.  In  a  survey  conducted  in  1994 
only  20%  of  the  banks  questioned  revealed  their  intention  to  take  part  in  the  privatisation 
41  E.  Zhuravskaya  (1995),  "The  first  stage  of  banking  reform  in  Russia  is  completed  what  lies  ahead?  ",  in 
Banking  Reform  in  Central  Europe  and  the  Former  Soviet  Union,  edited  by  J.  Rostowski.,  (Budapest:  Central 
European  University  Press),  pp.  166-182.  (p.  170) 
42  E.  Zhuravskaya  (1995),  "The  first  stage  of  banking  reform  in  Russia  is  completed  what  lies  ahead?  ",  in 
Banking  Reform  in  Central  Europe  and  the  Former  Soviet  Union,  edited  by  J  Rostowski.,  (  Budapest:  Central 
European  University  Press),  pp.  166-182. 
171 process,  while  the  rest  of  them  considered  privatisation  a  not  sufficiently  attractive 
investment  43 
Yet,  some  banks  acted  from  the  very  beginning  with  the  clear  intention  of  establishing  their 
own  industrial  conglomerates.  The  major  Moscow-based  banks,  such  as  MENATEP  and 
Russian  Credit,  played  the  most  active  role.  4  As  involuntary  groups  emerged  around  a 
large  commercial  bank,  the  most  popular  strategies  to  accumulate  shares  in  the  enterprises' 
business  were  threefold.  A  bank  would  buy  enterprises'  shares  with  the  intent  to  re-sell 
them  at  a  profit  later,  it  would  then  grant  investment  credits  to  the  enterprise,  or  it  would 
buy  shares  of  its  debt.  From  this  original  nucleus  gigantic  FIGs  developed. 
During  the  voucher  privatisation,  banks  did  not  seem  to  have  a  coherent  strategy,  as  shares 
were  bought  almost  indiscriminately,  on  the  basis  of  the  perception  that  assets  were  sold  at 
underestimated  prices,  and  the  share  prices  would  certainly  increase  at  a  later  stage.  45  By 
the  second  stage  of  privatisation  based  on  monetary  rather  than  voucher  investments, 
opportunities  for  banks  to  acquire  the  controlling  block  of  enterprises'  shares  increased 
even  further.  Thanks  to  this  process,  banks  with  large  cash  resources  and  powerful  political 
connections  gained  the  opportunity  to  grow  rapidly.  46  Six  of  the  notorious  "Big  Seven" 
groups  that  went  on  to  dominate  Russian  politics  after  the  1996  presidential  elections,  grew 
out  of  this  model  of  involuntary  financial-industrial  groups,  with  a  large  commercial  bank 
as  the  core  of  the  operations  (see  table  4.2). 
43  L.  Gorbatova  (1995),  Op.  Cit. 
44  Ibid. 
45  L.  Freinkman  (1995),  Op.  Cit. 
46  A.  K.  Kuz'min  (1995),  "Rol'  banks  v  protsesse  formirovaniya  i  razvitiya  Finansovo-Promyshlennykh 
Grupp",  Finansy  no.  1,  pp  25-28 
172 Table  4.2.  The  "Big  Seven" 
NAME  OF  NAME  OF  ORIGIN 
THE  GROUP  THE 
LEADER 
CAPITAL  KEY  POLITICAL 
(AT  1  JULY  HOLDINGS  NETWORK 
1997),  IN  MN 
RB 
ALFA  Mikhial  Trading 
Fridman,  Petr  company 
Aven  established  in 
1987. 
Connections 
with  the 
Ministry  of 
Foreign 
Economic 
Relations 
INKOMBANK  Vladimir  Bank 
Vinogradov  established  in 
1988  to  service 
Komsomol' 
commercial 
activities 
LOGOVAZ  Boris  First  Russian 
Berezovskii  car  dealership 
established  in 
1989 
MENATEP  Mikhail  1987  Youth 
Khodorkovskii  Scientific 
Aleksandr  Technical 
Zhubarov  Creativity 
Centre  in 
Frunze's 
Moscow 
district 
9,891,903  Alfa  Bank,  Anatolii 
Alfa  Capital,  Chubais,  Egor 
Alfa  Cement,  Gaidar 
part  of 
consortium 
than  owns  38% 
of  ORT 
22,232,134  Inkom  capital,  Aleksandr 
Samara  Lebed 
Aluminium, 
controls  15% 
of  the  Russian 
confectionery 
market 
Information  Avtovaz  Bank,  Pyotr  Aven, 
not  available  Obedinionnyi  Egor  Gaidar, 
Bank,  Sibneß  Aleksandr 
oil,  Aeroflot,  Korzhakov, 
ORT  (8%  and  Tatyana 
control  over  Dyachenko 
executives), 
Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta, 
Ogonyok 
12,229,470  Alliance-  Oleg 
Menatep  Soskovets, 
Investment  Aleksandr 
Bank,  Trading  Korzhakov, 
Company,  Yurii 
Yukos,  Russkii  Shafranik, 
Tekstil',  ORT  Ruslan 
(part  of  a  38%  Khasbulatov 
shares 
consortium) 
173 MOST  Vladimir  Bank  11,013,431  Media  Most,  Yurii  Luzhkov, 
Gusinskii,  established  in  Most  Egor  Gaidar, 
Boris  Khat  1989  to  finance  Investment,  Yavlinskii, 
restructuring  NTV  (70%),  Anatolii 
office  Ekho-Moskvy  Chubais, 
buildings  (controlling  Viktor 
business  packet),  Chenomyrdin 
Segodnya, 
Obshchaya 
Gazeta,  Itogi 
ONEKSIMBANK  Vladimir  Trading  firm  20,559,345  International  Anatolii 
Potanin,  established  in  Finance  Chubais,  Oleg 
Mikhail  the  1990s  on  a  Corporation,  Soskovets 
,  Prokhorov  USSR  Ministry  Renaissance  Aleksandr 
of  Foreign  Capital,  Korzhakov 
Economic  Norilsk  Nikel' 
Relations  (51  %),  Sidanko 
$l  Oth  loan  oil  (81%), 
Szyazinvest 
(25%), 
Komsomol'ska 
ya  Pravda, 
Izvestiya 
SBS-AGRO  Aleksandr  Party  and  13,860,459  Finance  Oil  Opposed  to 
Smolenskii  Government  Company,  Chubais, 
financial  ORT  (38%),  supports 
resources  Kommersant'D  conservative 
aily,  political  forces 
Kommersant' 
Weekly 
Source:  D.  N.  Jensen  (1998),  "Russia's  Financial  Empires", 
http:  //www.  rferl.  orW  nca/speciaVnifinance/index  html 
Vladimir  Potanin's  Oneksimbank-Interros  was  one  of  the  most  typical  informal  financial- 
industrial  groups.  The  group  was  established  around  Oneksimbank,  heir  of  the  Soviet 
Foreign  Trade  Bank,  which  expanded  and  diversified  its  financial  interests  during  the 
monetary  stage  of  privatisation.  In  June  1998  the  bank  was  ranked  third  among  Russian 
banks  for  net  assets  (23  138  860  thousand  rubles),  and  third  for  capital  stock  (5  740  204 
thousand  rubles).  7 
The  group  accounted  for  a  total  of  $10  billion,  Oneksimbank  and  Mezhdunarodnaya 
Finansovaya  Kompaniya  (MFK),  controlled  Sidanko,  Russia's  fifth-largest  oil  company, 
47  300  krupneishikh  bankov  Rossii",  Profil'  n.  22  (102),  June  15,1998,  special  issue 
174 Noril'skii  Nikel'  one  of  the  country's  biggest  metals  conglomerates  and  the  world's  largest 
producer  of  nickel,  Svyazinvest,  the  communication  giant,  Permskiye  Motory,  and  its  ' 
subsidiary  Aviadvigatel',  one  of  Russia'a  biggest  aircraft  engine  manufacturers,  and  three 
of  the  country's  largest  newspapers,  Komsomol'skaya  Pravda,  Izvestiya,  and  Russkii 
Telegraf. 
Each  of  these  companies,  in  turn,  was  on  the  top  of  a  pyramid  of  smaller  enterprises,  and 
had  a  complex  management  structure.  The  giant  Noril'skii  Nikel',  for  example,  producer 
of  99.8%  of  Russia's  platinum  metals  (40%  of  the  total  world  output),  included  six 
enterprises  and  had  an  authorised  capital  exceeding  31  billion  rubles.  8 
In  the  shares  for  loans  programme  (detail  on  the  programme  below)  Oneksimbank  acquired 
38%  of  the  company's  authorised  capital,  accounting  for  51%  of  the  voting  stock,  as 
collateral  to  a  $170  million  credit  to  the  federal  authorities.  The  results  of  the  auction  were, 
however,  challenged  by  the  company's  management  in  the  first  instance,  and  by  the 
unsuccessful  contenders  in  the  second  instance,  causing  one  of  the  most  bitter  conflicts  in 
the  entire  process  of  Russian  privatisation. 
Sidanko  was  a  vertically  integrated  oil  company,  controlling  a  total  of  2.19  billion  tons  of 
oil  reserves.  49  This  was  another  one  of  the  companies  that  Oneksimbank  acquired  through 
the  shares  for  loans  scheme.  On  that  occasion,  the  bank  was  accused  of  having  prevented 
Russkii  Kredit  from  taking  part  in  the  auction,  firstly  by  impeding  representatives  of  the 
competing  bank  from  entering  the  building  where  the  bids  were  being  accepted,  then  by 
refusing  the  bank's  offer.  so 
Another  characteristic  of  the  financial-industrial  groups  that  enhanced  the  political  power 
of  the  oligarchs  was  the  use  they  made  of  the  media  as  an  instrument  to  fight  their 
campaigns,  prompting  concerns  that  a  new  form  of  censorship  (the  "big  capital's 
48  Nezavisimaya  Gazeta,  Jan.  25,1996,  p.  4 
49  B:  Arsen'yev,  "Banki  byutcya  ob  zaklad",  Kommersant'.  n.  37,1996,  pp.  44-45 
50  Seeodnyaa,  December  6,1995,  p.  1 
175 censorship")  would  soon  silence  any  dissent.  51  Oneksimbank  and  Potanin  were  slower  that 
others  in  understanding  the  importance  of  the  media  in  the  struggle  for  political  influence, 
but  the  group  recovered  rapidly  acquiring  control  of  Komsomolskaya  Pravda  and  Izvestiya, 
and  founding  in  September  1997  Russkii  Telegraf. 
As  opposite  to  Oneksimbank-Interros,  Boris  Berezovskii's  LogoVAZ  did  not  develop  from 
a  bank.  The  conglomerate  emerged  around  LogoVAZ,  the  car-dealing  company 
established  by  Berezovskii  in  1989,  on  the  basis  of  an  agreement  he  had  struck  with 
Togliatti  AvtoVAZ  plant  director  Vladimir  Kadannikov.  According  to  this  agreement 
LogoVAZ  would  buy  AvtoVAZ  cars  at  internal  subsidised  prices,  and  would  sell  them  on 
the  internal  Russian  market  at  full  market  prices.  LogoVAZ  grew  to  become  one  of  the 
leaders  in  the  Russian  car  business,  and  in  1993  its  turnover  exceeded  250  million  dollars. 
The  business  was  so  successful  that  after  four  years  LogoVAZ  accounted  for  more  than 
10%  of  AvtoVAZ  Russian  market.  52 
The  group  included  other  valuable  assets  such  as  the  TV  channel  ORT  (Berezovskii 
controlled  only  a  small  fraction  of  its  shares,  but  had  influential  relations  with  the  TV 
station  executives),  the  oil  company  Sibneft,  Aeroflot,  and  the  newspaper  Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta.  Connections  between  the  different  enterprises,  however,  were  remarkably  loose, 
and  a  co-ordinated  policy  between  them  was  not  evident.  Moreover,  Berezovskii's 
business  appeared  more  shaky  and  vulnerable  than  other  conglomerates,  as  he  did  not  own 
the  controlling  shares  of  many  of  the  enterprises  that  were  part  of  his  empire.  It  was 
probably  this  instability  that  prompted  Berezovskii  to  become  the  most  politically  active  of 
the  oligarchs,  lobbying  for  political  favours  and  involving  himself  in  backroom 
conspiracies,  necessary  to  consolidate  his  wealth. 
51  "Today  money  is  playing  the  role  that  used  to  be  played  by  the  CPSU  Central  Committee's  regional 
committees,  and  its  propaganda  department,  and  the  myth  of  an  independent  press  seems  to  be  fading  once 
again"  (Obshchaya  Gazeta,  n.  15,  April  17-23,1997,  p.  2).  "The  time  of  journalist  romanticism  in  Russia  has 
passed.  [...  ]  A  covert  bureaucratic  coup  has  taken  place  in  Russia.  And  the  massive  buying  up  of  newspapers 
is  the  final  stage  of  that  coup.  We  have  fumbled  away  not  only  freedom  of  the  press,  but  freedom  altogether. 
Russia  is  entering  a  new  political  era  that  is  in  some  ways  similar  to  the  stagnation  of  the  Brezhnev  period. 
Everything  will  be  decided  by  the  interests  of  the  financial-bureaucratic  oligarchy".  (Novaya  Gazeta.  n.  15, 
Apr.  14-20,1997,  p.  4) 
52  R.  Wright  et  al.  (1998),  "Nine  lives  of  Berezovsky",  The  European,  25-31  May,  pp.  8-12 
176 More  than  for  their  real  financial  weight,  however,  the  big  seven  gained  renown  as  informal 
networks  of  alliances  and  political  clans,  which  included  not  only  prominent  figures  from 
industrial  and  financial  structures,  but  also  politicians,  representatives  of  the  media,  and 
members  of  the  security  forces.  The  forming  and  dissolving  of  these  alliances  characterised 
political  life  under  Yel'tsin's  second  presidency. 
Oligarchic  Politics 
Members  of  the  economic  elite  emerged  as  strong  political  actors  in  the  mid-1990s, 
following  a  process  of  rapid  capital  accumulation.  Thanks  to  previous  connections  with  the 
structures  of  political  power,  leading  business  figures  had  acquired  large  financial  resources 
through  foreign  currency  speculation,  foreign  trade  operations  and  banking  activities. 
During  the  process  of  privatisation,  financial  capital  was  invested  in  industrial  enterprises, 
giving  rise  to  financial-industrial  groups. 
The  relative  wealth  of  these  groups  and  the  weakness  of  the  presidential  structure  emerged 
under  Yel'tisin  allowed  prominent  economic  leaders  to  infiltrate  the  state  apparatus  and 
establish  an  oligarchic  system.  Under  this  oligarchic  regime  the  power  and  prestige  of 
financial  figures  was  defined  by  the  property  they  owned.  A  struggle  for  ownership,  fought 
through  legal  and  illegal  means,  rather  than  investment  in  productive  activities  became  the 
distinguishing  feature  of  the  Russian  business  elite. 
A  number  of  attempts  at  providing  institutional  representation  to  economic  interests  were 
made  already  in  the  early  1990s,  with  the  creation  of  business  associations  first,  and  later 
through  parties  like  Kostantin  Borovoi's  Party  of  Economic  Freedom  or  Arkadii  Volskii's 
Civic  Union.  53  The  establishment,  during  the  1995  Duma  elections,  of  Our  Home  is  Russia 
53  P.  Rutland  (1992),  Business  Elites  and  Russian  Economic  Policy,  (London:  Royal  Institute  of  International 
Affairs);  on  the  position  and  role  of  Civic  Union,  J.  Lester  (1995),  Modern  Tsars  and  Princes.  The  Struggle 
for  Hegemony  in  Russia,  (London:  Verso),  chapter  5,  and  M.  McFaul  (1993)  "Russian  Centrism  and 
Revolutionary  Transitions",  Post-Soviet  Affairs.  Vol.  9,  n.  3,  pp.  196-222 
177 (OHR)  provided  the  privatised  state-sector  and,  in  particular,  the  raw-materials  complex,  an 
opportunity  to  defend  their  sectoral  interests  in  areas  such  as  the  extraction  and 
redistribution  of  natural  resources.  54  Divergence  of  interest  with  those  sectors,  however, 
and  their  relative  position  of  strength  convinced  the  oligarchs  to  by-pass  parliamentary 
representation  and  aim  directly  at  the  presidential  administration.  This  move  reflected  also 
the  shift  in  the  balance  of  power  that  had  followed  the  introduction  of  the  1993 
Constitution. 
After  the  power  struggle  with  the  Supreme  Soviet,  the  President  had  become  head  of  State, 
chief  of  the  armed  forces,  and  head  of  the  Security  Council.  Yel'tsin  was  now  directly 
responsible  for  the  internal  as  well  as  the  foreign  policy  of  the  country.  He  appointed  the 
Prime  Minister,  the  Vice  Prime  Ministers  and  other  ministers  suggested  by  the  Prime 
Minister,  the  Chairman  of  the  Central  Bank,  the  General  Prosecutor,  members  of  the 
Constitutional  Court,  the  Supreme  Court,  and  the  Court  of  Arbitration.  He  was  personally 
in  charge  of  the  strategic  ministries  (Defence,  Internal  and  Foreign  Affairs).  He  could  rule 
by  decree,  and  in  certain  areas  of  decision-making  considered  the  President's  exclusive 
domain,  the  Parliament's  checking  authority  was  severely  restricted.  55 
The  economic  elite  had  obviously  sensed  the  change  of  direction.  Already  in  a  1993  survey 
of  Moscow  entrepreneurs,  53%  of  the  respondents  admitted  that  for  the  defence  of  their 
interests  they  preferred  to  lobby  the  Presidential  Central  apparatus  rather  than  the  members 
of  parliament.  56  While  the  presidential  structures  were  not  accessible  to  the  majority  of  the 
entrepreneurs,  from  the  summer  of  1995,  however,  their  doors  opened  to  a  conspicuous 
circle  of  bankers  and  financiers. 
It  was  the  disastrous  condition  of  the  state  budget,  the  immediate  need  for  it  to  be 
replenished  with  fresh  cash  flows,  and  the  relative  power  of  the  big  banks  that  gave  the 
oligarchs-to-be  the  opportunity  to  enter  the  presidential  circle.  Already  in  August  1995  the 
sa  Moskovskie  Novosti,  n.  50,  July  23-30,1995,  p.  6 
ss  For  a  review  of  the  Russian  presidentialism  S.  White,  (1997),  "Russia:  Presidential  Leadership  under 
Yeltsin",  in  Postcommunist  Presidents,  edited  by  R.  Taras  (Cambridge:  CUP),  pp.  38-66 
178 money-based  privatisation  displayed  signs  of  its  substantial  failure.  Only  5%  of  the 
properties  planned  for  sale  by  the  end  of  the  year  had  actually  been  purchased.  Lagging 
behind  with  the  payment  of  wages  and  salaries,  the  government  signalled  its  readiness  to 
strike  a  dial  with  the  banking  elite. 
With  the  shares  for  loan  scheme  a  group  of  powerful  entrepreneurs  gained  a  distinctive 
image  in  Russian  politics,  appearing  as  a  more  or  less  cohesive  syndicate,  able  to  deal  with 
the  state  structures  on  an  equal  footing.  The  bankers  were  no  longer  a  lobby  alongside 
other  sectoral  lobbies;  they  were  in  the  unique  position  of  proposing  a  business  agreement 
to  the  state  institutions,  negotiating  it,  and  profiting  from  it. 
"Big  capital"  had  already  made  its  first  public  political  appearance  on  the  eve  of  the  1995 
parliamentary  election,  when  an  alliance  including  LogoVAZ,  Gazprom,  Mikrodin, 
MENATEP  bank,  National  Credit,  Alfa  Bank,  Imperial  Bank,  and  the  Capital  City  Savings 
Bank  had  called  for  the  elections  to  be  postponed.  It  was  maintained  that,  in  a  situation  of 
heated  controversy,  where  political  struggle  could  provoke  a  "cataclysm",  electoral 
competition  needed  to  be  scaled  down..  To  guarantee  social  and  political  stability  big 
business  representatives  wanted  the  electoral  contest  to  take  place  only  after  the 
privatisation  of  the  large  state  enterprises,  the  redistribution  of  property,  and  the 
consolidation  of  a  middle  class  had  been  accomplished.  57 
As  one  of  its  representatives  explained,  the  authority  of  the  group  derived  from  their 
economic  wealth,  in  the  name  of  which  they  were  reclaiming  their  rightful  political  status. 
"[The  "big  eight"  league] 
... 
includes  the  structures  that  are  the  most  influential  in  terms  of  many  parameters 
and  that  [...  ]  recognise  each  other  as  leaders  of  the  business  world.  [...  ]  We  certainly  think  alike  on  many 
56  A.  Zudin  (1996),  "Rossiya:  biznes  i  politica",  Mirovaya  Ekonomika  i  Mezhdunarodniye  Otnoshenie,  n.  4, 
17-  27 
51  Kommersant-Daily,  March  14,1995,  p.  3.  Aleksander  Smolenskii,  President  of  the  Capital  City  Savings 
Bank,  remarked:  "From  the  time  of  the  first  Congress  of  USSR  People's  Deputies  [in  1989]  to  the  present  day, 
I  have  seen  the  quality  of  our  parliamentarians  diminish.  I  think  fearfully:  What  are  we  going  to  elect  for 
ourselves  at  the  end  of  the  year?  [...  ]  I  am  deeply  convinced  that  if  a  new  corps  of  Deputies  comes  in,  there 
will  just  be  another  division  of  the  spoils.  We  won't  survive  that...  "  Moskovskiye  Novosti,  No.  19,  March 
19-26,1995,  p.  4 
179 questions,  because  we  have  common  class  interests  and,  by  definition,  cannot  have  serious  political 
disagreements.  Before,  we  were  not  sufficiently  aware  of  what  we  had  in  common  -  there  simply  was  no 
time  to  think  about  that  -  but  now  we  have  all  become  a  little  more  aware  and  have  started  being  more 
tolerant  toward  one  another  and  trying  to  take  some  joint  actions.  "58 
The  proposal  for  the  shares  for  loans  scheme  came  into  the  debate  on  how  to  realise  the 
money-based  stage  of  privatisation.  The  problem  was  to  reconcile  two  divergent  sets  of 
priorities  voiced  within  the  government.  On  the  one  side,  the  function-based  ministries 
favoured  an  approach  focused  on  the  enterprises,  aiming  at  attracting  private  investment,  to 
restructure  the  enterprises'  debts,  and  to  promote  efficiency  in  production.  On  the  other 
side,  the  economic-branch  departments  promoted  an  approach,  which  aimed  to  produce 
substantial  revenues  for  the  state  budget  to  be  used  to  settle  the  pensions  and  wages 
arrears.  59 
The  approval  of  the  shares  for  loans  meant  the  prevalence  of  the  budget-oriented  approach. 
The  Consortium  of  seven  banks  that  proposed  the  deal  emphasised  that  a  number  of  large 
and  potentially  rich  companies  could  hardly  be  sold,  given  the  underdevelopment  of  the 
Russian  financial  market,  and  the  poor  financial  state  of  the  companies  themselves.  Putting 
the  state's  block  of  shares  from  these  enterprises  into  a  trust  with  the  consortium  was  to  be 
the  solution  to  square  the  circle.  The  banks  would  provide  credit  to  the  state  budget  while, 
at  the  same  time,  they  would  restructure  the  enterprises  to  sell  them  later  to  strategic 
investors  60 
The  plan  spurred  immediate  controversies.  Neither  the  number  of  the  banks  actually  taking 
part  in  the  project,  nor  the  amount  of  credit  to  be  provided  to  the  budget  was  clarified  at  an 
initial  stage.  61  An  early  figure  of  9  billion  rubles  was  mentioned,  but  it  later  slipped  into  a 
58  Obshchaya  Gazeta  No.  12,  March  23-29,1995,  p.  8' 
59  Seeodnya.  March  31,1995,  p.  1. 
60  Segodnya,  March  31,1995,  p.  1. 
61  Avtovaz  bank  was  the  eighth  bank  to  join  in,  so  the  final  list  included:  AvtoVAZ  Bank,  Alfa-Bank, 
Menatep,  MFK,  Oneksimbank,  Renaissance,  Rossiiskii  Kredit,  and  Stolichnii  Savings  Bank.  After 
participating  in  the  first  stages  of  the  negotiations  over  the  agreement,  Imperial  and  'Inkombank  withdrew 
from  the  project.  Moscow  News,  n.  36,  Sept.  15-21,1995,  p.  9 
180 vague  "several  trillion  rubles".  62  After  the  agreement  came  into  effect,  unofficial'  sources 
quoted  figures  between  $800  million  and  $1  billion,  while  Alfred  Kokh,  Chairman  of  the 
State  Property  Committee  estimated  a  total  of  3  billion  rubles  63 
Critics  also  contested  that  the  banks  could  not  possibly  have  enough  money  to  finance  the 
plan.  It  was  calculated  that  the  total  assets  of  Oneksimbank,  Inkombank,  Menatep  and  the 
Capital  City  Savings  Bank  barely  reached  45-50  trillion  rubles,  but  the  proportion  of  liquid 
assets  in  that  sum  was  significantly  smaller.  The  possibility  that,  in  the  short-  term  the 
banks  could  induce  substantial  changes  in  the  structure  of  their  assets  to  make  sure  they 
would  be  able  to  provide  the  agreed  credits  looked  improbable.  64  It  was  instead  considered 
more  likely  that  the  scheme  would  be  used  to  legalise  cases  of  spontaneous  privatisation: 
the  enterprises  would  put  into  circulation  part  of  their  unreported  profits,  channelling  the 
money  through  the  banks  and  receiving,  in  return,  the  right  to  manage  the  shadowy 
resources.  65 
The  banks  were  denounced  for  trying  to  set  up  a  conveniently  competition-free 
environment,  where  they  would  be  able  to  seize  ownership  of  the  country's  most 
prestigious  companies  at  discount  prizes.  66  But  most  of  all  there  were  allegations  that  the 
relationship  between  the  banks  and  the  government  would  inevitably  change  from  an 
"amorphous  co-operation  without  hard  and  fast  rules  to  an  extremely  formalised  co- 
operation:  political  and  economic  loyalty  in  exchange  for  priority  access  to  blue  chips".  67 
Observers  wittingly  equated  the  consortium  to  a  "Ministry  of  Banks".  8 
The  scheme  envisaged  two  long-term  stages.  In  the  first  stage,  the  State  Property 
Committee  would  select  a  list  of  state  enterprises  to  be  proposed  as  collateral  to  the  banks' 
62  Segodnya,  April  4,1995,  p.  1 
63  Moscow  News,  n.  36,  September  15-21,1995,  p.  9, 
64  Segodnya,  April  4,1995,  p.  11 
6$  Segodnyaa,  May  18,1995,  p.  1 
66  Segodnya.  April  4,1995,  p.  11 
67  Kommersant'-Daily,  March  31,1995,  p.  1 
68  The  Consortium  declared  its  objectives  as:  (1)  co-ordinating  contacts  between  the  bankers  and  state 
agencies;  (2)  settling  disputes  among  the  founding  banks;  and  (3)  mediating  between  the  state  and  structures 
that  have  not  joined  the  consortium.  Kommersant'-Daily.  April  5,1995,  p.  5. 
181 loan.  Then  the  consortium  would  invite  tenders  for  the  right  to  participate  in  the  fiduciary 
management  of  the  companies'  shares.  Tenders  indicating  the  amount  of  credit  the  banks 
were  willing  to  provide  would  be  submitted  both  by  consortium  members  and  by  non- 
members.  Conditions  of  the  loan  would  be  negotiated  separately  in  each  case,  although  a 
framework  agreement  would  be  concluded  on  general  terms  for  the  management  of  the 
shares  transferred  to  the  consortium.  69 
Upon  the  expiration  of  the  credit  terms,  on  1  September  1996,  the  state  and  the  banks 
would  arrange  for  the  competitive  sale  of  the  shares,  which  would  be  open,  also  to 
foreigners.  The  banks  that  had  managed  in  trust  the  packets  of  shares  could  not  take  part  in 
the  bids.  Yet,  if  the  banks  had  managed  successfully  the  enterprise,  and  had  increased  its 
initial  value,  they  were  entitled  to  collect  30%  of  the  difference  between  the  basic  price  of 
stock  and  the  final  price  of  it.  70  Between  the  first  and  the  second  term  of  the  shares  for  loan 
scheme,  however,  the  1996  presidential  elections  intervened,  changing  remarkably  the 
Russian  political  landscape. 
In  the  well-known  letter  "Get  out  of  the  empasse"  addressed  to  the  two  presidential 
contenders,  thirteen  oligarchs  expressed  their  concern  that  the  "ideologisation"  of  the 
electoral  campaign  could  open  an  irremediable  divide  in  society.  Taking  a  "patriotic" 
stance,  they  launched  an  appeal  to  all  the  forces  involved  in  the  campaign  for  a  political 
compromise,  to  avoid  the  risk  of  conflict  threatening  the  interests  and  the  very  existence  of 
the  country.  The  primary  fear  was  that  a  communist  victory  could  spur  an  "ideological 
revenge",  and  induce  changes  that  would  be  "final  and  vitally  important"  for  the  whole 
society.  " 
At  the  international  economic  Forum  in  Davos  seven  bankers  and  energy  industrialists, 
headed  by  Boris  Berezovskii,  promised  to  offer  their  financial  and  media  services  to 
69  Kommersant'-Daily,  April  5,1995,  p.  5 
70  Moscow  News,  n.  26,  July  7-13,1996,  p.  9 
71  Kommersant'-Daily,  April  27,1996,  p.  1. 
182 Yel'tsin  72  After  the  electoral  victory  had  been  secured  most  of  them  were  duly 
compensated.  Vladimir  Potanin  was  appointed  Economic  Minister,  and  Boris  Berezovskii 
first  deputy  secretary  of  the  Security  Council.  According  to  journalistic  reports,  Vladimir 
Gusinskii  was  granted  a  personal  conversation  with  the  President,  in  which  the  composition 
of  the  first  post-electoral  government  was  discussed.  The  Minister  of  Defence  Igor 
Radionov  held  consultations  with  some  commercial  banks  before  drafting  a  plan  to 
restructure  the  Army,  and  Prime  Minister  Viktor  Chernomyrdin  appealed  to  representatives 
of  the  largest  banks  to  buy  15  billion  rubles  worth  of  state  obligations.  3  Yet,  most 
importantly,  the  consolidated  group  of  oligarchs  was  in  the  position  of  insiders  when  the 
terms  of  the  shares  for  loan  arrangement  expired. 
What  followed  was  an  internecine  struggle  for  the  control  of  the  Russian  blue  chips, 
Noril'sk  Nikel',  Rosprom,  Szyazinvest.  The  battle  was  fought  through  legal  and  illegal 
instruments,  openly  in  the  media  or  in  backroom  plots  involving  all  the  key  figures  of  the 
political  and  economic  clans.  The  scandal  over  the  Svyazinvest  privatisation,  in  September 
1997,  was  probably  the  most  clamorous  one  and  it  eventually  broke  the  unsteady 
equilibrium  set  by  the  "Davos  pact". 
Not  only  the  bankers,  who  the  year  before  had  arranged  a  truce  to  guarantee  President 
Yel'tsin's  re-election,  sided  again  one  against  the  other.  But  also,  the  silent  agreement 
between  the  bankers  and  the  reformist  wing  in  the  government  was  shattered  by  accusations 
of  illegal  deals  in  support  of  the  privatisation  bid  by  Oneksimbank,  Interrosprom  and 
Deutsche  Bank  group  against  the  Alfa  Group,  Telefonica  de  Espana,  Credit  Swiss  First 
Boston,  LogoVAZ  alliance. 
In  the  media  war  that  ensued,  deputy  prime  minister  Anatolii  Chubais,  who  had  endorsed 
the  deal,  was  characterised  as  an  "authoritarian  and  unscrupulous  politician",  who  "belongs 
to  a  very  dangerous  category  -  that  of  the  cynical  fanatic".  An  article  signed  by 
72  The  "big  seven",  uniting  in  what  has  come  to  be  known  as  the  "Davos  Pact",  included:  Boris  Berezovskii, 
Vladimir  Potanin,  Vladimir  Gusinskii,  Mikhail  Khodorkovsky,  Petr  Aven,  Rem  Vyakhirev,  and  Vagit 
Alekperov. 
183 Berezovsldi,  accused  Chubais  of  deliberately  strengthening  an  oligarchic  tendency  rather 
than  promoting  a  democratic  development,  creating  a  "superoligarchy",  a  de  facto  "gentle 
dictatorship".  74 
The  scandals,  which  closed  the  first  stage  of  relations  between  the  presidency  and  the 
economic  elite,  gave  Yel'tsin  the  opportunity  to  curb  the  political  influence  of  the 
oligarchs.  Feeling  that  the  financial  situation  of  the  country  had  stabilised,  the  reforms 
were  proceeding  steadily,  and  the  credibility  of  the  country  had  been  endorsed  by  Russia's 
acceptance  in  the  Paris  Club,  Yel'tsin  decided  that  the  government  was  no  more  in  need  of 
the  bankers'  support.  In  an  address  to  the  Council  of  the  Federation  the  President  warned: 
"The  state  will  not  tolerate  any  attempt  to  influence  [the  political  course]  on  the  part  of  representatives  of 
business  and  banks.  They  have  to  serve  society,  and  act  for  the  good  of  the  Russians".  75 
The  tense  political  climate  of  the  years  between  1995-1998,  the  corruption  of  business 
power  and  its  rapacious  attitude  towards  ownership  gave  Russia's  neighbours  a  flavour  of 
the  business  style  that  the  oligarchs  might  be  willing  to  export  to  their  neighbouring 
countries. 
The  Foreign  Policy  of  Russian  Business 
Having  acquired  a  degree  of  political  representation  within  the  domestic  institutions, 
economic  agents  aimed  at  gaining  access  also  to  foreign  policy-making.  Engaged  in  an 
expansion  on  foreign  markets,  Russian  companies  developed  distinctive  and  at  times 
contrasting  foreign  policy  agendas,  which  often  conflicted  also  with  the  definition  of 
national  interest  promoted  by  foreign  policy  institutions.  Russian  business'  bid  to  gain 
institutional  support  on  foreign  markets  was  facilitated  by  the  high  degree  of  permeability 
of  the  Russian  foreign  policy  machinery.  Fluidity  in  post-Soviet  institutions  and  a  state  of 
73  Ya.  Skvortsov  (1997),  "Politicheskii  kapital  vykhodit  na  chistuyu  pribyl"',  Kommersant',  n.  9,  March  11, 
1997,  pp.  17-18. 
74  Nezavisimaya  Gazeta,  Sept.  13,1997,  pp  1,6 
75  S.  Viktorov  (1997),  "Kapital  za  bottom",  Kommersant',  n.  35  (241),  Sept.  30,1997,  pp.  11.14 
184 "anarchy"  in  the  foreign  policy-making  process  made  the  system  easily  accessible, 
generating  situations  in  which  "several  foreign  policies"  were  conducted  at  the  same  time.  76 
The  gradual  erosion  of  the  state's  authority,  in  a  context  in  which  market  mechanisms  and 
business  representation  were  poorly  regulated,  failed  to  give  full  and  equal  expression  to 
individual  interests.  Corporate  interests  prospered,  often  turning  the  state's  policies  to  their 
private  benefit  77  Under  Yel'tsin's  presidency,  figures  like  Gennadii  Burbulis,  Mikhail 
Poltoranin,  Aleksandr  Korzliakov,  and,  at  a  later  stage,  Boris  Berezovskii  (and  with  them 
the  set  of  alternative  policy  preferences  they  supported)  gained  large  but  ephemeral 
political  powers.  "Owing  to  their  close  association  with  the  president  some  of  them 
[acquired]  a  significance  in  society  in  general  and  foreign  affairs  that  [was] 
incommensurate  with  their  human  dimension".  78 
A  striking  concentration  of  powers  in  the  hands  of  the  President  was  matched  by 
fragmentation  and  rivalry  among  other  foreign  policy  agencies.  In  the  dim-light  of  the 
presidential  authority,  the  various  institutions  involved  in  foreign  policy  (for  a  summary  of 
their  powers  and  activities  see  table  4.3)  were  often  engaged  in  "a  fierce  and  at  times 
violent  political  struggle"  79  Their  roles  were  defined  more  by  the  balance  of  power 
prevailing  at  the  moment  than  by  a  set  of  codified  rules.  Shifts  of  power  and  alliances 
caused  abrupt  changes  in  the  policy  line  and  institutional  hierarchies.  80 
76  N.  A.  Simonia  (1995),  "  Priorities  of  Russia's  Foreign  Policy  and  the  Way  it  Works",  in  The  Making  of 
Foreign  Policy  in  Russia  and  the  New  States  of  Eurasia,  edited  by  A.  Dawisha  and  K.  Dawisha,  (Armonk:  M. 
E.  Sharpe),  pp.  17-41 
77  V.  Sokolov,  (1996)  "Natsionalniye  ekonomicheskiye  interesy:  vyrabotka  konsensusa",  Mirovava 
Ekonomika  i  mezhdunarodniye  otnosheniya  n.  3,  pp.  5-18 
78  N.  A.  Simonia  (1995),  Op.  Cit. 
79  N.  Malcom,  "Foreign  Policy  Making"  (1996),  in  Internal  Factors  in  Russian  Foreign  Policy,  edited  by  N. 
Malcom  et  al.,  (Oxford:  OUP),  pp.  101-167 
80  Under  Kozyrev,  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  (MFA),  which  was,  de  jure,  the  institution  in  charge  of 
implementing  the  policies  designed  by  the  President,  was often  overshadowed  by  the  Security  Council  and  its 
Secretary.  The  Foreign  Ministry  was  itself  shaken  by  ferocious  inter-departmental  struggles,  prompting 
observers  to  comment  that  "what  appears  to  be  Russian  policy  is  often  either  the  result  of  ad  hoc  decision- 
making  in  response  to  the  pressure  of  international  events,  or  simply  the  free-lancing  by  various  elements  of 
the  Russian  bureaucracy".  Only  Evgenii  Primakov's  appointment  in  January  1996  resored  credit  and  primacy 
to  the  MFA.  S.  Parish  (1996),  "Chaos  in  Foreign  Policy  Decision-Making",  Transitions.  17  May,  pp.  30-33, 
p.  32 
185 Table  4.3.  Foreign  Policy  Institutions,  1994-1998 
INSTITUTION  CHARACTERISTICS  FUNCTIONS 
PRESIDENT  The  presidential  Negotiated  and  signed  treaties, 
administration  contained  1500  accredited  foreign  diplomats, 
members,  with  several  appointed  Russian  diplomats 
departments  in  charge  of  after  consultation  with  Federal 
foreign  policy  Assembly  and  head  of 
Security  Council,  appointed 
members  of  the  cabinet 
without  consulting  the 
parliament. 
Regulated  foreign  policy 
issues  by  decree. 
DuMA  Not  officially  involved  in 
foreign  policy  making,  had 
influence  over  foreign  policy 
though  foreign  policy  and 
defence  policy  committees 
Ratified  and  denounced 
international  treaties,  approved 
the  presidential  appointment 
of  ambassadors. 
MINISTRY  OF  FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS 
SECURITY  COUNCIL 
Overstaffed  with  Soviet  era 
bureaucrats  in  Kozyrev  time, 
prone  to  interdepartmental 
conflicts. 
Established  in  1992,  on  the 
model  of  the  US  National 
Security  council. 
Most  important  members: 
President,  Prime  Minister, 
Council's  Secretary.  Ministers 
of  Defence,  Foreign  Affairs 
and  Interior  are  non-voting 
members. 
Officially  responsible  for 
implementing  the  policies  set 
by  the  president. 
Co-ordinated  and  monitored 
work  by  other  ministries, 
committees  and  departments 
to  ensure  a  unified  political 
line. 
Consultative  body,  made 
recommendations  and 
proposals,  and  prepares 
decisions  for  the  President  on 
security  matters  that  he  would 
implement  by  decree.  It 
covered  internal  and  external 
security  matters. 
MINISTRY  OF  FOREIGN  Established  in  February  1992  Supervised  the  remnants  of  the 
ECONOMIC  RELATIONS  Soviet  system  of  monopoly  of 
Foreign  Trade  organisations, 
promoted  exports,  set  tariffs 
and  import  controls, 
negotiated  international  trade 
agreements. 
186 MINISTRY  OF  RELATIONS  Established  in  1994  after  Overlooked  and  co-ordinated 
WITH  CIS  having  been  a  committee  policy  towards  the  CIS  states 
within  the  government 
Sources:  Richard  Sakwa  (1996),  Russian  Politics  and  Society,  (London:  Routledge,  Second  edition),  pp.  281- 
285 
The  appointment  of  Evgenii  Primakov  as  Foreign  Minister  in  January  1996  marked  a 
turning  point  in  relations  between  foreign  policy  institutions  and  big  business.  Russian 
media  branded  Primakov  a  "moderate  reformer"  and  a  "pragmatist",  and  economic  circles 
hoped  they  could  finally  look  at  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  (MFA)  as  a  supportive 
partner  for  their  activities  abroad.  81  In  an  interview  two  months  after  his  appointment, 
Primakov  identified  the  creation  of  "more  favourable  conditions  for  economic  development 
within  our  country"  as  one  of  Russian  foreign  policy  top  priorities.  82 
The  practice  that  followed,  however,  revealed  the  difficulty  to  reconcile  the  foreign  policy 
preferences  of  big  companies  with  the  official  foreign  policy  line.  The  multiformity  of 
potential  economic  subjects  interested  in  foreign  policy  outcomes,  and  the  discrepancy 
between  private  interests  of  individual  companies  and  what  were  perceived  to  be  Russian 
vital  interests  made  the  co-ordination  of  foreign  policy  agendas  an  almost  impossible  task. 
The  result  was  a  free-for-all  strategy,  in  which  the  most  powerful  companies  tended  to  set 
their  own  foreign  policy  agenda,  irrespective  of  directions  and  instructions  issued  by 
foreign  policy  agencies. 
Primakov  was  accused  of  resorting  to  Soviet-style  policies  using  economic  power  as  an 
instrument  to  achieve  foreign  policy  aims,  rather  than  foreign  policy  as  an  instrument  to 
achieve  economic  power.  The  outcome  was  not  only  economically  damaging,  but  also 
strategically  embarrassing.  83  Gazprom  Chairman,  Rem  Vyakhirev  called  "madness"  the 
MFA  directive  that  commercial  agreements  between  Gazprom  and  Iran  for  the  exploitation 
$1  Izvestiva,  15  May  1996,  p.  6 
82  Izvestiva,  6  March  1996,  p.  3 
83  Energy  diplomacy  was  used  to  try  and  deter  Poland  and  the  Czech  Republic  from  joining  NATO,  but, 
contrary  to  expectations,  the  two  countries  succeeded  in  diversifying  their  supply  sources,  by  switching  to  a 
187 of  South  Caspian  deposits  were  to  be  frozen  until  the  United  Nations  sanctions  towards  Iran 
had  been  lifted.  84 
While  the  number  of  companies  with  foreign  policy  interests  was  potentially  large,  only  a 
few  companies  were  in  a  position  to  play  an  effective  role  on  the  international  arena.  The 
economic  wealth  of  the  company,  its  ability  to  generate  badly  needed  hard  currency,  and  its 
consequential  political  connections  were  the  main  determinant  of  a  company's  foreign 
policy  authority.  Thus,  the  energy  sector,  which  accounted  for  45  %  of  total  Russian 
exports,  and  had  representatives  well  positioned  in  political  circles,  appeared  in  the  mid- 
1990s  as  the  main  lobbyist  in  Russian  foreign  policy. 
The  individual  policies  of  Lukoil  and  Gazprom  were  perceived  to  be  part  of  official 
Russian  policy  towards  foreign  countries.  While,  on  the  other  side,  Lukoil  and  Gazprom 
were  powerful  enough  to  by-pass  foreign  policy  institutions.  The  fact  that  Rem  Vyakhirev, 
whom  the  Ukrainian  press  nicknamed  "the  Godfather  of  Gazprom",  would  accompany 
Prime  Minister  Chernomyrdin  on  his  most  important  visits  abroad  was  seen  as  a  clear 
indicator  of  Gazprom's  preferential  position.  85  As  for  Lukoil,  its  economic  power  allowed 
it  to  conduct  a  foreign  policy  strategy  at  times  in  open  contrast  with  the  Foreign  Ministry, 
lobbying  directly  with  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  President  to  be  allowed  to  participate  in 
foreign  projects.  86 
The  common  interest  of  energy  companies  was  to  promote  international  expansion,  but 
geographical  interests  were  widely  different.  As  European  markets  were  Gazprom's  main 
areas  of  expansion,  preserving  good  relations  with  Western  Europe  was  on  the  top  of 
Gazprom  foreign  policy  agenda.  A  deterioration  in  relations  between  Russia  and  its 
Norwegian  oil  provider.  G.  Sysoev  and  A.  Shumilin  (1997),  "Ministerstvo  Strannikh  Del",  Kommersant',  n. 
44  (250),  2  December,  pp.  39-40 
84  Vyakhirev  clarified  that  Gazprom  would  not  comply  with  the  Foreign  Ministry  decision.  RFE/RL 
Newsline.  7  October  1997 
85A.  Eremenko  (1998a),  "Presidenty  i  Argumenty",  Zerkalo  Nedelii,  N.  5  (174),  31  January 
86  In  1994-96  the  Foreign  Ministry  forbade  Russian  companies  from  participating  in  projects  for  the 
excavation  of  the  Caspian  Sea  basin  until  the  legal  status  of  the  Caspian  had  been  defined.  Yakov  Pappe 
(1997),  "Neftyanaya  i  gazovaya  diplomatiya  Rossii",  Pro  et  Contra.  Vol.  2,  Summer,  pp.  55-72 
188 Western  partners  and  the  extreme  case  of  a  Western  embargo  against  Russia  would  cause 
an  extraordinary  damage  to  Gazprom  exports.  87 
Conversely,  Lukoil  was  not  interested  in  establishing  a  special  relation  with  Western 
Europe,  but  was  rather  concerned  to  improve  relations  with  the  Baltic  States,  which 
represented  40  %  of  its  market.  88  Both  Gazprom  and  Lukoil  shared  interests  in  restoring 
good  relations  with  Ukraine,  Moldova  and  Belarus,  where  strategic  oil  refineries  and  gas 
pipelines  were  located.  Gazprom  was  particularly  active  in  promoting  the  establishment  of 
a  Union  between  Russia  and  Belarus.  89 
After  the  energy  sector,  the  arms  trade  was  the  industry  in  which  the  contradictions 
between  Russian  national  interest  and  interests  of  the  business  companies  appeared  most 
striking.  As  foreign  trade  was  the  only  means  of  support,  the  military-industrial  complex 
was  naturally  oriented  towards  external  markets.  90  Minatom  (the  Ministry  for  Atomic 
Energy),  for  example,  was  animated  by  an  "ideology  of  export",  ready  to  sell  abroad 
nuclear  technologies  and  fuel  services  in  order  to  obtain  the  hard  currency  needed  to  sustain 
and  modernise  its  infrastructure. 
Trade  agreements  were  negotiated  with  China,  Cuba,  India  and  Iran  for  the  construction  or 
completion  of  nuclear  power  reactors  and  for  the  provision  of  training  and  fuel  services.  In 
1995,  a  $800  million  contract  was  signed  with  the  Atomic  Energy  Organisation  of  Iran  to 
complete  a  nuclear  reactor.  91  The  training  of  specialists  and  the  provision  of  nuclear-fuel 
services  included  in  the  contract  were  offered  to  Iran  without  previous  consultations  with 
87  Ibid. 
83  Ibid. 
89  Upon  the  inauguration  of  works  of  the  Belarusian  stretch  of  the  Yamal-Hamburg  pipeline,  Rem Vyakhirev 
praised  Lukashenka  for  being  the  "leading  integrator  in  the  CIS",  and  stressed  the  implications  of  the  project, 
which  would  provide  a  "political  link  between  Russia  and  Belarus".  Jamestown  Monitor.  24  October  1996, 
see  also  A.  Serov  (1997),  "Gazprom  uber  alles",  Itou',  8  April,  pp.  13-14 
90  While  the  only  possible  domestic  buyer,  the  Ministry  of  Defence  lacked  resources  to  purchase  new 
weaponry;  it  has  been  estimated  that  international  arms  trade  financed  more  than  50  %  of  all  weapons 
production  by  Russian  enterprises.  Izvestiya.  September  19,1996,  p.  2 
1  Izvestiva.  April  8,1998,  p.  1 
189 the  MFA  and  stirred  tension  with  the  United  States.  92  Agreements  between  individual  arms 
companies  and  China  were  equally  disruptive,  and  inflicted  a  serious  damage  to  Russian 
security  interests.  93 
The  majority  of  Russian  companies  were  pursuing  a  conventional  program  of  expansion  to 
foreign  markets,  aiming  at  increasing  the  export  of  their  products  aboard.  But,  in  the 
second  half  of  the  1990s,  a  small  number  of  Russian  economic  actors  became  increasingly 
attracted  by  the  opportunities  offered  by  the  upcoming  privatisation  of  strategic  assets  in 
the  former  Soviet  countries.  Seeking  to  earn  an  insider  position  to  influence  the  process  of 
privatisation,  Russian  oligarchs  tried  to  establish  preferential  relations  with  the  presidential 
administrations  of  the  neighbouring  countries,  acquiring  an  institutional  basis  from  which 
to  conduct  their  campaign. 
In  Ukraine,  in  particular,  large-scale  privatisation,  which  had  been  repeatedly  delayed  by 
the  national  parliament,  was  expected  to  begin  towards  the  end  of  1997,  at  the  time  when 
the  Russian  oligarchs  had  reached  the  peack  of  their  political  and  economic  power.  The 
fact  that  the  tactics  experimented  with  during  the  Russian  privatisation  had  proved 
92  J.  C.  Baker  (1997),  "Non-Proliferation  Incentives  for  Russia  and  Ukraine",  Adelphi  Paper  309,  pp.  55-79. 
In  July  1998  the  Iranians  tested  successfully  a  medium  range  ballistic  missile,  the  Shahab  3,  considered 
capable  of  delivering  nuclear  warheads.  According  to  Russian  and  American  estimates,  thanks  to  Russian 
nuclear  co-operation,  Iran  could  be  in  a  position  to  produce  its  own  bomb  within  5-8  years.  Consequently, 
Americans  increased  pressure  on  Moscow  to  freeze  projects  involving  the  transfer  of  dual-use  technologies  to 
Iran.  Se  odn  a  July  25,1998,  p.  3).  This  free-rider  approach  on  the  side  of  Russian  arms  companies  has 
created  tension  with  Washington  on  sale  of  military  technology  more  than  once.  In  July  1998  the  US 
authorities  compiled  a  blacklist  of  seven  Russian  companies  considered  responsible  of  transferring  illegally 
missile  technology  to  Iran,  Libya,  and  South  Korea.  Imports  of  the  seven  companies  to  the  US  were 
prohibited,  and  American  firms  and  American  government  agencies  were  barred  from  providing  the  Russian 
companies  with  financial  or  technological  assistance.  The  accident  raised  the  issue  of  imposing  a  firmer 
control  on  Russian  companies  trading  in  hot  spot  region,  or  facing  the  possibility  of  a  prolonged  friction  with 
Washington,  at  a  stage  when  Russia  was  in  need  of  international  loans.  vesti  July  30,1998,  p.  1) 
93  In  1995,  for  example,  the  Sukhoi  Special  Design  Bureau  in  Khabarovskii  krai  sold  to  China  a  license  to 
produce  the  warplane  SU  27.  Damages  were  of  a  commercial  as  well  as  of  a  strategic  nature.  The  agreement 
had  not  only  meant  the  loss  of  a  further  $1.2  billion  worth  of  commission  to  Russian  enterprises,  and  the  rise 
of  a  potential  competitor  for  the  Russian  aviation  industry  on  the  Asian  market,  but  it  also  provided  for 
additional  weaponry  to  one  of  Russia's  traditional  military  adversaries.  Russian  observers  stressed  the  risks 
that  the  operation  involved  for  Russian  security.  The  Chinese  military  doctrine  calls  Russia  an 
"unquestionable  enemy"  and  a  "belligerent  force".  More  than  60  percent  of  Chinese  combat-ready  forces  are 
intended  to  repel  a  threat  from  Russia.  This  not  withstanding,  Russia  has  been  active  building  up  China's 
military  power,  by  selling  it  new  weaponry:  four  S-300  surface  to  air  missile  systems;  a  submarine  originally 
ordered  by  the  Russian  navy,  later  unable  to  pay  for  it;  10  IL-76  military  cargo  planes;  a  number  of  T-80 
190 successful  for  some,  led  to  the  belief  that  a  vicious  privatisation  struggle  might  be  in  store 
also  for  Ukraine  if  Russian  enterprises  were  allowed  to  dictate  the  rules. 
The  Oligarchs  and  Ukraine 
In  his  capacity  as  first  deputy  secretary  of  the  Security  Council,  and  then  executive 
secretary  of  the  CIS,  Boris  Berezovskii  presented  himself  as  the  official  representative  of 
Russian  business  abroad.  Following  a  self-styled  pragmatist  policy,  Berezovskii  made 
business  interests  and  "economic  pacifism"  the  pillars  of  his  foreign  policy  strategy.  As 
Deputy  Secretary  of  the  Security  Council  he  conducted  ceaseless  operations  in  Chechnya, 
finally  negotiating  a  peace  agreement.  94  His  diplomatic  skills,  but  most  of  all,  the  promise 
of  credit  and  financial  opportunities,  managed  to  win  over  the  natural  distrust  of  the 
Chechen  leadership.  95  In  his  attempt  at  proving  that  in  the  Russian  business  community 
laid  the  primary  responsibility  to  secure  internal  stability,  Berezovskii  emphasised  the  link 
between  the  peace  needs  of  the  country  and  the  interests  of  the  economic  elite.  96 
Berezovskii's  pragmatism  was  welcomed  with  enthusiasm  by  the  CIS  heads  of  state,  which 
put  forward  his  candidature  for  the  position  of  executive  secretary  of  the  CIS.  Ukrainian 
commentators  were  positively  impressed  by  the  "inhuman  energy"  he  had  displayed  in  his 
express  tour  of  the  CIS.  97  Allegedly,  Uzbekistan  moved  from  a  position  of  critical 
opposition  to  Russia,  to  a  position  of  strategic  partnership  during  the  very  Moscow  summit 
in  which  Berezovskii  was  appointed.  Convinced  by  Berezovskii's  proposals  to  promote 
economic  co-operation,  no  more  than  a  week  later,  in  an  official  visit  to  the  Russian  capital, 
President  Karimov  offered  Russian  business  a  full  packet  of  economic  projects  98 
tanks.  (Kommersant'-Daily,  May  25,1996,  p.  2,  Kommersant'  Daily.  July  18,1996,  p.  2,  Nezavisimoe 
Voennoe  Oboozrenie  July25,1996,  pp.  1-2) 
94  A.  Grishkovets  (1996a),  "Berezovsky  otkryl  v  Chechnye  vtoroi  front".  Kommersant,  n.  42,  November  12,, 
pp.  11-12 
Moskovskie  Novosti,  No.  47,  Nov.  24-Dec.  1,1996,  p.  8. 
96  A.  Grishovets  (1996c),  "Boris  Berezovsky:  `Nado  zaplatit'!  i  nikuda  ne  denesh'cya"',  Kommersant',  n.  42, 
November  12,  pp.  13-15 
97  V.  Portnikov  (1998),  "Sig'or  Truffal'dino",  Zerkalo  Nedelii,  n.  18-19,7-15  May,  pp.  1,4 
98  A.  Pivovarov  et  al.  "AOZT  `Sodruzhestvo  Nezavisimykh  Gosudarsty"',  Kommersant'  Vlast',  n.  16-17 
(268-269),  May  12,1998,  pp.  24-25 
191 According  to  more  caustic  observers,  however,  it  was  not  Berezovskii's  energy  that  had 
attracted  favours  within  the  top  echelons  of  the  CIS.  His  control  of  media  outlets  active 
also  on  the  CIS  territories,  the  approach  of  new  presidential  elections  in  the  neighbouring 
countries,  and  his  comment  that  "the  CIS  needs  continuity  of  power"  had  most  probably 
convinced  the  Commonwealth  leaders  of  the  advantages  that  Berezovskii  would  bring  to 
the  Eurasian  space.  99  Leonid  Kuchma  hailed  him  as  a  "new  type  of  politician"  and  an 
"intelligent  man",  while  local  observers  commented  that  Berezovskii  would  seek  in 
Ukraine  what  he  had  sought  in  Chechnya;  "money,  capital,  property".  100  The  quick 
success  he  had  obtained  with  the  Ukrainian  president  was  seen  as  a  sign  that  Berezovskii 
had  already  worked  his  way  through  the  presidential  circle  and  had  found  somebody  close 
to  the  president  who  would  lobby  for  his  interests.  101 
As  Executive  Secretary  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States,  Berezovskii  vowed  to 
bring  economic  pragmatism  to  Russian  foreign  policy.  He  professed  the  use  of  "economic 
pacifism"  as  an  instrument  to  resolve  conflicts  and  incomprehension  within  the  CIS.  102 
Characterising  his  task  as  "building  a  real  Commonwealth",  Berezovskii  confirmed  that 
"private  capital  is  the  only  force  capable  of  consolidating  the  CIS".  103 
"Representatives  of  private  business  know  in  depth  the  problems  on  the  way  of  economic  co-operation  with 
the  CIS  countries,  and  know  also  the  instruments  for  their  solution".  '°4 
A  successive  proposal  of  a  debt  relief  scheme  modelled  on  the  Russian  debt  for  shares 
program  raised  questions  that  Berezovskii  was  indeed  planning  to  export  to  the  CIS 
privatisation  strategies  that  had  poisoned  the  Russian  process.  The  project  was  aimed  at 
settling  the  $8  billion  energy  debt  of  CIS  countries  towards  Russia  (of  which  $2.7  billion 
from  Ukraine,  $1.3  billion  from  Kazakhstan  and  $500  million  from  Belarus).  According  to 
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192 the  plan,  Russian  banks  would  pay  back  to  Russia  the  total  amount  of  the  foreign  debt, 
receiving  in  exchange  Russia's  creditor  rights  to  cash  in  the  debt.  Russian  banks  would 
thus  acquire  from  the  debtor  countries  industrial  facilities  and  infrastructures  considered 
more  valuable  than  the  actual  debt.  '°5 
While  a  number  of  Russian  companies  expressed  interest  in  the  programme,  options  were 
restricted  by  the  fact  that  only  Kyrgizstan  actively  endorsed  the  debt-for-property  scheme, 
and  put  forward  a  list  of  facilities  it  was  willing  to  entrust  to  Russian  banks.  106  A  difficult 
balance  between  internal  and  external  interests  in  the  other  countries  and  the  explosion  of 
the  August  crisis  halted  Berezovskii's  belligerent  plans. 
The  impending  mass  privatisation  process  and  the  nature  of  the  assets  that  would  pass  from 
state  to  private  property  attracted  the  attention  of  the  oligarchs  to  Ukraine.  Gazprom  was 
claiming  gas  fields  in  the  Carpathian  region,  compression  plants  and  gas  pipelines. 
Sibirskii  Aluminium  offered  to  become  a  strategic  partner  of  the  Ukrainian  aluminium 
complex,  investing  in  local  enterprises  $200  million,  while  hoping  to  acquire  ownership  of 
the  Nikolaevsk  aluminium  combine.  107  Oneksimbank  expressed  interest  for  Ukrtelekom, 
while  Yukos  and  Lukoil  were  competing  for  the  Lisichansk  (Linos),  and  the  Odessa  oil 
refineries.  108  The  space  and  aeronautical  complexes  in  Kyiv  and  Dnipropetrovsk,  and  the 
export  military  productions  in  Dnipropetrovsk  or  Kharkiv  figured  among  the  most 
attractive  investment  opportunities  on  the  privatisation  agenda. 
The  fact  that  Ukrainian  enterprises  were  at  least  three  times  cheaper  than  Russian 
enterprises,  while  having  a  similar  rate  of  capital  productivity  led  many  to  believe  that 
Russian  investors  would  be  exceptionally  active  in  the  process.  109  Aware  of  the  stir  that  the 
presence  of  Russian  capital  would  cause  in  Ukraine,  Vladimir  Vinogradov  of  Inkombank 
tried  to  smooth  difficulties.  "We  would  like  to  be  considered  not  as  rivals  in  the  struggle 
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193 for  ownership  on  the  Ukrainian  territory,  but  as  partners  in  the  development  of  our 
countries.  "'  10 
Russian  companies  had  already  tried  to  enter  the  Ukrainian  market,  but  with  scarce  success. 
Distrusting  the  Ukrainian  nationalist  leadership  control  over  transformation  and 
transportation  facilities  vital  for  its  activity,  Gazprom  had  traditionally  aimed  at  acquiring 
the  ownership  of  Ukrainian  strategic  assets.  In  1995  it  had  put  forward  the  names  of  fifteen 
enterprises,  including  ferrous  alloy  plants  and  gas  storage  and  transportation  facilities, 
claiming  a  30-50%  share  as  partial  payment  for  Ukraine's  $1.5  billion  debt.  "  But 
Ukrainian  nationalists'  preoccupation  that  the  acquisition  of  Ukrainian  assets  by  Russian 
investors  would  result  in  a  loss  of  political  independence  had  blocked  the  plan  and  made  it 
difficult  to  implement  any  other  related  project. 
The  urgency  of  external  financing  for  the  state  budget,  however,  and  the  increasing 
opposition  of  international  lenders  to  cover  the  Ukrainian  deficit,  gave  Russian  companies 
the  hope  that  the  Ukrainian  authorities  would  be  more  forthcoming  this  time.  The  "big 
privatisation"  could  become  for  Kyiv  an  opportunity  to  replenish  their  budget.  Already 
$600  million  out  of  the  $11  billion  projected  1998  budget  income  had  been  set  to  come 
from  privatisation.  112  While  it  was  estimated  that  Russian  investors  could  bring  to  the 
Ukrainian  economy  a  profit  in  the  range  of  $1  billion.  113 
The  February  1998  ten-year  Agreement  on  Economic  Co-operation  between  Russia  and 
Ukraine  officially  opened  Ukrainian  privatisation  to  Russian  investors.  In  the  meeting  that 
accompanied  the  signature  of  the  treaty  Kuchma  and  Yel'tsin  spoke  in  favour  of  Russian 
and  Ukrainian  businesses  having  free  access  to  each  other's  market,  stepping  up  investment 
policies  on  a  mutually  beneficial  basis  and  creating  international  financial  and  industrial 
groups.  The  fuel  and  energy  complex,  the  space  sector,,  nuclear  power  engineering, 
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194 electronics  aircraft  building,  transport  and  agriculture  were  cited  as  the  primary  areas  of  co- 
operation.  114 
Significantly,  Kuchma's  visit  to  Moscow  was  preceded  by  talks  in  Kyiv  with  a  delegation 
of  Russian  entrepreneurs,  including  Vladimir  Gusinskii  (Media-Most)  and  Mikhail 
Khodorkovskii  (Yuksi),  to  discuss  the  investment  opportunities  in  Ukraine.  '  15  Among  the 
issues  on  the  table  there  was  the  possibility  for  Russian  capital  to  participate  in  the 
privatisation  of  oil  and  gas  enterprises  in  exchange  of  a  guarantee  of  energy  deliveries  to 
Ukraine.  116  In  particular,  Russian  investors  were  promised  the  right  to  subscribe  to  the  sale 
of  45%  of  the  Linos  oil  refinery  on  condition  that  they  would  re-pay  the  enterprise's  debts 
and  regularly  deliver  no  less  than  $6  million  tons  of  oil  a  year.  "?  Renewed  opposition  by 
the  Verkhovna  Rada,  which  had  already  blocked  a  November  1997  presidential  decree 
allowing  international  tenders  for  a  number  of  blue  chip  enterprises,  led  Russian  observers' 
to  believe  that  the  agreement  would  never  be  implemented!  18 
Large-scale  privatisation  represented  the  first  real  opportunity  for  the  penetration  of 
Russian  capital  in  Ukraine,  because  despite  all  the  protests  and  concern  expressed  by  the 
nationalists,  Russian  investment  had  been  up  to  then  barely  significant.  Trying  to  reassure 
those  who  accused  him  of  having  sold  Ukraine  to  the  Russians,  President  Kuchma 
produced  a  figure  of  $150  million  of  Russian  investment  over  a  total  of  $2  billion  foreign 
direct  investment  since  independence.  "It  is  ridiculous  to  say  that  Russian  capital  will  eat 
up  Ukraine!  There  is  not  enough  Russian  capital  even  in  Russia,  even  for  Russia"-  Kuchma 
exclaimed.  119 
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195 Official  statistics  painted  an  even  grimmer  picture.  In  1997  the  total  amount  of  investment 
from  the  CIS  and  the  Baltic  States  in  Ukraine  was  $67.7  million,  40%  less  than  in  1996.120 
Investment  from  Russia  had  remained  constant  through  the  years  since  1995,  with  an 
exceptional  rise  in  1996  when  a  $2  billion  capital  flow  (invested  primarily  in  bonds)  was 
registered  in  association  with  the  uncertainty  of  the  Russian  presidential  elections.  121  In 
1994  and  1995  the  proportion  of  Russian  investment  to  Ukraine  had  been  only  4  and  5%  of 
the  total  (against  20  and  22%  of  the  US  and  21  and  17%  of  Germany).  This  figure  was 
below  the  share  of  investment  from  Cyprus  (6%  and  5%),  where  Ukrainian  and  Russian 
illegal  capital  was  often  laundered.  122 
Admittedly,  the  data  above  do  not  provide  the  full  picture  of  Russian  investment  in  Ukraine 
for  the  period  under  investigation,  as  a  number  of  Russian  businesses  were  involved  in  the 
neighbouring  country  through  affiliated  resident  companies  or  puppet  companies  legally 
registered  in  the  West.  The  practice  allowed  Russians  to  by-pass  Ukrainian  regulation, 
which,  for  example,  restricted  some  type  of  business  -  as  gas  supply  -  only  to  Ukrainian 
residents.  Also,  the  Western  flag  afforded  Russian  business  an  aura  of  credibility  and 
prestige  that  made  it  more  palatable  to  independence  conscious  Ukrainians.  123 
Participation  in  a  Ukrainian  bank,  or  the  opening  of  a  branch  in  Ukraine  was  key  in  the 
Russian  banks'  strategy  of  expansion.  According  to  figures  published  in  1997,  out  of  the 
200  commercial  banks  operating  at  the  time  in  Ukraine,  six  were  representatives  of  Russian 
banks  (Oneksimbank,  Rossiiskii  Kredit,  National  Reserve  Bank,  Inkombank,  Kreditimpeks, 
and  Mezhkombank).  124  Twelve  Ukrainian  banks  registered  the  participation  of  Russian 
capital;  among  these  Lukoil  Imperial  Bank,  active  in  Bank  Ukraina,  the  agricultural  sector 
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196 authorised  bank,  and  Oneksimbank,  which  had  become  a  shareholder  to  save  the  Ukrainian 
Yuneks  Bank  from  bankruptcy.  125 
Russian  banks  were  engaged  in  the  trade  of  the  $1.4  billion  government  obligation  issued  in 
1995  by  the  Ukrainian  Ministry  of  Finance  to  cover  the  energy  debt  with  Gazprom.  The 
largest  investor  in  the  sector  was  the  National  Reserve  Bank,  which  owned  a  $850  million 
packet.  126  In  addition  to  that,  Russian  banks  in  Ukraine  performed  the  role  of  intermediary 
between  enterprises  across  the  border,  especially  in  the  metal  and  aviation-building  sector, 
served  Russian  enterprises  involved  in  projected  transnational  financial-industrial  groups, 
and  functioned  as  clearing-houses  for  bilateral  trade.  127 
Alongside  banks,  Russian  brokering  houses  (such  as  Alfa  Capital)  had  made  their 
appearance  in  Ukraine,  issuing  and  circulating  securities  on  the  Ukrainian  stock  market, 
and  working  on  corporate  and  state  securities  on  the  secondary  market.  Capitalising  on 
their  experience  in  Russian  privatisation,  Russian  brokering  houses  were  actively  involved 
in  the  Ukrainian  privatisation  process,  buying  shares  at  auctions  and  investment  tenders. 
Russian  investors  in  Ukraine  displayed  a  considerable  interest  in  short-term  speculative 
activities,  trading  in  state  bonds  (OVSGZ),  treasury  bills,  eurobonds,  and  trade  equities.  In 
1997  the  Ukrainian  stock  market  generated  profits  in  the  range  of  62%  of  the  initial 
investment,  raising  expectations  that  after  the  Russian  boom  (the  Russian  market  provided 
in  1997  120%  profits  on  the  initial  investment),  Ukraine  would  be  the  "next  Russia".  The 
small  size  of  the  Ukrainian  market  and  its  low  level  of  liquidity,  however,  proved  a 
distinctive  obstacle  to  this  expansion.  128 
So  much  activity  on  the  Russian  side,  however,  was  met  by  a  more  than  cautious  attitude  in 
Ukraine.  The  Ukrainian  reluctance  to  initiate  the  process  of  mass  privatisation,  the 
approaching  of  the  presidential  election,  and  the  political  uncertainty  associated  to  it  slowed 
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197 down  significantly  Russian  oligarchs'  plans  to  expand  in  Ukraine.  But  what  definitively 
froze  any  movement  in  this  direction  was  the  eruption  of  the  1998  financial  crash. 
The  deterioration  of  the  Asian  crisis  and  fears  that  the  financial  instability  would  also  infect 
Russia  convinced  President  Yel'tsin  and  the  oligarchs  to  seek  again  an  accord.  In  an 
attempt  to  institutionalise  their  political  rule  in  a  "virtual  second  government",  with  the 
creation  of  a  permanent  council  of  experts  for  the  president,  the  powerful  economic  actors 
granted  their  approval  to  Sergei  Kirienko's  cabinet,  and  promised  to  support  the  effort  at 
economic  stabilisation.  Their  pledge  to  refrain  from  "political  games",  however,  was  not 
sufficient  to  halt  the  wave  of  investor  panic  that  on  17  August  burst  the  bubble  of  the 
Russian  economy.  129 
The  decision  of  the  Russian  government  simultaneously  to  devalue  the  rouble,  default  on 
foreign  debt  and  introduce  capital  controls  imposed  a  suspension  of  activity  on  the  financial 
market,  a  drop  in  the  volume  of  transactions  on  the  currency,  inter-bank  and  security 
markets.  Most  Russian  banks  became  illiquid,  and  especially  those  with  foreign  debts 
became  unable  to  service  them.  While  economic  activity  decreased  rapidly  inflation  rose  to 
43%  in  the  first  weeks  of  September.  130 
As  a  result  of  the  crisis,  a  number  of  banks,  among  which  Aleksand  Smolenskii's  SBS- 
Agro  and  Vladimir  Vinogradov's  Inkombank  went  bankrupt.  Alfa  Bank  survived  thanks  to 
its  limited  involvement  in  the  short-term  security  market,  Potanin's  Oneksimbank  was 
forced  to  reduce  its  activities,  while  other  groups  like  Gazprom  and  Lukoil  considered  a 
merge.  Groups  engaged  in  natural-resources  extraction,  like  Menatep  and  LogoVAZ 
(Yuksi)  were  relatively  unhurt.  131 
129  Nezavisimava  Gazeta,  6  June  1998,  p.  3,  Nezavisimaya  Gazeta.  18  June  1998,  pp.  1,3,  Kommersant' 
Daily,  20  June  1998,  p.  1,  A.  Bagrov  (1998),  "Snova  v  stroyu",  Kommersant'  Vlast',  n.  22,16  July  1998,  pp. 
28-29 
130  P.  Hanson  (1999),  "The  Russian  Economic  Crisis",  Europe-Asia  Studies,  Vol.  51,  n.  7,  pp.  1141-1166 
131  P.  Rutland  (1998)  "How  Russia  is  Ruled,  1998",  Radio  Free  Europe/Radio, 
http:  //www.  rferi.  org/nca/special/ruwlioruies/index.  htmi 
198 Strangled  by  a  liquidity  crisis  Russian  businesses  in  Ukraine  were  forced  to  downsize  or  to 
withdraw  all  together.  Fears  that  Russian  capital  would  buy  up  the  Ukrainian  economy 
subsided,  while  the  drop  in  asset  prices  opened  windows  of  opportunity  to  investors  who 
had  an  interest  in  more  long-term  rather  than  speculative  engagement.  Russian  and 
Ukrainian  policy-makers  had  pointed  to  the  transnational  financial  industrial  group  as  an 
instrument  to  further  bilateral  co-operation.  Could  TFIGs  provide  a  framework  for 
mutually  beneficial  economic  interaction? 
Transnational  FIGs 
Plans  to  establish  transnational  financial-industrial  groups  (TFIGs)  as  an  instrument  to 
foster  economic  co-operation  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  were  largely  unsuccessful.  The 
slowness  in  overcoming  the  technical  obstacles  to  the  effective  operation  of  the  groups  or 
the  resistance  to  the  idea  of  TFIGs  can  be  interpreted  as  a  further  testimony  of  the  lack  of  a 
widespread  convergence  of  interests  between  economic  actors  in  Russia  and  in  Ukraine. 
TFIGs  were  conceived  as  "locomotives  of  integration"  in  the  former  Soviet  space,  able  to 
promote  gradual  economic  integration,  combining  international  co-operation  and  the 
concrete  interests  of  banks  and  enterprises  in  the  region.  132  Within  their  framework, 
industrial  enterprises  were  encouraged  to  re-establish  Soviet-era  industrial  connections  that 
would  revitalise  grassroot  interest  towards  co-operation  within  the  CIS.  Members  of  the 
structure  would  represent  an  "industrial  capital"  independent  from  territorial  location, 
naturally  interested  in  setting  up  an  optimal  level  of  inter-sectoral,  industrial  and  techno- 
scientific  co-operation.  133  Their  capacity  to  satisfy  common  economic  necessities  was 
viewed  as  an  opportunity  to  counterbalance  the  rise  of  nationalism  in  the  countries  of  the 
former  Soviet  Union  and-defuse  ideological  conflicts  and  incomprehension. 
132  Nezavisimaya  Gazeta,  27  August  1994,  p.  1-2 
133  S.  Golubeva  (1996),  "rransnatsionalizatsiya  Rossiiskikh  FPG",  Rossiskii  Ekonomicheskii  Zhurnal  n.  7, 
pp.  29-36 
199 As  with  many  other  CIS  agreements  and  projects,  however,  transnational  groups  were  also 
affected  by  the  same  problems  that  multilateral  interaction  experienced  in  the  post-Soviet 
arena.  Firstly,  a  formal  commitment  to  co-operation  was  often  met  by  the  difficulty  to 
harmonise  increasingly  divergent  national  legislation  and  economic  practices.  Secondly, 
the  particular  activism  of  Russian  enterprises  and  the  relative  weakness  of  their 
counterparts  in  the  former  Soviet  space  raised  concerns  among  non-Russian  actors  that 
TFIGs  would  become  an  instrument  to  reassert  Russian  economic  and  eventually  political 
supremacy  over  them. 
The  idea  of  TFIGs  appeared  for  the  first  time  in  the  December  1993  "Agreement  for  the 
Creation  of  an  Economic  Union",  in  which  the  parties  agreed  to  "promote  the  creation  of 
joint  transnational  industrial  entrepreneurial  unions,  and  a  net  of  commercial  and  credit- 
financial  institutions  and  organisations".  To  encourage  the  emergence  of  transnational 
structures,  enterprises  were  promised  breaks  in  export  duties,  taxes,  and  trade  restrictions, 
and  were  guaranteed  the  right  to  open  accounts  in  local  banks.  134 
In  the  1994  agreement  on  "Intervention  for  the  Creation  and  Development  of  Industrial 
Associations",  CIS  members  reaffirmed  their  commitment  to  this  approach.  They  vowed  to 
provide  "support  for  the  development  of  effective  forms  of  industrial,  techno-scientific, 
investment,  insurance,  commercial  joint  activities,  and  to  co-ordinate  their  actions  to 
support  the  establishment  and  the  development  of  transnational  associations".  In  particular 
it  was  agreed  to  establish  convenient conditions  for: 
   the  co-operation  of  enterprises  basing  their  activities  on  close  technological  ties, 
   the  specialisation  and  co-operation  in  production, 
   the  realisation  of  inter-state  programs,  industrial  and  economic  projects, 
   the  creation  of  joint  trade  organisations  aiming  at  the  utmost  development  of  direct 
trade-economic  ties  between  economic  subjects, 
'34  For  a  collection  of  the  documents  that  underpinned  the  development  of  transnational  financial-industrial 
groups,  Yu.  B.  Vinslav  and  S.  S.  Golubeva  (ed.  ),  Reintegratsiya  postsoyusnogo  ekonomicheskogo 
prostranstva  i  stanovlenie  transnatsional'nykh  finansog-promyshlennykh  grupp  v  Rossi,  (Moscow:  REZh), 
Appendix  1,  pp.  139-175 
200    the  guarantee  of  effective  credit-financial  services  of  enterprises  taking  part  in  the 
transnational  associations 
   the  issue  and  distribution  of  shares  and  other  bonds  belonging  to  the  transnational 
associations, 
   the  participation  in  joint  investment  projects,  the  establishment  of  joint  insurance 
companies. 
Transnational  associations  would  be  established  on  the  basis  of  inter-state  agreements,  or 
through  spontaneous  agreements  between  economic  subjects.  Yet,  the  fact  that  the  group's 
activities  were  expected  to  be  regulated  by  the  legislation  of  the  country  where  the 
association  was  located  represented  one  of  the  most  difficult  obstacles  for  its  effective 
operation.  Groups  were  subjected  to  widespread  variations  in  investment  conditions  and 
difficulties  in  co-ordinating  their  activity  with  the  parent  company,  which,  if  located  in  a 
different  country,  would  be  exposed  to  different  regulation. 
Harmonisation  in  areas  like  tax,  customs  and  financial  legislation,  reciprocal  bank  accounts 
and  relations  between  banks  and  other  financial  and  credit  institutions,  property,  investment 
and  profit  sharing  regulation  was  advocated  as  a  means  to  speed  up  management 
bottlenecks.  135  Efforts  made  in  this  sense  by  the  inter-factional  groups  in  the  Russian, 
Ukrainian,  Belarusian  and  Kazakh  parliaments  since  1994  registered  scarce  success.  136 
In  a  seminar  held  by  the  Commercial-Industrial  Chambers  of  the  Russian  Federation,  with 
the  economic  committee  of  the  Economic  Union  and  the  Association  of  Russian  FIGs,  in 
the  spring  of  1997,  representatives  pointed  out  the  lack  of  implementation  of  transnational 
groups.  The  existing  tax  systems,  the  payments  crisis,  the  unstable  social  and  political 
situation,  the  insufficient  degree  of  preparation  of  cadres  were  blamed  as  the  most 
135  Yu.  Belaev  (1997),  "Finansovo-promyshlennykh  grupp:  opyt  i  problemy",  Finans  n.  5,  p.  58 
136  Promoted  in  the  Russian  Duma  by  Nikolay  Gonchar,  at  the  time  Chairman  of  the  Council  of  the 
Federation's  Budget  and  Finance  Committee,  the  aim  of  the  groups  was  to  "bring  about  the  economic 
reintegration  of  the  countries  of  the  former  Soviet  Union  "from  the  bottom",  by  forming  transnational  FIG". 
The  groups  across  the  borders  would  therefore  draft  parallel  laws  on  FIGs  and  get  them  enacted  by  their 
legislative  bodies  (Nezavisimaya  Gazeta  7.10.1994,  p.  1). 
201 significant  impediments  to  the  establishment  and  development  of  transnational  FIGs,  which 
remained  "at  the  stage  of  projects  and  good  will  agreements".  137 
In  addition  to  the  technical  problems,  transnational  groups  often  experienced  fierce  hostility 
within  hosting  countries.  Ukrainian  observers  were  concerned  that  Russia  would  establish 
transnational  groups  under  its  auspices  to  renew  "the  tradition  of  colonial  exploitation 
threatening  national  security".  138  TFIGs  would  become  a  mechanism  to  exert  Russian 
influence  on  other  CIS  countries  through  firm  control  over  the  neighbours'  economics 
sectors.  The  economic  supremacy  of  Russian  investors  and  the  relative  inexperience  of 
their  Ukrainian  counterparts  would  inevitably  create  an  unbalanced  relation  within  the 
framework  of  the  TFIGs. 
Taking  advantage  of  their  weak  and  incomplete  legislation,  Russian  enterprises  would 
acquire  the  lion's  share  of  profits  deriving  from  their  joint  activity.  Russian  capital  would 
be  able  to  dictate  law  in  the  division  of  labour  between  partner  enterprises,  diminishing 
Ukrainian  companies  to  the  role  of  providing  cheap  manpower,  raw  material,  and  semi- 
finished  products.  In  the  long-run  this  strategy  would  weaken  Ukrainian  companies' 
competitiveness,  restrict  their  access  to  the  market,  and  exacerbate  their  economic 
dependence  on  Moscow.  139 
The  result  of  the  combined  effects  of  divergent  legislation  and  nationalistic  opposition  to 
the  TFIGs  project  meant  that,  despite  the  frequent  statements  by  Commonwealth  leaders  on 
the  creation  of  hundreds  of  groups,  the  practice  saw  very  few  examples  of  implementation. 
In  the  case  of  Russia  and  Ukraine,  for  example,  press  reports  announced  that  in  1995  only, 
tao  one  hundred  transnational  FIGs  would  be  established. 
137  Yu.  Belaev  (1997),  "Finansovo-promyshlennykh  grupp:  opyt  i  problemy",  Finansv,  n.  5,  p.  58 
138  Oleg  Soskin,  Advisor  to  the  President  of  Ukraine  on  economic  issues,  Director  of  the  Institute  of  Society 
Transformation,,  interview  with  the  author,  Kyiv,  27  November  1998 
139  V.  Koval,  (1996)  "Problemi  Stvorennia  Finansovo-Promislovikh  Grup  v  Ukraini",  Ekonomika  Ukraine, 
October,  pp.  39-44 
140  Ekonomicheskie  Novosti  Rossii  i  Sodruzhestva,  no.  20,  October  1995 
202 Up  to  1998,  however,  there  was  incontrovertible  information  regarding  the  activity  of  only 
one  group,  the  Ukrtatneft  financial  industrial  corporation  established  between  Ukraine  and 
Tatarstan  to  refine  Tatar  oil  in  the  Keremenchuk  oil  refinery  in  Poltava.  '4'  A  number  of 
other  partnerships,  however,  like  Mezhdunarodnie  Aviamotory,  responsible  for  the  AN-  40 
Russian-Ukrainian  project,  preferred  to  work  under  the  juridical  form  of  "associations", 
avoiding  the  red  tape  that  could  arise  from  official  registration.  '42 
As  in  the  case  of  Russian  financial  industrial  groups,  there  was  a  further  possibility  for  the 
expansion  of  transnational  FIGs.  This  would  be  attached  to  the  emergence  of  spontaneous 
groups,  born  out  of  the  acquisition  of  enterprises'  shares  by  a  powerful  bank  (most 
probably  a  Russian  bank).  Both  Inkombank  and  Alfa  Capital  were  moving  along  that 
route. 
Inkombank,  which  was  technically  a  Ukrainian  bank,  with  100%  of  Russian  capital,  was 
engaged  in  a  project  to  extend  the  number  of  subsidiary  structures,  especially  in  the  agro- 
industrial  sector,  where  Agroinkom  and  Inkomleasing  were  working.  As  a  result  of  this 
strategy,  Inkombank  created  a  sort  of  very  loose  financial  industrial  group,  without  direct 
connections  between  the  enterprises,  and  with  the  bank  on  top  of  the  structure.  143 
Alfa  Capital,  which  was  a  subsidiary  of  Alfa  Bank  and  Alfa  Capital  in  Moscow,  was 
similarly  establishing  an  informal  financial-industrial  group,  and  already  owned  shares  in 
pharmaceutical,  gas  and  computer  companies.  As  opposite  to  what  happened  to  other 
groups,  Alfa  Capital  encountered  a  more  favourable  environment  for  the  creation  of  its 
TFIG  after  the  August  1998  crisis. 
Following  the  financial  melt-down,  the  structure  shifted  from  a  brokerage  service  to  a 
strategic  partnership  plan,  promoting  the  development  of  the  investment  banking  sector. 
Lower  prices  of  Ukrainian  enterprises  convinced  the  management  of  the  company  to  buy 
141  OMRI  Daily  Digest.  12  July  1998 
142  Ivan  Byk,  first  vice  Director  of  the  State  Economic  Division,  Ministry  of  Industrial  Policy,  interview  with 
the  author,  Kyiv,  24  November  1998 
203 shares.  Yet,  the  short  time  frame  of  economic  plans  and  the  possibility  that  more 
convenient  investment  could  arise,  prompting  the  company  to  sell  and  "move  on",  made 
Alfa  Capital  a  particularly  fluid  and  speculation-prone  group.  '44 
Given  the  technical  and  ideological  problems  that  state-led  transnational  financial  industrial 
groups  presented,  especially  in  relation  to  Russia  and  Ukraine,  bank-led  spontaneous 
financial  industrial  groups  seemed  to  provide  the  most  likely  opportunity  for  Russian 
investment  in  Ukraine.  There  were,  however,  two  problems  connected  with  them. 
First,  experience  demonstrated  that  Russian  companies  establishing  their  TFIGs  in  Ukraine 
were  primarily  moved  by  speculative  motives,  aiming  at  maximising  revenues  in  the 
shortest  possible  time,  ready  to  leave  the  enterprises  they  had  bought  up  if  expectations  of 
revenues  fell.  Investment  strategies  appeared  therefore  defined  in  a  short-term  frame, 
confirming  the  Ukrainian  nationalists'  stereotype  of  Russian  capital.  Second,  the  expansion 
of  these  groups  was  inevitably  dependent  on  the  wealth  and  economic  stability  of  the  parent 
company.  As  the  financial  crash  in  the  summer  of  1998  demonstrated,  a  drop  in  liquidity 
and  a  climate  of  general  uncertainty  convinced  most  of  the  parent  companies  to  quickly 
withdraw  investments  from  Ukraine. 
Conclusions 
In  this  chapter  I  have  provided  a  portrait  of  the  Russian  economic  elite  and  its  relation  to 
political  power.  I  have  also  identified  the  main  foreign  policy  interests  of  the  Russian 
economic  elite  and  outlined  their  strategy  of  expansion  in  Ukraine.  I  have  focused  on  a 
relatively  small  segment  of  the  Russian  economic  elite:  the  oligarchs.  The  Russian 
economic  elite  was  certainly  a  more  widely  diversified  social  group,  with  different  and 
conflicting  interests  across  sectoral  and  regional  dimensions.  Beyond  the  plans  of 
expansion  of  the  oligarchs  in  Ukraine,  there  were  also  examples  of  successful  joint- 
143  Gennadii  Trofimenko,  Head  of  the  Press-Services,  Inkombank  Ukraine,  interview  with  the  author,  Kyiv  6 
November  1998 
144  Mikhail  Karpilovsky,  interview  with  the  author  Op.  Cit. 
204 ventures  between  Russian  and  Ukrainian  enterprises.  Russian  capital  was  certainly  looked 
at  as  a  life-saving  investment  opportunity  in  some  areas  and  sectors  in  Ukraine. 
There  are,  however,  two  reasons  that  make  it  worthwhile  to  concentrate  on  the  activities  of 
the  Russian  conglomerates.  Firstly,  the  fact  that  the  oligarchs  had  successfully  worked 
their  way  into  the  corridors  of  political  power  in  Moscow  gave  their  strategies  an 
institutional  endorsement.  Thanks  to  their  connections  to  the  government,  Gazprom's 
interests  were  de  facto  identified  with  the  national  interest  of  Russia.  When  Boris 
Berezovskii  travelled  to  the  CIS  in  his  capacity  as  executive  secretary  of  the 
Commonwealth,  he  sought  to  establish  relations  and  push  through  decisions  that  would 
benefit  also  his  business  interests. 
Secondly,  the  scandals  and  the  illegal  practices  that  accompanied  the  second  stage  of 
Russian  privatisation  gave  the  oligarchs  wide  notoriety  and  made  their  strategies 
representative  of  the  approach  that  the  whole  Russian  business  community  would  have 
adopted  if  allowed  to  penetrate  the  CIS  markets.  Russian  capital  in  Ukraine  was  perceived 
as  a  speculative,  short-term  profit  oriented  business.  The  emphasis  on  ownership  rather 
than  long-term  development  became  a  major  deterrent  for  Ukrainian  entrepreneurs.  The 
dirty  tricks  that  had  characterised  the  Russian  privatisation,  the  pervasive  corruption  and 
the  large-scale  embezzlement  that  had  enriched  the  Russian  oligarchs  raised  fears  that  the 
same  methods  could  be  adopted  in  Ukraine  had  the  Russian  elite  gained  an  insider  position 
to  control  the  whole  process. 
The  primary  concern  of  the  just  emerging  Ukrainian  economic  elite,  however,  was  that  they 
would  not  be  able  to  compete  against  the  relatively  large  Russian  financial  empires.  The 
aggressive  business  style  of  the  Russian  conglomerates,  then,  gave  Ukrainian  entrepreneurs 
the  opportunity  to  justify  their  claims  for  protectionism  as  an  instrument  to  defend  the 
economic  and  political  independence  of  the  country.  Fears  of  being  dwarfed  in  and  ejected 
from  their  own  market  prompted  the  Ukrainian  elite  to  regroup  in  support  of  a  strategy 
aimed  at  defending  "national  capital"  as  an  instrument  to  preserve  the  country's  newly 
acquired  sovereignty. 
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The  Ukrainian  Economic  Elite 
The  increasing  influence  of  the  Russian  oligarchs  on  their  domestic  arena,  and  plans  to 
expand  their  power-base  to  neighbouring  countries  during  the  forthcoming  process  of 
privatisation  were  met  in  Ukraine  by  calls  for  the  protection  of  the  domestic  market 
expressed  through  a  nationalist  rhetoric.  With  Ukrainian  strategic  assets,  crucial  for  the 
development  of  Russian  companies  (pipelines  and  refineries)  expected  to  be  sold  at  prices 
significantly  lower  than  in  Russia,  the  approaching  large-scale  privatisation  was  viewed  by 
Russian  entrepreneurs  as  an  unmissable  opportunity.  The  fact  that  the  Ukrainian 
presidency,  under  Leonid  Kuchma,  appeared  to  be  more  favourably  inclined  towards 
Russia  that  it  had  been  under  his  predecessor,  led  the  Russian  oligarchs  to  believe  that  all 
the  right  conditions  were  in  place  to  consolidate  "economic  co-operation"  between  Russia 
and  Ukraine.  There  were,  however,  a  number  of  factors  that  had  not  been  taken  into 
account. 
The  election  of  Leonid  Kuchma  to  the  Ukrainian  presidency,  in  1994,  was  read  by  many  as 
a  sign  that  aspirations  towards  increasingly  close  economic,  and  possibly  political  co- 
operation  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  would  find  expression  in  the  country's  foreign 
policy  course.  Kuchma  was  elected  on  a  programme  that  rejected  much  of  the  Kravchuk 
era  nationalism  and  instead  proposed  closer  links  to  Russia  and  a  restoration  of  the  cultural 
pre-eminence  of  the  Russian-speaking  population  of  Ukraine.  Instead,  however,  of  a  union 
with  Moscow  and  expansion  of  economic  links  to  the  east,  the  first  Kuchma  presidency  was 
characterised  by  the  emergence  and  consolidation  of  a  national  economic  elite,  which  acted 
to  resist  the  penetration  of  external  actors  into  key  economic  sectors. 
In  the  period  between  1994-1998,  Kuchma  and  key  business  actors  developed  an  ideology 
for  the  protection  of  the  national  economy  encapsulated  in  the  concept  of  `national 
206 bourgeoisie'.  Ukraine,  it  was  maintained,  could  only  develop  through  the  creation  of  an 
indigenous  class  of  property  owners.  This  class  would  provide  the  foundations  for  the 
consolidation  of  national  independence,  promote  democratisation  and  further  stimulate 
economic  growth.  In  this  view,  the  national  bourgeoisie  would  serve  as  the  locomotive  of 
development  and  would  foster  an  improvement  in  living  standards  for  the  whole 
population. 
Expectations  of  co-operation  and  economic  integration  between  Russia  and  Ukraine,  then, 
failed  to  materialise  mainly  because  of  the  emergence  of  a  more  powerful  idea  of  national 
economic  development  for  Ukraine,  which  generated  competing  rather  than  convergent 
policy  preferences  between  business  actors  in  Ukraine  and  Russia.  At  the  heart  of  this 
antagonism  was  the  set  of  interests  produced  by  the  structure  of  economic  liberalisation  in 
both  post-Soviet  states.  In  both  Russia  and  Ukraine,  economic  liberalisation  created  a 
business  class  with  strong  interests  in  ownership  rather  than  production.  Economic 
instability,  an  uncertain  rule  of  law  and  the  lack  of  significant  investment  capital  channelled 
business  actors  toward  rent  seeking  activity  rather  than  production  as  a  source  of  wealth 
generation. 
By  the  mid-1990s  liberalisation  in  Ukraine  was  at  a  far  earlier  stage  than  in  Russia,  while 
the  country  lacked  the  large  business  groups  that  dominated  economic  life  in  Moscow. 
Through  Kuchma  and  with  the  rhetoric  of  fostering  a  national  bourgeoisie,  the  Ukrainian 
business  elite  sought  to  consolidate  its  limited  power,  and  to  translate  its  relative  economic 
wealth  into  political  capital.  Gradual  and  partial  privatisation,  coupled  with  the 
development  of  business  practices  strongly  dependent  on  political  favours,  strengthened  the 
position  of  a  rent-seeking  business  elite,  which  made  use  of  its  proximity  to  political  power 
to  assure  and  expand  its  control  over  the  national  wealth. 
With  the  1998  parliamentary  elections  and  the  campaign  preceding  the  1999  presidential 
elections,  the  economic  elite  gained  an  opportunity  to  establish  control  over  the  economic 
policy-malting  process.  This  happened  at  a  time  when  vital  decisions  relating  to  business 
207 legislation  and  the  relaxation  of  privatisation  regulations  were  expected.  Through 
Kuchma's  first  term  in  office,  the  presidential  patronage  network,  which  had  emerged 
around  a  regional  clan  structure,  evolved  into  a  rudimentary  party  system.  A  more 
formalised  regime  of  mutual  support  between  business  and  the  presidential  apparatus  was 
then  established  in  the  form  of  "holdings".  An  embryonic  oligarchy  had  taken  root, 
affecting  also  relations  with  Russia. 
In  this  chapter  I  will  examine  the  emergence  of  a  Ukrainian  economic  elite,  its  closeness  to 
the  political  power  and  its  policy  preferences  towards  Russia.  I  will  start  by  analysing  the 
emergence  of  an  ideology  of  "national  bourgeoisie"  as  the  instrument  to  provide  political 
legitimisation  to  a  set  of  business  actors  close  to  the  Kuchma  administration.  In  the  section 
on  the  political  economy  of  reforms,  I  will  look  at  how  a  diversification  between  business 
and  politics  never  took  place  in  Ukraine,  and  how  a  favourable  relationship  with  political 
leaders  helped  economic  actors  to  steer  the  direction  of  reforms. 
In  the  following  two  sections,  I  will  consider  the  evolution  of  relations  between  politics  and 
business  within  the  two  main  centres  of  policy-making,  the  Parliament  and  the  Presidential 
Administration.  In  particular,  I  will  argue  that  relations  between  the  economic  elite  and  the 
presidential  administration  consolidated  through  the  formation  of  regional  political- 
economic  clans,  president-sponsored  parliamentary  fractions,  and  finally,  business 
"holdings".  I  will  maintain  that  the  Kuchma  administration  made  use  of  administrative 
resources,  for  instance,  the  transfer  of  state-owned  shares  into  private  trusts,  as  an 
instrument  of  coalition  and  support  building  within  economic  circles.  The  energy  sector 
will  be  presented  as  an  example  of  this  attitude. 
Finally,  I  will  discuss  the  spreading  of  a  protectionist  mood  articulated  in  the  nationalist 
vocabulary  of  the  necessity  to  defend  the  "national  capital".  Preoccupations  that  a  Russian 
economic  expansion  would  wipe  out  of  the  market  weaker  Ukrainian  business  were 
stronger  in  sectors  that  felt  particularly  exposed.  In  the  last  section  I  will  show  how  the 
lack  of  security  from  external  competition  made  the  banking  and  financial  sector  prone  to 
208 support  the  idea  of  "national  capital". 
Kuchma  and  the  Idea  of  a  "National  Bourgeoisie" 
The  1994  presidential  campaign  was  conducted  by  Leonid  Kuchma  in  the  name  of 
economic  pragmatism,  and  on  a  ticket  of  improved  relations  with  Russia.  Kuchma  pledged 
that,  in  defining  his  policy  towards  Moscow,  he  would  take  into  account  the  objective 
economic  interests  of  industrial  enterprises  on  both  sides  of  the  border,  rather  than  the 
nationalistic  stances  that  had  informed  his  predecessor's  presidency.  Representing  the 
interests  of  those  enterprise  directors,  whose  business  activities  had  been  disrupted  by  the 
collapse  of  the  Soviet  common  economic  space,  mainly  located  in  the  south-eastern  regions 
of  the  country,  Kuchma  gave  voice  to  their  requests  for  co-ordinated  trade,  payment  and 
economic  policies  between  the  two  countries. 
Despite  Kuchma's  repeated  dismissal  of  projects  for  a  common  Eurasian  space  or  a  Slavic 
Union  together  with  Russia  and  Belarus,  voters  voted  for  him  in  anticipation  of  a 
rapprochement  with  Russia.  Expectations  were  that  a  policy  based  on  improved  economic 
co-operation  would  eventually  lead  to  an  economic  reintegration.  '  On  these  grounds, 
Kuchma  received  significant  support  also  in  Russian  political  circles.  Indeed  rumours 
circulated  that  Kuchma's  final  electoral  victory  was  secured  thanks  to  financial  help  from 
the  big  Russian  financial-industrial  groups.  In  the  wake  of  the  privatisation  of  large 
Ukrainian  strategic  plants,  representatives  of  the  "Russian  big  capital"  appeared  only  too 
eager  to  make  sure  that  their  projects  for  future  expansion  into  Ukrainian  markets  would 
win  a  powerful  ally  in  Kyiv's  political  quarters. 
Contrary  to  expectations,  'however,  Kuchma's  first  term  in  office  was  characterised  by  the 
emergence  of  an  ideology  centred  on  the  concept  of  a  `national  bourgeoisie'  as  the  prime 
engine  of  political  and  economic  change  rather  than  integration.  According  to  this  view, 
1  The  idea  of  establishing  an  economic  union  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  had  been  central  of  Kuchma's 
electoral  campaign.  It  was  hoped  that  within  an  economic  union  Ukraine  would  obtain  economic  privileges, 
such  as  special  prices  for  energy  resources.  Nezavisimaya  Gazeta.  July  12,1994,  p.  1 
209 privatisation,  land  reform,  foreign  trade  and  price  liberalisation  would  initiate  widespread 
economic  growth.  This  would  in  turn  generate  an  economic  elite,  a  class  of  proprietors, 
personally  interested  in  the  course  of  reforms,  in  the  progressive  opening  up  of  the 
economy,  and  in  the  preservation  of  the  new  status  quo.  A  developmental  economic  elite 
would  guarantee  the  stability  of  a  democratic  political  system,  and  would  set  the 
preconditions  for  the  emergence  of  a  wealthier  society  altogether.  2 
In  the  rhetoric  of  the  `national  bourgeoisie',  entrepreneurs  were  presented  by  the  president 
as  part  of  a  "new  wave"  ("novaya  volna  "):  new  political  and  business  actors  conscious  of 
their  social  responsibility,  and  actively  involved  in  economic  activities  for  the  common 
good  of  the  country. 
"Entrepreneurs  are  people  who  realise  their  connection  with  the  country,  who  understand  that  fabulous  profits 
sometimes  are  a  loss  for  them,  as  they  are  a  loss  for  the  country.  Earning  money  by  pumping  out  blood  from 
the  country  is  stupid.  What  is  more  profitable  now  are  revenues  that  are  modest  in  speculative  terms,  but  are 
rooted  in  the  development  of  the  enterprises,  not  in  their  fall.  i3 
Kuchma  outlined  also  the  responsibilities  that  the  government  had  towards  the 
entrepreneurial  class. 
"The  government  must  give  to  the  reforms  a  social  direction,  defending  not  only  those  who  have  little  [...  ], 
but  also  all  those  who  can  create  national  wealth.  The  government  must  create  jobs,  give  people  the 
possibility  to  earn'  .4 
Approaching  the  end  of  his  first  term  in  office,  Kuchma  suggested  that  his  economic 
policies  were  already  showing  signs  of  success.  The  process  of  reforms  was  indeed 
creating  an  open  economy  and  the  emerging  class  of  entrepreneurs  was  playing  an 
increasingly  tangible  role  in  the  economic,  political,  and  human  development  of  the 
country.  , 
2  T.  Kuzio  (1999),  Ukraine:  State  and  Nation-Building,  (London:  Routledge),  p.  26,  and  P.  D'Anieri  et  al. 
(1999),  Politics  and  Society  in  Ukraine,  (Boulder,  Colorado:  Westview  Series  on  the  Post-Soviet  Republics), 
137  fL. 
Kuchma  (1999),  0  samom  glavnom,  (Kyiv:  USPP),  p.  145 
210 "The  middle  class  gathers  social  significance,  a  large  layer  of  shareowners  consolidates.  On  the  basis  of  this 
changing  social  psychology  economic  freedom  is  indeed  strengthening'  .5 
The  idea  of  a  developmental  economic  elite,  charged  with  the  responsibility  for  helping  to 
establish  and  defend  a  liberal  political  and  economic  structure,  was  not  new  in  political 
terms.  The  classical  study  of  Barrington  Moore  on  the  causes  of  democracy  draws  a  line  of 
inevitable  dependence  between  the  development  of  democratic  conditions  and  the 
emergence  of  a  class  which  has  a  personal  stake  in  the  preservation  of  economic  and 
political  freedom.  The  equation  `no  bourgeoisie,  no  democracy'  has  ever  since  been 
viewed  by  many  as  the  secret  of  successful  democratic  transitions.  6 
Seymour  Martin  Lipset's  conclusion  that  "the  more  well-to-do  a  nation,  the  greater  the 
chances  are  that  it  will  sustain  democracy"  has  important  implications  for  the  social 
engineering  of  post-authoritarian  societies.  7  As  does  Larry  Diamond's  consideration  that 
values  such  as  "moderation,  tolerance  and  democracy"  are  naturally  embedded  in  the 
middle-class.  8  The  assumption  underpinning  these  theories  is  that  the  bourgeoisie  will 
invest  in  the  political  sphere  the  power  they  acquired  in  economic  terms,  automatically 
restraining  the  authority  of  the  state  and  reducing  the  possibilities  for  authoritarian  regimes 
to  be  re-established. 
After  the  wave  of  military  coups  in  the  1960s  and  1970s,  and  the  successive  return  to 
democracy  in  the  1980s  and  1990s,  Latin  America  became  the  traditional  testing  ground  for 
this  interpretation.  Local  economic  elites  were  often  exhorted  to  "assume  the  role  of  agent 
of  national  development  with  responsibility  and  vision",  and  to  "commit  [themselves]  to 
4  Ibid.,  p.  238 
,  5  Uryadovyi  Kur'er.  November  22,1998,  pp.  1-4.  I  am  grateful  to  Taras  Kuzio  for  this  reference. 
6  B.  Moore  Jr. (1969),  The  Social  Origins  of  Dictatorship  and  Democracy:  Lord  and  Peasants  in  the  Making 
of  the  Modern  World,  (Harmondsworth:  Penguin),  p.  418. 
7  S.  M.  Lipset  (1959),  "Some  Social  Requisites  of  Democracy:  Economic  Development  and  Political 
Legitimacy",  American  Political  Science  Review.  March,  p.  75 
8  L.  Diamond  (1999),  Developing  Democracy:  Towards  Consolidation,  (Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins  University 
Press) 
211 the  task  of  expanding  the  social  basis  of  the  economy,  enlarging  the  market,  generating 
more  employment,  and  multiplying  the  wealth  of  the  country".  9 
In  Ukraine,  the  concept  of  a  developmental  economic  elite  was  supported  with  equal 
enthusiasm  in  different  political  circles.  Even  figures  more  normally  critical  of  presidential 
activities  went  as  far  as  advocating  the  establishment  of  nothing  less  than  an  oligarchic 
system.  Blaming  the  then  Ukrainian  crisis  on  the  lack  of  an  oligarchy,  a  political 
commentator  argued  that  in  a  transitional  country  an  oligarchic  structure  presents  the 
advantage  of  supplementing  the  incomplete  institutions  of  civil  society.  Oligarchs  can,  for 
example,  provide  the  parliament  with  a  professional  and  civilised  system  of  lobbying.  In 
filling  the  gaps  of  civil  society,  oligarchy  erects  a  barrier  to  the  recurrence  of  totalitarian 
powers,  as  "the  presence  of  numerous  ambitions  neutralises  the  rise  of  one  individuality".  10 
In  more  openly  nationalistic  quarters  the  appearance  of  an  economic  elite,  defined  by  a 
"distinctive  national  character"  and  the  "understanding  of  the  country's  purposes"  was 
hailed  as  an  example  of  "positive  nationalism",  as  opposed  to  the  cosmopolitan  attitudes 
imposed  by  the  Soviet  state.  l  l  The  emergence  of  an  ideology  of  `national  bourgeoisie'  was 
indeed  instrumental  in  maintaining  a  relation  of  mutual  dependence  between  political  and 
economic  actors,  and  was  the  result  of  two  crucial  circumstances.  First,  the  need  to  provide 
social  legitimisation  to  the  emerging  economic  elites,  and  second,  the  need  to  sustain  the 
strategic  alliance  concluded  between  the  latter  and  the  President  in  the  wake  of  the  1999 
presidential  elections. 
9  G.  M.  Rocha  (1994),  "Redefining  the  Role  of  the  Bourgeoisie  in  Dependant  Capitalist  Development",  Latin 
American  Perspectives.  Vol.  80,  n.  1,  p.  72.  On  competing  interpretations  of  the  role  of  the  economic  elites  in 
the  process  of  democratisation  in  Latin  America  see  also  G.  O'Donnell  (1973),  Modernisation  and 
Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism,  (Berkley:  University  of  California  Press);  F.  H.  Cardoso  (1986), 
"Entrepreneurs  and  the  Transition  Process:  The  Brazilian  Case",  in  Transitions  from  Authoritarian  Rule. 
Comparative  Perspectives,  edited  by  G.  O'Donnell  et  al.  (Baltimore:  The  John  Hopskins  University  Press,  ) 
pp.  137-153;  and  E.  Bartell  and  L.  Payne  (Eds).  (1995),  Business  and  Democracy  in  Latin  America, 
(Pittsburgh:  University  of  Pittsburgh  Press). 
10  O.  Dashko  (1998),  "Tak  li  strashen  chert?  ".  Kompanyon,  n.  32,  pp.  11-15 
11  Oleg  Soskin,  Advisor  to  the  President  of  Ukraine  on  economic  issues,  Director  of  the  Institute  of  Society 
Transformation,  interview  with  the  author,  Kyiv,  27  November  1998 
212 In  a  country  that  still  harboured  a  distinctive  dose  of  suspicion  towards  private  business,  it 
seemed  important  to  provide  an  official  endorsement  to  an  economic  elite  that  was 
becoming  increasingly  visible  and  active  also  in  the  political  arena.  According  to  a  1997 
survey  conducted  by  the  Democratic  Initiative  Foundation  and  the  National  Academy  of 
Sciences,  49%  of  the  1800  people  interviewed  declared  to  have  a  rather  negative  attitude 
towards  the  privatisation  of  large  enterprises,  while  22%  were  still  opposed  to  the 
privatisation  of  small  enterprises.  While  25%  of  respondents  recognised  that  businessmen 
played  a  powerful  role  in  shaping  the  Ukrainian  state,  more  than  50%  confessed  some  sort 
of  distrust  towards  private  entrepreneurs,  and  more  that  53%  expressed  mistrust  towards 
large  state  enterprise  managers.  12 
The  President  of  the  Ukrainian  Union  of  Industrialists  and  Entrepreneurs,  and  Prime 
Minister  since  2001,  Anatolii  Kinakh,  tried  to  present  the  business  elite  as  the  prime  group 
responsible  for  an  effective  strategy  of  economic  development  and  job-creation  in  the 
country.  In  the  general  context  of  popular  disapproval  towards  powerful  economic  actors, 
Kinakh's  words  marked  an  important  step  towards  the  political  legitimisation  of  the 
country's  economic  elite. 
"In  the  course  of  structural  reforms  now  under  way  in  Ukraine,  millions  of  people  lose  their  jobs  [...  ]  a 
chance  of  creating  new  jobs  for  them  is  connected  with  the  formation  of  a  small  and  medium-sized  business 
sector.  [...  ]  It  is  the  small  and  medium  sector  that  is  the  main  foundation  upon  which  the  middle  class  is 
built,  and  the  middle  class  is  a  guarantor  of  democracy  and  of  the  irreversible  character  of  the  market-oriented 
reforms".  13 
Political  legitimisation  in  the  form  of  an  ideology  of  national  bourgeoisie  was  also  needed 
to  sanction  the  tactical  agreement  concluded  between  the  economic  elites  and  the 
presidency.  On  the  one  side,  the  president  gained  in  the  new  entrepreneurs  a 
12  Democratic  Initiative  Foundation  and  National  Academy  of  Sciences  (1998),  Ukrainian  Society  1994-1998, 
mimeo 
13  A.  Shestakov  (1998),  "Ukraine  Is  To  Be  Developed  By  Ukrainians",  Welcome  to  Ukraine,  n.  1,  pp.  30-3  1. 
This  interview  with  Kinakh  was  published  in  a  magazine  destined  for  foreign  investors  whose  primary  aim 
was  to  support  the  idea  that  "Ukraine  is  committed  to  reforms,  and  the  new  -  new  for  Ukraine  -  class  of 
businessmen  and  entrepreneurs  are  all  for  reforms.  These  people  are  the  force  that  can  set  Ukraine  onto  the 
course  of  steady  economic  development". 
213 counterbalancing  support  against  the  appartachiki  and  the  "red  directors",  who  had 
monopolised  the  agenda  of  reforms  from  independence  to  the  adoption  of  the  new 
Constitution  in  1996.  It  was  not  accidental,  indeed,  that  the  inner  circle  around  Kuchma 
consolidated  in  the  year  preceding  the  1999  presidential  elections  (on  this  point  more 
below).  On  the  other  side,  however,  with  presidential  support,  the  economic  elite  received 
an  official  endorsement  to  grow  and  prosper  "for  the  good  of  the  country". 
Inside  observers  confirmed  that  the  idea  of  a  national  bourgeoisie  originated  from  within 
the  presidential  administration,  at  the  hands  of  a  group  of  economic  figures  well  aware  that 
the  political  survival  of  President  Kuchma  was  of  vital  importance  for  the  preservation  of 
their  positions  of  power.  The  widespread  preoccupation  within  this  circle  was  that  an 
abrupt  change  of  the  guard,  and  a  possible  return  of  the  Communists  to  power,  could 
endanger  the  gains  they  had  made  since  1994,  and  prejudice  the  chances  to  acquire  the 
ownership  of  attractive  business  assets.  14 
Following  a  pattern  of  behaviour  that  has  been  wittily  termed  "the  Vyakhirev  syndrome", 
members  of  the  economic  elite  realised  that  vicinity  to  the  loci'of  decision-making  would 
guarantee  them  favourable  results  in  business  terms.  Exemptions  from  the  anti-monopoly 
legislation,  privileged  access  to  privatisation,  budget  subsidies,  quotas  and  licences  on  the 
import-export  of  oil,  gas,  wheat,  vodka,  and  tobacco  would  be  awarded  according  to  the 
balance  of  power  established  within  the  presidential  patronage  networks.  '5 
The  most  tangible  result  of  President  Kuchma's  economic  policies,  thus,  was  not  the 
creation  of  an  economic  elite,  but  its  "ierarkhizatsiya".  The  President's  intervention  drew 
a  distinction  within  the  business  elites,  and  placed  on  a  hierarchy  of  influence  those  who 
were  granted  access  to  budget  resources,  those  who  enjoyed  political  connections,  and 
those  who  were  altogether  banned  from  the  circles  of  power.  16 
'4  Aleksander  Goncharenko,  Chief  Department  of  National  and  International  Security,  National  Security  and 
Defence  Council  of  Ukraine  interview  with  the  author,  Kyiv,  10  November  1998 
is  Ivan  Lozowy,  Director  of  the  Institute  of  Statehood  and  Democracy,  interview  with  the  author,  Kyiv,  12 
November  1998 
16  Oleksandr  Shnypko,  Vice  Chairman  of  the  Ukrainian  Union  of  Industrialists  and  Entrepreneurs,  interview 
with  the  author,  Kyiv,  1  December  1998 
214 Critics  argued  that  if  the  President  had  genuinely  intended  to  establish  a  developmental 
middle  class,  whose  personal  interest  would  coincide  with  the  country's  interest,  the  first 
priority  of  the  reforms  should  have  been  the  creation  of  a  stable  and  predictable  economic 
environment.  "Equally  applied  rules  of  economic  activity",  would  have  led,  after  a 
conspicuous  length  of  time,  to  the  consolidation  of  an  economic  elite  distinguished  from 
"the  gamblers  and  the  speculators".  17 
Instead  the  unstable,  corrupted,  and  physically  dangerous  business  climate  in  Ukraine 
appeared  most  unsuited  for  long-term  investment.  Small  and  medium  business  was  pushed 
into  the  shadows,  and  forced  to  find  a  political  krysha  (protection)  to  resist  a  punitive  tax 
system,  unpredictable  legislation  and  a  corrupted  administration.  Western  investors 
repeatedly  signalled  their  uneasiness  in  committing  resources  under  these  conditions,  and 
foreign  donors  often  imposed  conditionality  on  the  release  of  financial  aid  requiring  the 
introduction  of  guarantees  for  the  stability  of  business  regulations.  '8 
Kuchma's  advocates  were  quick  to  relieve  him  of  any  responsibility  for  the  system  of  "clan 
capitalism,  state  capitalism,  monopolistic  capitalism"  that  had  emerged  during  his  first 
term.  As  the  President  could  only  give  policy  directions  and  intervene  in  the  political  arena 
by  means  of  laws  and  decrees,  the  finger  was  pointed  against  the  Cabinet  of  Ministers, 
which  was  still  "what  it  used  to  be,  Soviet,  socialist,  based  on  clans".  19  According  to  this 
view,  the  split  between  the  President's  `zhelanie'  (will),  and  the  actual  power  of  the  Cabinet 
17  Igor  Burakovskii  Associate  Professor,  Department  of  Economic  Theory,  Kyiv-  Mohila  Academy,  interview 
with  the  author,  Kyiv,  12  October  1998 
'$  In  1997  the  US  Congress  conditioned  further  financial  support  on  the  introduction  of  measures  to  fight 
corruption  in  the  state  apparatus.  In  his  meeting  with  President  Kuchma  in  Washington  in  May  of  that  year, 
President  Clinton  also  voiced  the  dissatisfaction  of  the  American  investors  in  Ukraine.  "Soobshcheniya  o 
korruptsii,  meshayushchei  deyatel'nosti  amerikanskikh  firm,  mogut  oslozhnits'  vizit  Prezidenta  Kuchmy  v 
SshA",  (translation  of  an  article  published  in  the  Washington  Post,  10  May,  1997),  Delovava  Nedeliya,  n.  3, 
1997,  p.  5.  The  low  inflow  of  foreign  direct  investment  into  Ukraine  compared  to  other  Eastern  European 
countries  is  also  an  illustration  of  the  distrust  of  foreign  investors.  In  the  period  between  1992-97  FDI  in 
Ukraine  were  $1742  million;  in  the  period  between  1989-97  FDI  were  $15403  million  in  Hungary,  $7473 
million  in  the  Czech  Republic,  $  8442  million  in  Poland.  United  Nations  (1998),  Economic  Survey  of 
Europe,,  n.  1  and  European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development  (1998),  Transition  Report  Update 
(London:  EBRD) 
19  Oleg  Soskin,  interview  with  the  author,  Op.  cit. 
215 had  then  caused  the  expansion  of  an  inner  circle  of  big  enterprises  managers  gathered 
around  the  administration  to  be  "fed  with  the  allocation  of  privileges".  20 
Political  Economy  of  Reforms 
Politics  and  business  never  became  separated  in  post-Soviet  Ukraine.  As  a  result,  the 
special  relationship  that  representatives  of  the  economic  circles  enjoyed  in  the  political 
sphere  crucially  informed  the  course  of  economic  reforms.  The  economic  elite 
systematically  pushed  through  measures  that  would  help  to  preserve  their  status,  while 
obstructed  policies  that  would  endanger  their  interests.  21 
The  consequence  was  the  reinforcement  of  a  rent-seeking  system  in  which  economic 
advantages  were  afforded  only  to  those  close  to  the  administration,  while  excluding  those 
who  were  not  part  of  it.  As  administrative  resources  became  a  source  of  income  for  the 
bureaucracy,  the  bureaucrats  became  themselves  an  obstacle  to  economic  reforms, 
preventing  changes  that  would  unsettle  their  power  and  revenues.  2 
In  such  a  system  wealth  was  generated  by  special  exemptions  from  economic  regulations, 
rather  than  by  the  development  of  a  productive  activity,  by  the  expansion  of  ownership  over 
existing  assets  rather  that  by  new  investments  and  developmental  projects.  The  burden 
placed  on  the  economic  system  and  the  state  budget  by  rent-seeking  activity  was  most 
certainly  one  of  the  factors  preventing  consistent  economic  growth. 
As  politics  and  business  largely  failed  to  separate,  a  clear  distinction  between  the  economic 
and  the  political  elite  in  Ukraine  did  not  materialise.  Olga  Kryshtanovskaya  and  Stephen 
20  Oleg  Soskin,  interview  with  the  author,  Op.  cit. 
21  A.  J.  Motyl  (1997),  "Structural  Constraints  and  Starting  Points.  The  Logic  of  Systemic  Change  in  Ukraine 
and  Russia",  Comparative  Politics,  July,  pp.  433-447 
22  A.  Aslund  (1999a),  Problems  with  Economic  transformation  in  Ukraine,  Paper  presented  at  the  Fifth 
Dubrovnik  Conference  on  Transition  Economies,  June  23-25,1999,  in 
http:  //w%vwceip.  org/files/Publications/webnotel0.  asp?  from==Pubproject 
. 
Cfr.  on  the  emergence  of  the 
Russian  economic  elite  A.  Aslund  (1999b),  "Russia's  Collapse",  Foreign  Affairs,  September/October,  pp.  64- 
77 
216 White  identify  a  Russian  economic  elite,  which  emerged,  in  the  early  years  of  liberalisation, 
as  a  result  of  the  "bifurcation"  of  the  Soviet  nomenklatura  into  a  political  elite  and  an 
economic  elite.  The  picture  painted  by  Kryshtanovkaya  and  White  characterises  the 
political  elite  as  a  group  competing  for  the  political  power  and  the  economic  elite  as  a 
group  whose  power  and  social  rank  was  based  upon  its  control  of  capital.  23  In  Ukraine  this 
diversification  did  not  take  place  in  the  late  perestroika  years,  and  well  into  the  post-Soviet 
period  the  economic  elite  was  still  identified  with  the  state  apparatus. 
In  Ukraine,  as  in  Russia,  an  economic  elite  appeared  as  a  result  of  the  late  1980s  economic 
reforms,  when  "miraculous  economic  exchanges"  took  place,  and  "real  billions  of  dollars 
were  made".  24  Wealth  was  accumulated  through  four  main  channels.  First,  through  the 
trade  of  metals  and  chemicals  bought  in  Ukraine  at  state-regulated  prices  (equal  to  10%  of 
the  world  prices)  and  sold  abroad  at  full  market  prices.  Second,  through  the  trade  of 
products  (like  Russian  gas)  imported  at  subsidised  exchange  rates  and  sold  in  hard 
currency.  Third,  through  subsidised  credits  issued  at  a  20%  interest  a  year  when  inflation 
was  running  at  10,155%.  Fourth,  through  budget  subsidies  (equal  to  8.1%  of  GDP  in  1992 
and  10.8%  in  1993)  concentrated  mainly  in  the  agricultural  sector,  and  in  the  gas  and  the 
coal  industry.  25 
Insider  privatisation  (or  nomenklatura  privatisation)  provided  another  opportunity  for  the 
consolidation  of  the  economic  elites,  turning  state  enterprise  directors  into  a  property  class. 
Given  the  lack  of  a  comprehensive  programme  of  privatisation,  enterprise  managers 
attained  de  facto  the  property  rights  of  the  state  enterprises  they  directed.  By  mid-1997, 
85%  of  all  shares  allocated  had  been  acquired  by  incumbent  managers  and  working 
collectives.  26 
23  O.  Kryshtanovskaya  and  S.  White  (1996),  "From  Soviet  Nomenklatura  to  Russian  Elite",  Europe-Asia 
Studies,  Vol.  48,  n.  5,  pp.  711-733.  For  a  list  of  materials  on  the  debate  on  the  structure  of  post-Soviet  elites, 
see  footnote  4,  chapter  4. 
24  Oleksandr  Shnypko,  interview  with  the  author,  Op.  cit. 
25  A.  Aslund  (1999a),  Op.  Cit. 
26  P.  D'Anieri  et  al.  (1999),  Politics  and  Society  in  Ukraine,  (Boulder,  Colorado:  Westview  Series  on  the 
Post-Soviet  Republics),  p.  184 
217 Because  of  their  previous  affiliation  to  the  CPSU  in  their  capacity  as  managers  of  state 
enterprises,  `red  directors'  gained  parliamentary  representation  through  seats  won  within 
the  ranks  of  the  Communist  Party.  This  situation  gave  rise  to  the  paradox  of  an  embryonic 
capitalist  class  (the  `red  directors')  that  was  bound  at  the  same  time  by  party  discipline  to 
an  anti-capitalist  ideology  and  by  their  own  private  interests  to  the  development  of  a  market 
economy.  27 
The  faltering  pace  of  privatisation  and  the  way  the  process  was  conducted  are  the  most 
striking  examples  of  how  nomenklatura  and  bureaucratic  interests  intertwined  in  setting  the 
course  of  reforms.  Initiated  in  1992,  privatisation  was  repeatedly  halted  by  the  Parliament, 
which  was  dominated  by  a  lobby  for  the  red  directors.  In  1996,  a  resolution  exempting 
more  than  6000  state  enterprises,  especially  in  the  gas  and  oil  sector,  which  were 
considered  of  strategic  importance,  brought  the  large-scale  privatisation  to  a  standstill. 
Small-scale  privatisation  was  substantially  completed  by  mid-1997,  but  enterprises,  which 
had  been  acquired  by  existing  mangers  and  employee  groups,  totalled  only  2%  of  the 
official  industrial  output.  The  great  bulk  of  Ukrainian  production  remained  instead 
concentrated  in  large  enterprises,  more  resistant  to  privatisation  and  often  successful  in 
lobbying  for  exemptions  to  antimonopoly  regulation.  28 
The  system  of  "rent  with  buy  out",  according  to  which  enterprises  had  to  submit  a 
privatisation  application  to  local  bureaucrats  before  being  authorised  to  initiate  the 
privatisation  procedures,  gave  rise  to  widespread  forms  of  bribery  and  corruption.  29 
Finally,  a  process  of  substantial  restructuring  was  obstructed  as  privatisation  largely 
benefited  insiders,  and  discouraged  foreigners  and  external  investors,  leaving  state 
enterprises  producing  at  a  loss  and  begging  for  state  subsidies. 
27Aleksandr  Goncharenko,  interview  with  the  author,  Op.  cit. 
28  Paul  D'Anieri  et  al.  (1999),  Politics  and  Society  in  Ukraine,  (Boulder,  Colorado:  Westview  Series  on  the 
Post-Soviet  Republics),  pp.  184-186 
29  For  an  overview  of  the  privatisation  program  I.  Filatotchev  et  al.  (1996),  "Privatisation  and  Industrial 
Restructuring  in  Ukraine",  Communist  Economies  and  Economic  Transformation.  Vol.  8,  n.  2,  pp.  185-203 
218 A  similar  pattern  of  administrative  favouritism  appeared  in  the  foreign  trade  regime,  where 
liberalisation  took  place  only  at  a  formal  level,  while  in  fact  new  regulations  were 
introduced,  increasing  opportunities  for  corruption.  30 
Asymmetrical  control  over  the  political  institutions  drew  a  line  of  divergent  interests  and 
possibilities  between  big  and  small-medium  businesses.  Political  power  allowed 
representatives  of  big  businesses  to  shape  the  rules  of  the  market  to  fit  their  own 
preferences,  defending  their  newly  acquired  property  rights  and  preserving  their  privileges 
on  the  market.  Small  and  medium  businesses,  on  the  contrary,  were  generally  divorced 
from  political  power,  and  were  therefore  exposed  to  the  full  force  of  market  fluctuations, 
and  to  the  unpredictability  of  the  economic  environment. 
As  a  business  consultant  admitted,  in  Ukraine  "nobody  plans  long  into  the  future,  you  do 
not  sit  down  and  draw  a  business  plan  to  produce  something,  put  together  a  marketing  plan, 
where  your  product  is  going  to  be  sold  and  under  what  label.  Nobody  does  that  because  it 
is  too  long  range".  As  events  often  demonstrated,  a  businessman's  fortune  could  change 
abruptly  "not  because  of  the  business  cycles,  but  because  of  the  government's  action,  or 
inaction".  31 
Continuous  revisions  of  business  legislation  led  economic  subjects  to  develop  an  attitude  of 
distrust  towards  the  state.  "You  can  start  [by]  playing  chess,  then  you  find,  in  the  middle  of 
the  game,  that  you  are  playing  basketball,  or  soccer".  With  rules  being  so  uncertain,  the 
economic  environment  was  characterised  by  a  permanent  search  for  ways  to  survive  and 
shortcuts  to  reach  the  heart  of  the  system.  "People  try  to  steal.  You  can  take  anybody,  and 
there  is  something  he  disobeyed  in  the  law,  because  laws  and  regulations  can  be  in  the  way, 
30  In  the  autumn  of  1994,  for  example,  the  Kuchma  administration  abolished  export  quotas  and  licences, 
replacing  them  with  a  registration  and  certification  scheme,  requiring  traded  goods  to  comply  with  Ukrainian 
standards.  Economist  Intelligence  Unit  (1995),  Ukraine  Country  Profile,  Second  Quarter  1995.  See  also  A. 
Aslund  (1999a),  Op.  Cit. 
31  Ivan  Lozowy,  Director  of  the  Institute  of  Statehood  and  Democracy,  close  to  the  Rukh 
219 and  you  have  to  overcome  any  barrier.  It  is  not  always  intentional,  but  there  are  some  gaps 
in  the  system  which  allow  people  to  escape  or  by-pass  the  laws".  32 
Excessive  bureaucratic  requirements,  the  arbitrariness  of  business  regulations  and  a 
punitive  tax  system  pushed  business  to  face  the  alternative  between  exit  (capital  flight, 
migration  or  withdrawal  into  the  shadow  economy),  and  voice  (choosing  a  political 
affiliation).  While  capital  flight  in  Ukraine  up  to  the  late  1990s,  has  been  estimated  in  the 
region  of  $25-50  billion,  33  an  increasing  number  of  leading  businessmen  chose  to  emigrate, 
fearing  "to  be  caught  in  a  civil  war,  to  become  victim  of  crime,  or  to  be  kidnapped".  34 
Among  these  was  Vadim  Rabinovich,  President  of  the  Ukrainian  Jewish  community,  media 
magnate,  and  Israeli  citizen. 
Capital  export  and  emigration,  however,  were  an  option  open  only  to  big  business,  as  small 
and  medium  business  were  left  with  only  the  option  of  illegality.  Anatoliy  Kinakh 
admitted: 
"The  problem  of  the  shadow  economy  is  a  result  of  the  lack  of  trust  from  the  entrepreneurs  toward  state 
power.  It  manifests  a  problem  of  stability,  quality  and  transparency  in  the  legislation  that  regulates  the 
economic  and  business  activity,  it  is  a  problem  of  civilised  relations  between  the  state  and  the  business 
sector"  35 
Two  surveys  conducted  among  managers  of  privatised  large  and  medium-sized  enterprises 
in  1998  confirmed  this  picture.  The  overall  economic  situation  in  Ukraine  was  described  as 
very  bad  by  69%  of  those  interviewed,  while  a  total  of  89%  considered  the  country  a 
negative  environment  for  the  development  of  private  enterpreneurship.  When  asked  to 
name  the  most  critical  problems  for  their  enterprise,  80%  did  not  hesitate  to  identify 
oppressive  taxation,  and  27%  blamed  constantly  changing  rules  and  regulations.  The  main 
f 
32  Anatoli  Grytsenko,  Head  of  the  Analytical  Centre,  National  Security  and  Defence  Council  of  Ukraine, 
interview  wit  the  author,  Kyiv,  17  November  1998 
33  Paul  D'Anieri  et  al.  (1999),  Politics  and  Society  in  Ukraine,  (Boulder,  Colorado:  Westview  Series  on  the 
Post-Soviet  Republics),  p.  175 
34  Ivan  Lozowy,  interview  with  the  author,  Op.  Cit. 
35  T.  Ivzhenko  (1999),  "President  USPP  Anatoliy  Kinakh:  ekonomicheskie  problemy  Ukrainy  mozhet  reshit' 
tol'ko  komanda  professionalov  u  vlasti  ",  Kompanyon  n.  4,  pp.  18-20 
220 reason  why  business  stagnated  in  Ukraine  was  identified  by  96%  as  high  taxes,  and  75% 
put  the  reason  down  to  corruption  by  national  government  officials.  36  Reflecting  this  spirit 
of  pessimism,  in  November  1998  a  business  magazine  speculated  whether  the  government 
would  soon  introduce  a  tax  on  breathing  air.  37 
According  to  data  provided  by  the  Kharkhiv-based  TACIS  Enterprise  Assistance  Centre,  a 
typical  owner  of  a  small  business  spent  annually  4,200  hryvnas  (about  1100  dollars)  in 
fines  paid  to  local  or  national  authorities.  38  While  the  `unofficial  price-list'  for  services 
granted  by  the  local  authorities  to  enterprises  was  publicly  known.  39 
Small  business  representatives  called  insistently  for  the  establishment  of  a  system,  which 
would  allow  the  entrepreneur  to  "work  normally".  If  business  were  administered 
effectively,  it  was  argued,  the  state  would  benefit  from  it,  at  least  tax  revenues  would 
increase.  On  the  contrary,  in  an  unstable  and  corrupted  environment,  unprotected  small 
business  was  `forced'  to  illegality.  As  Lyudmila  Yakovleva,  Director  of  the  Agency  for  the 
Development  of  Business  Enterprises  put  it,  "I  will  cheat,  I  will  start  producing  in  the 
shadow,  I  will  earn  money  on  which  I  will  not  pay  taxes,  I  will  cheat  on  custom  duties"  40 
Under  conditions  of  lawlessness,  the  choice  between  the  state  and  the  parallel  criminal 
structures  became  in  Ukraine  a  rational  economic  calculation.  Political  observers 
calculated  that  if  the  tax  load  for  a  legal  business  could  reach  up  to  two  thirds  of  a 
businessman's  income,  the  racket  required  only  between  10  and  30%  of  it  41 
36  G.  Anderson  and  Company/The  PBN/  USAID  (1998),  Ukrainian  Medium  and  Large  Enterprises  Manager 
Survey,  (Kyiv:  mimeo),  and  Ukrainian  Market  Reform  Education  Program  (1998),  A  National  Survey  of  441 
Managers  of  Privatised  Enterprises  in  Ukraine,  (Kyiv:  mimeo) 
37  Biznes,  n  47,1998,  p.  25 
38  R.  Vysitskiy  (1998),  "When  Small  is  Big",  Eastern  Economist.  Vol.  5,  n.  44,  p.  14 
39  A  Ukrainian  magazine  listed  that  the  registration  of  an  enterprise  costs  "unofficially"  $176  dollars,  the  visit 
of  the  health  or  fire  security  inspection  $42,  a  visit  of  the  tax  inspection  $87.  To  have  a  telephone  connection 
an  enterprise  pays  $894,  $123  to  obtain  an  export  licence,  $278  for  an  import  licence.  0.  El'tsov  (1998), 
"Nomenklatura  kak  vety'  vlasti",  Kompanyon,  n.  33,  pp.  10-12 
40  Lyudmila  Yakovleva,  Director  of  the  Agency  for  Development  of  Business  Enterprises,  interview  with  the 
author,  Kyiv,  24  November  1998 
41  0.  Turchynov  (1996),  "The  Shadow  Economy  and  Shadow  Politics",  Politichna  Dumka,  n.  3-4,  pp.  75-87 
221 Business  associations,  which  could  play  a  crucial  role  in  mediating  between  the  state  and 
entrepreneurs,  were  weak,  very  numerous,  and  scarcely  significant  on  the  political  scene. 
Paul  Kubicek  characterises  them  as  "infiltrated  by  and  subservient  to  the  communist  party"; 
they  were  "intertwined  with  state  structures  and  dependent  heavily  upon  state  sponsorship 
and  recognition  for  their  present  power"  42  A  line  of  financial  dependence  was  created 
between  the  Ukrainian  Union  of  Industrialists  and  Entrepreneurs  and  the  state  in  the  form 
of  state  subsidies  paid  to  the  enterprises  constituting  the  organisation.  3  When  asked  why 
his  organisation  was  not  taking  up  a  more  critical  attitude  towards  the  presidency,  the  Vice- 
Chairman  of  the  Union  of  Industrialists  and  Entrepreneurs  admitted:  "You  cannot  bite  the 
hand  that  feeds  you".  44 
Polling  among  entrepreneurs  confirmed  that  "lobbying  the  Government  is  not  seen  yet  as  a 
way  to  advocate  the  interests  of  enterprises  before  local  and  national  government  officials, 
at  least  partly  because  existing  lobbying  organisations  are  not  seen  as  effective".  In  the 
above  mentioned  survey,  73%  of  respondents  recognised  that,  should  they  need  to  defend 
their  interests  in  the  political  sphere,  they  would  resort  to  personal  contacts.  Only  11%  of 
entrepreneurs  said  that  they  would  rely  on  business  associations  45 
Rent-seeking  was  essentially  an  economic  activity  that  afforded  members  of  the  elite 
privileges  and  means  that  they  would  not  earn  through  productive  activities.  Engagement 
with  political  power  was  a  constituent  part  of  this  system.  A  high  degree  of  interlocking 
between  political  and  economic  positions  blurred  even  further  the  distinction  between 
politics  and  business,  and  led  observers  to  believe  that  "the  economic  elite  controls  the  state 
by  bringing  in  its  own  members,  through  direct  connections,  without  even  the  need  to 
camouflage  them"  . 
a6 
42  P.  Kubicek  (1997),  "Post-Soviet  Ukraine:  In  Search  of  a  Constituency  for  Reform",  Journal  of  Communist 
Studies  and  Transition  Politics.  Vol.  13,  No.  3,  pp.  103-126  (quotation  p.  112) 
43  P.  Kubicek  (2000),  Unbroken  Ties.  The  State,  Interest  Associations  and  Corporatism  in  Post-Soviet 
Ukraine,  (The  University  of  Michigan  Press),  p.  91 
as  Oleksandr  Shnypko,  interview  with  the  author,  Op.  cit.  45  Ukrainian  Market  Reform  Education  Program  (1998),  A  National  Survey  of  441  Managers  of  Privatised 
Enterprises  in  Ukraine,  (Kyiv:  mimeo),  p.  10. 
46  Oleksandr  Shnypko,  interview  with  the  author,  Op.  cit. 
222 The  list  of  representatives  of  business  interests  in  key  political  position  was  significant.  A 
few  example  will  suffice  to  indicate  the  trend.  Serhei  Tihipko,  for  example,  Deputy  Prime 
Minister  in  Valerii  Pustovoytenko's  government  had  been  from  1991  to  1992  vice  Director 
of  the  Dnipro  Commercial  Bank.  He  then  became  director  of  the  Dnirpopetrovsk  branch  of 
Privatbank,  the  second  largest  bank  in  Ukraine,  before  being  appointed  in  1997  to  the 
position  of  Deputy  Prime  Minister  in  charge  of  the  economic  reforms.  47 
Oleksandr  Tkachenko,  Speaker  of  the  Parliament  from  1998,  was  the  Chairman  of  the 
agriculture-based  financial-industrial  group  Zemlya  i  Lyudi.  Oleg  Ishchenko,  Chairman  of 
the  01-bank,  Mikhail  Brodskii  Chairman  of  the  concern  Dendi,  Leonid  Chernovetskii, 
Chairman  of  Praveksbank,  Grigoryi  Surkis,  President  of  the  Dynamo  Kyiv,  were  only  few 
of  the  conspicuous  wave  of  entrepreneurs  who  entered  the  Parliament  following  the  March 
1998  election. 
In  the  following  two  sections  I  will  turn  to  the  structure  of  relations  between  business  and 
political  power  in  the  two  most  important  centres  of  Ukrainian  policy-making,  the 
Parliament  and  the  presidential  administration. 
Business  and  the  Verkhovna  Rada 
In  post-independence  Ukraine,  the  Parliament  became  the  main  channel  for  the  former 
nomenklatura  to  defend  their  positions,  lobby  for  state  subsidies,  obstruct  reforms,  and 
acquire  personal  immunity.  In  the  March  1994  elections,  enterprise  directors  (including 
farm  directors)  were  the  third  largest  individual  group  in  the  parliament,  following  high 
governmental  officials  and  professionals.  The  July  1994  moratorium  on  privatisation 
(lifted  the  following  December)  was  arguably  the  most  remarkable  success  in  the  strategy 
of  business  leaders  to  halt  economic  reforms,  but  throughout  its  entire  legislative  mandate 
the  conservative  majority  voted  consistently  to  grant  subsidies  to  unprofitable  enterprises. 
Red  directors  and  Party  nomenklatura  strongly  opposed  President  Kuchma's  efforts  of 
47  G.  Andrushchak  et  al.  (1997),  Khto  e  khto  v  Ukraini,  (Kyiv:  KIS),  various  entries 
223 economic  restructuring  and  finally  provoked  a  conflict  between  the  executive  and  the 
legislative  that  eventually  resulted  in  the  weakening  of  the  parliament.  48 
The  April  1998  elections  marked  a  significant  turn  in  business  representation  within  the 
Ukrainian  political  institutions,  as  a  large  number  of  entrepreneurs  (mostly  representative  of 
the  sectors  that  had  prospered  in  the  post-Soviet  arena)  ran  for  and  won  seats  in  parliament. 
As  many  as  127  representatives  of  business,  equal  to  28%  of  the  total  number  of  legislators 
were  finally  elected.  49  While  the  energy  sector  was  most  successful  in  gaining 
representation,  electing  15  deputies,  the  banking  sector  was  the  most  active.  49  bankers  ran 
under  different  party  tickets,  while  a  few  dozens  campaigned  in  single  mandate 
constituencies,  and  Privatbank  even  established  its  own  party.  14  representatives  of  the 
banking  community  were  finally  elected.  The  Sixth  Congress  of  the  Association  of 
Commercial  Banks,  held  the  previous  February,  had  signalled  a  general  consensus  in  the 
sector  on  the  necessity  to  establish  a  banking  lobby  in  Parliament.  50 
48S.  Birch  (1997),  "Nomenklatura  Democratisation:  Electoral  Clientelism  in  Post-Soviet  Ukraine", 
Democratization,  Vol.  4,  n.  4,  pp.  40-62 
49  For  a  more  general  analysis  of  the  1998  elections,  A.  Wilson  and  S.  Birch  (1999),  "Voting  Stability, 
Political  Gridlock:  Ukraine's  1998  Parliamentary  Elections",  Europe-Asia  Studies,  Vol.  51,  n.  6,  pp.  1039- 
1068 
50  A.  Kovtun  (1998),  "Banki  uzhe  vzyali",  Zerkalo  Nedelii,  n.  7,14-21  February,  p.  1 
224 Table  5.1.  Composition  of  the  Verkhovna  Rada,  by  Profession 
PROFESSION  NUMBER  OF  DEPUTIES 
Entrepreneurs  127  28.0 
Former  deputies  118  26.0 
State  officers  77  17.0 
Party  officers  26  5.7 
Academics  23  5.1 
Trade  unionists  18  4.0 
Journalists  12  2.6 
Researchers  11  2.4 
Factory  workers  9  2.0 
Others  33  7.3 
Total  454  100 
Source:  Delovaya  Nedelya,  6  April,  1998,  pp.  6-8 
Table  5.2.  Economic  Elite  in  the  Verkhovna  Rada,  by  Profession 
POSITION  DEPUTIES  % 
Chairmen  of  Enterprises/Board  of  88  69.3 
Directors 
Deputy  Chairmen  10  7.9 
Managers  10  7.9 
ex  Chairmen  7  5.5 
Presidents  of  Business  5  3.9 
Associations 
Other  4  3.1 
Financial  advisors  3  2.4 
Total  127  100 
Source:  Delovaya  Nedelya,  6  April,  1998,  pp.  6-8 
225 Table  5.3.  Economic  Elite  in  the  Verkhovna  Rada,  by  Fraction 
PARLIAMENTARY  FRACTION  TOTAL  NUMBER 
OF  DEPUTIES  (1) 
ECONOMIC  ELITE 
DEPUTIES 
1998  2000  (3) 
(2) 
People's  Democratic  Party  28  31(4)  8 
Green  Party  of  Ukraine  19  11  6 
Social  Democratic  Party  of  Ukraine  17  10  10 
(united) 
Rukh  46  3  2 
Hromada  26  2  0 
Reforms  and  Order  3  1  1 
Regional  Revival  2  0  14 
Working  Ukraine  1  0  11 
Fatherland  0  0  3 
Solidarity  0  0  4 
Independents  5  (5)  5  unknown 
Deputies  elected  in  Single  mandate  unknown  2 
Constituencies 
Sources:  Inna  Pidluska  and  Svitlana  Kononchuk  (2000),  Dilova  elita  Ukrainy,  Part  1,  Parliament,  (Kyiv: 
UNfsPD),  pp.  264-266,  Andrew  Wilson  and  Sarah  Birch  (1999),  "Voting  Stability,  Political  Gridlock: 
Ukraine's  1998  Parliamentary  Elections",  Europe-Asia  Studies,  Vol.  51,  n.  6,  p.  1040 
(1)  Total  number  of  deputies  initially  registered  in  the  fraction  (1998-99) 
(2)  Number  of  deputies  from  the  economic  elite  initially  registered  in  the  fraction 
(1998-99) 
(3)  Number  of  deputies  from  the  economic  elite  registered  in  the  fraction  after  a  number  of  defections(1999- 
2000) 
(4)  28  deputies  elected,  three  joined  the  party  in  the  following  months 
(5)  Number  of  deputies  registered  as  independent  as  march  2000,  according  to  Pidluska  and  Kononchuk 
(2000) 
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226 Table  5.4.  Economic  Elite  in  the  Verkhovna  Rada,  by  Sector 
SECTOR  NUMBER  OF 
DEPUTIES 
Energy  15 
Banking  14 
Agro-industry  12 
FIGs  5 
Media  5 
Trade  3 
Other  8 
Source:  Delovaya  Nedelya,  6  April,  1998,  pp.  6-8 
Political  observers  remarked  that  it  was  the  first  time  that  representatives  of  business 
structures  had  taken  such  a  bold  position,  announcing  publicly  their  plans  to  influence  the 
decision-making  process  from  inside.  51  Others  reckoned  that  the  decision  to  enter  en  masse 
the  parliament  reflected  six  years  of  frustration  in  economic  circles  due  to  legislative 
inactivity.  52 
The  urge  of  "business  promotion"  had  in  most  cases  motivated  the  economic  elite  in  their 
quest  for  a  parliamentary  seat.  Disparate  political  quarters  reflected,  however,  the  hope 
that,  by  default,  the  presence  in  parliament  of  representatives  of  business  would  produce 
positive  consequences  for  the  economic  community  at  large.  "They  cannot  establish  rules 
only  for  themselves,  and  if  they  push  on  legislation  that  cuts  down  taxes  everybody  will 
benefit,  if  they  adopt  more  liberal  economic  rules  everybody  will  benefit,  even  though  they 
are  mainly  guided  by  their  own  interests".  53 
While  representatives  of  small-enterprises  appeared  more  sceptical  of  the  advantages  that 
the  presence  of  big  business  in  Parliament  would  bring  to  the  general  economic 
51  Inna  Pidluska,  Director  of  the  Ukrainian  Centre  for  Independent  Political  Research,  Kyiv,  31  October  1998 
52  Igor  Buryakovski,  interview  with  the  author,  Op.  cit. 
53  Inna  Pidluska,  interview  with  the  author,  Op.  cit. 
227 environment,  54  members  of  the  banking  community  welcomed  the  event  as  a  "natural 
phenomenon"  that  reflected  the  more  active  presence  of  business  in  society.  55  It  was 
argued  that  the  economic  elite  could  make  a  real  difference  in  the  law-making  process  by 
virtue  of  their  awareness  of  the  real  conditions  of  business,  contrasting  with  the  "political 
decisions"  adopted  by  members  of  the  political  elite.  6  With  the  presence  of  economic 
actors,  the  Verkhovna  Rada  looked  finally  "more  professional",  but  still,  it  was  lamented, 
the  number  of  representatives  of  the  banking  sector  was  not  sufficient.  57 
"Business  promotion"  or  obtaining  a  political  affiliation  prompted  candidates  to  pay  as 
much  as  1  million  dollars  in  a  single  mandate  district  to  obtain  a  parliamentary  seat.  58  "In 
order  to  defend  his  own  business  every  businessman  looks  for  a  krysha,  including  a 
59  political  one,  against  the  state",  commented  the  former  Speaker  of  the  Rada  Ivan  Plyuch. 
But,  what  concrete  advantages  could  a  parliamentary  seat  offer  to  the  new  economic  elite? 
The  1995  Power  Bill  had  been  the  first  step  towards  the  shift  of  decision-making  powers 
from  the  parliament  to  the  President,  which  had  then  been  confirmed  with  the  approval  of 
the  1996  Constitution.  Even  though  the  president  had  been  awarded  considerable  powers  to 
conduct  political  and  economic  reforms,  the  parliament  had  nonetheless  been  left  with 
significant  authority  in  the  economic  area,  which  made  it  the  key  player  in  the  privatisation 
process.  60  In  fact,  the  parliament  was  not  only  put  in  charge  of  "approving  the  list  of  state- 
owned  objectives  which  [would]  not  be  made  subject  to  privatisation,  determining  the  legal 
sa  Lyudmila  Yakovleva,  interview  with  the  author,  Op.  cit. 
55  Valeryi  Suskin,  Director  of  Privatbank  Kyiv,  interview  with  the  author,  Kyiv,  10  November  1998 
56  These  opinions  were  expressed  both  by  Stanislav  Arzhevitin,  Chairman  of  the  Board  of  Aggio  Bank  and 
Deputy  Chairman  of  the  Association  of  Ukrainian  Commercial  Banks,  interview  with  the  author,  Kyiv,  13 
November  1998,  and  Evgenyi  Zel'ster,  interview  with  the  author,  Vice  Director  of  the  Investment  Division, 
Bank  Ukraina,  interview  with  the  author,  Kyiv,  13  November  1998 
57  Aleksei  Pavlov,  Director  of  Public  Relations,  Bank  Ukraina  interview  with  the  author,  Kyiv,  13  November 
1998 
58  M.  Tomenko  (1998),  Returns  of  the  Recent  Parliamentary  Elections  in  Ukraine,  Politichna  Dumka  (Kyiv), 
n.  2,  pp.  113-126 
59  "Pochemu  predpriminatelei  idut  v  politicu?  ",  Kompanyon,  n.  47,1998,  pp.  8-9 
60  On  the  establishment  of  a  presidential  system  in  Ukraine  A.  Wilson  (1997),  "Ukraine:  Two  Presidents  and 
Their  Powers",  in  Postcommunist  Presidents,  edited  by  R.  Taras  (Cambridge:  CUP),  pp.  67-106 
228 principles  for  appropriating  privately  owned  objectives",  but  it  also  received  control  over 
the  State  Property  Fund,  which  supervised  privatisation.  61 
By  virtue  of  these  powers,  a  parliamentary  seat  still  presented  remarkable  advantages  to 
representatives  of  the  economic  elite.  Firstly,  the  deadline  on  the  freezing  on  the  sale  of 
thirty-two  large  enterprises  (especially  in  the  energy  sector)  was  due  to  expire  during  the 
lifetime  of  the  1998  parliament,  and  regulation  for  their  privatisation  would  be  issued  by 
the  legislature.  62  Secondly,  legislation  on  economic  activity  (as  for  example  regarding  the 
new  tax  code)  was  still  expected  to  be  debated  and  adopted  within  the  Parliament.  Finally, 
the  parliament  could  guarantee  immunity  from  criminal  charges  to  perspective  deputies 
who  had  been  caught  up  in  corruption  scandals. 
Bidding  for  immunity  was  arguably  one  of  the  most  powerful  motivations  for  candidates  to 
run  in  the  elections.  "Business  in  Ukraine  if  it  is  not  entirely  criminal  is  semi-criminal. 
The  status  of  Deputy  gives  [the  businessman]  more  or  less  four  years  to  cover  and  to  solve 
the  problems  of  his  business",  commented  a  member  of  the  presidential  administration  63 
Statistics  seemed  to  prove  him  right,  as  between  1990  and  1994  over  500  deputies  were  not 
committed  for  trial  because  either  a  local  council  or  the  Verkhovna  Rada  had  failed  to  grant 
approval.  64  Louise  Shelley  has  estimated  that  following  the  1998  parliamentary  elections 
more  than  20  members  of  the  parliament  faced  criminal  prosecution  if  they  were  stripped  of 
their  parliamentary  immunity,  while  forty-four  legislators  elected  to  local  political  bodies 
also  had  criminal  backgrounds.  65 
61  In  December  1996  the  Parliament  amended  the  existing  legislation  and  made  the  Fund  accountable  to  the 
Parliament.  Kuchma  vetoed  the  amended  law  and  made  the  Fund  responsible  to  the  President  through  the 
Cabinet  of  Ministers.  The  final  law  approved  by  the  Parliament  placed  the  fund  "under  operative 
subordination"  of  the  Cabinet  and  made  it  accountable  to  the  Parliament.  Charles  R.  Wise,  Trevor  L.  Brown 
(1999),  "The  Separation  of  Powers  in  Ukraine",  Communist  and  Post-Communist  Studies  Vol.  32,  pp.  23-44 
(p.  40),  and  Charles  R.  Wise  and  Trevor  L.  Brown  (1998),  "The  Consolidation  of  Democracy  in  Ukraine", 
Democratisation.  Vol.  5,  n.  1,  pp.  116-137, 
62  I.  Maskalevich  (1998),  "Privatizatsiya  energetiki:  Iskusstvo  petch  bliny",  Zerkalo  Nedelii,  n.  6,7  February, 
p.  9 
63  Kompanyon  (1998b),  Op.  Cit. 
64  O.  Turchynov  (1996),  "The  Shadow  Economy  and  Shadow  Politics",  Politichna  Dumka  (Kyiv),  n.  3-4,  pp. 
75-87. 
229 Many  prominent  figures  elected  to  the  Parliament  did  indeed  have  a  remarkable  past  of 
relations  with  the  justice.  A  typical  example  was  Oleksandr  Tkachenko,  President  of  the 
agro-industrial  concern  `Zemlya  i  Lyudi',  then  Speaker  of  the  1998  Rada.  At  the  time  of 
his  election,  a  lengthy  investigation  was  pending  against  him.  Tkachenko  had  been  accused 
of  illegal  transactions  committed  by  Zemlya  i  Lyudi,  together  with  the  American  wheat 
dealer  Zeneka  Incorporated,  on  the  basis  of  a  500  million  dollar  credit  line  provided  by  the 
American  government.  The  operation,  which  had  cost  the  Ukrainian  budget  more  than  30 
million  dollars,  and  Ukrainian  exporters  a  temporary  freeze  on  their  corresponding  accounts 
in  Ukreximbank,  had  also  prompted  an  US  investigation.  Once  Tkachenko  was  elected, 
however,  all  accusations  were  miraculously  dropped.  Allegedly,  the  President  had  helped 
by  "smoothing"  the  process,  judging  it  safer,  in  view  of  the  upcoming  presidential 
elections,  to  have  a  loyal  ally  in  charge  of  the  often-vociferous  Parliament.  66 
The  1998  elections  demonstrated  that  by  dispensing  favours  to  business  structures,  and  by 
granting  protection  to  figures  like  Tkachenko,  the  President  and  his  administration  were 
trying  to  expand  their  control  over  legislative  power.  Support  to  individual  businessmen, 
parties  entering  parliament  for  the  first  time,  or  coalitions  established  around  business 
interests  were  all  part  of  the  complex  strategy  adopted  by  the  presidential  circles  in 
anticipation  of  the  1999  electoral  campaign. 
65  L.  I.  Shelley  (1998),  "Organised  Crime  and  Corruption  in  Ukraine:  Impediments  to  the  Development  of  a 
Free  Market  Economy",  Demokratisatsiya  -  The  Journal  of  Post-Soviet  Democratisation.  Fall,  pp.  648-663 
66  Information  on  the  Zemlya  and  Zemeka  case  was  provided  off  the  record  by  an  official  of  the  Procuror's 
office.  Mikhail  Brodskii  was  another  deputy  who  ran  seeking  immunity.  Brodskii  had  been  the  founder  and 
the  President  of  the  concern  `Dendi',  a  de  facto  financial-industrial  group  established  around  the  Dendi  bank. 
The  concern  comprised  28  enterprises  engaged  in  disparate  activities,  among  which  also  the  popular 
newspaper  'Kievskie  Vedomosti'.  After  having  been  charged  for  money  laundering  and  having  been  exposed 
to  lengthy  administrative  controls,  in  1997  the  bank  virtually  collapsed,  overwhelmed  by  debts  of 
approximately  4  million  dollars.  Brodskii  accused  the  Ministry  of  Internal  Affairs  of  having  staged  a 
campaign  against  him  with  the  real  intent  of  silencing  Kievskie  Vedomosti,  which  had  been  in  the  past  critical 
of  the  Ministry's  activities.  Brodskii  was  then  jailed  for  financial  irregularities  in  the  buying  and  selling  of 
apartments,  and  eventually  released  in  April  1998,  after  having  been  elected  a  deputy.  Through  the  pages  of 
his  newspaper,  Brodskii  managed  to  fight  his  electoral  campaign  as  a  self-styled  hero,  raising  an  inflamed 
debate  within  public  opinion  on  his  controversial  figure.  A.  Sakhno  and  V.  Gonchar  (1997,  )  "Kak  Dendi 
londonskiy  odet",  V.  Gonchar  (1997),  "Ya  ne  poydu  igrat'  s  gosudarsvom  v  kakie-libo  igri",  N.  Rodina  and 
Yu.  Shiblovskaya  (1997),  "Vozmozhniye  versii  politicheskikh  al'yansov  Brodskogo",  Kompanyon,  n.  14, 
1997,  pp.  32-43.  A.  Sakhno  (1998),  "Mikhail  Brodskiy:  Ya  svoi  dengi  zaberu  iz  banka  Dendi  poslednim", 
Kompanyon,  n.  6,1998,  pp.  18-21.  Pochemu  predpriminatelei  idut  v  politicu?,  Kompanyon,  n.  47,1998,  pp. 
8-9,  and  "V  chem  fenomen  Brodskogo?  ",  Kompan  yon.  n.  15,1998,  p.  5 
230 Business  and  the  Presidential  Administration 
In  the  years  of  the  first  Kuchma's  presidency  a  "capitalist  class"  emerged  and  consolidated 
thanks  to  the  special  privileges  awarded  by  the  President  and  his  administration  to  the 
members  of  his  inner  circle.  The  President's  patronage  network  set  relations  between 
political  power  and  business  on  new  foundations.  Closeness  to  the  president  guaranteed 
access  to  the  administration,  redistribution  and  utilisation  of  state  financial  or 
administrative  resources  ("a  property  nobody  knows  whom  it  belongs  to"),  creating  large 
and  unexpected  fortunes.  67  As  an  observer  commented, 
"The  formula  `capital  forms  power',  traditional  in  all  developed  market  economies  has  been  completely 
inverted  into  its  opposite  -'power  forms  capital'.  Those  who  have  power  can  also  have  capital,  while  the 
power  of  an  owner  disloyal  to  the  authorities  could,  at  any  moment  be  alienated,  and  on  quite  legal 
grounds".  68 
Kuchma's  patronage  networks  developed  along  three  lines.  The  regional  clan  of 
Dnipropetrovsk  constituted  the  President's  primary  power-base,  which  fragmented  and 
evolved,  at  the  time  of  the  1998  parliamentary  elections,  into  an  embryonic  party-system. 
The  alliance  between  business  and  politics  consolidated  then  in  a  more  stable  form  centred 
around  "holdings". 
With  President  Kuchma  not  only  the  economic  elite,  but  first  and  foremost  his 
`Dnipropetrovsk  family  'went  to  power.  It  has  been  estimated  that  in  the  months  following 
Kuchma's  election  in  1994,  something  like  206  apparatchiki  moved  from  Dnipropetrovsk 
to  Kyiv  to  occupy  key  positions  in  the  state  administration,  and  control  the  process  of 
resource  allocation.  The  core  of  the  clan  was  composed  of  some  200  individuals,  among 
whom  were  figures  like  the  future  Prime  Minister  Valeryi  Pustoyvotenko,  Volodymir 
Horbulin,  secretary  of  the  National  Security  and  Defence  Council,  and  Serhey  Tihipko,  first 
67  S.  Belashko  (1998c),  Osnovnymipretendentami  na  viast'  ostayutsya  "Partii  Vlasti  ",  Kompanyon,  n.  1-2,6- 
7 
68  O.  Turchynov  (1996),  Op.  Cit. 
231 Vice  Prime  Minister  in  charge  for  the  economic  reforms.  69  In  1997  Ukrainian  media 
sources  counted  five  "Dnipropetrovtsy"  among  the  members  of  the  Presidential 
administration,  and  20  in  the  government's  apparatus.  0 
The  structure  of  regional  clans  in  the  Ukrainian  political  landscape  dated  back  to  the 
Stalinist  years,  when,  in  the  attempt  to  resist  the  persecution  of  the  political  police, 
communist  activists  joined  forces  in  tight  and  exclusive  regional  teams.  Regional  clans 
were  formed  according  to  the  country's  division  of  labour.  If  Donetsk  was  the  core  of  the 
mining  area  and  of  the  metallurgical  industry,  and  Kharkiv  the  centre  of  the  machine- 
building  sector,  Dnipropetrovsk's  strength  lay  in  its  high  level  of  industrialisation  and  the 
consequent  importance  of  its  party  organisation.  Thanks  to  the  high  concentration  of 
enterprises  of  the  military-industrial  sector,  Dnipropetrovsk  was  also  one  of  the  most 
strategically  important  regions  in  the  Soviet  Union.  These  factors  put  the  region  in  the 
position  to  place  its  own  political  representatives  in  key  positions  of  the  Soviet  apparatus.  1 
The  secretive  nature  of  the  clan  and  the  mutual  support  (financial  and  administrative)  it 
provided  to  its  members  characterised  the  clan  structure  also  in  the  years  of  the  Kuchma 
presidency.  The  Dnipropetrovsk  clan  could  draw  from  and  administer  a  large  pool  of 
resources.  The  top  managers  of  two  of  the  largest  Ukrainian  banks,  Mikhailo  Bairaka, 
Deputy  Chairman  of  the  Board  of  Directors  of  Bank  Ukraina,  and  Volodymir  Matvienko, 
69  D.  Voloshin  (1997),  "Legendy  i  byli  Dnepropetrovskogo  klana",  Delovaya  Nedelyaa,  n.  5,  p.  9 
70  Ukrainian  Centre  for  Independent  Political  Research,  The  Dinipropetrovsk  Family, 1997  (Kyiv:  UCIPR),  p. 
21 
71The  father  of  the  Dnipropetrovsk  family  was  Leonid  Brezhnev,  himself  politically  brought  up  in 
Dnipropetrovsk  and  graduated  of  the  Dnipropetrovsk  Metallurgical  Institute,  which,  for  the  large  number  of 
cadres  it  provided  to  the  USSR  has  been  ironically  compared  to  Yale,  Harvard  and  Princeton.  With  Brezhnev 
the  structure  of  the  regional  clan  acquired  a  double  significance.  For  regional  elites,  it  became  an  instrument 
to  press  for  participation  in  the  management  of  the  country,  while  for  the  General  Secretary  it  was  a  means  to 
consolidate  his  power  base.  In  his  18  years  at  the  top  of  the  Soviet  state  Brezhnev  used  his  native  region  as  a 
"private  patronage  reserve".  By  pooling  in  the  capital  cadres  from  Dnipropetrovsk  he  wanted  to  ensure 
himself  support  for  his  policy  initiatives  within  the  bureaucracies  responsible  to  implement  them,  and  at  the 
same  time,  counterbalance  the  influence  of  his  political  opponents.  Evidence  of  his  strategy  lies  in  the  fact 
that  the  number  of  Central  Committee  members  coming  from  the  region  increased  from  2  in  1956  to  13  in 
1976.  As  predictable  as  the  strength  of  the  military-industrial  region  was,  its  position  was  also  amplified  in 
the  internal  balance  of  power  in  Ukraine.  As  was revealed  in  a  1990  report  of  the  CPSU  Central  Committee, 
53%  of  the  Ukrainian  executive  officials  were  originally  from  Dnipropetrovsk.  J.  C. Moses  (1976), 
"Regional  Cohorts  and  Political  Mobility  in  the  USSR:  The  case  of  Dnepropetrovsk",  Soviet  Union/Union 
Sovietioue,  Vol.  3,  part  1,  pp.  63-89,  and  Ukrainian  Centre  for  Independent  Political  Research  (1997),  Op. 
Cit.  p.  3 
232 Chairman  of  the  Board  of  Directors  of  Prominvestbank,  were  recognised  members  of  the 
clan.  72 
Solidarity  between  members  of  the  clan  often  proved  a  useful  asset  to  escape  critical 
situations.  In  March  1995,  Yuliya  Timoshenko  was  arrested  at  the  Zaporizhzhia  airport  on 
charges  of  attempted  smuggling  of  $  26  million  to  Moscow.  Examination  of  the  case  was 
moved  from  Zaporizhzhia  to  Dnipropetrovsk,  where  Pavlo  Lazarenko  was  Speaker  of  the 
regional  parliament  and  head  of  the  regional  administration.  The  regional  procurator  was 
conveniently  promoted  to  general  procurator  in  Kyiv,  allegedly  on  an  expressed  request  of 
Lazarenko.  The  case  against  Timoshenko  was  subsequently  dropped,  and  the  documents 
related  to  it  were  made  inaccessible.  73 
With  the  appointment  of  Pavlo  Lazarenko  to  the  position  of  Prime  Minister  in  the  Autumn 
of  1996,  the  Dnipropetrovsk  clan  consolidated  its  position.  For  the  first  time  the  group 
gained,  as  one  observer  put  it,  the  "controlling  packet  of  shares"  in  the  country,  achieving 
the  position  of  President  and  Prime  Minister  at  the  same  time.  74 
Kuchma  and  Lazarenko,  however,  represented  the  two  conflicting  souls  of  the  clan:  the 
Soviet  military-industrial  complex,  the  former,  the  agrarian  sector  the  latter.  Lazarenko 
was  probably  instrumental  in  Kuchma's  1994  victory,  bringing  with  him  the  votes  of  the 
rural  areas  of  the  region,  and  with  his  appointment  to  the  Premiership  he  was  rewarded  for 
his  loyalty.  But  Lazarenko's  presidential  ambitions  and  growing  charges  of  corruption 
surrounding  him  caused  the  two  groups  to  split. 
In  July  1997  Lazarenko  was  forced  to  step  down.  His  resignation  represented  the  open 
fracturing  of  the  clan,  and  the  politicisation  of  conflict.  Lazarenko  established  the  main 
opposition  party,  Hromada,  and  became  its  leader.  Kuchma  found  support  in  the  newly 
established  Party  of  Popular  Democracy  (NDP  in  its  Ukrainian  acronym),  immediately 
72lbid.,  pp.  212-214 
73  T.  Ivzhenko  (1997),  Ne  Nashe  "Delo";  Kompanyon,  n.  24,  pp.  11-12 
74D.  Voloshin  (1997),  Op.  Cit. 
233 titled  the  `party  of  power'.  The  NDP,  in  turn,  derived  from  the  bloc  of  Constitutional 
Centre,  which  had  supported  Kuchma  in  the  1994  presidential  campaign. 
The  conflict  between  Kuchma  and  Lazarenko  produced,  paradoxically,  a  positive  outcome 
for  the  Ukrainian  political  system,  as  the  structure  of  regional  clans  seemed  to  evolve  into  a 
system  of  political  parties,  albeit  no  less  conflictual  and  personalised.  Observers  believed 
that  the  main  reason  for  the  transformation  was  that  the  structure  of  regional  clans  could  not 
be  preserved  any  longer  in  the  same  form  as  it  effectively  operated  under  Brezhnev.  While 
under  the  command-administrative  system,  it  had  been  possible  to  retain  the  monopoly  in 
managing  economic  resources,  in  post-  Soviet  Ukrainian  society  a  plurality  of  contrasting 
political  and  economic  actors  had  emerged.  In  this  complex  arena,  the  new  leader  would 
have  to  demonstrate  his  ability  to  play  all  the  conflicting  forces  to  his  advantage.  75 
The  creation  of  the  NDP  as  the  backbone  of  the  presidential  administration  could  then  be 
read  as  a  shift  from  a  policy  of  cadres  based  on  their  regional  origin,  to  a  policy  of  cadres 
based  on  political  (or  party)  belonging.  Kuchma's  supporters  hoped  that  the  NDP,  being 
economically  based  on  the  large  resources  of  the  energy  sector,  could  channel  and  actually 
expand  the  President's  political  support  beyond  the  borders  of  Dnipropetrovsk.  At  the 
same  time,  with  its  roots  in  the  government  (the  party  included  the  then  Prime  Minister 
Pustoyvotenko  as  its  leader  and  a  large  number  of  ministries),  the  NDP  could  increase 
presidential  control  over  administrative  power. 
The  1998  electoral  campaign  showed  that  political  forces  had  started  to  look  at 
entrepreneurs  as  an  important  part  of  their  constituency.  Just  before  the  elections  took 
place,  the  president  issued  a  decree  on  the  development  of  entrepreneurial  activities,  setting 
the  ground  for  a  sweeping  collection  of  reforms  in  the  tax,  trade  and  financial  sector.  Also 
the  parliament  passed  a  decree  that  allowed  enterprises  to  pay  a  single  flat-rate  tax.  6  It 
was,  however,  only  when  the  new  parliament  first  sat  that  the  full  extent  of  business 
interests  involved  in  legislative  power  became  finally  evident.  Political  parties  appeared, 
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234 for  the  first  time,  as  institutionalised  channels  to  lobby  for  specific  business  interests. 
Political  alliances  were  forged  on  the  basis  of  common  interests,  and  political  splits 
followed  as  a  result  of  these  same  interests. 
The  Green  party  was  the  big  winner  of  the  1998  elections,  as  after  more  than  ten  years  of 
battles  following  the  Chernobyl  disaster,  it  succeeded  in  overcoming  for  the  first  time  the 
5%  barrier,  to  gain  a  total  of  nineteen  seats.  Financial  support  and  the  direct  participation 
of  big  business,  with  the  consequential  shift  towards  pro-presidential  positions,  explain  part 
of  their  success.  The  Greens  were  viewed  as  a  new  party  in  the  Ukrainian  lifeless  political 
landscape,  able  to  appeal  to  a  larger  audience  by  virtue  of  their  high  moral  reputation.  The 
party  also  organised  an  effective  advertising  campaign.  Slogans  like  "It  is  ecology  rather 
than  politics  that  primarily  matters"  allowed  the  Greens  to  break  through  with  a  political 
electorate  disillusioned  with  traditional  politics.  The  success  of  the  Green  party  proved, 
however,  a  temporary  phenomenon,  as  fractions  soon  emerged  within  the  party. 
Regrouping  took  place  around  different  economic  interests. 
One  of  the  architects  of  the  operation  was  Vadim  Rabinovich,  President  of  the  Jewish 
Community.  Nicknamed  the  `Ukrainian  little  Berezovskii',  Rabinovich  was  at  the  time  in 
control  of  the  TV  channel  `1+1'.  Among  the  eleven  deputies  initially  elected  through  the 
Greens  (five  later  defected  to  other  fractions),  the  most  well-known  were  Irina  Shevchenko 
(Commercial  Director  of  the  Media  Company  Prioritiet,  controlled  by  Rabinovich),  Vasilii 
Khmel'nitskiy  and  Sergey  Pavlenko  (both  Chairmen  of  Real  Group),  and  Sergei  Rys' 
(Chairman  of  the  oil  company  Shelton). 
The  People's  Democratic  Party  (NDP)  was  by  far  the  most  successful  party,  initially 
gaining  a  total  of  twenty-eight  deputies,  all  of  whom  came  from  an  economic  background. 
The  party  was  immediately  dubbed  "the  party  of  power".  Political  commentators  noted  it 
had  been  formed  on  the  model  of  Our  Home  is  Russia,  with  the  aim  to  channel  economic 
interests  in  support  of  the  President  in  preparation  of  the  next  presidential  elections. 
Anatolii  Kinakh  was  one  of  the  deputies  of  the  fraction.  The  group,  representing  primarily 
235 energy  interests,  proved,  however,  very  unstable.  Controversies  over  the  redistribution  of 
gas  contracts  led  twenty-three  of  its  deputies  to  abandon  the  fraction  at  different  stages.  7 
Seven  of  them  established  subsequently  the  group  `Working  Ukraine',  while  eleven  moved 
to  reinforce  the  Party  of  Regional  Revival.  78 
The  second  pillar  in  the  administration's  strategy  to  create  parliamentary  support  for  the 
president  was  the  Social  Democratic  Party  (SDP),  which,  because  of  its  ten  deputies  elected 
among  the  ranks  of  the  business  elite,  was  considered  the  party  of  the  big  monopolies.  It 
included  representatives  of  economic  empires  like  Bogdan  Gubskii  Chairman  of  the 
Slavutich  Board  of  Directors,  and  Grigoryi  Surkis,  Chairman  of  Dynamo  Kyiv.  The 
"diversification"  of  Kuchma's  support  was  interpreted  as  an  attempt  to  send  a  signal  to  the 
business  community  that,  in  advance  of  the  presidential  campaign,  they  could  look  for  the 
President's  favour  regardless  of  their  party  belonging.  79 
The  rise  of  the  SDP  contrasted  sharply  with  the  decline  of  Hromada,  which  local 
commentators  identified  as  "the  party  of  the  power  that  was".  80  Hromada  had  been  created 
by  Lazarenko  to  gather  support  in  his  struggle  against  the  President.  Ideologically  it 
occupied  the  position  of  "authentic  social  democrats,  with  Christian  values",  and  called  for 
the  protection  of  Ukrainian  national  capital,  threatened,  in  their  view,  by  the  uncontrolled 
influx  of  foreign  companies  81  Contrary  to  this  image,  however,  Hromada  was  suspected  of 
entertaining  close  financial  relations  with  foreign  markets,  especially  the  United  Kingdom 
and  Cyprus,  thanks  to  expatriated  Ukrainian  entrepreneurs.  Hromada's  financial  power  put 
the  party  in  the  position  of  owning  a  bank  and  establishing  a  financial-industrial  group.  82 
The  party  won  twenty-six  parliamentary  seats,  of  these  eight  went  to  business 
representatives,  among  whom  were  Yuliya  Timoshenko  (former  Chairman  of  the  United 
77  S.  Belashko  (1998a),  Partya,  Plast'i  Biznes,  Kompanyon.  n.  48,  pp.  8-11 
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236 Energy  Systems),  Aleksandr  Ryanchenko  (Chairman  of  the  Kredit-Dnepr),  and  Sergei 
Chukmasov  (former  Chairman  of  Ukrzoloto).  Contrasts  between  Lazarenko  and 
Timoshenko,  and  the  December  1998  arrest  of  Lazarenko  in  Switzerland  on  charges  of 
money  laundering,  caused  the  party  to  split  into  two  groups:  `Fatherland',  headed  by 
Timoshenko,  and  'Solidarity'.  83 
With  the  1998  elections  the  Parliament  gained  importance  in  the  estimation  of  the 
economic  elite  as  a  place  to  present  and  advocate  business  interests.  Political  tactics  and 
the  significance  of  decisions  adopted  meant,  however,  that  effective  lobbying  in  the 
Verkhovna  Rada  required  coalition-building  and  inter-fraction  co-operation.  The 
presidential  administration  remained  still  the  focus  of  business  lobbying,  thanks  to  its 
ability  to  provide  protection  for  individual  interests. 
The  party  structure  appeared  to  rest  on  a  complex  and  unstable  network  of  five  or  six 
economic  clans  that  enjoyed  a  close  relationship  with  the  president,  supported  his  electoral 
campaign  and  secured  for  themselves  political  revenues  thanks  to  this  privileged  position. 
The  presidential  electoral  campaign  was  inevitably  perceived  as  a  delicate  phase  for  the 
economic  groups'  precarious  cohesion.  One  commentator  anticipated  that  this  would  be  a 
"time  of  divisions  and  redistribution,  St.  George's  Days  and  Bartholomew's  nights, 
expropriation  of  someone  else's  capital  and  in  that  process  earning  new  capital".  84 
The  economic  groups  that  were  assembled  in  anticipation  of  the  electoral  campaign  were 
called  by  Ukrainian  analysts  "holdings",  even  though  they  resembled  more  political 
coalitions  built  upon  financial  capital.  Holdings  were  created  from  the  confluence  of  a 
number  of  relatively  small  business  empires,  whose  owners  realised  that  it  would  be 
impossible  for  them  to  reach  political  power  on  their  own.  As  in  business,  they  negotiated, 
concluded  agreements,  and  made  mutual  concessions  within  their  political  alliances. 
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237 Contrary  to  the  Russian  oligarchy,  however,  because  of  their  limited  scale  and  capital, 
Ukrainian  holdings  were  forced  to  work  out  co-operative  strategies.  85 
The  possible  emergence  of  conflicting  interests  made  holdings  unstable  affiliations,  likely 
to  break  when  one  set  of  preferences  overlapped  with  the  interests  of  another  holding,  as 
happened,  for  example,  to  the  short-lived  alliance  between  Rabinovich  and  Surkis.  When 
Rabinovich  lost  influence  over  the  state  TV  channel  `1+1',  the  coalition  with  Surkis  also 
collapsed.  Ukrainian  journalists  speculated  that  as  Rabinovich  was  of  no  more  use  to  the 
president  because  he  no  longer  controlled  one  of  the  most  popular  TV  stations,  he  would 
most  likely  see  his  access  to  the  president  curtailed  and  his  business  activity  endangered.  86 
The  Rabinovich  case  was  not,  however,  an  isolated  one.  Other  examples  of  the  poisonous 
atmosphere  that  existed  within  in  the  presidential  circles  and  which  led  to  instability  in 
parties  and  holdings  can  also  be  found.  In  October  1998,  the  Government  transferred  the 
controlling  packet  of  shares  of  the  `Oriana'  chemical  concern  (50%  plus  1  share)  from  the 
state  property  fund  to  the  management  of  `Shelton',  whose  president  was  a  deputy  for  the 
Green  Party.  Igor'  Nasalyk,  Chairman  of  the  competing  `Tekhnotsentr'  and  NDP  deputy, 
frustrated  in  his  aspiration  to  gain  control  of  the  same  packet  of  shares,  left  the 
parliamentary  fraction,  contributing  in  the  split  that  led  to  the  creation  of  `Working 
Ukraine'.  Similar  episodes  involving  behind  the  scenes  agreements  between  the 
presidential  administration  and  leading  entrepreneurs  took  place  in  relation  to  the  enterprise 
South-Pipe  in  Nikopol',  which  had  recently  been  included  in  the  list  of  assets  undergoing 
privatisation,  and  the  Nikolaevsk  refinery.  87 
In  anticipation  of  the  presidential  elections,  Ukrainian  observers  agreed  that  the  electoral 
campaign  would  work  as  a  catalyst  for  the  different  and  contrasting  interests  of  the 
economic  holdings.  There  were  expectations  that  during  the  political  process,  more  stable 
coalitions  would  be  created,  even  though  they  would  only  have  a  temporary  character. 
Building  up  alliances  with  political  forces  would  arguably  increase  the  financial  power  of 
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238 the  holdings.  88  Commentators  bitterly  remarked  that  Ukrainian  political  institutions  existed 
only  as  a  mechanism  to  legalise  decisions  made  by  economic  organisations  which  enjoyed 
direct  access  to  power.  If  an  oligarchy  had  not  materialised  yet  in  Ukraine,  this  was  only  a 
matter  of  time:  the  process  of  consolidation  was  still  at  an  early  stage.  89 
The  Energy  Sector  as  an  Administrative  Resource 
So  far  I  have  examined  the  consolidation  of  the  relation  between  business  and  politics  in 
the  Parliament  and  the  presidential  administration,  especially  following  the  1998 
parliamentary  elections  and  in  anticipation  of  the  1999  presidential  election.  I  have 
outlined  a  system  of  rent-seeking  based  on  the  mutual  dependence  between  political 
institutions  and  leading  economic  actors.  In  this  system,  access  to  the  redistribution  of 
economic  benefits  was  employed  by  political  figures,  notably  the  President  and  his 
administration,  as  a  currency  to  secure  political  support  from  powerful  business  people. 
The  clearest  example  of  how  the  presidential  circles  made  use  of  economic  and 
administrative  resources  as  an  instrument  of  coalition-building  is  the  energy  sector. 
Pavlo  Lazarenko  was  the  first  to  set  up  a  structure  designed  to  maximise  revenue  extraction 
from  the  gas  sector  for  himself  and  for  his  party.  In  his  capacity  as  Prime  Minister, 
Lazarenko  took  advantage  of  the  move  towards  the  de-monopolisation  of  the  gas  trade  with 
Russia  and  Turkmenistan,  which  had  previously  been  administered  by  Ukrgazprom  (the 
Ukrainian  gas  monopoly). 
The  alternative  proposal  to  establish  a  system  where  gas  was  bought  with  private  capital  by 
a  network  of  gas-trading  companies  emerged  between  the  end  of  1995  and  the  beginning  of 
1996.  Initially  six  companies  had  managed  gas  trading,  but  with  the  territorial  demarcation 
introduced  in  January  1996,  the  number  of  importers  dropped,  limiting  the  number  of  gas 
importing  companies  to  just  two:  United  Energy  Systems  (UES)  (chaired  by  Yuliya 
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239 Timoshenko),  and  Itera  (belonging  to  the  Russian  Gazpom).  While  Lazarenko  maintained 
the  position  of  Prime  Minister,  he  made  sure  that  the  largest  part  of  state  contracts  were 
granted  to  his  business  associates  in  UES,  sweeping  from  the  market  politically 
unconnected  competitors  90 
Industrialnyi  Soyuz  Donbassa  (ISD),  for  example,  was  considered  to  be  a  possible  third 
contender,  but  after  Donbass  governor  Vladimir  Sherbaniya  was  dismissed,  the  position  of 
ISD  weakened  considerably  and  in  1997  the  company  failed  to  obtain  supplies  to  place  on 
the  Ukrainian  market.  Intergaz  was  another  victim  of  the  territorial  demarcation.  In  1996 
the  company  not  only  had  its  quota  of  gas  import  curtailed,  but  the  volume  of  actual 
Russian  gas  deliveries  was  also  drastically  reduced. 
A  similar  fate  befell  Oleg  Ishchenko,  chairman  of  01-Bank  and  01-House  concern.  Before 
Lazarenko  became  Prime  Minister,  Ishchenko  controlled  about  25%  of  the  market  for  the 
import  of  natural  gas  to  Ukraine,  earning  an  estimated  $10  million  per  year.  The 
appearance  of  United  Energy  Systems  cut  his  business  turnover  dramatically  and  his 
company  collapsed.  Political  disgrace  followed  his  economic  crash.  Assessing  the  chances 
that  a  draft  law  presented  by  Ischenko,  who  had  subsequently  been  elected  deputy,  could 
receive  presidential  approval,  one  of  his  fellow  deputies  commented:  "Today  Ishchenko  is 
bankrupted  and  his  law  will  not  be  approved".  91 
Towards  the  end  of  1996  the  Ukrainian  government  decided  to  establish  a  consortium,  the 
Ukrainian  Gas  Resources  Consortium  (UGRC),  including  also  UES,  to  stabilise  the 
situation  on  the  energy  market.  Following  a  December  1996  decree,  the  market  was 
divided  so  that  UGRC  became  the  leading  company.  18.7%  of  its  quota  was  given  to  UES. 
In  addition,  UES  was  the  only  company  to  be  granted  the  privilege  of  a  100%  state  budget 
payment  for  supplies  to  the  population  and  state  organisations,  while  other  state  companies 
involved  in  the  gas  distribution  business  were  paid  no  more  than  40%  of  their  fees  92 
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240 In  the  spring  of  1997  the  Council  of  Security  and  Defence  (and  through  it  most  probably 
the  president)  denounced  the  "clan-administrative"  system  of  gas  supply  in  Ukraine.  A 
Temporary  Special  Committee  of  the  Parliament  established  to  create  a  national  market  for 
gas  transport  reported  that  private  companies  were  responsible  for  financial  breaches,  and 
had  tendencies  to  monopolise  the  gas  market.  The  Committee  recommended  the 
development  of  a  concept  for  the  reform  of  the  energy  sector  based  upon  the  establishment 
of  an  exchange  on  which  energy  resources  would  be  traded. 
As  a  result,  a  proposal  was  formulated  to  set  up  a  gas  resources  consortium,  in  which  the 
big  companies  would  define  common  conditions  for  the  definition  of  prices  and  supply  of 
gas.  Yuliya  Timoshenko  proposed  that  the  consortium  be  awarded  the  right  to  function  as 
the  sole  gas  importer  in  the  country.  Commentators  remarked  that  UES  was  trying  to  get  a 
status  of  "official  monopolist"  in  the  gas  sector.  But  other  companies  such  as  Itera  and 
Intergaz  (believed  to  be  close  to  President  Kuchma)  contested  the  UES  position.  Since  all 
the  companies  failed  to  find  a  compromise,  the  idea  of  the  Consortium  was  temporarily 
discarded. 
Approximately  at  the  same  time,  however,  Mikhail  Kovalko,  a  figure  close  to  the  president 
and  member  of  the  People's  Democratic  Party,  was  appointed  President  of 
Gazneftegazprom,  the  Ukrainian  gas  and  oil  concern.  Kovalko  announced  the  decision  to 
create  a  number  of  gas  trading  companies  ("gaztreidery",  as  they  became  known  in  the 
Ukrainian  political  jargon).  The  companies,  he  said,  would  be  set  up  on  different 
conditions  to  guarantee  "healthy  competition"  93 
A  number  of  deputies,  not  related  to  the  gas  industry  but  believed  to  be  close  to  the 
president,  addressed  a  letter  to  Kuchma  urging  that  he  stop  the  dissolution  of  Ukrgazprom, 
which  controlled  the  whole  gas  infrastructure,  and  was  vital  for  the  defence  of  Ukrainian 
interests.  LTkrgazprom  in  fact  administered  more  than  34  thousand  kilometres  of  gas 
pipelines,  through  which  every  year  ran  more  than  240  billion  cubic  metres  of  gas,  of  which 
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241 120  billion  cubic  metres  was  Russian  gas  en  route  to  European  markets.  The  letter  written 
by  the  Ukrainian  deputies  called  for  Ukrgazprom  to  be  guaranteed  a  privileged  position  on 
the  Ukrainian  market  and  in  the  import  of  Russian  gas,  in  virtue  of  its  strategically 
important  role.  94 
The  fragmentation  of  the  gas  market  and  the  political  decline  of  Lazarenko  and  UES  had  a 
major  influence  on  the  political  arena  and  on  the  emergence  of  a  group  of  gaztreidery, 
actively  engaged  in  politics,  lobbying  against  the  creation  of  energy  monopolies.  95 
Gaztreidery  initially  sided  with  Kuchma,  on  the  expectation  that  the  political  defeat  of 
Lazarenko  would  mean  a  more  equitable  distribution  of  the  gas  market  for  them. 
The  creation  of  the  gas  monopoly  `Neftegaz  Ukraina'  in  February  1998,  however,  sparked 
immediate  protests  against  the  president  and  his  administration.  The  company,  established 
to  "increase  the  degree  of  energy  security  of  the  country",  pooled  all  the  state-owned  shares 
in  energy  enterprises  that  were  exempted  from  privatisation.  Neftegaz  Ukraina  was 
designed  to  perform  activities  that  were  previously  distributed  among  a  number  of  separate 
enterprises,  like  transit,  formerly  managed  by  Ukrgazprom  and  regional  distribution  of  gas, 
previously  supervised  by  Ukrgaz.  The  purpose  of  the  company,  whose  institutional  capital 
was  fixed  at  $650  millions,  was  defined  as  "conducting  an  effective  state  policy  in  the 
energy  sector  through  the  establishment  of  a  vertically  integrated  company  with  the 
functions  of  a  financial  holding".  96  In  their  trade  relations  with  Moscow,  single  agents 
were  forced  to  use  Neftegaz  as  an  intermediary,  and,  as  a  result,  their  authority  on  the 
energy  market  was  severely  curtailed. 
Hromada,  and  Yuliya  Timoshenko  called  upon  parliament  to  impeach  the  president  (the 
proposal  had  no  follow  up)  on  the  grounds  that  the  decree  for  the  establishment  of  Neftegaz 
94  ibid. 
9s  G.  Lyuta  (1998a),  'V  `Ukrgazprome'  uvereny:  zabotoi  NAKa  dolzhny  byt'  raschety  za  energonosoteli,  a  ne 
ikh  transit",  Zerkalo  Nedelii,  n.  21,23  May,  p.  9 
96  G.  Lyuta  (1998c)  "Vemut'cya  k  prezhdnei  modeli  rynka  gaza...  nevozmozhno",  Zerkalo  Nedelii,  n.  44,31 
October  1998,  p.  9,  G.  Lyuta  (1998b),  "Igor'  Bakai:  'U  NAKa  est'  bozmozhnosti,  kotorykh  ni  u  kogo  prezhde 
ne  bylo",  Zerkalo  Nedelii,  n.  31,1  August,  p.  5 
242 posed  the  risk  of  a  gradual  loss  of  strategically  important  energy  enterprises.  97  But,  on  June 
24  1998,  the  Parliament  voted  239  to  34  a  law  forbidding  the  government  to  transfer  shares 
of  state-owned  energy  companies  to  Neftegaz.  The  law  equally  forbade  the  government  to 
re-organise  energy  enterprises  which  were  exempted  from  privatisation  into  share-holding 
companies,  which  would  be,  in  the  words  of  one  of  the  promoters  of  the  law,  the  first  step 
towards  open  privatisation.  98 
The  draft  law  was  presented  by  the  Rukh  deputy  Oleg  Ishchenko,  who  accused  the 
President  and  the  Cabinet  of  violating  the  constitution  and  the  legislation  on  privatisation, 
as  Neftegaz  was  de  facto  being  established  as  a  monopolist  in  the  oil  and  gas  market.  9 
Commenting  on  the  fact  that  the  law  would  most  probably  be  vetoed  by  the  President, 
Ishchenko  said:  "When  there  is  the  opportunity  to  privatise  for  10  billion  hryvnas 
something  that  is  worth  ten  times  more,  who  will  give  up  on  it?  "100 
In  November  1998,  the  presidential  administration  was  forced  to  partially  give  in,  accepting 
that  Neftegaz  would  control  only  85%  of  the  gas  market.  The  event,  however,  provided  the 
opportunity  to  reward  other  political  allies  for  their  support.  The  shares  of  three  state- 
owned  energy  enterprises  were  transferred  to  the  management  of  the  Ukrainian  Credit 
Bank,  considered  close  to  Gregoryi  Surkis'  business  empire.  While  it  was  expected  that 
Surkis'  energy  enterprises,  together  with  Interpipe  chaired  by  the  recently  elected  deputy 
Viktor  Pinchuk,  would  be  among  those  benefiting  from  the  redistribution  of  the  remaining 
15%  of  the  gas  market.  '°' 
Read  in  political  terms,  the  verticalisation  of  the  gas  sector,  and  its  submission  to  a  single 
authority,  loyal  to  the  president  (NDP  Igor'  Bakai  was  appointed  Chairman  of  the  concern) 
seemed  designed  to  strengthen  the  president's  control  over  the  energy  sector.  As  Bakai 
would  be  the  only  person  to  decide  about  gas  deliveries,  gas  traders  could  be  required  to 
pay  different  prices,  reflecting  "objective  and  subjective"  conditions.  Gaztreidery  not 
97  L.  Krinichna  (1998),  "Dubl'  Dva",  Kompanyon.  n.  11,  pp.  12-13 
98  Yu.  Mostovaya  (1998),  "Neftegaz  prikryt:  nadolgo  li?  ",  Zerkalo  Nedelii,  n.  30,25  June,  p.  2 
99  Ibid. 
'°°N.  Burlyuk  (1998),  "Parlament  `nazhal'  na'Neftegaz"',  Kompanyon,  n.  34,  pp.  28-29 
243 sufficiently  loyal  to  the  executive  power  and  political  opponents  could  have  their  access  to 
the  market  denied  or  curtailed,  as  it  happened  to  UES,  which  was  fined  1.4  billion  hryvnas 
(about  $  450  million),  for  a  violation  of  the  Neflegaz  monopoly.  102 
Finally,  no  one  made  a  mystery  of  the  plan  to  channel  the  vast  financial  resources  generated 
in  the  gas  sector  into  the  presidential  race.  "We  will  buy  gas  at  36  dollars,  and  sell  it  twice 
as  much.  We  will  transfer  money  from  one  pocket  to  the  other,  and  the  difference  will  go 
to  the  electoral  campaign",  confirmed  a  source  close  to  Neftegaz.  103 
Defence  of  `National  Capital' 
The  system  of  rent-seeking  and  network  patronage,  which  consolidated  in  Ukraine  during 
President  Kuchma's  first  term,  provided  very  little  room,  if  any,  for  co-operation  with 
Russia  on  the  basis  of  a  convergence  of  economic  interests.  The  Ukrainian  economic  and 
political  environment  appeared  designed  to  exclude  (or  significantly  limit)  the  intervention 
of  outsiders,  who  might  upset  the  precarious  balance  of  forces  that  existed  between  the 
presidential  administration,  the  Parliament  and  the  different  groups  of  the  economic  elite. 
Russian  investors,  in  particular,  were  deemed  the  greatest  threat  to  the  expansion  on  wealth 
and  property  of  the  Ukrainian  economic  elite. 
More  affluent  than  their  Ukrainian  counterparts,  Russian  financial  conglomerates  had  an 
advantage  over  other  potential  foreign  investors  in  view  of  the  cultural  proximity  between 
the  two  countries.  An  understanding  of  the  risks  inherent  in  the  Ukrainian  economic 
environment  made  the  Russians  more  resilient  than  Western  investors,  while  the  common 
historical  background  made  it  possible  for  the  Ukrainians  to  characterise  Russian  business 
interests  as  attacks  on  Ukrainian  newly  acquired  sovereignty.  An  ideology  of  protection  of 
`national  capital'  was,  therefore,  forged  as  an  instrument  to  defend  the  Ukrainian  system, 
and  preserve  the  existing  balance  of  force  among  insider  actors. 
1°1  N.  Kononenko  and  V.  Denisenko  (1998),  Op.  Cit. 
102  S.  Belashko  (1998b),  Op.  Cit. 
103  Ibid. 
244 National  capital,  the  argument  went,  was  more  attached  to  the  country  than  foreign  capital. 
While  the  former  was  there  to  stay,  despite  the  fluctuations  of  the  market  and  the  instability 
of  the  political  environment,  the  latter  would  be  ready  to  leave  at  the  first  signs  of  social 
and  political  unrest.  The  former  was  interested  in  the  economic  development  of  the  country 
and  would  reinvest  profits  on  the  national  soil.  The  latter,  instead,  had  primarily  a 
speculative  intention,  and  once  it  had  exploited  the  resources  of  the  host  country,  it  would 
repatriate  its  revenues,  leaving  the  region  poorer  than  before.  Finally,  national  capital  had  a 
natural  right  and  a  patriotic  duty  to  administer  the  country's  wealth,  because  it  had  at  heart 
the  good  of  the  nation,  while  foreign  investors  concealed  expansionistic  and  imperialistic 
attitudes  behind  business  interests,  and  plans  to  exert  political  control  through  economic 
means.  104 
`National  capital'  arguments  were  voiced  in  different  quarters  of  the  Ukrainian  political 
arena  and  to  different  degrees.  The  President  urged  to  "buy  Ukrainian!  ",  and  Oleksander 
Moroz's  Socialist  Party  demanded  the  development  of  national  capital  and  called  for  the 
support  of  national  production.  '°5  Lamenting  the  massive  penetration  of  low-quality 
products,  especially  in  the  food  industry,  some  advocated  the  introduction  of  "flexible 
protectionist  measures"  to  defend  the  quality  of  products  and  give  national  industry  an 
opportunity  to  grow.  106  At  the  same  time,  Ukrainian  entrepreneurs  complained  that  because 
of  the  high  tax  rating  and  complicated  foreign  trade  regulations,  Ukrainian  production  was 
disadvantaged  vis-ä-vis  foreign  production,  and  export  had  become  for  them  highly 
unprofitable.  '°7 
As  a  representative  of  the  banking  community  pointed  out,  "everybody  thinks  [that  national 
capital  must  be  defended  to  allow  its  development],  because  without  national  capital  it  is 
difficult  to  manage  the  economy".  108  Oleg  Bilorus,  deputy  of  Hromada,  and  one  of  the 
most  vociferous  supporters  of  a  policy  to  defend  national  entrepreneurs,  confirmed:  "In  the 
104  Stanislav  Arzhevitin,  interview  with  the  author,  Op.  cit. 
ios  L.  Kuchma  (2000),  Op.  Cit.,  p.  242 
106  Anatolii  Gritsenko,  interview  with  the  author,  Op.  cit. 
107  Yu.  Kornev  (1998),  "Ne  vygodno",  Biznes,  n.  46,  pp.  14-15 
245 national  interest  only  national  capital  can  be  the  real  locomotive  of  transformation  and 
development.  It  would  be  the  real  security  and  guarantee  for  that.  National  capital  is  [...  ] 
not  ethnic  but  political.  National  in  the  sense  that  it  was  produced  here,  and  that  it  was 
invested  here".  109 
On  the  concept  of  'National  Capital'  the  interests  of  the  economic  elite  were  seen  to 
coincide  with  the  nationalist  striving  to  preserve  an  independent  Ukraine.  Arguments  for 
moderate  protectionism  gained  praise  also  in  liberal-oriented  nationalist  circles,  where,  it 
was  suggested,  specific,  group  interests  could  be  channelled  to  foster  the  process  of  nation- 
building.  110  As  the  interest  of  the  economic  elite  was  primarily  in  "establishing  control 
over  the  national  wealth",  they  acquired  a  patriotic  character  by  default.  "'  Only  the 
consolidation  of  Ukraine  as  a  "strong  nation"  would  rebuff  the  dangers  of  re-assimilation 
that  the  Russian  capital  would  present  in  the  case  that  the  plan  of  an  economic  or  political 
union  between  the  two  countries  was  implemented. 
The  Ukrainian  economic  elite  was  well  aware  that  their  resources  were  limited  in 
comparison  with  their  Russian  or  Western  counterparts,  and  their  production  was  largely 
unable  to  face  competition  on  foreign  markets.  Ukrainian  economic  actors  realised  that 
their  activity  was  inevitably  territorially  limited  to  Ukraine,  their  fortunes  irremediably 
"linked  to  the  Ukrainian  soil".  The  defence  of  the  Ukrainian  nation,  then,  became  for  the 
Ukrainian  business  a  matter  of  survival.  '  12 
The  policy  preferences  of  small  entrepreneurs,  however,  seemed  to  make  no  difference 
between  foreign  and  national  capital.  Concerned  with  the  stagnation  of  the  Ukrainian 
economy,  representatives  of  small  business  viewed  the  influx  of  any  sort  of  foreign 
investment  as  an  indispensable  contribution  to  a  strategy  of  growth.  '  13 
108  Valerii  Suskin,  interview  with  the  author,  Op.  cit. 
1°9  Oleg  Bilorus,  interview  with  the  author,  Op.  cit. 
"o  Aleksandr  Goncharenko,  interview  with  the  author,  Op.  cit. 
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246 The  idea  of  national  capital  found  fertile  ground  on  the  widespread  preoccupation, 
primarily  supported  in  nationalistic  (Rukh)  as  well  as  liberal  (presidential  administration) 
quarters,  that  Russia  was  using  economic  levers  to  achieve  its  political  aims.  Although 
many  agreed  that  the  threat  of  a  massive  invasion  of  Russian  capital  had  never  really 
existed,  there  was,  however,  general  apprehension  about  the  aggressive  character  of 
Russian  investors.  114  Western  investors  were  moved  only  by  business  reasons,  it  was 
argued,  exclusively  aiming  at  maximising  their  profits,  whereas  Russian  investors  masked 
their  imperial  appetites  beyond  business  projects,  which  aimed  to  thus  reinforce  Ukraine's 
political  dependence  through  economic  means.  '15 
As  Oleg  Bilorus  pointed  out,  Russian  business  involved  in  Ukraine  had  a  dual  objective: 
"the  first  basic,  very  pragmatic,  business,  economic  co-operation  in  spite  of  all,  and  the 
second  integration  with  Ukraine.  [...  ]  They  discussed  all  of  the  time  the  so-called  `strategy 
of  fragmentation'  of  Ukraine,  fragmentation  in  all  senses,  disintegration,  reduction  of  trade 
and  so  on".  116 
At  the  same  time,  Russian  capital  was  viewed  as  "dirty  capital",  speculative  and  criminal 
capital  which  would  introduce  in  Ukraine  the  devious  Russian  business  practices.  Oleg 
Soskin,  presidential  advisor  on  economic  issues  was  adamant  on  this  point: 
"As  Ukrainian  capital  also  the  Russian  capital  is  a  new  capital,  originated  from  the  shadow  economy,  it  is  a 
criminal  capital.  This  is  why  it  should  not  be  allowed  in  Ukraine.  Russian  capital  is  oriented  towards  making 
their  profits  under  monopoly  conditions.  We  should  not  allow  a  capital  that  bums  all  the  bridges  behind,  that 
gathers  as  much  as  it  can  and  then  leaves". 
113  Nataliya  Koshevina,  President  of  the  small-business  organisation  "Yednannya",  interview  with  the  author, 
K  iv,  12  November  1998 
11  Officials  in  Bank  Ukraina  reported  an  influx  of  Russian  capital  into  the  bank,  as  well  as  another  Ukrainian 
bank,  in  coincidence  with  the  1996  Russian  Presidential  elections.  The  risk  of  a  massive  influx  of  Russian 
capital  was,  however,  dismissed,  given  the  rigid  controls  imposed  on  the  Ukrainian  banking  system  by  the 
National  Bank.  This  control  also  reduced  the  opportunities  to  establish  transnational  financial-industrial 
groups.  This  information  was  provided  by  Aleksei  Pavlov  and  Evgenyi  Zel'tser,  interviews  with  the  author, 
I10, 
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116  Oleg  Bilorus,  interview  with  the  author,  Op.  cit. 
247 In  the  most  moderate  form,  protection  of  national  capital  focused  on  defence  against 
Russian  penetration,  while  it  hailed  Western  investment  and  the  consequent  exchange  of 
technology  as  a  route  towards  economic  recovery  and  scientific  progress.  The  option  of  an 
autarchic  economy  was  completely  dismissed;  it  was  viewed  as  being  the  source  of  further 
corruption  and  economic  degradation,  while  an  export-oriented  strategy  was  indicated  as 
the  optimum  alternative.  As  in  the  countries  of  East  Asia,  an  active  engagement  with 
Western  companies  was  felt  to  bring  the  advantages  of  new  technology  and  consistent 
investment  capital.  Ukraine  would  then  become  the  next  "economic  tiger".  "We  should 
not  defend  our  capital,  creating  for  it  artificial  support,  we  have  only  to  establish  the  right 
conditions  for  it  to  work.  The  same  conditions  must  be  applied  to  foreign  capital".  117 
The  appeal  for  Western  economic  involvement  in  Ukraine  derived  also  from  the  view  that 
Western  investment  would  counterbalance  the  Russian  presence  in  the  country,  especially 
in  the  energy  sector.  Ukrainian  commentators  welcomed  the  idea  that  Western  companies 
would  be  attracted  to  finance  repairs  to  the  Ukrainian  gas  transportation  system  in  exchange 
for  concessions.  i's  As  part  of  its  "geopolitical  project",  Gazprom,  it  was  feared,  would  not 
be  satisfied  with  generic  concessions.  In  the  view  of  Ukrainian  commentators,  Gazprom's 
exclusive  aim  was  to  obtain  ownership  over  the  Ukrainian  system,  increasing  the  country's 
debt  up  to  50%  of  the  value  of  the  transportation  facilities.  This  would  then  put  the 
company  in  a  position  to  reclaim  property  legally,  or  take  long-term  control  over  these 
obj  ects.  119 
In  more  radical  forms,  however,  the  ideology  that  claimed  the  protection  of  national  capital 
portrayed  any  foreign  intervention  as  an  instrument  of  political  and  economic  domination. 
117  Oleg  Soskin,  interview  with  the  author,  Op.  cit. 
11$  More  than  30%  of  the  gas  used  in  Europe  travelled  through  Ukrainian  pipelines.  Europeans  were 
concerned  about  the  state  of  the  system  and  feared  that  a  break  down  may result  in  vast  losses.  Royal  Dutch 
Shell  proposed  that  the  Ukrainian  government  participate  in  the  management  and  upgrading  of  the  pipeline 
system.  One  of  the  forms  of  co-operation  put  forward  by  them  was  the  creation  of  a  joint  enterprise  with 
Ukrgazprom.  Shell  would  hold  49%  of  the  shares  and  leave  to  the  Ukrainian  government  control  over  the 
infrastructure.  Shell  would  participate  with  $1,5  billion  investment  in  the  operation.  L.  Krinichna  (1998), 
Op.  Cit.,  and  A.  Volnenko  (1998),  "Iskusstvo  igry  na  trube",  Biznes  n.  13,6  April,  pp.  35-36 
"  V.  Granovskii,  M.  Karizhskii  (1998)  "Komplementarnaya  politika  reformirovaniya  gazovogo  sektora", 
Kompanyon.  n.  17,  p.  9 
248 This  was  the  position  taken  by  Lazarenko  and  Hromada  who  used  this  rhetoric  to  launch 
their  political  challenge  against  the  president  and  his  administration. 
According  to  Lazarenko,  the  gradual  opening  up  of  the  Ukrainian  economy  and  its 
consequential  pauperisation  had  been  part  of  a  well-designed  strategy  to  diminish  the 
country's  sovereignty,  make  way  to  the  "Foreign  Investor",  obtain  foreign  financial  aid  and 
force  the  government  to  issue  state  obligations.  120  The  intervention  of  foreign  advisers  and 
the  policies  of  stabilisation  imposed  by  international  organisations  had  resulted  in  the 
"deindustriyalizatsiya,  deinttelektualizatsiya,  dekulturalisatsiya"  of  the  country. 
Consequently,  Ukraine  had  become  "an  economic  and  intellectual  donor  for  developed 
countries.  From  [Ukraine]  they  extract  tens  of  billion  dollars  every  year".  In  particular,  the 
liberalisation  of  foreign  trade  had  caused  a  massive  loss  of  national  wealth  to  foreign 
countries.  "The  people  of  Ukraine  have  become  an  investor  for  the  `world  society',  every 
year  we  invest  billion  of  dollars  in  the  development  of  the  economy  of  other  economies,  but 
not  the  other  way  round".  '2' 
Lazarenko  characterised  the  relationship  between  Ukraine  and  other  foreign  countries  in 
terms  of  "neo-imperialism"  and  "neo-colonialism".  Thus,  "the  most  important  condition 
for  Ukraine  to  realise  its  own  national  interests  in  the  economic  sphere  was  to  guarantee  the 
development  of  the  country's  economic  system,  preserving  its  management  and 
integrity".  122  Russian  capital,  however,  represented,  in  Lazarenko's  view,  the  most  serious 
threat  to  Ukraine's  economic  development.  Russian  companies  would  not  invest  in 
industry,  he  accused,  and  would  not  resist  the  "temptation  of  buying  some  Ukrainian 
sectors  at  dumping  prices".  123 
The  protectionist  mood,  echoed  by  the  `national  capital'  arguments  and  often  disguised 
behind  patriotic  professions,  appeared  typical  of  a  country  approaching  the  international 
economy  and  concerned  by  foreign  competition.  As  Oleg  Bilorus  put  it: 
120  T.  Nezhenko  (1998),  "Pavel  Lazarenko:  Ya  ponimayu  chto  mne  v  blizhaishee  vremiya  ne  dadut  spokoino 
rapotat"',  Kompanyon,  n.  21,  pp.  19.20 
12  P.  Lazarenko  (1998)  Ukraina  poslennii  shans:  strategiya  natsionalnogo  spaseniya  (Kyiv:  Hromada) 
122  Ibid. 
249 "Our  strategy  of  open  economic  borders  is  not  working.  This  strategy  would  be  very  good  if  we  were 
stronger,  the  strongest  economy  in  the  region,  then  we  could  open  the  economic  system.  But  if  we  are  weak, 
if  we  are  in  a  process  of  transformation,  in  crisis,  if  we  change  social  political  formation  -  from  pseudo- 
socialism  to  pseudo  capitalism,  if  we  are  changing  the  economic  system,  if  we  are  trying  to  change  the 
economic  structure  of  national  economy,  we  should  follow  first  the  strategy  of  self-reliance,  as  China  does, 
and  we  should  follow  the  strategy  of  economic  [isolationism].  All  governments  of  Ukraine  starting  from 
1992  never  understood  this.  They  for  sure  thought  that  all  other  countries  are  brothers  and  sisters,  they  come 
bringing  investments.  They  have  never  understood  what  international  economic  competition  is,  and  they  have 
never  understood  that  every  country  has  its  own  national  interests.  "tZ° 
Commercial  Banks  and  National  Capital 
The  banking  sector  was  perceived  as  the  most  seriously  at  risk  from  foreign  competition, 
given  the  delay  it  had  experienced  in  liberalisation  and  in  the  emergence  of  a  stable  private 
enterpreneurship.  Hyperinflation  in  the  early  1990s  had  led  to  a  massive  flight  from  money 
and  a  consequent  return  to  barter  relations,  both  at  the  level  of  consumption  and  at  the  level 
of  industrial  exchange.  Burning  up  savings  and  long-run  investment  perspectives, 
hyperinflation  had  obstructed  the  growth  of  an  independent  and  solid  banking  system. 
In  1995,92  of  the  then  registered  208  commercial  banks  (42%  of  the  total  amount  of 
capital)  had  a  statutory  fund  of  not  more  than  10.5  billion  karbovanets.  Given  the 
rate  of  currency  depreciation  and  inflation,  the  National  Bank  of  Ukraine  (NBU) 
itself  defined  that  amount  "insufficient  for  the  sound  functioning  and  for  the 
development  of  commercial  banks".  125 
The  central  bank  remained  firmly  in  control  of  the  commercial  banks  (130  registered 
in  1998),  regulating  their  activity  and  restricting  their  possibilities  for  investment. 
Directly  responsible  to  the  government,  the  NBU  was  for  the  best  part  of  the  1990s 
forced  to  support  the  executive's  policies  and  finance  its  extra-budget  credits,  and 
123  T.  Nezhenko  (1998),  Op.  Cit. 
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250 was  thereby  unable  to  provide  liquidity  appropriate  for  the  investment  purposes  of 
the  financial  institutions.  126 
As  was  the  case  with  Russia,  many  Ukrainian  banks  had  been  created  in  the  early 
1990s  to  address  the  financial  needs  of  particular  businesses,  industrial  or 
administrative  institutions,  and  they  had  emerged  on  the  basis  of  often  very  limited 
investments.  127  One  third  of  the  banks  registered  in  1997  was  believed  to  have  an 
authorised  capital  below  the  ECU  1m  or  $  1.3m  minimum  set  by  the  NBU.  128  It  was 
estimated  that  in  terms  of  the  amount  of  capital,  the  largest  Ukrainian  bank  would  not 
be  included  among  the  top  10  Russian  banks,  and  only  two  Ukrainian  banks  would 
make  it  into  a  list  of  the  100  largest  banks  in  the  CIS.  129 
In  the  autumn  of  1998  commercial  banks  were  in  revolt  against  the  NBU  and  the  restriction 
imposed  by  the  central  institution  to  their  activities.  At  the  Congress  of  the  Association  of 
Commercial  Banks  in  February  of  the  same  year,  representatives  of  the  commercial  banks 
had  demanded  that  the  NBU  lower  the  percentage  for  mandatory  reserves.  The  high  debt  of 
state  enterprises  (totalling  more  than  $  13  million)  and  the  consequent  restriction  on  the 
capitals  available  were  already  strangling  the  banks'  commercial  possibilities.  It  was 
feared  that  a  further  reduction  in  liquidity  funds  would  severely  hamper  business  activities 
in  the  financial  sector.  130 
As  a  consequence  of  the  steady  and  automatic  subsidies  made  to  loss-making  state- 
enterprises,  commercial  banks  suffered  an  endemic  bad-debt  problem.  The  low  quality  of 
125  National  Bank  of  Ukraine  (1994),  Annual  Report,  (Kyiv:  mimeo),  p.  16 
126  In  1994  according  to  the  NBU  annual  report,  total  credits  granted  to  the  Ministry  of  Finance  amounted  to 
Kb  140  trillion.  They  were  granted  to  cover  the  inter  year  gap  between  budget  revenue  and  expenditures,  but 
they  were  systematically  transformed  into  budget  subsidiary  funds.  Given  the  fact  that  commitment  to  the 
government  absorbed  much  of  the  central  bank's  resources,  the  NBU  claimed  that  it  could  not  fulfil  its  plan  to 
direct  10%  of  the  primary  credit  emission  to  crediting  commercial  banks  for  their  transactions. 
127  Five  of  the  existing  banks  derive  from  the  local  branches  of  the  Soviet  Gosbank's  sectoral  banks,  one  is  a 
savings  bank  (Oschadbank),  three  are  specialised  lending  banks  (industrial  investment,  agricultural  and  social 
development)  and  one  is  the  Export-Import  Bank  of  Ukraine.  A.  R.  Latter  (1995)  "Banking  reform  in 
Ukraine",  in  Banking  Reform  in  Central  Europe  and  the  Former  Soviet  Union,  edited  by  J.  Rostowski, 
(Budapest:  Central  European  University  Press),  pp  183-96. 
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251 assets  appeared  to  be  the  most  widespread  issue.  In  January  1997,  about  22%  of  the  credit 
and  investment  portfolio  of  all  Ukrainian  banks  was  defined  as  "problematic".  131  As  a 
result  of  the  drop  in  industrial  (-1.8%)  and  agricultural  production  (-1.9%)  in  1997,  the 
banking  system  had  registered  losses  between  7-8.5%.  132  Since  the  creation  of  the 
Ukrainian  system  of  commercial  banks  sixty-three  banks  had  faced  financial  difficulties, 
forty  of  them  had  already  been  liquidated  and  twenty-three  were  in  a  regime  of  sanitation 
whereby  their  activities  were  supervised  by  the  central  bank.  133 
Two  more  circumstances  intervened  in  1998  to  weaken  the  position  of  commercial  banks 
and  to  make  them  fear  for  their  survival.  The  National  Bank  imposed  a  requirement  that 
banks  raise  their  statutory  fund  to  ECU3  million  from  January  1999.  The  move,  designed 
to  guarantee  stability  in  the  system,  would  have  had  in  fact  the  result  to  cut  off  the  so-called 
pocket  banks  and  reducing  drastically  the  overall  number  of  active  banks.  The  president  of 
the  Banks  Association  in  Odessa  estimated  that  80%  of  the  banks  in  his  region  would  be 
forced  to  close.  134 
The  second  blow  against  commercial  banks  was  the  National  Bank's  decision  to  reduce  the 
number  of  authorised  banks  from  eighteen  to  six.  Serving  as  an  authorised  bank  had  been 
for  many  financial  institutions  an  opportunity  to  increase  liquidity,  through  the 
management  of  budget  resources.  Having  their  liquidity  reduced  and  the  number  of 
customers  severely  curtailed,  banks  would  be  forced  to  make  more  frequent  use  of  inter- 
banking  credits.  Privatbank  and  Praveksbank  were  among  the  institutions  affected.  '35 
Feeling  squeezed  by  market  restrictions,  representatives  of  the  banking  community,  more 
than  other  sectors,  went  on  the  offensive.  The  president  of  the  Association  of  Ukrainian 
Banks  (AUB)  Aleksandr  Sugonyako  accused  the  legislature  of  seeming  to  introduce  into 
the  capital  market  regulations  that  limited  the  participation  of  national  capital  and  favoured 
130  A.  Kovtun  (1998),  Op.  Cit. 
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252 the  accumulation  of  foreign  capital.  In  particular,  he  said,  tax  provisions  for  state 
obligations  (OVGZ)  discriminated  against  domestic  investors,  while  allowing  foreigners  to 
escape  taxation.  Foreign  investors  were  guaranteed  21%  revenue  on  medium-term 
obligations  (allegedly  three  times  higher  than  on  the  world  market).  Commercial  banks  at 
large  advocated  the  introduction  of  protectionist  measures  that  would  allow  them  to 
accumulate  enough  capital  to  face,  at  a  later  stage,  foreign  competition.  136 
Stanislav  Arzhevitin,  president  of  Aggio  Bank,  and  Vice-President  of  the  AUB  called  for 
the  introduction  of  a  central  planning  system  of  foreign  investment  based  on  the  "careful 
consideration  of  the  country's  aims,  possibilities  and  financial  requirements".  The 
government  would  be  called  upon  to  decide  the  proportions  and  the  modality  for  foreign 
economic  participation.  Foreign  investment,  he  maintained,  should  never  exceed  a  level 
beyond  which  foreigners  could  claim  control  over  the  political  situation  of  the  country, 
demanding  representation  in  the  government  and  the  parliament.  137 
Concerns  over  the  predominance  of  foreign  capital  in  the  Ukrainian  financial  system 
appeared  to  be  widely  shared  beyond  the  commercial  banks.  Domestic  legislation  had 
indeed  created  conditions  that  offered  vast  protection  to  the  national  financial  institutions 
and  had  repeatedly  attracted  criticism  for  the  use  of  double  standards  for  foreign  and 
national  investors.  138  Despite  the  fact  that  Ukrainian  legislation  applied  to  enterprises  with 
foreign  capital  the  same  regulation  that  applied  to  enterprises  with  only  Ukrainian  capital, 
observers  stressed  the  wide  discrepancy  existing  between  the  law  and  practice,  which,  in 
fact,  imposed  severe  limitations  to  the  establishment  and  the  activity  of  foreign  banks. 
There  was  the  perception  that,  for  example,  since  the  quality  and  quantity  of  services 
offered  by  foreign  banks  was  higher  than  the  services  offered  by  Ukrainian  banks,  the 
penetration  of  foreign  banks  should  be  somehow  limited,  to  discourage  potential 
competitors.  The  procedures  to  open  a  bank'with  foreign  capital  were  made  artificially 
135  E.  Pototskaya  (1998),  "Byudzhet  pokinul  banki",  Biznes,  n.  10,16  March,  p.  22 
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253 long,  expensive  and  complex.  But,  most  of  all  they  were  subjected  to  the  arbitrary 
decisions  of  the  NBU,  which  had  to  provide  authorisation  for  the  creation  of  the  bank. 
Foreign  banks  were  obliged  to  undergo  a  compulsory  examination  of  the  Antimonopoly 
Committee,  while  the  same  rule  did  not  apply  to  domestic  banks.  139 
Conclusions 
During  his  first  term  in  office  President  Kuchma  succeeded  in  stabilising  relations  with 
Russia,  and  solving  most  of  the  disputes  that  had  been  left  open  in  the  post-independence 
period.  To  Leonid  Kuchma  and  his  administration  went  the  credit  for  having  negotiated 
and  signed  the  long-awaited  Friendship  Agreement  between  the  two  neighbouring  countries 
that,  for  the  first  time  after  the  dissolution  of  the  Soviet  Union,  set  relations  between  Russia 
and  Ukraine  on  an  equal  footing.  Ukrainian  sovereignty  was  formally  acknowledged,  and 
the  mutual  inviolability  of  borders  sanctioned.  During  Kuchma's  presidency  the  practice  of 
anti-Russian  nationalism  followed  by  Leonid  Kravchuk  was  finally  abandoned. 
The  stabilisation  of  relations  with  Russia  did  not  open,  however,  the  path  to  the  much- 
anticipated  Slavic  union.  Expectations  that  with  the  election  of  President  Kuchma  a 
process  of  political  integration,  preceded  by  economic  integration,  would  take  place  were 
disappointed.  The  Ukrainian  economic  elites,  together  with  their  Russian  counterparts, 
were  supposed  to  lead  the  rapprochement  based  upon  a  presumed  commonality  of  business 
interests. 
Yet,  in  the  period  between  1994-98  it  became  evident  that  in  fact  precisely  these  economic 
elites  had  become  aware  of  the  antagonism  of  their  group  interests,  and  had  started  to 
articulate  a  militant  nationalist  agenda.  In  the  wake  of  the  privatisation  of  large  strategic 
plants,  nationalistic  politics  was  designed  to  keep  the  Russian  economic  elites  out  of  the 
process  that  would  redistribute  the  national  wealth.  The  fact  that  nationalism  had  been  used 
as  a  state-building  platform  in  the  post-independence  years  and  that  an  active  nationalist 
139  M.  Yanevich  (1997),  "Inostrannye  banki  i  butylki",  Kompanyon,  n.  4,  pp.  14-15 
254 movement  existed  at  the  grassroots  level  allowed  the  Ukrainian  economic  elite  to  use 
nationalist  arguments  to  maintain  their  grip  on  the  national  wealth.  That  is,  concepts  such 
as  `national  bourgeoisie'  and  `national  capital'  were  used  instrumentally  as  a  tool  of 
resource  mobilisation.  '40 
The  system  of  rent-seeking  and  patronage  network  that  had  emerged  as  a  result  of  the 
process  of  reforms  and  incipient  liberalisation  and  had  consolidated  around  the  figure  of 
President  Kuchma  left  little  space  to  the  participation  of  external  economic  agents.  In  the 
period  between  1994-98  the  economic  structure  seemed  to  maintain  a  precarious  balance  of 
forces  between  the  Presidential  administration,  the  Parliament  and  the  different  sections  of 
the  economic  elite,  which  traded  political  support  for  control  over  parts  of  the  national 
wealth.  In  anticipation  of  the  1999  presidential  election,  privatisation  of  strategic  plants 
and  allocation  of  subsidies  and  exemptions  were  used  as  resources  to  support  the 
President's  second  electoral  bid. 
Russian  capital,  more  than  any  other  foreign  capital,  was  ready  and  experienced  in  playing 
the  game  by  the  same  rules.  Being  more  powerful  and  better  experienced  in  privatisation 
deals  than  its  Ukrainian  counterpart,  Russian  business  could  be  depicted  as  the  real  threat  to 
Ukrainian  economic  independence.  The  aggressive  character  Russian  oligarchs  had 
displayed  in  their  domestic  transactions  justified  fears  of  defeat  and  re-annexation.  On  the 
economic  grounds  of  co-operation  between  Russia  and  Ukraine,  as  a  result,  the  policy 
preferences  of  a  vulnerable  and  slowly  consolidating  Ukrainian  elite  clashed  with  the 
predatory  attitudes  of  the  Russian  elite,  thereby  undermining  the  basis  for  economic  co- 
operation  between  Russia  and  Ukraine. 
The  set  of  economic  and  political  interests  that  developed  within  Russia  and  Ukraine  in  the 
period  between  1994  and  1998  provided,  then,  little  in  the  way  of  a  foundation  for  a 
presumed  communality  of  economic  interest`s.  The  very  emergence  of  national  economic 
elites,  concerned  with  extending  their  control  over  national  wealth,  set  the  relationship 
140  M.  A.  Molchanov  (2000),  "Post-Communist  Nationalism  as  a  Power  Resource:  A  Russia-Ukraine 
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255 between  the  two  countries  on  a  competitive  rather  than  co-operative  basis,  with  control  over 
property  interpreted  as  a  zero-sum  game. 
256 CONCLUSIONS 
In  the  period  between  1994-1998  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  underwent  a 
dramatic  transition,  moving  away  from  the  narrow  nationalistic  approach  that  had 
characterised  the  first  years  of  independence.  On  the  one  side,  the  Ukrainian  leadership 
abandoned  the  aggressive  anti-Russian  tones  that  had  been  an  integral  part  of  Kravchuk's 
strategy  of  nation-building.  On  the  other  side,  the  prevalence  of  pragmatic  nationalist 
arguments  in  the  Russian  foreign  policy  circles  also  meant  that  boisterous  imperialistic 
plans  of  political  reintegration  on  the  post-Soviet  arena  were  replaced  by  a  less  threatening 
rhetoric  of  economic  co-operation. 
The  election  in  Ukraine  of  a  moderate  President  as  Leonid  Kuchma  was  interpreted  by 
many  as  a  sign  that  a  rapprochement  between  Moscow  and  Kyiv  would  follow  soon.  With 
a  background  as  director  of  an  industrial  plant  located  in  one  of  the  Russian-speaking 
regions  of  Ukraine,  Kuchma  presented  himself  as  the  best  representative  of  a  pragmatist 
foreign  policy  approach.  In  the  president's  view,  a  pragmatist  strategy  would  restore  the 
priority  of  economic  interests  over  ideology  as  the  crucial  factor  in  defining  relations 
between  Russia  and  Ukraine. 
The  emergence  of  a  powerful  economic  elite  in  Moscow,  which  soon  acquired  control  over 
domestic  and  foreign  policy-making  institutions  led  to  believe  that  all  the  conditions  were 
in  place  for  a  renewed  relation.  Old  imperialistic  ambitions  would  be  discarded  in  the  name 
of  a  mutually  beneficial  economic  co-operation.  Following  a  functionalist  approach  to 
economic  integration  in  the  CIS,  economic  actors  in  Russia  and  in  Ukraine  were  expected 
to  play  a  leading  role  in  an  increased  economic  and  possibly  political  interaction  between 
the  two  countries. 
In  practice,  however,  economic  and  political  reintegration  did  not  take  place.  The 
economic  elites  of  the  two  states,  with  their  divergent  rather  than  convergent  interests 
played  a  crucial  role  in  this  process.  Russia  and  Ukraine  consolidated  as  two  separate 
entities,  and  relations  between  the  two  countries  evolved  towards  a  civilised  coexistence 
257 based  on  the  mutual  acceptance  of  their  independent  statehood  rather  than  towards  political 
or  economic  re-absorption. 
In  this  work  I  have  sought  to  explain  why  increased  economic  and  political  co-operation 
between  Russia  and  Ukraine  failed  to  happen.  This  question  is  important  also  in  terms  of 
the  study  of  international  relations,  as  the  relationship  between  Russia  and  Ukraine 
provides  an  interesting  testing  case  for  co-operation  and  integration  theories. 
The  transnationalist  and  institutionalist  theories  outlined  in  chapter  one  present  important 
insight  to  understand  some  aspects  of  the  unfolding  of  events  between  Russia  and  Ukraine. 
In  particular  they  are  useful  tools  to  depict  fragmented  polities,  to  which  a  unitary  concept 
of  national  interests  and  foreign  policy  agency  is  not  appropriate.  These  theories,  however, 
fail  to  catch  the  complexity  of  the  Russo-Ukrainian  relationship  and  its  dynamic  evolution. 
Transnationalist  theories  of  integration,  for  example,  would  lead  to  believe  that  the 
difficulties  derived  from  the  disintegration  of  the  Soviet  common  environment  would  be  a 
sufficient  motivation  for  economic  elites  in  both  Russia  and  Ukraine  to  lobby  for  the 
recreation  of  the  common  market.  Institutionalist  theories  would  maintain  that  the  formal 
existence  of  institutions  such  as  the  CIS  Economic  Union  and  extensive  legislation 
regulating  TFIGs  should  automatically  convince  economic  actors  to  shift  their  loyalty  from 
the  national  to  the  transnational  level. 
This  research  has  shown,  instead,  that  only  a  comprehensive  examination  of  the  domestic 
level  of  politics  provides  a  parsimonious  analysis  of  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine. 
The  interests  of  domestic  actors,  their  aggregation  into  political  coalitions,  the  role  played 
by  the  state  institutions  in  representing  these  interests,  and  the  influence  and  conditions 
provided  by  the  international  environment  are  all  elements  that  must  be  taken  into  account. 
The  discussion  presented  in  this  work  has  then  been  framed  within  a  domestic  perspective 
of  international  relations  and  has  been  developed  in  two  levels.  The  first  level  is  the 
interrelation  of  domestic  and  international  factors  in  the  shaping  of  interests  and  policy 
preferences  of  political  actors.  The  second  level  is  the  influence  that  the  interests  of 
258 individual  groups  exercise  over  the  sanction  or  re-direction  of  a  determined  foreign  policy 
course. 
This  bifocal  approach  stems  from  the  conviction  that  "the  relationship  between  a  weak  and 
unstable  domestic  institutional  context,  ideas  as  a  source  of  legitimacy  in  competition  for 
political  power,  and  the  weight  of  the  international  environment  in  activating  interests  and 
influencing  policy  choice"  are  powerful  instruments  to  understand  post-Soviet  foreign 
policy.  '  This  is  particularly  true  when  issues  like  state-building,  nationalism,  economic 
liberalisation  and  the  consequent  redistribution  of  economic  resources  overlap,  as  they  did 
in  post-Soviet  Russia  and  Ukraine. 
Moving  away  from  an  issue-based  analysis  of  Russian-Ukrainian  relations  in  the  post- 
Soviet  arena,  I  have  then  adopted  an  actor-based  perspective  grounded  on  the  assumption 
that  in  countries  undergoing  a  process  of  political  and  economic  liberalisation,  like  Russia 
and  Ukraine,  social  interests  are  fragmented  and  widely  diversified.  Political  representation 
of  interests  is  achieved  by  the  group(s)  that  succeeds  in  "capturing"  the  state  institutions 
and  in  translating  its  preferences  into  implemented  policies. 
The  choice  to  concentrate  on  the  economic  elites  in  Russia  and  Ukraine  derives  from  two 
considerations.  First,  the  Russian  economic  elite  successfully  "captured"  the  Russian  state 
institutions  in  the  period  between  1995-98.  Thanks  to  the  special  relationship  established 
between  Yel'tsin's  administration  and  the  oligarchs,  not  only  domestic,  but  also  foreign 
policy  interests  of  the  top  echelons  of  the  Russian  business  community  found  expression  in 
the  centre  of  Russian  political  power. 
In  Ukraine  the  consolidation  process  of  business  interests  around  state  institutions  was 
somehow  slower,  but  by  1998  the  Ukrainian  big  business  had  managed  to  gain 
representation  both  in  the  legislative  and  the  'executive  branches  of  power.  Ukrainian 
oligarchs,  to  different  degrees,  were  thus  in  a  position  to  influence  or  determine  Ukrainian 
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259 domestic  policies.  The  weakness  of  the  Ukrainian  business  at  the  international  level  meant, 
however  that  the  Ukrainian  economic  elite  was  not  ready  to  formulate  a  set  of  foreign 
policy  preferences  other  that  the  request  for  protection  on  the  domestic  market. 
The  second  consideration  is  that,  both  the  doctrine  of  CIS  integration  and  the  pragmatist 
approach  to  Russian-Ukrainian  relations  (outlined  in  the  introduction)  assumed  the 
existence  of  convergent  interests  between  the  economic  elites  of  the  two  countries  as  the 
precondition  for  a  possible  bilateral  reintegration.  If  the  two  theories  had  any  foundation, 
the  period  between  1994-98  should  have  witnessed  acceleration  in  bilateral  co-operation 
and  possibly  in  economic  and  political  reintegration,  as  the  economic  elites  were  in  a  ruling 
position  in  both  countries. 
Contrary  to  expectations,  however,  during  this  period  Russia  and  Ukraine  experienced  a 
process  of  consolidation  as  independent  political  and  economic  entities.  The  nature  of 
economic  transformations  in  these  countries  played  a  critical  role  in  the  pattern  of  national 
formation  that  emerged. 
This,  however,  is  not  to  say  that  President  Kuchma  repudiated  the  policy  of  pragmatism 
that  brought  him  to  office,  but  he  reoriented  it  substantially.  Leonid  Kuchma's  electoral 
promise  of  a  political  rapprochement  with  Russia  was  indeed  achieved  with  great  success. 
The  signature  of  the  1997  Friendship  Agreement  marked  the  end  of  the  post-Soviet 
contention  between  Russia  and  Ukraine.  Territorial  claims  were  dropped.  State  borders 
were  indisputably  defined.  Any  ground  for  Moscow's  direct  intervention  in  Ukrainian 
domestic  politics  was  removed.  Russia  and  Ukraine  agreed  to  relate  one  to  the  other  as  two 
legitimately  sovereign  countries. 
Kuchma's  pragmatism,  however,  suggested  that,  in  order  to  maintain  Ukraine's  balance  of 
power,  the  president  needed  to  appease  both  `the  domestic  business  community  and  the 
Russian  partners.  The  former  would  provide  Kuchma  with  vital  support  in  his  internal 
political  struggles,  while  the  latter  could  impinge  upon  Ukrainian  stability  through  their 
control  over  energy  supplies,  the  Ukrainian  debt,  and  bilateral  trade  policy. 
260 Following  unsatisfactory  results  in  economic  and  administrative  reforms,  international 
organisations  and  Western  governments  threatened  to  curtail  their  contributions  to  Ukraine. 
Exposed  to  external  pressures  and  to  the  urgent  necessity  to  secure  Russian  help  in  the  1999 
presidential  elections,  Kuchma  made  concessions  to  Russian  interests  with  the  1998  Treaty 
of  Economic  Co-operation.  Yet,  the  guarantee  that  the  agreement  would  encounter 
substantial  parliamentary  opposition  to  its  ratification,  and  would  be  unlikely  to  be 
implemented,  put  the  Ukrainian  president  in  the  position  to  lend  a  friendly  hand  to 
Moscow,  while  at  the  same  time  still  enjoying  the  support  of  domestic  economic  actors. 
Kuchma  never  gave  the  signal  that  he  would  move  relations  between  Russia  and  Ukraine 
along  the  same  path  of  integration  that  Belarus  was  following.  The  President's  main 
constituency  in  the  1994  elections  had  been  the  industrialists  from  the  southern  and  eastern 
regions  of  the  country,  who  identified  their  primary  economic  interests  as  the  restoration  of 
Soviet-era  industrial  and  trade  relations  with  Russia.  Then  two  conditions  changed. 
During  the  four  years  of  his  first  term  in  office,  Kuchma  broadened  his  electoral  support. 
On  the  one  side  he  portrayed  himself  as  the  defender  and  the  promoter  of  the  whole 
Ukrainian  business  sector.  On  the  other  side,  however,  he  sought  the  backing  of  the 
business  community  to  crush  political  opposition.  Pressures  on  the  privatisation  of 
strategic  assets  and  the  relative  wealth  of  their  Russian  counterpart  convinced  the  Ukrainian 
business  community  that  their  interests  were  in  fact  very  much  different  from  the  Russians'. 
The  Ukrainian  "national  bourgeoisie"  defined  then  its  agenda  in  terms  of  defending 
"national  capital"  as  an  instrument  to  foster  the  country's  development. 
The  emergence  of  a  protectionist  mood  in  Ukraine,  articulated  through  the  nationalist 
vocabulary  of  patriotic  concerns,  challenged  then  the  a  priori  assumption  of  common 
economic  interests  between  members  of  the  Russian  and  the  Ukrainian  elite.  In  fact,  it 
highlighted  the  existence  of  antagonistic  interests  dictated  by  the  very  emergence  of  a 
nation-based  economic  elite. 
261 The  process  of  economic  liberalisation,  in  particular  privatisation,  with  the  emphasis  placed 
on  ownership  rather  than  investment,  brought  to  the  fore  the  close  interdependence  between 
political  circles  and  the  business  community.  The  rent-seeking  nature  of  the  business  elite 
in  both  countries  made  it  heavily  dependent  on  political  power.  At  the  same  time,  unstable 
administrations  employed  the  distribution  of  economic  privileges  (access  to  privatisation, 
management  of  profitable  enterprises,  granting  of  state  subsidies)  as  an  instrument  to 
guarantee  the  support  of  powerful  economic  actors. 
An  important  aspect  of  the  alliance  between  business  and  politics  was  that  such  an  alliance 
was  very  much  country-based.  The  intervention  of  external  agents  was  hardly  foreseeable 
in  a  situation  where  newcomers  could  upset  the  delicate  balance  of  forces  defined  between 
the  executive,  the  legislative,  different  sectoral  economic  interests,  and  the  oligarchs.  The 
perception  of  the  process  of  privatisation  as  a  zero-sum  game  also  left  little  or  no  room  for 
outsiders'  participation.  A  Russian  strategy  based  on  economic  expansion,  then,  contrasted 
a  Ukrainian  strategy  based  on  withdrawal  within  domestic  boundaries  and  protection  of  the 
internal  market.  Economic  and  political  re-integration  dropped  from  the  agenda  of  bilateral 
relations. 
Theorists  of  nation-building  would  interpret  the  failed  reintegration  between  Russia  and 
Ukraine  as  an  example  of  the  consolidation  of  statehood  in  the  two  countries.  While  not 
denying  this  interpretation,  my  research  shows  that  economic  interests  and  economic  elites 
also  played  an  important  role  in  the  process  of  achieving  and  preserving  independence. 
Three  conclusions  then  follow. 
First,  the  very  emergence  of  national  economic  elites  created  conflicting  economic  interests 
opposed  to  political  and  economic  integration.  Second,  the  process  of  liberalisation  and,  in 
particular,  the  redistribution  of  resources  initiated  a  struggle  among  domestic  and  foreign 
actors  to  acquire  control  over  the  national  wealth.  Third,  asymmetrical  wealth  and 
authority  between  national  economic  elites  and  consequent  preoccupations  that  the  richer 
country  may  take  over  economic  resources  belonging  to  the  poorer  country  found 
expression  in  a  nationalist  rhetoric  in  Ukraine. 
262 The  structure  of  relations  between  business  and  the  state  institutions  accounted  for  the 
degree  of  vulnerability  perceived  by  domestic  economic  actors  and  for  the  concrete 
possibilities  they  had  to  articulate  their  group's  interests.  Before  going  on  to  explore  in 
more  detail  the  interrelation  between  nationalism  and  economic  elites,  it  is  worthwhile 
summarising  the  patterns  of  business-politics  relations  established  in  Russia  and  in  Ukraine 
in  the  period  1994-98. 
Models  of  Interrelations  between  Business  and  Politics 
In  post-Soviet  Russia  and  Ukraine  proximity  between  economic  and  political  power  proved 
a  distinctive  feature  of  political  life,  allowing  the  business  elites  the  opportunity  to  translate 
their  political  preferences  into  concrete  policy  agendas.  The  weight  and  influence  of  the 
business  elite  appeared  substantially  different  in  the  two  countries,  expressed  in  different 
forms  and  modulated  by  the  importance  of  a  number  of  political  and  economic  factors  at 
work  in  the  period  between  1994  and  1998. 
In  the  second  half  of  the  1990s,  Russia  and  Ukraine  could  be  characterised  as  forms  of 
weak  states,  where  "political  power  is  fragmented  and  dispersed,  [and]  there  are  many 
points  of  access  to  the  decision-making  process".  Fragmented  political  institutions  were 
open  to  pressures  by  societal  interests,  and  in  particular  to  the  influence  of  "big  business". 
Consequently,  the  ability  of  the  state  institutions  to  impose  policies  and  decisions  or  to 
extract  resources  from  societal  groups  appeared  significantly  impaired. 
The  Russian  and  the  Ukrainian  political  structures  were  distinguished  by  the  interweaving 
of  three  elements  that  determined  the  different  character  and  development  of  the  systems. 
The  first  element  was  the  mutual  dependence  between  business  structures  and  executive 
power,  caused  by  the  authoritarian/illiberal  degeneration  of  the  political  regimes.  The 
second  element  was  the  pace  and  extension  of  the  economic  reforms  together  with  the 
2  S.  D.  Krasner  (1978),  "Defending  the  National  Interest.  Raw  Materials  Investments  and  U.  S.  Foreign 
Policy",  Princeton  University  Press  (Princeton,  New  Jersey) 
263 resource-endowment  of  the  national  economies.  The  third  element  was  the  division  of 
competence  between  the  executive  and  the  legislative  in  relation  to  economic  issues. 
Both  the  Russian  and  the  Ukrainian  political  systems  evolved  in  the  post-Soviet  period 
towards  forms  of  authoritarianism  (or  illiberalism),  in  which  power  was  largely 
concentrated  in  the  hands  of  the  executive.  3  This  generated  the  need  for  extraordinary 
support  provided  by  powerful  agents,  who  had  a  stake  in  the  maintenance  of  the  newly 
acquired  political  status  quo,  but  were  formally  external  to  the  political  struggle  and 
institutions. 
The  Russian  system  generated  an  ambivalent  relationship  between  the  executive  (the 
presidential  administration  and  the  government)  and  the  economic  elite,  in  which  episodes 
of  intense  collaboration  were  replaced  by  attempts  by  the  executive  at  restraining  the 
cumbersome  influence  of  the  business  partners.  The  concentration  of  economic  power,  the 
narrowness  of  the  circle  of  power  around  the  president  and  the  high  degree  of  penetration 
into  state  institutions  achieved  by  representatives  of  the  economic  elite  were,  then,  the 
distinguishing  features  of  the  Russian  system. 
The  1996  Presidential  elections  provided  the  most  vivid  examples  of  how  this  ambivalent 
relationship  functioned.  Some  authors  concur  in  saying  that,  even  if  Russia  had 
substantially  moved  towards  forms  of  authoritarianism,  the  importance  played  by  elections 
in  maintaining  the  stability  of  the  system  and  the  balance  among  political  forces  was  still 
significant.  As  one  observer  noted,  "the  Russian  state  and  democracy  might  be  weak,  but 
the  balance  of  weak  forces  in  them  has  so  far  been  sufficiently  strong  to  deter  an  attempt  at 
a  coup  d'etat"  4  The  only  way  to  subvert  the  Russian  regime,  then,  was  through  an 
"electoral  transfer  of  power".  5  Facing  the  risk  of  a  Communist  revival  in  the  1996 
presidential  elections,  the  interests  of  the  economic  elite  and  of  the  presidency  coincided, 
and  the  two  groups  joined  forces.  The  economic  elite's  support  for  Yel'tsin's  presidential 
3  P.  G.  Roeder  (1994),  "Varieties  of  Post-Soviet  Authoritarian  Regimes",  Post  Soviet  Affairs,  Vol.  10,  No.  1, 
pp.  61-101 
4  N.  Robinson  (2000),  "The  Economy  and  the  Prospects  for  Anti-democratic  Development  in  Russia", 
Europe-Asia  Studies,  Vol.  52,  No.  8,  pp.  1391-1416 
264 campaign  was  used  as  currency  to  acquire  a  right  to  participate  in  the  design  of  the  future 
economic  reforms. 
Conversely,  the  Ukrainian  system  allowed  for  a  more  continuous,  even  if  no  less  pervasive, 
presence  of  the  economic  elite,  not  only  in  the  presidential  circles,  but  also  within  the 
parliament.  This  relationship  between  business  and  politics  was  formalised  in  a  corporative 
structure.  6  The  diffusion  of  economic  power,  consequent  fragmentation  of  the  economic 
elites,  and  sectoral  lobbying  appeared  as  the  primary  components  of  this  system.  Also,  the 
presence  and  the  influence  of  external  elements  (for  example  pressures  from  the 
international  community,  or  from  Russia)  seemed  at  times  to  contain  the  power  of  local 
economic  elites. 
Furthermore,  in  Ukraine  the  general  instability  of  the  political  and  economic  system, 
coupled  with  the  relentless  struggle  for  power  between  the  executive  and  the  legislative 
forced  the  president  to  pull  business  forces  originally  exogenous  to  the  political  system, 
into  the  state  institutions.  Redistribution  of  resources,  promises  of  privileged  access  to  the 
privatisation  of  strategic  assets  and  management  of  profitable  state  enterprises  were  all  used 
as  instruments  to  reward  loyal  supporters  and  punish  those  who  challenged  presidential 
authority. 
The  political  backing  of  the  economic  elite  was  initially  channelled  through  business 
associations  or  councils  for  the  support  of  the  enterpreneurship  established  under  the 
auspices  of  the  president.  At  a  later  stage,  parliamentary  fractions,  party  organisations  and 
economic  "holdings"  provided  an  institutional  structure  for  the  alliance  between  business 
and  the  presidential  administration. 
The  second  element  that  determined  the  distinct  character  of  business-politics  relations  in 
Russia  and  Ukraine  was  the  different  pace  and  extent  of  economic  reforms  adopted  in  the 
two  countries.  In  Ukraine,  export  quotas  and  licensing  arrangements  on  foreign  and 
Ibid. 
6  P.  Kubicek  (2000),  Unbroken  Ties.  The  State,  Interest  Associations  and  Corporatism  in  Post-Soviet 
Ukraine,  (Ann  Arbor,  Michigan.:  The  University  of  Michigan  Press) 
265 commodity  trade  were  formally  abolished  only  in  December  1994.  As  a  result  of  the  long 
restricted  access  to  these  activities,  foreign  and  commodity  trade  failed  to  generate  the  same 
extent  of  private  wealth  that  emerged  in  Russia. 
Moreover,  a  rich  raw  material  endowment  in  Russia  allowed  individuals  who  succeeded  in 
appropriating  state  resources  to  trade  even  in  the  absence  of  a  well-developed  industrial 
infrastructure.  Ukrainian  energy  dependence  on  Russia  and  the  country's  decaying 
industrial  system  also  explain  the  different  outcomes  of  capital  accumulation  in  Russia  and 
Ukraine. 
A  further  element  in  this  equation  is  the  late  development  of  the  Ukrainian  banking  system. 
As  opposite  to  Russia,  the  Ukrainian  financial  market  remained  firmly  centralised,  with 
remarkable  degrees  of  controls  available  to  the  National  Bank  until  the  late  1990s. 
Hyperinflation  led  in  Ukraine  to  a  massive  flight  from  money  and  a  consequent  return  to 
barter  relations,  both  at  the  level  of  consumers  and  enterprises  level.  Uncontrolled  price 
rises  burned  up  savings  and  impaired  any  long-run  investment  perspective. 
This  poorly  developed  banking  system  lacked  the  appropriate  financial  and  management 
resources  to  face  the  challenge  of  privatisation.  On  the  other  side,  however,  Ukrainian 
privatisation,  obstructed  by  the  ideological  opposition  of  a  left-wing  parliament,  started 
much  later  than  in  Russia,  proceeded  in  a  sporadic  fashion  and  did  not  concern,  at  least 
until  the  late  1990s,  large  or  strategic  plants. 
As  a  result  of  inconsistent  economic  reforms  and  a  poorer  natural  resources  endowment,  the 
Ukrainian  business  elite  was  significantly  weaker  that  its  Russian  counterpart;  it  was 
equally  dependent  on  state  munificence,  but  because  of  its  more  limited  wealth  enjoyed  less 
negotiating  power  towards  state  institutions.  Yet,  relations  between  "big  business"  and 
political  power  underwent  a  substantial  evolution  during  the  four  years  of  President 
Kuchma's  first  term. 
266 In  the  period  between  1994-98,  the  economic  elite  provided  generic  political  support  to  the 
president  in  the  parliament,  voting  in  favour  of  presidential-sponsored  decisions  and  against 
a  nomenklatura-bureaucratic  opposition.  The  rewards  that  the  administration  granted  in 
exchange  were  along  the  traditional  patronage  lines  and  rent-seeking,  such  as  export 
licences  and  subsidies  to  loss-making  enterprises.  From  the  1998  parliamentary  elections, 
however,  the  system  started  to  evolve  towards  a  more  sophisticated  exchange  between  the 
presidency  and  the  economic  elite  in  anticipation  of  the  privatisation  of  large  enterprises 
from  the  energy  sector  and  the  1999  presidential  campaign. 
Following  a  more  rapid  process  of  economic  liberalisation,  wealth  in  Russia  was  larger  and 
more  concentrated  than  in  Ukraine,  and  the  political  weight  of  the  Russian  economic  elite 
was  more  pervasive  and  sophisticated  than  in  the  neighbouring  country.  In  Russia, 
commodity  exports,  subsidised  credits  and  food-import  subsidies  generated  since  the  early 
1990s  large  patrimonies,  that  were  later  employed  in  the  establishment  of  a  private  banking 
system  and  a  financial-industrial  structure. 
A  substantial  diversification  in  the  economic  arena  took  place,  with  a  state  system  largely 
dependent  on  budget  subsidies  and  a  dynamic  private  sector  ready  to  exploit  its  vicinity  to 
political  power  to  increase  its  economic  weight.  On  the  basis  of  a  mutually  advantageous 
exchange,  the  relationship  between  the  new  Russian  enterpreneurship  and  the  presidential 
administration  was  set  on  conditions  of  equality. 
The  Russian  economic  elite  was  in  a  situation  to  provide  substantial  financial  help  to  the 
1996  presidential  campaign,  bail-out  for  the  indebtedness  of  the  state  (the  share-for-loans 
scheme  revenues  was  used  to  pay  salary  and  pension  arrears),  and  promises  of  "responsible 
behaviour"  in  the  wake  of  the  1998  economic  crash.  In  exchange,  the  Russian  economic 
elite  was  rewarded  with  the  guarantee  that  the  post-Soviet  status  quo  would  be  preserved 
and  privatisation  would  not  be  overturned.  The  endorsement  to  carry  out  privatisation  deals 
to  the  advantage  of  a  restricted  group  of  oligarchs  was  part  of  the  advantages  acquired 
through  bargaining  with  the  institutions. 
267 The  final  element  that  distinguished  business-politics  relations  in  Russia  and  Ukraine  was 
the  different  division  of  powers  between  the  executive  and  the  legislative  in  the 
management  of  economic  issues.  The  conflict  between  the  executive  and  the  legislative 
was  solved  in  Russia  much  earlier  that  in  Ukraine.  The  1993  constitution  assigned  to  the 
president  exclusive  powers  and  control  over  the  government,  while  the  legislature's 
authority  to  check  and  balance  the  president  was  severely  restricted.  Privatisation  was 
strictly  controlled  by  the  executive  through  the  State  Property  Fund,  and  decisions  relative 
to  the  share-for-loans  scheme  were  made  by  the  government.  Also  decisions  relative  to 
state  subsidies  were  made  by  presidential  decree,  and  were  subject  to  the  ratification  of  the 
parliament.  Because  of  the  extensive  powers  the  president  and  his  administration  were 
afforded  in  the  economic  area,  for  the  Russian  economic  elite  it  was  most  profitable  to 
nurture  connections  with  the  executive. 
In  Ukraine,  the  conflict  between  the  executive  and  the  legislative  was  resolved  only  with 
the  approval  of  the  1995  Power  bill  and  the  1996  Constitution,  which  concentrated  broad 
powers  in  the  hands  of  the  president,  but  allowed  the  parliament  authority  in  some 
economic  decisions,  mainly  in  relation  to  privatisation.  For  the  economic  elite,  proximity 
to  the  president  proved  an  important  element  of  stability,  but  the  parliament,  alongside  the 
presidential  administration,  retained  its  importance  as  a  body  involved  in  the  definition  of 
strategic  economic  issues. 
To  sum  up,  different  patterns  of  interrelation  between  business  and  politics  in  Russia  and 
Ukraine  were  determined  by  the  intertwining  of  three  factors:  the  emergence  of  illiberal 
regimes,  the  shaping  of  different  economic  structures,  and  the  establishment  of  a  different 
balance  of  power  between  the  executive  and  the  legislative  in  the  regulation  of  economic 
issues. 
The  distinctive  combination  of  these  three  elements  gave  rise  to  a  Russian  oligarchic 
system  characterised  by  close  connections  to  the  presidential  administration  and  large 
financial  capital.  Once  the  possibilities  of  expansion  within  the  territory  of  the  Russian 
268 Federation  seemed  to  be  exhausted,  the  Russian  economic  elite  turned  to  Ukraine  as  a 
possible  area  of  further  economic  acquisition. 
On  the  other  side,  the  Ukrainian  economic  elite  was  characterised  by  a  more  dispersed 
model  of  political  representation,  with  connections  both  to  the  legislative  and  the  executive 
branches  of  power.  The  limited  nature  of  their  resource  forced  the  Ukrainian  oligarchs  to 
an  inward  oriented  economic  strategy  aimed  at  preserving  the  only  areas  over  which  they 
could  exercise  their  control.  The  exclusion  of  the  more  powerful  Russian  competitors  from 
the  process  of  resource  redistribution  became  an  integral  part  of  the  Ukrainian  elite's 
strategy  of  self-preservation. 
Nationalism  as  a  Political  Resource 
Nationalism  and  patriotic  sentiments  provided  both  the  Russian  and  the  Ukrainian 
economic  elites  with  in  arena  on  which  to  articulate  their  interests  and  policy  preferences. 
A  distinction  between  benign  and  hegemonic  forms  of  nationalism  helps  to  clarify  this 
point.  A  benign  national  mission  is  characterised  by  a  defensive  attitude  towards  outsiders 
and  focuses  on  "improving  collective  welfare,  maintaining  the  status  quo,  and 
strengthening  internal  cohesion  and  unity".  Conversely,  a  hegemonic  national  mission  has 
an  "imperialistic  and  messianic"  character,  ultimately  leading  to  expansive  and  aggressive 
policies  pursued  in  the  name  of  the  nation. 
Following  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union,  both  Russia  and  Ukraine  went  through  a 
process  of  vast  readjustment.  Nationalism  and  identity  played  the  important  role  of 
"holding  society  together",  while  the  two  countries  were  undergoing  the  strains  of  political 
and  economic  transformations.  8 
7  A.  S.  Tuminez  (1996),  "Russian  Nationalism  and  the  National  Interest  in  Russian  Foreign  Policy",  in  The 
Sources  of  Russian  Foreign  Policy  After  the  Cold  War,  edited  by  C. A.  Wallander  (Boulder:  Westview),  pp. 
41-68 
8  E.  B.  Baas  (1986),  "What  is  Nationalism  and  Why  Should  We  Study  it?  ",  International  Organization,  VO. 
40,  n.  3,  p.  710 
269 Ukraine  embarked  on  a  process  of  nation-building,  facing  the  challenge  of  having  to  justify 
and  legitimise  the  very  existence  of  the  new  state  entity  not  only  to  the  international 
community,  but  also  to  some  parts  of  its  population.  Exposed  to  financial  (energy 
dependence  on  Russia,  external  debt,  and  industrial  restructuring)  and  political  pressures 
(democratisation,  institution-building,  ethnic  and  citizenship  policies),  the  young  Ukrainian 
state  appeared  to  the  outside  world  permanently  on  the  brink  of  fragmentation  and  civil 
war.  One  of  the  most  important  tasks  for  post-independence  Ukraine  was  then  to 
demonstrate  that  the  Ukrainian  state  would  be  able  to  consolidate  internally  and  satisfy  its 
external  obligations. 
Russia  also  was  severely  hit  by  a  post-Soviet  crisis.  Russian  identity  had  overlapped  with 
imperial  identity  for  centuries.  After  independence,  Russians  struggled  to  accept  a  reduced 
role  within  the  restricted  boundaries  of  the  Russian  Federation.  With  the  consolidation  of 
post-Soviet  governments  in  the  former  Soviet  republics,  Russians  were  forced  to 
acknowledge  that  the  possibility  of  the  restoration  of  Russian  authority  in  the  region  was 
not  only  politically  impossible,  but  also  economically  unfeasible. 
Yet,  as  James  Richter  summarises  it,  "elites  in  Russia  [agreed]  that  Russia  is  the  successor 
to  a  truncated  empire  and  that  Russia  should  regain  its  dominant  influence  over  the  territory 
of  the  former  Soviet  Union".  9  For  pragmatic  nationalists,  economic  expansionism  became 
a  substitute  for  political  or  military  control  to  satisfy  Russian  hegemonic  ambitions. 
Ukraine's  "benign  national  mission",  dictated  by  internal  instability  and  external  insecurity 
translated  into  a  nationalistic  rhetoric  centred  around  ideas  of  protection  of  the  recently- 
acquired  sovereignty  and  defence  against  risks  of  creeping  re-absorption  within  a  newly 
fashioned  Soviet  Union.  Concepts  such  as  "national  bourgeoisie  and  "national  capital" 
provided  the  economically  weak  Ukrainian  oligarchs  with  a  convenient  vocabulary  through 
which  to  express  their  expectations  of  economic  protection.  In  contrast,  Russia's 
"hegemonic  nationalism",  a  heritage  from  the  Tsarist  and  Soviet  imperial  past,  provided 
9  J.  Richter  (1996),  "Russian  Foreign  Policy  and  the  Politics  of  National  Identity",  in  The  Sources  of  Russian 
Foreign  Policy  After  the  Cold  War,  edited  by  C.  A.  Wallander  (Boulder:  Westview),  p.  75 
270 Russian  oligarchs  with  an  ideological  background  against  which  an  economic  re-conquest 
of  the  Soviet  space  was  viewed  as  a  return  to  the  traditional  Russian  grandeur. 
In  accordance  to  a  constructivist  model  of  nationalism,  the  Ukrainian  economic  elite 
employed  nationalistic  sentiments  for  two  main  purposes:  to  legitimise  their  public  role, 
and  to  justify  their  protectionist  claims.  Nationalism  provided  Ukrainian  economic  actors 
with  a  channel  of  political  mobilisation  justified  on  the  grounds  of  a  past  of  political, 
cultural  and  religious  repression  suffered  by  Ukraine  at  the  hands  of  Russian  imperial 
institutions.  10 
In  this  respect,  post-independence  Ukraine  followed  the  pattern  of  a  post-colonial  society, 
in  which  the  belief  that  "only  the  nation,  organised  not  merely  as  a  community  in  arms  but 
as  a  territorial  economy,  can  redress  the  wrongs  of  economic  exploitation"  found  wide 
intellectual  currency.  l  l  As  in  many  post-colonial  societies,  in  Ukraine  the  existence  of  a 
middle  class  was  viewed  as  a  prerequisite  for  social  stability  and  democratic  politics. 
The  creation  of  a  middle-class,  supported  through  state  financial  resources,  was  portrayed 
as  a  necessary  investment  to  establish  a  stable  and  sovereign  state.  The  most  significant 
aspect  of  this  rhetoric  was  that  solely  the  economic  elite  was  on  the  receiving  end  of  the 
"tangible  benefits"  (income,  property  rights)  deriving  from  the  use  of  nationalistic 
lo  Theorists  of  nationalism  categorise  theories  of  ethnic  and  national  politics  into  three  groups.  A 
primordialist  approach  presents  ethnicity  as  a  "natural  inherent  attitude,  as  inescapable  as  a  genetic  property". 
An  instrumentalist  approach  sees  ethnicity  and  nationhood  as  "fabricated,  ideological  categories"  used  by  the 
local  elites  to  manipulate  public  opinion  and  advance  particular  agendas.  A  constructivist  approach 
understands  ethnicity  as  an  ongoing  social  process  of  "construction  and  deconstruction"  in  which  ethnicity 
represents  a  "social  identity  that  groups  incorporate  and  internalise,  largely  as  a  collective  response  to 
discrimination,  domination  and  exclusion".  Instrumentalist  and  constructivist  theories  agree  in  viewing 
nationalism  as  a  "political  myth",  that  is  "consciously  created,  propagated,  and  manipulated  by  the  elites,  or 
proto-elites  seeking  power,  material  advantages,  or  both".  Within  this  framework  social  identities  are 
believed  to  develop  as  a  result  of  "the  recognition  and  articulation  of  a  shared  experience  of  discrimination, 
subjugation  and  subordination".  B.  Anderson  (1983),  Imagined  Communities,  (London:  Verso)  and  L. 
Walker  (1996),  "Nationalism  and  Ethnic  Conflict  in  the  Post-Soviet  Transition",  in  Ethnic  Conflict  in  the 
Post-Soviet  World:  Case  Studies  and  Analysis,  edited  by  L.  Drobizheva  et  al.  (Armonk:  M.  E.  Sharpe),  pp.  3- 
13 
11  J.  Mayall  (1990),  Nationalism  and  International  Society,  (Cambridge:  CUP),  p.  71 
271 sentiments.  While  the  country  at  large  benefited  only  of  the  "psychic  satisfaction"  accruing 
from  the  "gratification  of  the  taste  of  nationalism".  12 
There  is,  however,  one  important  issue  that  sets  apart  the  process  of  nation-building  in  post- 
Soviet  Ukraine  from  many  post-colonial  countries.  The  transition  in  Ukraine  took  place  on 
the  background  of  a  process  of  liberalisation  of  the  economy  and  privatisation  of  the  state 
ownership.  In  many  post-colonial  countries,  instead,  the  consolidation  of  the  newly 
acquired  sovereignty  was  carried  on  within  the  framework  of  a  Marxist  ideology  that  called 
for  the  nationalisation  of  the  economic  resources. 
Economic  liberalisation  imposed  special  pressures  to  newly  independent  Ukraine  in  the 
definition  of  its  foreign  policy  agenda  and  on  its  perspectives  to  join  post-Soviet  projects  of 
integration.  Conclusions  deriving  from  the  Ukrainian  case  can  be  tentatively  extended  to 
post-communist  countries  as  well  as  post-colonial  countries  that  face  processes  of  state- 
building  and  economic  liberalisation  simultaneously. 
The  redistribution  of  resources  that  follows  the  dissolution  of  colonial  institutions  or  the 
liberalisation  of  previously  centralised  economies  sparks  a  struggle  for  power  among 
domestic  economic  actors  and  against  possible  foreign  competitors.  Domestic  actors  are 
given  the  opportunity  to  acquire  unprecedented  control  over  national  resources.  In  an 
initial  phase  of  internal  consolidation,  actors  struggle  to  achieve  permanent  control  over 
national  assets  and  state  institutions.  As  the  economic  arena  is  fluid,  the  intervention  of 
stronger  foreign  actors  is  perceived  as  a  threat,  and  the  vulnerability  of  domestic  economic 
elites  prompts  them  to  raise  demands  for  protection.  The  anxiety  of  the  economic  elite  to 
gain  access  to  property  may  find  expression  through  a  nationalist  rhetoric.  This  is 
especially  true  if  the  history  of  relations  between  the  two  engaging  countries  is 
characterised  by  a  past  of  cultural  and  political  repression  or  economic  exploitation. 
12  For  a  definition  of  economic  nationalism  in  post-colonial  countries  see  H.  G.  Johnson  (1965),  "A 
Theoretical  Model  of  Economic  Nationalism  in  New  and  Developing  States",  Political  Science  Quarterly. 
Vol.  80,  June,  n.  2,  pp.  169-185 
272 Domestic  actors  might  be  available  to  move  away  from  their  narrow  territorial  base  at  a 
further  stage  of  their  development,  when  they  perceive  that  the  process  of  resource 
accumulation  and  power  consolidation  is  accomplished,  and  they  have  gained  control  over 
a  sufficient  amount  of  resources  to  guarantee  their  stability.  In  this  context,  economic  elites 
may  be  instrumental  in  the  emergence  of  nationalistic  movements,  as  they  elect  to  use  a 
nationalist  rhetoric  to  preserve  control  over  national  resources.  Arguably,  economic  actors 
may  be  behind  the  promotion  of  nationalist  movements.  Their  need  for  stability  finds 
expression  through  a  patriotic  vocabulary  that  is  still  part  of  the  country's  common 
heritage,  following  the  recent  struggle  for  independence. 
As  Celeste  Wallander  explains, 
"Legitimacy,  authority,  and  elite  coalition  building  centered  on  issues  of  nationalism  because  these  ideas 
served  as  focal  points  for  political  competition  and  provided  information  that  both  the  elites  and  the  public 
need  in  order  to  stake  out  political  positions  and  to  offer  policies  that  would  serve  their  interests".  13 
The  redistribution  of  economic  resources  may  then  become  a  catalyst  for  the  mobilisation 
of  the  economic  elite.  But  the  coincidence  between  economic  interests  and  nationalistic 
sentiments  may  be  characteristic  only  of  an  initial  stage  of  nation-building,  when  property 
is  up  for  grabs,  and  the  economic  power  of  the  local  elite  is  not  yet  consolidated. 
At  a  later  stage,  when  political  and  economic  power  has  stratified  and  roles  and 
prerogatives  of  domestic  groups  vis-ä-vis  foreign  groups  have  been  defined,  the  struggle  for 
resources  may  be  fought  using  weapons  other  than  nationalism.  Domestic  economic  actors 
may  then  accept  possibilities  of  "internationalisation",  signalling  their  availability  to 
compete  on  external  markets  and  opening  up  the  domestic  economy  to  foreign  investors. 
Further  research  is  needed  to  show  whether  the  significance  of  the  business  elite  in  national 
movements  and  the  repercussion  of  economic  liberalisation  on  political  agendas  are  a  case 
isolated  to  Ukraine  or  whether  they  have  correspondence  in  other  post-Soviet  states.  The 
13  C.  A.  Wallander  (1996),  "Ideas,  Interests,  and  Institutions  in  Russian  Foreign  Policy",  in  The  Sources  of 
Russian  Foreign  Policy  After  the  Cold  War,  edited  by  C.  A.  Wallander  (Boulder:  Westview),  p.  213 
273 emergence  of  Transnestrian  nationalism  in  the  Republic  of  Moldova,  for  example,  seems  to 
point  to  a  movement  generated  within  the  local  economic  elite  as  an  instrument  to  maintain 
ownership  of  the  region's  assets  against  the  risk  of  a  take-over  from  the  Moldovan  elites.  '4 
There  is,  however,  a  contradiction  between  processes  of  globalisation  and 
internationalisation  going  on  in  the  outside  world  and  the  consolidation  of  a  national  elite 
through  redistribution  of  national  wealth. 
Anthony  Smith  observes  that: 
"With  the  demise  of  the  national  state,  regional-continental  federation  is  the  political  form  that  best  expresses 
and  serves  the  economics  of  the  great  transnational  companies  and  the  societies  of  a  `post-national'  era.  [...  ] 
The  national  state  can  no  longer  serve  the  needs  and  interests  of  business  and  the  market  economy  of 
advanced  capitalism.  [...  ]  The  regional-continental  federation,  which  is  best  suited  to  the  needs  of 
transnational  capitalism  and  as  the  locus  of  sovereignty,  is  especially  appropriate  for  those  populations  who 
share  a  close  historical  bond  and  cultural  heritage".  15 
The  results  of  my  research  dispute  that  countries  like  Ukraine  and  Russia  can  be  considered 
part  of  this  general  trend  of  "post-nationalism",  in  which  political  and  economic  issues 
become  clearly  separated.  In  the  period  between  1994-98,  Ukraine  and  Russia  appeared 
exposed  to  the  contradictory  pressures  of  globalisation  and  internal  consolidation.  Thus, 
while  international  organisations  and  foreign  governments  were  providing  financial  support 
and  technical  assistance  for  the  transition,  they  also  imposed  conditions  for  their  assistance, 
which  contrasted  with  the  interests  of  the  local  elites. 
In  particular,  calls  for  a  larger  participation  by  the  indigenous  elites  in  the  economic 
activities  of  the  country  conflicted  with  the  country's  dependence  on  the  external  economy 
and  the  need  to  initiate  technological  modernisation  through  the  support  of  international 
organisations  and  foreign  governments.  Autarchic  or  rigidly  protectionist  policies  that 
characterised  economic  nationalist  movements  in  the  1970s  were  difficult  to  implement, 
141  owe  this  insight  into  Transnestrian  nationalism  to  Neil  Melvin 
15  A.  D.  Smith  (1995),  Nations  and  Nationalism  in  a  Global  Era,  (Cambridge:  Polity  Press),  p.  117 
274 because  the  state  lacked  the  resources  needed  for  the  restructuring  and  modernisation  of  the 
economic  infrastructure.  This  unbalance  explains  why  Ukrainian  "economic  nationalism" 
had  to  be  selective,  calling  for  protection  against  Russian  competition,  while,  at  the  same 
time,  trying  to  attract  foreign  investments  and  financial  assistance  from  international 
organisations. 
The  failure  of  Russia  and  Ukraine  to  establish  a  close  pattern  of  economic  and  political 
integration  in  the  period  between  1994-98  supports  James  Mayall's  observation  that: 
"When  governments  have  newly  acquired  sovereignty  and/or  are  primarily  concerned  with  their  political  and 
economic  vulnerability,  they  generally  show  a  marked  reluctance  to  create  such  institutions  [supra-national 
institutions  with  the  power  and  authority  to  redistribute  income  within  the  new  entity]".  16 
A  newly  independent  country's  hesitancy  in  joining  schemes  of  international  co-operation 
has  its  roots  in  the  delicate  balance  of  forces  established  within  the  domestic  political  and 
economic  arena. 
16  J.  Mayall  (1990),  Nationalism  and  International  Society,  (Cambridge:  CUP),  p.  94 
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